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Abstract 
      The thesis examines the design and implementation of African regional economic 
cooperation initiatives using the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as comparative case studies. With regards to 
design, it focuses on the international political economy of the shift from the LPA’s 
state-led, inward-looking, collective self-reliance model to NEPAD’s outward 
looking, market-friendly orientations. Pertaining to implementation, it examines the 
domestic political economy of institutionalising compliance with regionally agreed 
policy prescriptions in the absence of an overarching central authority. It focuses on 
the level of implementation of the LPA and the prospects of implementing NEPAD. 
       The thesis pursues two main sets of arguments: First, it argues that African states’ 
common concerns about their vulnerability in the global economy have informed the 
design of a number of ambitious regional initiatives. Within this context, the shift 
from the LPA to the NEPAD has been dictated by changes in global realities and 
circumstances. Second, it argues that individual African governments’ concern with 
vulnerability nationally has been responsible for the low levels of implementation of 
regional economic initiatives. In this regard, the prospects for the sustained 
implementation of regional cooperation initiatives is structured by expectations of 
socio- economic benefits, the cost of compliance to states and the institutions to 
enforce compliance. 
     The study employs neo-liberal and nationalist perspectives of international 
political economy to explain how global realities have dictated Africa’s economic 
cooperation options. To explain African governments’ attitude towards regional 
initiatives, the thesis uses insights from comparative political economy. The thesis 
meanwhile employs insights from institutional economics and rational choice 
institutionalism to highlight the difficulties of institutionalising compliance with 
regional policy prescriptions. 
      To capture the differences in the contexts within which the LPA and the NEPAD 
were crafted and the variations in their orientations, the thesis uses a combination of 
‘historical explanation’ and ‘structured focused comparison’ methodology that allows 
for two separate, but structurally linked accounts of the processes of design and 
implementation of the two initiatives. 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
             A major challenge facing Africa since independence has been to reverse the 
trend of economic decline and global marginalisation. Africa’s overall record of 
economic performance has been disappointing, comparing very unfavourably with 
other regions of the developing world.  Between the 1960s and 2000, Sub-Saharan 
Africa registered absolute decline on virtually all indices of socio-economic 
development.  A key explanation to this has been that Africa attained political 
independence as a fragmented continent, with many small states that offered neither 
large enough internal markets, nor the physical or institutional infrastructure to 
engender industrialization and development. Moreover, like other developing regions, 
Africa was incorporated into the global economy from a disadvantaged position, as 
supplier of raw materials to the industries of the North and as a market for their 
finished goods within the logic of an already established global economic division of 
labour. 
           Against this backdrop, collective action in the form of regional economic 
integration and cooperation has long been identified as a potential strategy for 
restructuring the fragmented African region into a more coherent and viable economic 
space. The perception has been that the numerous obstacles to genuine development 
that individual African countries confront, including the vulnerability of their 
economies to global economic forces could only be overcome through collective 
action.1 Over the years, the continent has formulated a number of ambitious collective 
initiatives. In Africa’s quest for development through concerted action, the Lagos Plan 
                                               
1 See for example, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), “African alternative 
framework to structural adjustment programmes for socio-economic recovery and transformation,” 
E/ECA/CM.15/6ref.3 (Addis Ababa, July 1989); S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa’s 
development: Expectations, reality and challenges (London: Macmillan, 1997); Julius K. Nyerere, 
Non-Aligment in the 1970s (Dar-es-Salam: Government Printers, 1972). 
 
 2 
of Action’s state-led, inward-looking collective self-reliance model of the 1980s and 
the emergent market driven and more pro-liberal New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) appear to be the most ambitious continent-wide initiatives.  
             The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) constituted a watershed in Africa’s regional 
cooperation history in that it was the first genuinely indigenous continent-wide effort 
to forge a comprehensive, unified approach to the continent’s problems of economic 
development. Emerging from perceptions of the continent’s general vulnerability to 
global economic forces, the initiative’s central thrust was that “Africa needed to 
actively strive to reduce its dependence on external nations and to replace this 
dependence with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum 
internal use of the continent’s resources,”2 in what has been described variously as 
“collective self-reliance,” “inward-looking regionalism,” and “delinking.”3 Beginning 
in the early 1980s, the LPA’s collective self-reliance strategy became an axiom of 
Africa’s international relations. It translated into a series of resolutions and treaty 
agreements, creating a myriad of economic cooperation and integration institutions 
across the continent.4  
           Yet, most sub-regional groupings, building blocks of the LPA’s philosophy of 
inward-looking developmental regionalism, have failed in achieving their stated 
                                               
2 Robert S. Brown and R. J. Cummings, The Lagos Plan of Action versus the Berg Report: 
contemporary issues in African economic development, Monograph (Virginia, Lawrenceville: 
Brunswick Publishing Company, 1994): 23. 
 
3 Delinking here does not imply “autarky” which is a severance of all economic relations with the 
outside world. Rather, it implies a deliberate partial disengagement from the dominant relationships 
that prevailed in the international economic system. 
 
4 See Percy S Mistry, “Africa’s record of regional cooperation and integration,” African Affairs 99 
no. 397 (October 2000): 553. 
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goals.5 Many of them have remained little more than paper arrangements as most of 
the agreed policy measures have hardly been implemented by member states. Overall, 
cooperation has remained painfully minimal and integration has not occurred, neither 
has development been engendered. Africa has, therefore, remained vulnerable to 
global economic pulls and initiatives. Africa emerged from the decades of pursuing 
self-reliance as a debtor continent, if anything, more dependent on the North than ever 
before. 
            The demise of the former USSR and the resultant end of the Cold War has 
heralded a new highly liberal world order, and an accelerated process of economic 
globalisation. This has created new opportunities while at the same time posing 
serious threats to global actors, particularly the peripherally integrated and vulnerable 
African economies.6 Against this backdrop, a “new breed” of African statesmen have 
crafted yet another continent-wide plan of action - the NEPAD - aimed not only at 
bringing about the continent’s socio-economic rejuvenation, but also, to negotiate 
Africa’s integration into the global economy as a competitive and equal partner. 
             The NEPAD’s design has been influenced by the awareness that there have 
been attempts in the past to set out continent-wide development programmes but that 
for many reasons, both internal and external, these have been less than successful. It 
has also been influenced by the assumption that there are new circumstances in the 
                                               
5 Jeffrey Fine and Stephen Yeo, “Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dead end or a fresh 
start,” in Ademola Oyejide et al. (eds.), Regional integration and trade liberalisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Vol.1 (London:  Macmillan, 1997). 
 
6 On the impact of the new phase of globalisation see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalisation and its 
discontents (London: Allen Lane, 2002); Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Does 
globalisation make the world more unequal?” NBER Working Paper 8228 (Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2001) accessed at http://www.nber.org/papers/w82228.pdf; Tatah 
Mentan, “Globalisation, democratisation, exploitation, and the state in Africa: the final conquest,” 
Annales de la faculte des sciences juridiques et politiques, de l’ Universite de Dschang, Tom 3 (1999): 
161-170. 
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continent and the global environment that lend themselves to integrated practical 
implementation.7 Three main elements can be identified in distinguishing the 
NEPAD’s approach and strategy from that of previous plans and initiatives in support 
of Africa’s development: 
o First, while earlier initiatives - like the LPA advocated state-led, inward-
looking collective self-reliance or closed regionalism, the NEPAD prescribes 
liberal, market-driven and outward-looking regionalism. It envisions ‘deeper 
integration’ of the continent’s economies into the global economy, however, 
with emphasis on reforming relationships with global economic actors and 
processes (new partnerships).  
 
o Second, unlike the LPA model that blamed the continent’s economic woes 
almost exclusively on external forces, the NEPAD asserts a strong link 
between the lack of accountability and responsiveness of domestic governance 
institutions and processes and Africa’s poor economic performance. 
Accordingly, its central thrust is to try to align African governments’ political 
incentives to long-term development goals through domestic governance 
reforms.8  
 
o Third, the NEPAD has emphasised the centrality of credible regional restraint 
institutions, on the prospects for implementing regionally agreed policy 
prescriptions. In this regard, African governments have pledged to hold each 
other accountable in their conduct of state affairs - within a self-selective and 
self-monitoring regional “lock-in” mechanism, the APRM.  
 
          However, the shift from the traditional state-led and inward-looking thinking 
about Africa’s development to the market driven and outward orientations of the 
NEPAD is in tension with the continent’s reluctance to embrace the global economy.9 
This shift has been seen as an attempt to revive African countries over-dependence on 
the global economic system, against which the LPA’s self-reliance model was 
                                               
7 African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa’s Development - NEPAD (October 2001): 
Chapter 9 paragraph 42. 
 
8 Ibid. chapter 19, paragraph 79. 
 
9 For details on Africa’s suspicions of the global economy, see Jeffrey Herbst, “Africa and the 
international economy,” in Antoinette Handley and Greg Mills (eds.), From Isolation to integration? 
The South African economy in the 1990s (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1996): 62-84; Edmond Keller cited in 
Mengisteab Kidane (ed.), Globalisation and autocentricity in Africa’s development in the twenty first 
century (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1996). 
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formulated.10 This has made the initiative unpopular with many segments of the 
African societies with implications for the prospects of its implementation. More 
importantly, NEPAD’s governance reform agenda, particularly its innovative APRM 
would require that African leaders subject sensitive aspects of domestic economic and 
political governance to external scrutiny. Yet, African governments are known to have 
been very defensive of their sovereign authority since independence.  Therefore, by 
linking the sensitive issue of political sovereignty to Africa’s economic development 
agenda, the architects of the NEPAD have greatly increased the cost of compliance to 
states for its sustained implementation.   
            Africa’s cooperation balance sheet shows that regional cooperation initiatives 
in the continent have been very good at raising hopes and expectations, but have 
remained painfully very short at delivering. Despite Africa’s expression of faith in 
regional economic cooperation and notwithstanding the design of ambitious regional 
initiatives, commitment to implementation has been “more visceral rather than 
rational and more rhetorical than real.”11  Therefore, NEPAD’s promise for a better 
future through greater collective engagement with the global economy and through 
the reform of domestic governance, placed in the context of similar, but unfulfilled 
promises in the past (as in the LPA) gives rise to important questions regarding the 
design and implementation of regional economic initiatives in Africa. 
o First, what explains the shift from the state-led, inward-looking, collective 
self-reliance initiative (LPA) which conformed with the continent’s 
established suspicions towards the liberal global economy, to a market-driven 
and outward-looking partnership (NEPAD) which is evidently in dissonance 
with the attitude of many Africans towards the global economy? 
 
 
 
                                               
10 CODESRIA – TWN – Africa, “Africa’s Development challenges,” Millennium Accra 
Conference Declaration (April 23-26, 2002): 1-4 
 
11 Mistry, “Africa’s record,” p. 554. 
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o Second, given Africa’s record of failed cooperation initiatives, and against the 
backdrop of the NEPAD’s apparent “meddling” in traditionally sensitive 
sovereign issues of governance, what are the prospects and challenges for 
sustained implementation of the initiative? 
 
 
            These are salient research questions particularly in light of the surviving faith 
in regional economic cooperation as a strategy for overcoming Africa’s development 
challenges. This research aims at beginning to answer these questions with the hope 
of improving the understanding of Africa’s age-old economic cooperation and 
development dilemmas. Against the backdrop of NEPAD’s emergence as the most 
important element in Africa’s current development agenda, alongside continued 
expression of faith in the self-reliance prescriptions of the LPA amongst critics of the 
NEPAD, a comparative study of these two initiatives is of particular import. It will 
not only place ongoing debates on the emergent NEPAD into proper perspective, but 
more importantly it will, using hindsight from the LPA’s record, highlight challenges 
to be overcome to increase the prospects for NEPAD’s implementation. The study 
examines the design and implementation of Africa’s regional economic cooperation 
initiatives, using the LPA and the NEPAD as comparative case studies.  
           To analyse the design and orientation of African regional economic initiatives 
the study employs insights from international political economy. It emphasises the 
role of regional economic initiatives as African governments’ survival strategy in the 
context of perceived vulnerabilities to external political and economic forces such as 
great power conflicts and global economic shocks. To analyse the prospects and 
challenges of implementation of regional economic initiatives, the study leans on the 
field of comparative political economy, focusing particularly on the domestic 
(national) political economy of African states, in terms of the interplay between the 
potential long-term gains of regional initiatives and the perceived short-term political 
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costs to African governments. And in light of African governments’ reluctance to 
commit to long-term development goals, the study draws from insights on new 
institutional economics to appraise, first, the role that the reform of domestic 
institutions of governance could play in curtailing African governments’ perceptions 
of political insecurity and in aligning their behaviour to long-term development goals; 
and second, the potential of credible regional restraint mechanisms in ‘locking in’ 
African governments’ commitments to regional agreements. 
           Given the prominence of regional economic cooperation in Africa’s 
development agenda and in light of the fact that, until the NEPAD’s advent the 
approach to African economic cooperation has been state-led and inward-looking, I 
advance two main sets of arguments: 
           First, I argue that African states’ common concern about political and 
economic vulnerability in the global economy have informed the design of many 
ambitious regional economic initiatives in the continent. Within this context, I 
contend that the shift in orientation from the LPA’s state-led inward-looking 
collective self-reliance model, to the NEPAD’s market-friendly, extra-regional 
partnership has been informed by changes in the context and realities of the global 
environment (in terms of the emergence of liberal international “consensus,” the 
ascendancy of asymmetry-based multilateral institutions in global economic 
management and the weakening bargaining position of Africa in ‘North – South’ 
relations).  
       Second, I argue that individual African government’s concerns with political and 
economic vulnerability at home (nationally) have been responsible for the low levels 
of implementation of regional economic cooperation initiatives. Within this context, I 
contend that the prospects for sustained implementation of Africa’s regional 
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cooperation initiatives is structured by governments’ expectations of potential 
benefits, the perceived cost of compliance to governments (in terms of perceptions of 
domestic political insecurity and vulnerability) and the effectiveness of institutions to 
monitor and enforce compliance.  
      The authors of the LPA, influenced by notions of “political voluntarism” of states, 
hinged the prospects for the implementation of the initiative almost exclusively on 
incentives offered by expectations of potential economic benefits to African societies 
and peoples. They overlooked the fact that what constituted socio-economic benefits 
to African societies were not necessarily politically beneficial to African 
governments. The LPA’s authors ignored the possible impact of African 
governments’ perceptions of political insecurity on their willingness to implement the 
prescriptions of the LPA. They also paid inadequate attention to the role of credible 
regional restraint institutions to counter governments’ tendency to free ride and to 
renege on regional commitments. In other words, the LPA’s incentives were not 
compatible with those of politically insecure African governments and therefore, 
compliance was bound to be problematic. 
          Conversely, the NEPAD is anchored on the reasoning that African governments 
do not operate in political vacuums. Rather, the volatile African domestic 
environments and the uncertainties and insecurities they create for African 
governments serve as “lenses” through which African governments view regional 
cooperation initiatives. Therefore, the prospects for NEPAD’s implementation hinge 
on reforming domestic institutions and processes of governance. Governance reforms 
can potentially improve the responsiveness, accountability, and political sensitivity of 
African governments, better aligning their political incentives with commitments to 
long-term development goals, including those defined in regional economic 
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initiatives. Moreover, to “lock in” otherwise unresponsive African governments’ 
commitments to regionally agreed norms and standards of good governance, credible 
regional restraint mechanisms must be established. The NEPAD’s APRM must 
therefore, be central to any assessment of initiative’s prospects. 
         The chapter that follows lays out a framework for examining the validity of the 
foregoing arguments. It also specifies the methodology, data sourcing and data 
analysis techniques, and presents a summary of the organisation of the rest of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
       Since independence, African governments have operated within politically and 
economically difficult national and international environments. Because of African 
countries’ political and economic vulnerabilities, one of the most distinctive features 
of their international relations has been the prominence of issues of survival.12 Issues 
of survival have not only defined African states’ behavioural orientations towards the 
international system, but more importantly, they have shaped the attitude of 
governments towards long-term regional and national development goals.  
      While common concerns about political and economic vulnerability in the global 
economy have informed the design of many ambitious regional economic initiatives, 
individual African governments’ concerns about political and economic vulnerability 
at home have been responsible for the low levels of implementation of these 
initiatives. The design and orientation of the LPA and NEPAD were (in different 
ways) influenced by perceptions of the vulnerability of African economies in the 
global economy. Pertaining to implementation, while the LPA’s unenviable record of 
implementation could be partly explained in terms of African governments’ 
perception of domestic economic and political vulnerabilities, the prospects for 
NEPAD’s sustained implementation are anchored on domestic governance reforms 
that could remove the elements that create perceptions of insecurity for African 
governments and that make them generally unresponsive and unaccountable. 
                                               
      12 See Christopher Clapham (ed.), Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival, 
third edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), particularly chapter 1, “Fragile states 
and the international system.” 
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           The LPA’s character for example, was fashioned from the exploitation that 
Africa had long suffered from its general weakness globally, beginning with the 
devastating slave trade, through colonisation to the continent’s enhanced role as 
supplier of raw materials to the industries of the developed world at independence. 
Understandably, its inward-looking collective self-reliance strategy aimed to curtail 
the continent’s dependence on the industrialised countries of the North and also to 
reduce their vulnerability to global economic fluctuations.  
           On the other hand, the character of the NEPAD has been structured by Africa’s 
worsening economic situation, particularly in terms of the continent’s unsustainable 
debt burden and its increasing marginalisation from global economic processes. 
Against the backdrop of Africa’s financial indebtedness to the industrialised countries 
(and multilateral financial institutions) and their overall weakened position in North-
South power relations, the option of disengagement prescribed by the LPA in the 
early 1980s was not conceivable at the turn of the century. Rather, globalisation has 
come to be seen as providing both the context and the means for the continent’s 
economic rejuvenation.13 It is imagined for example that by abiding by global norms 
of economic and political governance, Africa could hope to negotiate the reduction 
(cancellation) of its debts, attract greater foreign direct investments (FDI) and official 
development assistance (ODA), and greater access of African goods to the markets of 
the developed world. 
          The foregoing arguments highlight the fact that the LPA and the NEPAD were 
crafted under different contexts and differed in their contents and orientations. More 
importantly, it emphasises that the factors informing the design of African regional 
economic initiatives differ from those factors determining their implementation. To 
                                               
13 See AU, NEPAD October 2001, paragraphs 28-34. 
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capture these variations, the study evolves an analytical framework and a causal 
model that addresses issues of regional initiatives’ design while at the same time 
embracing questions relating to implementation.  
 
 1.2 EXPLAINING THE DESIGN OF REGIONAL INITIATIVES  
          Africa’s cooperation and economic development dilemmas have been the focus 
of systematic discourse and analysis over the years giving rise to a vibrant body of 
literature. The literature has been animated by two images of the African state: One 
has presented the African state as a predatory neopatrimonial agent and as an obstacle 
to development;14 the other has portrayed it as a benevolent agent of development, 
concerned mainly with maximizing the welfare of its peoples.15 These images have 
been imbibed in the neo-liberal and state interventionist (nationalist) paradigms that 
have dominated analyses of Africa’s development problems, including efforts at 
regional economic cooperation.   
       Pro-liberal literature consistent with the neo-patrimonial thesis has emphasized 
the need to cut down on the involvement of the African state in economic 
                                               
       14 See variously, Jean-François Bayart, The state in Africa: The politics of the Belly (London: 
Longman, 1993); Thomas Callaghy, “The state as lame leviathan: The patrimonial administrative state 
in Africa,” in E. Zaki (ed.), The African state in transition (London: Macmillan, 1987); Patrick Chabal 
and J. P. Daloz, Africa works: Disorder as political instrument (London: James Currey, 1999); E. 
Amporo-Tuffuor and C.D. Delormey Jr., “The nature, significance and cost of rent-seeking in Ghana,” 
Kyklos Vol. 44 no. 4 (1987): 537-59; Richard Sandbrook, “The state and economic stagnation in 
tropical Africa,” World Development Vol. 14, no. 3 (1986); Mark Gallagher, Rent-seeking and 
economic growth in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Margaret Levi, “A theory of predatory 
rule,” Politics and society 10, 4 (1981): 431-65; also see Peter Evans’ portrait of Mobutu’s Zaire as the 
archetype of the predatory state in Peter Evans, Embedded autonomy: States and industrial 
transformation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1995): 45-47. 
 
       15 This image of the state as an agent of development has been in line with development theories, 
particularly the strand of thought that was propagated in the 1950s and 60s by development economists. 
See for example, Arthur Lewis, The economic theory of growth (London: Allen, Unwin, 1955); 
“Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour,” Manchester School 22/2 (May 1954): 139-
91; Albert O. Hirschman, The strategy of economic development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1958); Dudley Seers “An approach to the short-period analysis of primary-producing economies,” 
Oxford Economic Papers (February, 1959): 1-36; Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of capital formation in 
underdeveloped countries (London: Blackwell, 1953); Walter L. Sharp, “The institutional framework 
for technical assistance,” International Organisation 7, 3 (1953): 342-79. 
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management. It has identified African states’ interventionist and nationalist policies as 
the principal explanation to the continent’s poor economic performance and as a 
partial explanation for the failure of regionalism.16 In its neoclassical liberal economic 
growth version, the Third World’s development predicaments are explained in terms 
of internal macro-economic inadequacies rather than in terms of global economic 
asymmetries and imbalances.17 According to this perspective, any benefits of regional 
economic cooperation/integration must stem from an outward-looking strategy that 
would allow free market forces to dictate the pace and pattern of development. 
      Conversely, pro-nationalist literature, in part influenced by development 
economists’ view of the state as the principal agent of development and concerned 
about maximising the welfare of society, has emphasised the need for the state to act 
as the principal economic manager in Africa’s development agenda. Moreover, it has 
tended to blame Africa’s economic failures on the continent’s exposure to external 
economic forces. Analyses informed by the pro-nationalist perspective, particularly 
the dependency thesis, have blamed the Third World’s development predicaments on 
the imbalances that have characterised their relationship with the developed world.18   
                                               
       16 See for example, World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for 
Action (Washington DC: World Bank, 1981); Robert Bates, Markets and states in tropical Africa: The 
political basis of agricultural policies (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981); 
Faezeh Foroutan, “Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past experience and future prospects,” 
in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya  (eds.), New dimensions in regional integration  (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1993). 
 
17 See variously, P. T. Bauer, Reality and rhetoric: Studies in the economics of development 
(London: Weidenfeild and Nicolson, 1984); Deepak Lal, The poverty of development economics 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985); Harry Johnson, “A word to the Third World: A 
Western economist’s frank advice,” Encounter, Vol. 37 (1971); Ian Little, Economic development: 
Theories, policies and international relations (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 
 
18 See for example: Samir Amin, “Underdevelopment and dependency in black Africa: origins and 
contemporary forms,” Journal of modern African studies 10, 4 (1972): 503-24; Accumulation on a 
world scale (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Walter Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped 
Africa (London: Bogle L’ouverture, 1972); Unequal development (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1973); 
Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal exchange: a study of the imperialism of trade (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1969); F. H. Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and development in Latin America 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1979); G. Kay, Development and 
underdevelopment: a Marxist analysis (London: Macmillan, 1975); G. Palma, “Dependency: A formal 
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       Throughout much of the 1970s and 80s, most developing countries (including 
those in Africa) accepted this dependency analysis that ascribed their 
underdevelopment to the workings of the international economic system rather than to 
indigenous characteristics of their own societies.19 Regional cooperation and 
integration were perceived as frameworks for Third World countries to manage their 
negotiated interdependencies, while challenging domination by the industrialised 
countries of the North.20 They have therefore stressed closed and inward-looking 
approaches to cooperation as a survival strategy against the exploitative relationship 
with the North. Overall, this literature has argued that the global economic system 
posed a threat to the small, fragmented and unviable individual African economies. 
The perception that the global system was a threat to African economies constituted 
the official rationale for crafting regional economic cooperation initiatives, including 
the self-reliant model of the LPA. 
      In the late 70s and early 80s, the dichotomy between the pro-liberal and the pro-
nationalist theses was very rigid. While African governments and technocrats 
emphasised the primacy of the African state in economic management, international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and western governments stressed the exclusive role of the 
market in economic development and perceived the state mainly as an obstacle that 
had to be eliminated. By the 1990s however, this divide had narrowed considerably. 
And although the liberal thesis appeared to have triumphed over the nationalist thesis, 
a consensus emerged that well governed states had an important role to play in 
                                                                                                                                      
theory of underdevelopment or a methodology for analysis of concrete situations of 
underdevelopment?” World Development, Vol. 6. (1978); Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and 
underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1967). 
 
19 See, Stephen Krasner, Structural conflict: the Third World against global liberalism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
 
20 Samir Amin, “Regionalisation in the Third World – in response to the challenges of polarising 
globalisation,” Mimeo (1998). 
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facilitating market-driven economic liberalism. It is within the context of the 
triumphant liberal economic agenda, which is more tolerant of good political and 
economic governance that the NEPAD emerged.  
        Although the liberal and nationalist paradigms have both been criticised for 
being too ‘economistic,’ they have remained useful tools for explaining the role of the 
international environment, history and external transformations in defining Africa’s 
economic cooperation options. They allow for an appraisal of the economic 
opportunities and constraints for African states within the international system - 
including explanations of how global transformations have dictated the continent’s 
economic cooperation orientations over the years.  Within this context, I employ these 
paradigms to address the research question bearing on the shift in the design of 
African regional economic initiatives from the LPA to the NEPAD.  
      However, to place this shift in proper perspective, a causal model informed by an 
international political economy perspective helps clarify relationships between a 
select set of independent and dependent variables. The model is summarized in Figure 
1. In it, the dependent variable is to the right while the independent variables are to 
the left. The arrows show the direction of the relationship between the variables. More 
precisely, the dependent variable is the “design of regional initiatives” i.e., the LPA 
state-led, inward-looking collective self-reliance model (closed regionalism) or the 
NEPAD market driven, extra-regional partnership (open regionalism). Three clusters 
of independent variables are identified as possible explanations for the choice of one 
or the other of the two designs of initiatives: (1) the realities and context of the 
international political economy (greater role for “equality enhancing” multilateral 
institutions or greater role for “asymmetry enhancing” multilateral institutions); (2) 
the dominant international economic and development ideas  (protectionist 
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nationalism or global liberal consensus); (3) the nature of North-South relations 
(South in a position of relative strength or South in a position of relative dependence).   
         These independent variables are mediated by intervening variables in the form 
of diplomatic and political processes involving African states and African institutions 
in what we have tagged international processes. For example, Nigeria as a lead state 
in continental politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s played an important role in 
defining the continent’s response to global politico-economic transformations of the 
1970s, culminating in the LPA. Similarly, the emergence of a non-racial South Africa, 
with an economic and political system anchored on liberal principles and the re-
emergence of Nigeria from years of military rule, converged to provide a new 
direction to the continent in response to new global forces – culminating in the 
NEPAD.  
 
 
Realities and context of global political  
economy: 
Greater role of ‘equality enhancing’  
multilateral institutions vs. ‘asymmetry  
enhancing’ multilateral institutions 
Dominant international economic and   
development ideas :   
Protectionist nationalsim vs  global liberal 
‘consensus’ 
Nature of North - South relations: 
South in position of relative strength  
vs. weakness 
Design of regional initiatives: 
state led, inward looking collective  
self - reliance (LPA) vs. market  
driven, outward - looking partnership  
(NEPAD) 
International 
processes 
involving 
African 
states 
Figure 1 — Overview of causal framework for first research question. 
 
          To capture the different contexts within which the LPA and the NEPAD were 
crafted and the resultant differences in their contents/orientations, I adopt a 
“structured focused comparison” methodology, which requires that I give two 
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separate but structurally linked accounts of the processes involved in the design of the 
two initiatives.21 Accordingly, the causal diagram addressing the question of design of 
regional initiatives has been further split into two sub-diagrams presented in Figures 
1a and 1b below.  
     Figure 1a shows the values of the independent variables in the late 1970s that are 
assumed to have informed the design of the LPA’s inward-looking collective self-
reliance model (dependent variable). This period was defined by the prevalence of the 
Northern dominated Post-WWII global institutions of trade and finance – GATT, IMF 
and IBRD. However, the power of these institutions was mediated by the political role 
of global multilateral institutions, particularly the UN-General Assembly and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Finance (UNCTAD), which gave both 
developing and developed countries equal voting rights. Developing countries used 
their bonds of solidarity and their numerical strength in these “equality based” 
institutions to advance agendas of particular interest to them. One of such agendas 
was the NIEO campaign, whose failure obliged developing countries to seek for 
alternative development strategies, which for Africa was the design of the LPA’s 
inward-looking collective self-reliance model. 
                                               
21 For details, see section on methodology below. 
 18 
Realities and context of global political 
economy:
Greater role of ‘equality enhancing’ 
multilateral institutions in global 
economic management .
Dominant international  economic and 
development ideas:
Prevalence of protectionist/interventionist 
development ideas (development economics 
/dependency thesis)
Nature of  North -South relations:
South in position of relative strength 
due to Cold War,  commodity
cartels  (OPEC) act ion and NAM
Design of regional initiatives:
State led, inward-looking 
collective self-reliance (LPA)
Figure 1a — Overview of causal framework for f irst  research question,  late 1970s
 
 
       Pertaining to economic and development ideas, in the late 70s, the global system 
offered developing countries alternative political and economic models to choose 
from. Economically, they could adopt either liberal capitalism or variants of planned 
economic management. Politically, they could adopt either Western-styled political 
pluralism or any variant of communist or socialist organisation. However, with the 
prominence of dependency ideas that emphasised the exploitative nature of the global 
system, African governments opted for inward-looking developmental regionalism, 
epitomised by the LPA model.  
       Regarding North South relations, although Africa has always been the weaker 
partner in its dealings with the North, it was in a relatively more powerful position in 
the 1970s. This was as a result of the combined effects of the Cold War environment, 
the strong bonds of solidarity amongst Third World countries under the auspices of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the inspiration derived from the success of 
the Third World dominated OPEC cartel’s concerted action against the North’s 
domination of the global economy. This conspired to encourage African states to 
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design the LPA’s inward-looking model, which in a way was a challenge to the global 
economic order.     
        Figure 1b on the other hand, shows the changes in the values of the independent 
variables that are thought to have brought about the change in design from the LPA’s 
model, to the NEPAD’s. Beginning in the late 1980s, the approaches to global 
economic issues witnessed a sea change. The influence of “equality-based” United 
Nations multilateral institutions in global economic management dwindled in favour 
of the “asymmetry-based” institutions of finance and trade – IMF, WB and WTO. 
Decision-making in these institutions (with the exception of the WTO) that now had 
near total control over global economic management was increasingly premised on 
“quota based” voting, that greatly enhance the position of the countries of the North 
while further weakening that of the countries of the South. This obliged the continent 
to formulate an initiative that would meet the basic requirements of these new global 
realities - NEPAD. 
 
Realities and context of global political 
economy:
Increasing importance of ‘asymmetry 
enhancing’ multilateral institutions in 
global economic management
Dominant international economic 
and development ideas:
Emergence of liberal international
‘consensus’ (political and economic)
Nature of North -South relations:
South in position of relative weakness 
due to debt crisis/aid dependence and
end of the Cold War
Design of regional initiatives:
Market driven, extra -regional 
partnership (NEPAD)
Figure 1b— Overview of causal framework for first research question,  1990s-present
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       Pertaining to economic and development ideas, in the late 1980s, with the failure 
of the Soviet economic and political models, there emerged global consensus over the 
viability of liberal economic and political liberalism. The acceleration of economic 
globalisation, which placed the market over and above the state, amplified this 
situation. Within this context, African governments had little choice but to design an 
initiative that was market-oriented and open to the global economy – hence, the 
NEPAD. 
        In North-South relations, beginning in the late 1980s, Africa’s power position in 
her intercourse with the North was greatly weakened by the demise of the Cold War, 
the weakening of South-South solidarity and more importantly, by the onset of the 
debt crisis that deepened the continent’s dependence on the good-will of the 
industrialised North. Against this background, the continent could not afford an LPA-
type initiative that challenged the existing order. Rather, Africans had to craft an 
initiative that would attract the sympathy of the North – hence the NEPAD. 
 
1.3 EXPLAINING IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL INITIATIVES 
          While the liberal and nationalist paradigms of international political economy 
provide useful explanations to the design of African regional economic initiatives, 
they fail to capture important underlying internal political dynamics regarding the 
attitude of African governments towards long-term development goals, including 
those defined in regional economic initiatives.  
            To capture these dynamics and to extend the understanding of the sources of 
African regional economic cooperation beyond conventional liberal and nationalist 
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analysis, I employ a comparative political economy framework.22 More importantly, 
the study uses insights from new institutional economics and rational choice 
institutionalism to integrate competing visions of the African state - as a predator by 
the neopatrimonial thesis, and as a benevolent maximiser of welfare by the 
development economist. Proceeding from the premise that African governments are 
not benevolent maximisers of social welfare, I employ the new institutional 
economics framework to analyse the potential of the reform of domestic institutions 
of governance to align African governments’ behaviour to long-term development 
goals. And proceeding from the premise that African states are not condemned to 
being permanent predators, the framework allows me to analyse the role that a 
capable state can play in the development process in Africa, including region 
building.23 
      As emphasised earlier, while the design of African regional economic cooperation 
initiatives has been dictated by African governments’ perceptions about the structures 
and workings of the international economic system and how to survive in it, 
implementation has been largely a product of African governments’ perceptions about 
the potential political gains and costs of compliance with the prescriptions of these 
initiatives. Rational choice institutionalism posits that although individuals or groups 
involved in cooperation may expect gains from their cooperative behaviour, however, 
they usually face various types of incentive problems that make them vulnerable to 
                                               
        22 For the distinction between international political economy (IPA) and national political 
economy (DPI), see Michael Nicholson, “The global political economy,” in Nicholson Micheal (ed.), 
International relations: A concise introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002): 121. 
 
        23 On the role of the state in the development process, see variously Alence, “Political 
institutions;” Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa,” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 25 (October 2004): 289-313; Peter Evans, Embedded autonomy: States and 
industrial transformation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995): chapter 3. 
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short-term temptations to defect from cooperation.24 Meanwhile, related literature on 
transactions costs and institutions emphasises that while parties may have strong 
incentives to strike bargains, their incentives after the fact are not always compatible 
with maintaining the agreements. Compliance is therefore, always a potential 
problem.25 
       In the theoretical literature, reputation emerges as an important factor in limiting 
governments’ incentive to renege on commitments. This approach has been 
formalised in models of modern games theory – where it is held that the “long arm of 
the future” provides incentives to honour commitments to agreements today, so as to 
retain the opportunity for further cooperation tomorrow.  In many repeated games, 
this incentive alone (the shadow of the future) can be sufficient to prevent reneging.26 
However, in some instances, repeat play alone may be insufficient to police reneging. 
        An important context in which repeat play alone is insufficient to police 
repudiation concerns variations in governments’ time preferences or discount rate.27 
Generally, when political survival is at stake, or when future benefits are less valuable 
and uncertain, governments would heavily discount the future, making one-time gain 
of reneging more attractive relative to future opportunities forgone.28 The general 
                                               
24 Barry Weingast, “Rational choice institutionalism,” Discussion draft paper (Stanford: Stanford 
University, 2000): 23; also see Pranab Bardhan, “The new institutional economics and development 
theory: A brief critical assessment,” World Development 17, 9 (1989). 
 
25 Oliver Williamson, Economic institutions of capitalism (New York, 1985): 48-49; Douglas 
North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing 
public choice in seventeenth-century England,” The Journal of Economic History Vol. 49, no. 4 
(December 1989): 806.  
 
26 North and Weingast, “Constitutions and commitments,” p. 807. 
 
27 Ibid; B. Ames, Political survival: Politicians and public policy in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1987); P. M. Levis, Of rule and revenue (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1988): 32-33; Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Risk, rule, and reason in Africa,” African 
Economic Policy Discussion Paper No. 46 (Washington DC: USAID Bureau for Africa, 2000): 2-3. 
 
28 North and Weingast, “Constitutions and commitments,” p. 907.  
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conclusion of rational choice institutionalism is therefore, that institutions often arise 
or persist in part to create self-enforcing cooperation in such environments.29 In other 
words, institutions are necessary to extract compliance from actors facing incentives 
that are not compatible with those defined in a cooperative framework. 
        Literature on neo-patrimonialism has argued that African countries domestic 
economic and political vulnerability created by persistent economic decline and 
failure, and more especially, the inability of governments to establish consensus 
enhancing domestic political institutions have made concerns about domestic political 
survival paramount. Politics in Africa has generally been a zero-sum game with a 
discouraging history of violent political change. This together with the fate that has 
befallen many African leaders after they are forced out of power (assassinations in 
military coups, exiles, imprisonments and house arrests) has increased African 
governments resolve to maximise their gains under what they perceive as conditions 
of perennial political uncertainty.30  
       This has provided the lens through which African governments have viewed 
collective regional economic initiatives over the years. Arguably, because African 
governments have often been politically and economically insecure domestically, they 
have been especially sensitive about regional initiatives that could antagonise 
politically threatening domestic groups and constituencies – in terms especially of 
possible redistribution of costs and benefits of economic cooperation. They have been 
more preoccupied with placating the specific groups most pivotal to their survival and 
have generally been predisposed to giving high priority to the short-term interests of 
                                               
29 Weingast, “Rational choice,” p. 31; Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. 
Weingast, “The role of institutions in the revival of trade, Part I: The Medieval Law Merchant,” 
mimeo. (Hoover Institution: Stanford University, 1989). 
 
       30 See for example, Goldsmith, “risk in Africa,” pp. 3-6. 
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narrow constituencies, at the expense of longer-term social welfare including such 
welfare that could derive from regional economic cooperation.31 Overall, African 
governments’ assessments of regional economic initiatives has been that they can only 
offer long-term benefits - which are most of the time unsure in the context of 
immediate political and economic realities that they face.  
         Under such circumstances, the success of African regional economic 
cooperation initiatives is more likely if the elements that create political insecurity, 
unresponsiveness and unaccountability amongst African governments are removed. 
An important insight is that establishing responsive and accountable domestic 
governance institutions and processes is likely to curtail perceptions of political 
insecurity amongst African governments, while at the same time resolving the related 
time horizon problems. Lowering perceptions of political insecurity and aligning 
African governments’ political incentives with the requirements of long term socio-
economic development is more likely to encourage African governments to make 
more credible and sustained commitments to regional economic cooperation 
initiatives. However, to establish and sustain responsive domestic institutions amongst 
politically insecure African governments and to “lock in” their commitment to long-
term development goals, credible regional restraint mechanisms are needed. 
          The authors of Africa’s earlier regional initiatives, especially the LPA’s self-
reliant model, discounted the likely impact of Africa’s domestic political 
environments on the ability of their governments to uphold the prescriptions of the 
initiatives. They were influenced by assumptions of ‘political voluntarism’ promoted 
by development economists in the 1950s and 1960s – assumptions that governments 
act as benevolent “maximisers” of the social welfare of their populations, otherwise in 
                                               
31 Ibid; Rod Alence, “Political institutions and developmental governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no.2 (June 2004): 163-187 
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political vacuums. Understandably, the LPA’s self-reliant model was crafted with the 
understanding that if policies could be shown to be economically rewarding (welfare 
enhancing), African governments could be relied upon to implement them faithfully. 
Little emphasis was placed on reforming dysfunctional domestic institutions of 
governance and establishing credible regional restraint mechanisms to monitor and 
enforce compliance with collectively agreed programmes. 
         Neoclassical political economists have argued that real governments’ behaviours 
are not in line with these benevolent assumptions of development economists. Rather, 
they have emphasised that governments respond to political incentives that may or 
may not be compatible with achieving long-term development objectives – including 
those outlined in regional cooperation schemes. The experience with the collective 
self-reliance model of the LPA in terms of the gap between African governments’ 
stated objectives and concrete achievements, demonstrates that the assumptions of 
political voluntarism were faulty.  African governments were found to renege on 
regional commitments in response to short-term domestic political and economic 
survival concerns, and other related domestic pressures.  
      Recognising that African governments do not operate in political vacuums, the 
NEPAD has identified domestic governance reforms as a precondition for the 
continent’s socio-economic development. The NEPAD implicitly assumes that 
African governments’ political insecurity, unresponsiveness and unaccountability 
have stemmed largely from poor economic and political governance – that is, the lack 
of institutional arrangements to define and sustain relations between the governed and 
the governors to the satisfaction of both parties. In this regard, the over-centralisation 
of power in the continent and its arbitrary exercise particularly through widely 
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reported neopatrimonial practices are symptoms of state weakness in politically 
insecure environments.32   
         By seeking to reform domestic governance, the NEPAD aims at strengthening 
the African state.33 While governance reforms potentially, could yield developmental 
dividends for the continent, the prospects of achieving compliance with such a reform 
agenda remain constricted. The question arises as to how self-interested African 
governments could effectively restrain themselves from temptations to renege on 
regionally agreed norms and standards of good governance. Simply put, how can 
African governments widely criticised for poor governance institutionalise 
compliance with NEPAD’s governance prescriptions? 
            The NEPAD’s response to this puzzle has been in the establishment of a self-
selective “lock-in instrument” - the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).  Yet, 
the APRM is not an overarching central authority. It is founded on a plausible model 
of self-restraint by still perceivably unresponsive and politically insecure African 
governments. While proponents of the APRM have been very optimistic about the 
model, projecting it as the most innovative element upon which the implementation 
of the NEPAD hinges, they have failed to address problems of incentive 
incompatibility.34 Conversely, pessimists have been quick at dismissing the 
instrument as yet another misguided effort that simply cannot work, citing difficulties 
                                               
    32 Alence, “Political institutions,” p. 167; Evans, Embedded Autonomy, chapter 3; Thomas. M. 
Callaghy, “The state as lame leviathan: The patrimonial administrative state in Africa,” in Z. Ergas 
(ed.) The African state in transition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987): 87-116; A. Zolberg, “The 
structure of political conflict in the new states of tropical Africa,” American Political Science Review 
62, 1 (1968): 70-87.  
 
    33 On the diagnoses of the weaknesses of the African state, see World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
from crisis to sustainable growth: A long-term perspective study (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989). 
 
     34 On the perception that the APRM is the most innovative element of the NEPAD, see UNECA, 
“The African Peer Review Mechanism: Process and procedures,” in African Security Review, Vol. 11, 
no. 4 (2002): 7; G8, “G8 Africa Action Plan,” paragraph 7;” Grant Edward Thomas Masterson, 
“Governance quality and government commitment to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism,” 
EISA Research Report no. 5 (Johannesburg: Auckland Park, 2004): 8. 
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of institutionalizing compliance in the absence of an overarching central authority. 
Against this background, understanding the incentive problems plaguing the APRM 
must be central to any assessment of the NEPAD’s prospects. 
           In a similar vein, some literature highlights the limits of internal institutions of 
restraint and accordingly stresses the need for external restraints mechanisms as a 
more dependable way of aligning African governments’ behaviour with economic 
and political governance standards.35 The LPA did not provide for an external 
restraint mechanism as evidenced in the confrontation between its prescriptions and 
the diagnoses of the World Bank sponsored Berg Report.36 However, the NEPAD 
implicitly provides for an external restraint (anchor), within the ambit of the link 
between adherence to the NEPAD’s peer review mechanism (APRM) and prospects 
for greater external resource flows – in the form of market access, debt relief, ODA 
flows and greater FDI. 
            To place the foregoing arguments on the implementation of African economic 
cooperation initiatives into perspective, this study has developed a causal model 
showing the relationship between a select set of independent and dependent variables. 
In the causal model, the main independent variable has been identified as the “design 
of regional initiatives” i.e., either inward-looking or outward-looking regional 
schemes, which through the influence of a number of intervening variables, is 
                                               
35 Paul Collier, “Africa’s external economic relations: 1960 – 1990,” African Affairs 90 (1991): 
339-34; Paul Collier and J. Willem Gunning, “Why has Africa grown slowly?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 13, 3 (1999): 41-66; Larry Diamond, “Promoting real reform in Africa,” in E. Gyimah-
Boadi (ed.), Democratic reform in Africa: The quality of progress (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publisher, 2004): 263-295. 
 
        36 The World Bank’s sponsored Berg Report heralded structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
in the continent, with a wide-range of conditionality norms that initially focused on correcting balance 
of payment difficulties in African economies. However, these conditionality norms subsequently 
broadened to cover more general economic management issues and even political governance 
questions. 
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expected to affect the level or prospects for sustained implementation of cooperative 
initiatives.  
             For example, designed regional initiatives (independent variable - either the 
LPA self reliance model or the NEPAD extra-regional model) potentially, offer 
certain benefits to states, and the scale of these benefits is expected to determine 
whether or not states would comply with the initiatives’ prescriptions. However, 
adherence to each regional initiative carries some costs, which are expected to be 
lower in comparison to the envisaged gains, to be able to serve as incentives for states 
to be supportive (or otherwise) of the initiative. Lastly, the existence and 
effectiveness of institutional mechanisms (or lack of same) for the enforcement of the 
prescriptions of regional initiatives is expected to serve as an incentive or a 
disincentive for states to abide by the rules of regional initiatives, and therefore, 
determine the level of (or prospects for) sustained implementation. These causal 
relationships are summarized in figure 2 below. 
D e s i g n  o f
r e g i o n a l
ini t iat ives
Potent ia l  soc io  -
e c o n o m i c  b e n e f i t s
C o s t s  o f  
c o m p l i a n c e
to  s tates
Inst i tut ions  to  
m o n i t o r  a n d  e n f o r c e
c o m p l i a n c e
Incent ives
for  s ta tes
t o  c o m p l y
D e g r e e  o f
(or  prospec t s  for )
sus ta ined
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
Figure  2 — C h a l l e n g e s  o f  s u s t a i n e d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n i t ia t ives
 
           The study gives two separate but structurally linked accounts of the level or 
prospects of implementation of the two initiatives under study. In Figure 2 above, 
with respect to the LPA, the dependent variable is the degree of sustained 
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implementation of the LPA. With respect to the NEPAD, the dependent variable 
becomes the prospects for sustained implementation. However, the intervening 
variables remain the same in the two cases (potential benefits, perceived cost of 
compliance to states, and institutions to enforce compliance). This is so because, 
while the LPA timeframe has elapsed, allowing for an appraisal of the level of 
implementation, the NEPAD is an ongoing process and therefore, only allows for an 
assessment of the prospects for sustained implementation. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
            The analytical framework and its associated causal models are couched within 
the twin logic of “historical explanation” and “structured focused comparison.” 
Historical explanations, in the words of Alexander George, may involve process 
tracing to identify the intervening steps or cause-effect links between an independent 
variable and the value of the dependent variable.37 A comparison of two or more 
cases is “focused” insofar as the investigator deals selectively with only those aspects 
of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data 
requirements of the study.38  
             In this approach, the study proceeds by giving two separate but structurally 
linked accounts of the processes of the design and the level or prospects of 
implementation of the LPA and the NEPAD, using the same “causal framework.”39 
Ultimately, the study identifies and holds changes in the values of the independent 
variable(s) as explanations to the shift in design and as accounting for the 
                                               
37 Alexander George, “Case studies and theory development,” Unpublished Draft Paper presented 
to the Department of Political Science (Stanford: Stanford University, 1996): 11 
 
38 Ibid. p. 15. 
 
       39 See our causal diagram, figures 1 & 2 showing the identified common independent variables. 
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level/prospects of implementation.40 It is noteworthy that expected changes in the 
values of the independent variables are not mutually exclusive (i.e., if the value of 
one or more of the variables remains constant, while the other(s) change, this will not 
prevent the study from holding the variable(s) whose value has changed as an 
explanation for the shift in the design or the level of implementation). 
           With regard to the design of regional initiatives, the study begins with an 
account of the context and processes leading up to the adoption of the LPA. It 
highlights the prevailing international political economic environment in the late 
1970s, within which calls for a new international economic order (NIEO) were 
formulated and the failure of which culminated in establishment of the OAU-ECA led 
Lagos Plan of Action. The study attempts to reconstruct the negotiations between the 
OAU-ECA technocrats and African state leaders in evolving the LPA self-reliance 
model. It also examines the envisioned relationship between the LPA and sub-
regional economic groupings, including the agenda for a continental economic space, 
epitomised by the Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC. It then gives a brief overview 
of the advent of Structural Adjustment Programs in the 1980s, the divergence of their 
prescriptions from those of the LPA and how this impacted on implementation of the 
LPA. 
            Proceeding from the poor performance of the LPA’s collective self-reliance 
strategy, the advent of a debt crisis, the move toward an international liberal 
consensus and the emergence of a new phase of globalisation, we attempt to trace the 
origins and the evolution of the ideas and processes that led up to the adoption of the 
economic partnership initiative embodied in the NEPAD. The study traces the 
processes by which, “a new breed” of African leaders (the African Renaissance, the 
                                               
       40 See our causal diagram, figures 1a and 1b showing the possible changes in the values of the 
independent variables. 
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Millennium African Plan - MAP of Thabo Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika; and the 
Omega Plan of Abdoulaye Wade), evolved into a concrete policy framework for the 
development of the African continent (NAI, later NEPAD).  
            The process tracing is in two main areas: First, the study gives an account of 
bargaining and negotiations amongst African leaders and with existing inter-African 
institutions (the OAU and the ECA) to arrive at an agreement over the policy shift 
contained in the NEPAD (i.e., inter-African diplomacy and politics involved in the 
establishment of the NEPAD partnership). Second, it gives an account of negotiations 
between the African promoters of the NEPAD and the international community – 
foreign governments, international financial institutions, international regimes and 
international non-governmental institutions, to whip up the support for the partnership 
inscribed in the NEPAD program.  
         With regard to implementation, the study first appraises the level of 
implementation of the LPA’s self-reliance model, focusing especially on the interplay 
between the potential long-term benefits of the initiative and short-term costs for 
politically and economically insecure African governments. This is followed by an 
analysis of the role credible regional institutions could play in such an environment 
and how their absence, contributed to the poor record of the collective self-reliance 
model. Proceeding from the evidence of the poor record of LPA, the study examines 
the changes in the cost benefit calculus introduced by the NEPAD and how this could 
affect implementation. We focus especially on the NEPAD good governance agenda 
and its “self-selective” enforcement and monitoring mechanism, the APRM. 
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1.5 DATA SOURCING AND DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
          To meet the requirements of process tracing, the data collection techniques 
included archival library search and unstructured personal interviews. The study 
made extensive use of secondary sources: books; monographs; journal articles and 
magazines; official circulars and publications by relevant government departments. 
Internet searches also constituted a valuable source of data for this study, including 
conference and seminar proceedings.  Particular attention was paid to speeches and 
declarations by key political elites (past and present) involved in efforts at inter-
African cooperation. Materials and documentation were also sourced from the offices 
of international bodies, particularly the OAU-AEC secretariat, the headquarters of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and offices of sub-
regional economic Communities. However, the bulk of the data was readily available 
within South Africa. In this regard, the NEPAD secretariat in the Midrand was very 
central.  
         Interviews were conducted with some South African based officials of the 
core/leading states in the NEPAD process (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt and 
Algeria). I interviewed high-level officials from the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs and from the Embassies of the Republics of Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt 
and Tunisia. This was supplemented by interviews with officials from embassies of 
countries that were less involved in NEPAD’s development, for example Libya for 
the Maghreb region; Cameroon for the Central African region; Zimbabwe for the 
Southern African region; Ethiopia for the Eastern African region and Ivory Coast for 
the West African Region. I also interviewed official representatives of industrialised 
countries of the North (Europe, Asia and America), international financial institutions 
(World Bank/IMF) and other related bodies in South Africa. 
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           Although I faced some difficulties convincing the identified resource persons 
in the various embassies and related institutions to accept been interviewed, overall, I 
succeeded in getting a majority of them to discuss with me. In some instances 
however, I was unable to talk to high-level personalities, who were directly involved 
in the NEPAD process. Nevertheless, the close collaborators they designated to speak 
on their behalf gave me the necessary insights. During some of the interviews, the 
interviewees were evasive to what they perceived as politically sensitive questions. 
However, I convinced some of them to address sensitive issues off record. 
           The data gathered from these interviews was used in analysing and interpreting 
the processes and interests involved in negotiating the shift from the closed 
regionalism of the LPA to the extra-regional partnership of the NEPAD. For example, 
it gave useful insights into how the merger of the Omega Plan and the MAP was 
worked out. It was also useful in analysing the roles of African institutions such as the 
OAU/AU, the ECA and the ADB in the processes leading to the establishment of the 
NEPAD. More importantly, the data was helpful in analysing the negotiations 
between the African leaders of the NEPAD and their external partners (IMF/World 
Bank, the European Union/the G8, and individual industrialised countries of the 
North). In a nutshell, the data from our interviews was instrumental in answering our 
first research question and also to partially address our second research question, at 
least from the perspective of the architects of the NEPAD. 
            Data from the NEPAD secretariat/website; conference and seminar 
proceedings; and speeches/declarations by statesmen and important members of civil 
society, was used in conjunction with the elite interviews to explain the process of the 
transition from the LPA to the NEPAD. It was also useful in highlighting efforts at 
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popularising NEPAD and by so doing, bringing to the fore the latent and manifest 
challenges for the sustained implementation of the initiative  
             Archival library search consisted of sourcing for data from books, journals, 
newspapers, classified documents bearing on regional organizations like the OAU 
and various regional economic communities (RECs), the UN-ECA, the IMF/World 
Bank reports etc. Data from these sources was used to reconstruct the history of past 
initiatives at cooperation for African development, bringing out their orientation to 
the global economy. This data was particularly useful in giving an account of the 
processes and circumstances that led to the formulation of the LPA self-reliance 
initiative in the 1980s. It was also used to explain the advent of Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) and their implications for the implementation of the LPA. These 
sources provided data on both specific and general aspects of cooperation, which was 
used to bring out the structural and philosophical differences between the closed 
(inward-looking) regionalism prescribed by the LPA and open (outward-looking) 
regionalism advocated by the NEPAD.      
 
1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
            In line with the “structured focused comparison” and the “process tracing” 
approaches adopted in this research, the thesis is organised into two structurally 
linked sections of three chapters each. The first section focuses on the state-led, self-
reliance model of the LPA. It examines the context, design and level of 
implementation of the LPA. The second section, which is informed and structured by 
the first, focuses on the market-friendly, partnership prescriptions of the NEPAD. It 
examines the context, design and prospects of implementation of the NEPAD. The 
entire thesis is composed of seven substantive chapters – plus an introduction and 
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conclusion. The introduction and chapter one have been presented above. The rest of 
the thesis is organised as follows: 
 
PART I: THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION: THE STATE-LED COLLECTIVE 
SELF RELIANCE MODEL 
 
Chapter Two:  African Economic Regionalism: An Overview of the Pre-Lagos Plan of 
Action regional initiatives. 
 
            This chapter locates efforts at regional cooperation and integration in Africa in 
their historical context to clarify the dynamics of region building in the continent. The 
chapter focuses on efforts at evolving regional economic cooperation arrangements 
prior to the advent of the LPA. It appraises the various factors that have informed 
region-building processes in the continent – particularly in the immediate post 
independence years.  The chapter also examines the level of attainment of the stated 
goals of these earlier initiatives and how this influenced the region building enterprise 
in the continent in the following decades. 
Chapter Three: The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA): From Economic Extroversion to 
inward-looking collective self-reliance 
 
            This chapter examines the rethinking of Africa’s development cooperation 
options in the late 1970s and early 1980s that were informed by perceptions of the 
inadequacies of the strategies of extroversion adopted in the immediate post 
independence years. It has a three-pronged thrust: First, it examines the context 
within which the Lagos Plan of Action was formulated; second, it attempts a 
reconstruction of the diplomatic processes leading up to the adoption of the LPA; and 
third, it analyses the content and logics of the LPA, focusing on its regional bent and 
its overall orientation to the global economy in prescribing partial disengagement 
from the system. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: From Lagos to Abuja: the political economy of collective self –
reliance 
 
      This chapter presents a political economy perspective of the weak implementation 
of the LPA’s self-reliance model as a prelude to comprehending the new orientations 
contained in the NEPAD. Specifically, it investigates reasons why despite the 
potential socio-economic benefits of the LPA’s self-reliance model, African 
governments were unwilling to uphold its prescriptions.  
     The chapter focuses on two broad dimensions of the poor implementation of the 
LPA.  First, it examines the interplay between the long-term socio-economic benefits 
of the LPA and African governments’ perceptions of political insecurity that made 
them vulnerable to temptations to renege on regional commitments. Second, it 
examines various collective action and distributional problems that plagued the LPA 
and evaluate the role that regional enforcement and monitoring institutional 
mechanisms could play in such an environment of uncertainty.  It then demonstrates 
how the failure to endow the numerous institutions established within the LPA 
framework with adequate mechanisms to create incentives that could ‘lock in’ 
African governments commitments to implementation, contributed to the poor 
outcomes of the LPA.  
 
PART II: THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT: THE 
MARKET-DRIVEN EXTRA-REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL 
 
Chapter Five: The New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD): The 
International Politics of a paradigm shift 
 
         This chapter examines the international politics of the shift from Africa’s 
traditional inward-looking, state-led development cooperation paradigm epitomised 
by the LPA’s self-reliance model, to the outward-looking and market-driven 
orientations contained in the NEPAD. The chapter has a two pronged thrust: first it 
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appraises the extent to which the NEPAD constitutes a shift in approach to African 
regional economic cooperation; second, proceeding from the premise that the 
NEPAD “indeed” constitutes a shift in orientation, it then examines the internal 
(continental) and external (global), forces, interests, pressures and processes that have 
informed this shift. It assesses how changes in the international political and 
economic environment precipitated Africa’s shift from inward-looking regionalism, 
to outward-looking regionalism.     
Chapter six: NEPAD: A reconstruction of the underlying diplomatic processes 
            This chapter reconstructs the diplomatic processes through which African 
leaders and other stakeholders evolved a continental economic cooperation 
framework differing in fundamental ways from all earlier African initiatives.  The 
chapter has two main thrusts: first, it identifies the principal initiatives that were 
conceived at the turn of the twentieth century against the backdrop of Africa’s 
worsening economic situation and attempts to explain how the architects of these 
initiatives, together with existing inter-African institutions pulled together their 
various ideas and preferences to produce the NEPAD (i.e. the inter-African 
diplomacy with key actors been leaders of the MAP, the leader of the Omega Plan 
and key African institutions been the OAU/AU, and the ECA); Second, it evaluates 
the extent to which interactions between the NEPAD’s architects and various extra-
regional actors (governments of the industrialised countries, international financial 
institutions, international regimes and international non-governmental institutions) 
might have influenced the contents and orientations of the NEPAD. 
Chapter Seven: NEPAD challenges and prospects for sustained implementation: a 
political economy perspective.  
 
            This chapter evaluates the reasons and elements that make the NEPAD more 
amenable to sustainable implemented in comparison to earlier initiatives. The chapter 
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focuses on the NEPAD’s good governance agenda that sets the initiative apart from 
earlier initiatives.  It emphasises two dimensions of the governance agenda: First, it 
highlights the overall socio-economic benefits of good governance to the continent, 
however, with a particular focus on the potential of credible domestic institutions of 
governance to curtail the perceptions of political insecurity that have prevented 
African governments from genuinely committing to long term development goals, 
especially goals of regional economic cooperation initiatives. Second and more 
importantly, the chapter examines the NEPAD’s APRM and evaluates the extent to 
which its design and operational principles make it a dependable enforcement and 
monitoring mechanism that could align African governments’ commitments to the 
agreed standards and norms of good governance that are perceived as the 
precondition for the continent’s development.  
 Conclusion 
      The conclusion summarises the major arguments and findings of the thesis. It 
addresses some broader issues regarding the design of appropriate regional initiatives 
and achieving compliance with their prescriptions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM: AN OVERVIEW OF 
PRE-LPA INITIATIVES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
       Economic regionalism is an important aspect of the dynamics of modern society 
in its continuous process of transformation.41 It is premised on the reasoning that 
individual states cannot readily achieve their goals in isolation from their 
neighbours.42  The post World War Two (WW II) years saw regionalism emerging as 
a global phenomenon relevant to both the developed and developing countries.  
      However, whereas in the industrialised world, economic regionalism may be 
desirable for the regulation of the flow of certain goods and services or simply to 
secure a monopoly in the production and marketing of certain products to achieve 
more rapid economic growth, in the developing world conversely, economic 
regionalism has been acknowledged as a necessity for economic development.43 In 
Africa, it emerged as a strategy for overcoming the continent’s economic 
vulnerabilities resulting especially from its colonial experience. 
           This chapter locates Africa’s efforts at regionalism in their historical context so 
as to clarify the dynamics of region building in the continent. It begins by examining 
rationale for regionalism in the continent. This is followed by an overview of the 
historical evolution of region building in Africa, with a focus on changes in regional 
                                               
41  S. K. B. Asante, “Regionalism as a key element of African development strategy,” in S. K. B. 
Asante (ed.), “Regionalism and Africa’s development,” p. 2 
 
42 Christopher Clapham, “The changing world of regional integration in Africa,” in Clapham 
Christopher, Greg Mills et al. (eds.), Regional integration in Southern Africa: comparative perspectives 
(Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2001): 59. 
 
43 Asante, “Regionalism as key;” B. T. W. Mutharika, Toward multinational economic cooperation 
in Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers Incorporated, 1972): 20; UNECA, A survey of economic 
conditions in Africa, 1967, E/CN.14/409/Rev.1 (New York: United Nations, 1969): 5 
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initiatives over time – in terms of their size, goals and orientation towards the global 
economy. It then appraises the level of achievement of immediate post independence 
regional initiatives, linking their poor performance with the renewed momentum for 
broader and more viable initiatives that were precursors to the collective self-reliance 
model of the LPA. 
        The chapter argues that the impulse for regionalism in the continent came 
primarily from the colonial legacy of fragmentation of the continent’s economic 
space. Regionalism was seen as the only strategy that could enable the continent 
adjust to and mitigate individual African countries’ weaknesses inherited from 
colonialism – particularly in reducing the continent’s vulnerability to global economic 
shocks and dependence on former colonial powers. This is consistent with my 
argument that the design of regional initiatives in the continent has been informed by 
the political and economic vulnerability of African countries in the global 
environment.  
          Regional initiatives in the continent varied in terms of their membership, their 
institutional arrangements, the goals they set to pursue and more importantly, in their 
orientation to the global economy. As far as the pre-LPA initiatives are concerned, 
although they were informed by the Pan-African philosophy, they turned out to be 
narrowly based, unviable and very extroverted.   
        Overall, immediate post independence regional economic arrangements failed to 
produce envisaged economic development in the continent. More importantly, they 
failed to reverse the continent’s dependence and vulnerability to external economic 
forces. One explanation for this unenviable record was the reluctance of African 
governments to accept the long-term commitments that were required by regional 
cooperation arrangements and the implicit restraints on their autonomy over national 
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policy making. This was compounded by concerns about the distribution of the 
potential and real benefits of economic cooperation, particularly against the backdrop 
of differential levels of development and resource endowments of the various states 
involved in regional economic groupings. 
        Disappointment with immediate post-independence regional initiatives informed 
the need for broader, more viable and more inward-looking initiatives beginning in 
the 1970s.  The defining characteristic of the initiatives of the 1970s onwards was that 
they explicitly challenged the external domination of the continent and therefore, 
stressed the urgency of curtailing the external vulnerability of African economies. In 
this regard, the successful ratification of the ECOWAS treaty in 1975 by hitherto 
divided French and English-speaking West African states was a turning point in 
region building in the continent in that it came to serve as a catalyst for the 
establishment of other region-wide initiatives, all geared at evolving inward-looking 
economic development. The initiatives that followed the ECOWAS Treaty were 
precursors to the LPA’s self-reliance strategy that became popularised in the 1980s. 
 
2.2 ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN AFRICA: RATIONALE 
 
         Regionalism emerged as a central element in Africa’s international relations 
since the terminal years of colonialism.44 It has remained a key aspect in the 
continent’s development strategy such that regional and sub-regional economic 
cooperation and integration arrangements have been widely recognised as a necessary 
condition for the long-term sustainable development of the continent. In this light, 
African countries and the international community in various convergent policy 
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declarations have underlined the indispensability of inter-African economic 
cooperation for the socio-economic transformation of the continent.45 The contention 
has been that regional cooperation could potentially assist African states overcome the 
economic disadvantages of smallness and fragmentation imposed by colonialism. 
           Against this background, regionalism has been seen as an “alternative” 
development strategy to nationally oriented strategies,46 which could assist African 
countries in expanding their domestic markets and resource bases, increasing 
industrial opportunities, diversifying agricultural production, expanding inter-African 
trade – particularly through improved infrastructure and ultimately strengthening the 
continent’s overall position in relation to the developed countries of the North, 
through greater independence and self-reliance.47 
         Oteiza and Sercovich have observed that only very large national units have 
sufficient resource base, climatic diversity, and population size to afford an “autarchic 
self-reliant model.”48 However, African states are characterised by sparse populations, 
small internal markets, limited infrastructure, new and fragile borders, and economies 
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vulnerable to fluctuating global prizes.49 They are not only economically too small, 
but also and most unfortunately, enclose populations that are so poor that limiting 
production to the domestic markets alone would hardly make any economic sense. 
          The balkanisation of Africa’s economic and political space is about one of the 
most unfortunate colonial legacies. Africa harbours most of the world’s smallest 
states: nine African countries have populations of less than one million inhabitants 
and over thirty others have populations of less than ten million.50 Only about ten 
African states have markets exceeding twenty five million people. Together, these ten 
countries account for 64 percent of the continent’s population and well over 2/3 of its 
output. Moreover, five of them – Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa 
account for over 60 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), which is itself 
smaller than that of the Nordic community or Korea. More interestingly, excluding 
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) is about the same 
as that of Switzerland.51 In 1989 for example the gross national (GNP) of all sub-
Saharan African countries (excluding South Africa) put together was approximately 
equal to that of Belgium.52 Worse still, in 1992 South Africa (Africa’s largest 
economy) had a gross domestic product (GDP) of US $103651 million, which was 
slightly smaller than the Norwegian gross domestic product (GDP) of US$ 112906 
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million.53 In other words, Africa’s supposedly largest economy standing on its own is 
approximately the same size in terms of GDP, as that of a small European economy.54 
     The smallness of African national markets has informed the conclusion that only 
economic integration and cooperation could facilitate the production of investment 
and intermediate goods where economies of scale are especially important, promote 
industrial efficiency and competitiveness, and generally accelerate the rate of 
economic development in the continent.55 The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), in 1967 recognised the importance of bigger markets 
for meaningful industrialisation in the developing world by pointing out that:  
The bigger the area and the more varied its resources, the larger the 
number of industries, likely to be capable of operating under optimum 
conditions. Projects not only economically feasible or only feasible at 
high cost in an individual country become a practical proposition if 
undertaken by several countries jointly.56 
 
          The need for large applications of capital investment arises as a result of various 
technical indivisibilities and external economies. In the developing countries, the 
indivisibility of the production function, especially in the supply of social overhead 
capital, causes investments to be less than profitable if undertaken by any individual 
state, largely due to the limitations in the domestic market. Moreover, even when it is 
possible for any individual state in the developing region to undertake large 
applications of capital investment excess capacity or under-utilization of plant 
capacity results. To avoid this, extensive participation in capital investments by a 
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large number of countries is recommended.57 The problem of capital accumulation 
and excess capacity has been more acute in Africa than in any other region of the 
developing world, due especially to the continent’s extremely small, highly protected 
and underdeveloped national markets.58 
           Within this context, regional cooperation has been seen as a strategy for 
broadening African markets, facilitating industrial expansion as well as increasing the 
volume of external capital injection into African economies.59 African countries have 
depended on foreign capital for their development and have acknowledged the need to 
make their investment markets more attractive, particularly in terms of fair return to 
capital outlay. However, single African countries have been incapable of providing 
such a framework, particularly with regard to the establishment of large-scale 
industries. The perception has been that foreign investors become more attracted 
when economies are integrated and when risk can be spread over a wider area, further 
strengthening the case for regionalism. 
          Regionalism has also been seen as pre-requisite for reducing the vulnerability 
and dependence of African economies to external influences. During the colonial era, 
African economies were geared at mineral extraction and the production of tropical 
crops for colonial industries. The colonial powers were not interested in long-term 
internal growth and self-reliance in the continent. They failed to create an indigenous 
industrial and technological base for an eventual take-off of African economies. 
Therefore, at independence “most African countries lacked both the required domestic 
endowments in terms of human, social and material capital, and the physical and 
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institutional infrastructure for industrialisation and development.”60 Several decades 
after independence, Africa’s production pattern and physical infrastructure still 
largely reflects its colonial inheritance – with transportation and communication for 
example, remaining geared to extracting and exporting tropical crops and minerals 
(most of the time without any added value), and importing finished goods (capital, 
consumer and intermediate goods).61  
            This has not only made African states dependent on a narrow range of 
products (especially cash crops and minerals) for a greater proportion of their foreign 
exchange earnings, but more importantly, it has created a situation wherein 
“independent” African states’ trade policies cannot be detached from the trade and 
development policies in the advanced countries. Fluctuations in prices of primary 
products and large increases in imports of manufactured goods render the African 
economies particularly vulnerable to external influences. To change this pattern, it has 
been found imperative that African countries through concerted action diversify their 
economies through the development of industries geared to manufacture consumption 
and intermediate goods.62 
          The need to change the pattern of trade between African states and the 
developed world was recognised as early as the 1960s. In this respect, many African 
governments adopted national policies of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) as 
a development strategy, aimed at reducing their high dependence on the former 
colonial powers. However, these policies could not be effectively prosecuted largely 
because of the smallness of individual national African markets and also because of 
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the high cost of acquiring the required technology, which was understandably beyond 
the capacity of a majority of individual African states. The failure of national import 
substitution industrialisation strategies further underscored the fact that African 
countries could only break their excessive dependence on the developed world 
through collective action.  
           In a nutshell, regional cooperation and integration has been seen as both 
desirable, and necessary to overcome the economic disadvantages imposed by the 
fragmented nature of Africa’s economic space. It has been perceived as a viable 
strategy to engender the industrialisation of the continent, the development of inter-
African trade and the capacity to effectively evolve global linkages and 
interdependencies, reduce the continent’s vulnerability to fluctuating overseas 
markets, mobilize and maximize the continent’s use of scarce resources and to forge a 
way to effective African economic and political unity.63  
         There has been convergence of views among African scholars and political 
leaders that very little progress can be made in any area of endeavour in the 
development process in Africa without some significant level of cooperation between 
African states. This perception together with the fact that Africa got independence 
during the era of regionalism have served as an impulse for African states to resolve 
to vigorously pursue a policy of promoting regional cooperation and integration.64 
Since independence therefore, African states have contemplated and experimented 
with various forms of cooperation and integration arrangements.  
          These schemes have varied in terms of the number of states involved, from the 
minimum of two (like the Senegambian Confederation or the Mano River Union) to 
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sixteen (the Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS). They have 
sometimes (like the East African Community – EAC or the Customs and Economic 
Union of Central African States –“Union Dounier et economique des etats de 
l’Afrique Centrale” –UDEAC) been essentially carryovers into the independence era 
of former colonial arrangements, and at other times (like the case with the ECOWAS, 
or the Southern African Development Community – SADC) been intended to bridge 
over the divisions created by colonial partition. They have likewise differed in the 
complexity of their institutional arrangements, the level of common services 
possessed, and the ambitions of their goals.65 More importantly, regional 
arrangements in Africa have varied in terms of their orientation to the international 
political economy. In this respect, Steven Radelet has argued that “these schemes 
have been established either to support an inward-oriented or an outward oriented 
trade strategy.”66  
 
2.3 AFRICAN REGIONALISM: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
          Africa has had a very long and complex history of regional endeavours. 
Generally however, five main phases are discernible in the historical development of 
regionalism in Africa: 67 
o The first phase was that led by what Adebayo has called “supra-national Pan-
Africanism.”68  It spanned from Ghana’s independence in 1957 to the 
formation of the OAU in1963; 
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o The second phase consisted of efforts to modify or restructure colonially 
inherited or pre-independence cooperation and integration arrangements; 
 
o The third phase meanwhile, encompassed efforts to set up larger and more 
sustainable sub-regional arrangements among independent states, culminating 
in what appeared to be a “breakthrough” in sub-regional cooperation in the 
1970s and 1980s; 
 
o The fourth phase was heralded by the advent of the historic Lagos Plan of 
action (LPA - 1980) and its associated Full Act of Lagos (FAL - 1981) and 
extended up to the signing of the Abuja Treaty – establishing the African 
Economic Community (AEC) in 1991; 
 
o The fifth phase has been seen as commencing with the Abuja Treaty, through 
the constitutive Act of the African Union to the emergence of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
 
         Pre-LPA initiatives fit into the first three phases of Adebayo’s classification and 
are the focus of this chapter. The logical starting point in the reconstruction of these 
endeavours is the famous Pan-African movement of the early independence era. 
 
2.3.1 PAN-AFRICANISM: THE POLITICAL EMBRYO OF AFRICAN 
REGIONALISM 
 
          Pan-Africanism has been described as the consciousness and awareness of 
oneness that developed amongst Africans as a result of the deep feelings of 
dispossession, inferiority, discrimination, and loss of dignity and freedom occasioned 
by long years of inhuman treatment of Africans during colonial rule. The 
identification of a common enemy – colonialism deepened the consciousness of 
oneness amongst Africans. Understandably, in the early days of the struggle for 
independence, Pan-Africanism denoted the movement towards self-rule and self-
determination of the African people.69  
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      Political liberation in Africa was the harbinger of the embryo of economic 
integration and union that found eloquent articulation in the late 1950s with the 
emergence of Ghana as the first black independent state in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
1957.70 Pan-Africanism as an idea and as a movement on the African continent was 
predicated on cooperation and unity, such that the struggle to develop new patterns of 
post-colonial, continental and regional cooperative arrangements was, in a very real 
sense, an aspect of the struggle to institutionalise Pan-Africanism.71 
          Little wonder, regional cooperation and integration have been seen to have 
began as aspects of the Pan-African movement, which was aimed at the ‘unification 
of African forces against imperialism and colonial domination.’ It was recognised as 
an essential component of the strategies of economic decolonisation long before the 
attainment of political independence.72 One of the first African integration plans was 
debated at the Fifth Pan -African Congress held in Manchester, England in 1945, 
under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and George Padmore of the West 
Indies.73 At the congress, the establishment of a West African economic union was 
recommended as a means of combating the exploitation of the economic resources of 
the West African territories and ensuring the participation of indigenous people in the 
industrial development of West Africa.74  Meanwhile, as early as 1942, Nkrumah was 
already mapping out his politico-economic agenda for the continent by insisting that; 
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all the West African colonies “must unite and become a national entity, absolutely 
free from the encumbrances of foreign rule, before they can assume the aspect of 
international cooperation on a grand-scale.”75 
          Pan-Africanism became both an integrative force and a movement for the 
liberation of the continent. It was anchored on the belief that “a divided African 
continent could never control its economic destiny and therefore, could never be 
genuinely independent.”76 The centrality of the twin logics of integration and 
liberation in the Pan-Africanist movement is well captured by Nkrumah’s submission 
that:  
            If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of 
Africa’s rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total 
defence and the full exploitation of our material and human 
means in the full interest of our people. To go it alone will limit 
our horizon, curtail our expectations and threaten our liberty.77 
 
           The advent of Ghana’s independence in 1957 gave a new fillip to the struggle 
for the liberation and integration of the African continent. The three historic All-
African Peoples’ Conferences held in 1958, 1960 and 1961 respectively, and the 
Second Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in June 1960, 
all strongly urged the newly independent African states to accept economic 
cooperation as the basis of economic transformation.78 There was also agreement on 
the need to establish an African common market, devoted uniquely to African 
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interests, as a strategy of efficaciously promoting the true requirements of African 
states.79  
           Meanwhile, during the 1958 conference, delegates adopted a resolution to 
establish economic and research committees within each African country; and a joint 
economic and research committee with representatives of all independent African 
countries. The tasks of these committees was to consolidate the economic 
development policies of African states, promote trade and common industrial policies 
and coordinate economic planning among African states with a view of achieving an 
all-African economic cooperation arrangement.80 At the Addis Ababa Conference of 
1960, the independent African states recommended the creation of an African council 
for economic cooperation, an African Development Bank and an African Commercial 
Bank. The collective fervour for economic integration and cooperation ran through 
the various resolutions that sanctioned post independence Pan-Africanist 
conferences.81 However, there was no consensus on the scope and form that 
integration-cooperation would take among the emerging African states. 
            Efforts to institutionalise the concept of Pan-Africanism in the early post-
independence years structured and shaped the debate on the proper form and scope of 
African unity. Attention became focused on the geographical extent as well as the 
intensity or degree of cooperation deemed necessary.82 Nkrumah, the greatest 
proponent of Pan-Africanism canvassed for an all-embracing continental regionalism, 
which was to involve total economic integration and political union of all African 
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states.83 He strongly believed that the only way African countries could ever achieve 
the level of development of industrialised countries was through the total integration 
of African economies on a continental scale.84   
            Nkrumah struggled to impress his case on his peers by pointing out that no 
independent African state by itself had a chance to follow an independent course of 
economic development, and that many African states that had tried to do this had 
almost been ruined or had returned to the fold of the former colonial rulers. He argued 
with conviction that this was not to change unless African states had a unified policy - 
working at the continental level. And in the realm of actualising his ideal of political 
unity, Nkrumah proposed a ‘continental union government’ or, at the very least, a 
political union of West African States. A Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, a Ghana-Guinea 
union and a Ghana-Congo (Zaire) union were each envisaged by Nkrumah as a 
nucleus for continental union.85 
         Nkrumah’s radical and all-embracing “supra-national Pan-Africanist” approach 
to African cooperation came into sharp confrontation with the “gradualist” 
preferences of a majority of African states, particularly Nigeria. Nigeria’s position 
was that “economic integration was to precede political union and that economic 
integration itself must begin at the sub-regional level and proceed in stages beginning 
with functional cooperation and coordination and leading towards, perhaps, a 
common market.”86 The disagreement over the proper form and scope of African 
cooperation heralded a power struggle between Nigeria and Ghana, which broadened 
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to engulf the entire continent with attendant implications for the direction and depth of 
inter-African relations. 
            This struggle culminated in the emergence of two main power blocs: the 
socialist oriented Casablanca Group formed in January, 1961 (between Ghana, 
Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco) stood for the immediate unity – political 
and economic; the Monrovia Group established in May 1961 (between 19 African 
states - Nigeria, Liberia, sierra Leone, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Dahomey (now Benin Republic), Chad, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, Congo Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia, Tunisia and 
Libya) emphasised a more gradual and functionalist approach to African unity.   
Meanwhile, French-speaking African states wary of Nigeria’s hegemonic potentials in 
particular and apprehensive of cooperation with Anglophone states generally, formed 
a splinter group within the Monrovia bloc (between Cameroon, the Central African 
Republic, Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Niger, 
Senegal and Chad) that came to be known as the Brazzaville group.87 
       The divisions among these blocs formed the stuff of inter-African relations in the 
1960s.88 However, by the end of 1962, it emerged that notwithstanding the 
Anglophone- Francophone bifurcation within the Monrovia power bloc, and despite 
the general weariness of African states of Nigeria’s hegemonic potentials, Nigeria’s 
gradualist approach to cooperation was preferred as a lesser evil to Nkrumah’s 
radicalism and unavowed personal ambitions for continental leadership.89 Therefore, 
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the Nigerian-led Monrovia bloc eventually prevailed over the Ghanaian-led 
Casablanca bloc in this ideological impasse, precipitating the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.90 
           The question of political and economic unity on a continental or regional scale 
was laid to rest in the greater part of the 1960s with the formation of the OAU,91 
particularly as its charter emphasised the respect of colonially inherited frontiers and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states as the defining elements of 
interactions between African states.92 This was despite the enshrinement of 
regionalism as an important element of the OAU Charter.  Furthermore, the OAU’s 
focus on the liberation dimensions of Pan-Africanism and the sudden overthrow of 
Nkrumah in 1966 precipitated a loss in momentum in the integration dimension of 
Pan-Africanism through most of the 1960s.93  
           Given the environment of early 1960s,94 the whole concept of continental unity 
of interests (political and economic) was admittedly tenuous, despite the common 
heritage of colonialism. Moreover, the link between the movement towards political 
unity and the call for continental economic integration in the form of a common 
market turned out to be counterproductive because African leaders who were opposed 
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to political unity, also tended to give less than serious attention to economic 
integration even as they acknowledged its importance.95 
          Therefore neither Nkrumah’s enthusiasm for the noble Pan-African ideal of 
political unity and economic “continentalism” nor Julius Nyerere’s preferred 
“incremental regionalism” leading eventually towards Pan-Africanism went beyond 
the stage of theoretical discussion.96 Understandably, continental economic 
integration remained a “dream of unity” in the sixties and it was slowly supplanted by 
“economic sub-regionalism.”  
      Under the impetus of those states which favoured functional cooperation and 
coordination, and with the backing of the United Nations General assembly as well as 
the relentless independent efforts of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), it became generally accepted that for the purposes of economic 
cooperation and development, Africa be divided into five economically viable sub-
regions: North Africa comprising the Arab states; West Africa (from Mauritania to 
Nigeria); Central Africa (from Chad and Cameroon to Sudan/Zaire); East Africa 
(from Ethiopia to Tanzania) and Southern Africa (from Angola to Mozambique).97 A 
good number of initiatives attempted in the late1960s and 1970s centred more or less 
on this regional mapping although none of them attained the scope originally 
envisioned. Moreover, most of them turned out to be oriented towards former colonial 
powers as they were constructed on the structures inherited from the colonial era. 
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2.3.2 SUB-REGIONALISM IN THE 1960S: DEPENDENCE AND EXTERNAL  
ORIENTATION 
 
          Pre-independence sub-regional institutions served as a foundation to most of the 
economic cooperation initiatives that were attempted in Africa in the 1960s and early 
1970s. In Francophone Africa especially, regionalism in the 1960s virtually amounted 
to a form of “damage control” of the abrupt reversal of French colonial policy of 
political and economic integration to one of balkanisation before granting 
independence in the 1960s.98 The French colonial administration had established a 
high level of political organization, grouping its thirteen Sub-Saharan African 
territories into two federations: French West Africa (AOF – Afrique Occidental 
Français) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF – Afrique Equatorial Français).  
       The former, whose capital was in Dakar, was made up of eight territories – 
Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea (now Giunea), 
Dahomey (now Benin Republic), Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, and Upper Volta (today’s 
Burkina Faso). The French Equatorial African Federation meanwhile was made up of 
the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon and later Cameroon with its 
capital in Brazzaville. These two federations had a great potential for economic 
integration and development. However, on the eve of independence, the French 
engaged in the systematic fragmentation of these territories, culminating in the 
dissolution of the AOF and AEF by 1958. At independence therefore, the former 
French colonial territories faced the challenge of minimising the restrictions and 
constraints of fragmentation through a policy of promoting economic cooperation and 
integration.99  
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          In French West Africa, efforts to maintain pre-independence cooperation ties on 
a new basis began as early as 1959 when Dahomey (Benin), the Ivory Coast, Niger 
and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), agreed to set up a council of understanding 
(Counseil de l’Entente) with the objectives of promoting economic development and 
integration among members through a customs union. The arrangement also provided 
for the coordination of policies in the fields of communication, administration and 
fiscal policies, and assistance in the preparation of economic and industrial projects 
including sourcing for foreign aid to implement them. Despite early successes, the 
council did not make much progress towards a common market and was unable to 
establish supra-national institutions to move integration forward. Worse still, trade 
among its members remained a small fraction of their trade with non-members.100 It 
eventually started diminishing in importance due to the diversion of attention to an 
apparently larger and more dynamic grouping – the Economic Community of West 
Africa (Communaute economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest – CEAO). 
          The creation of the CEAO can be traced back to the establishment of the West 
African Customs Union (Union Douaniere de l’Afrique de l’Ouest – UDAO) in 1959 
to cushion the economic effects of the pending break up of the Federation of French 
West Africa, which collapsed in 1962. It was revived in 1966 as the Customs and 
Economic Union of West Africa (Union Douaniere et Economique de L’Afrique de 
L’Ouest – UDEAO), with a less ambitious objective than a full customs union.  By 
1969 however, UDEAO had been pronounced a failure by its council of ministers and 
it was to be replaced by the Economic Community of West Africa (Communaute 
Economique de L’Afrique de L’Ouest - CEAO) that came into being in 1973.  
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      The CEAO was deemed to be a customs union of seven states – Benin, Niger, 
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Mauritania. The 
April 1973 Treaty establishing the CEAO provided for free trade in certain 
commodities, free movement of persons, a common external tariff and a community 
fund for compensation to those states that benefit less from the union. Although the 
CEAO has registered some relative successes, particularly in expanding trade among 
its members, tensions have persisted over the relative share of regional trade, and no 
significant progress has been made in the area of coordination and harmonisation of 
industrial and economic development plans. Jalloh observes pessimistically, “the 
CEAO gives the impression of stagnating with little prospects for the expansion of 
regional tasks.”101  
          Meanwhile after the demise of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa 
(AEF) in 1956, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, the Central African Republic and Chad 
chose to maintain their former economic links in the form of a customs union and also 
to coordinate their fiscal policies. In this light, a treaty formerly establishing the 
Equatorial Customs Union was concluded in 1959 and in 1964, a new treaty that 
sought to strengthen the union in the direction of common market was negotiated. In 
January 1966 the treaty formerly establishing the Economic and Customs Union of 
Central African States (Union Douaniere et economique de L’Afrique Centrale – 
UDEAC) was signed.102 This organisation has not performed any better as restrictions 
on the opening of markets and non-compliance with its rules have sapped it of most of 
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its energy as an integrative system.103 Since 1966, not much has been achieved 
beyond the unification of tariffs and import duties. The envisaged full customs union 
has remained a distant illusion and very little progress has been made in other areas of 
cooperation.104 
         Under French influence, former French African colonies engaged in efforts to 
evolve an umbrella organization for cooperation among themselves, and between 
them and France. In 1961 they established the African and Malagasy Economic 
Cooperation Organization (OAMCE – Organisation Africaine et Malagache de 
Cooperation Economique), to manage economic relations between them. Meanwhile, 
an African and Malagasy Union (UAM – Union Africaine et Malagache), was also set 
up to take care of the political aspects of cooperation. With the emergence of the 
OAU in 1963, which eclipsed political unions in the continent, the OAMCE and the 
UAM and their affiliate organizations were consolidated into the African and 
Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation (UAMCE – Union Africaine et 
Malagache de Cooperation Economique) in 1964 to carter solely for economic, socio-
cultural and technical matters. However, given that at the time the OAU was still 
finding its feet, the UAMCE was given the mandate to perform both political and 
economic roles. Accordingly, in 1965 UAMCE was reorganized into what became 
known as the African Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM – Organisation 
Commune Africaine et Malagache).105 
           The objectives of OCAM included amongst others: the harmonization of 
economic, social, technical and cultural policies and activities, coordination of 
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development programmes; and consultation and coordination in foreign policy 
matters. In relation to France, OCAM has been seen in many circles as a major 
instrument by which France maintained cohesion and control over her former 
colonies, while at the same time wading off the influence of radical African states – 
particularly Nkrumah’s Ghana and Nigeria.106 Criticism by some progressive member 
states like Mauritania of the excessive dependence of OCAM on France, divergences 
over the Arab-Israeli conflict and apartheid South Africa brought severe strains on the 
organization. This pushed the organization to resolve to make itself completely non-
political and to become an exclusive instrument of economic, cultural and social 
development. In 1975, its charter eliminated reference to political consultations 
among member states.107 In terms of concrete realisations, OCAM’s showcase 
achievement was the establishment of the Pan-African Airways (Air Afrique), 
followed by the setting up of the Association of Development Banks and the Afro-
Malagasy Industrial Property Organization. Unfortunately, because of the numerous 
problems that have faced this organization, its projects, including the showcase “Air 
Afrique,” have seriously declined. And as Ojo and others put it: “OCAM has not been 
able to move forward, it has been in a state of encapsulation, or stagnation.”108 
          While the British colonial administration did not go as far as their French 
counterparts in linking their territories into federal unions, they did not entirely 
neglect the usefulness of economic cooperation between their colonial territories.109  
In British West Africa they established a common currency and common services 
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such as the West African Currency Board, the West African Court of Appeal, the 
West African Cocoa Research Institute and the West African Airways Corporation. In 
British East Africa, there was the well-known East African Economic Community.  
        However, at independence, while the Francophone West and Equatorial African 
countries consistently strove to maintain or restructure pre-independence cooperative 
institutions and even to establish new ones, their Anglophone counterparts disbanded 
the few joint institutions left behind by the British. Thus, each of the Anglophone 
West African states adopted its own currency and under the instigation of Ghana, all 
the common institutions were systematically dissolved, with the end result being the 
advancement of the disintegration of the region. Even more dramatic was the fact that 
the East African Community, arguably the most sophisticated regional cooperation 
arrangement in the Third World at the time, started facing acute tensions in the 1960s, 
such that by the end of the decade, its known level of economic integration had 
considerably declined.110 
           The East African Community was a regional grouping of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania established by a treaty that came into force in 1967. However, this treaty 
was only a culmination of a long process that began with the British colonial 
measures to promote more unified administrative control over its East African 
territories by establishing an East African Court of Appeal (1902), a Postal Union 
(1911), a Customs Union (1917), and the East African Currency Board (1920). In 
1948, a quasi-federation was established with a common market and a number of 
important common services such as the East African post and telecommunications 
administration, and the agricultural and medical research services.111 The significance 
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of the EAC can best be grasped by reflecting on the fact that at the time its member 
states got independence, external trade, fiscal and monetary policies, transport and 
communications infrastructure, including university education were all regional rather 
than national. Subsequently, these links and services were systematically dismantled 
and all the high hopes that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania would evolve into a full 
federation evaporated. By June 1977, the whole structure of the East African 
Community, once regarded as a model for African regional cooperation had 
collapsed.112 
           In Northern Africa, the Maghreb states were heavily dependent on France for 
their economic life; particularly in terms of export and import trade. The signing of 
the Treaty of Rome in 1958 establishing the European Economic Community 
drastically altered the terms of cooperative relations between these states and their 
former colonial master. Within the new context of a united Europe, Maghreb leaders 
organised a Conference of Unity at Tangiers in 1958, during which the issue of 
economic cooperation was discussed for the very first time at an executive leadership 
level. The idea of a united Maghreb front to strengthen the region’s leverage towards 
the emerging Western European economic bloc was hatched. The need was 
recognised to coordinate and harmonise industrial policies between the Maghreb 
states and to define a common position towards the EEC with a particular focus on 
multilateral trade relations as a strategy for the development of the region.113 
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         Agreement was reached on the establishment of a Maghreb Consultative 
assembly and a permanent secretariat to institutionalise the process of cooperation.114 
However, between 1959 and 1963, economic difficulties, political instability and a 
number of powerful centrifugal forces became stronger than the unifying forces in the 
region and therefore, rendered the regional cooperation project a lesser priority.115 
Regionalism in the region therefore, remained confined to declarations and 
governmental proclamations in the years preceding the creation of the Maghreb 
Permanent Consultative Committee (MPCC) in 1964. 
              Notwithstanding the divisive centrifugal forces in the Maghreb region, and 
although the individual Maghreb states were fully embroiled in the task of building 
their respective national economies, the need for regional cooperation still lingered in 
the minds of the Maghreb leaders. At two important conferences in Tunis and 
Casablanca in 1962, the economic ministers of the region came to the conclusion that 
“national economic policy making should henceforth take account of the regional 
context, otherwise it will not be successful, and that political unity can only succeed if 
it is based on economic cooperation.”116 From 1964 onwards, Maghreb states revived 
efforts to institutionalise regional cooperation beyond the scope bilateral 
arrangements. And with the assistance of the Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA), the first Maghreb ministerial conference on industrial development was held 
in 1964, with discussions focussing on evolving cooperation in line with 
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institutionalising a collective self-reliant and regional import substitution development 
strategy. 
         In a follow-up to the 1964 Conference a protocol agreement recommending the 
creation of a Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee (MPCC) was adopted in 
Tunis in November 1965. Maghreb ministers gave the MPCC a joint mandate to 
facilitate the coordination of the development policies of their respective states, to 
examine conditions that could enhance industrial harmonisation and develop the 
conditions that would support a multilateral framework, which would encourage intra-
regional trade. Although Maghreb ministers only vaguely discussed the type of 
integration to be pursued, their general approach corresponded to sectoral integration, 
with the guiding objective being “collective self-management.”117 Between 1964 and 
1975 under the aegis of the PMCC seven ministerial meetings were held, a total of 
four protocols signed and two ministerial declarations made all outlining the 
principles of cooperation.118 However, because national governments were not legally 
bound by these protocols and declarations, their impact and potential as a driving 
force for the integration process in the region remained limited. 
 A 1967 conference of economic ministers of the Maghreb adoptted a 
resolution to alter the approach to the regional cooperation project, from a sectoral to 
a “comprehensive regional development strategy.” The MPCC was, therefore, to 
focus on accelerating trade liberalisation and industrial harmonisation over a five 
years transition period. It was to examine problems of economic cooperation and 
coordination as well as appropriate measures to facilitate structural integration. A 
particular emphasis was to coordinate the respective Maghreb states’ trade relations 
                                               
117 Ibid. pp. 85-6. 
  
118 Jean-Claude Santucci, “Le Grand Maghreb Reactive: Crise des etats et ideologie de 
substitution,” L’Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 23 (1983). 
 
 67 
with the EEC and other third countries. It was also to explore the possibilities of intra-
regional trade liberalisation and the gradual establishment of a customs union with a 
common external tariff, harmonised customs policies and a multilateral payment 
system.119 However, centrifugal forces in the form of divergent development 
trajectories, political tensions and ideological differences persisted between the 
governments of the region, making regionalism in the Maghreb during the first two 
decades after independence a big failure. 
In the Southern African region, regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s was driven 
by South Africa’s policy of apartheid.  On the one hand, smaller neighbouring states 
embarked on regional arrangements to shield themselves from economic domination 
by apartheid South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa initiated a regional project 
as a veil its widely criticised racist supremacy policies.  First, Pretoria’s apartheid 
policies were seen by its smaller neighbours as a threat to their interests, therefore, 
these states sought a collective approach and solution in their intercourse with South 
Africa. This started with the creation of an alliance of Front Line States (FLS) that 
ultimately led to the formation of the Southern African Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC) in 1980. This body became the vehicle through which South Africa’s 
smaller neighbours sought to lessen their economic dependence on the hegemonic 
minority regimes in the Republic of South Africa.120 
On its part, South Africa in the face of the resurgence of armed struggles in its 
peripheries in the late 1960s adopted a policy strategy of establishing strong economic 
relations with the neighbouring former British protectorates in Southern Africa 
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namely: Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS states). South Africa therefore, 
championed the revival of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1969. 
This revived customs union which in a very real sense was a restructuring of 
preceding cooperation arrangements (dating as far back as 1910) between the 
Republic of South Africa and its surrounding dependent enclaves, was South Africa’s 
strategy to establish a form of economic “apron-string” over these dependent states 
and to prevent them from participating in the political, diplomatic and military efforts 
to liberate the oppressed majority black population in South Africa. SACU also 
offered South Africa a propaganda weapon internationally to demonstrate how 
beneficial the association was to the satellite states and therefore strengthen their 
rationale for the infamous Bantustan policy (homelands) for Africans.121 SACU was 
arguably more of a politico-diplomatic device in the hands of South Africa’s apartheid 
regimes than a genuine instrument for sub-regional cooperation for development. 
         Alongside these initiatives with a semblance of regional outlook, there was a 
proliferation of mini schemes, in the form of intergovernmental, multi-sectoral and 
multi-national organizations for the promotion of technical and economic cooperation 
among different clusters of African states. This proliferation of regional initiatives 
converted the 1960s into what Asante has described as “the halcyon years of African 
regionalism.”122 However, by the early 1970s most schemes that had been launched 
with a lot of fanfare in the 1960s had become moribund.123 Indeed, the process of 
region building in Africa’s first decade of independence was often no more than a 
declaration of intent and an indication of continental alignment. Considering the 
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collapse of the East African Community in 1977, the decade after independence could 
be said to have witnessed a decline rather than a progress in the field of effective 
regional cooperation and integration in Africa.124 The reasons for this dramatic failure 
of efforts at regionalism in the immediate post independence years are many and 
varied. 
 
2.3.3 EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN THE 
EARLY POST INDEPENDENCE YEARS 
 
         While African countries’ enthusiasm for concerted action in the immediate post 
independence years reflected an awareness of their weakness inherited from colonial 
partition, the failure to commit genuinely to regional arrangements was informed 
largely by domestic political and economic considerations.   
        One of the most prominent explanations for the rather poor outcome of economic 
cooperation and integration during the early years after independence was the growth 
and impact of national consciousness. States spawned by the process of colonialism 
were by no means nations; rather, they represented the shells of territorial 
independence in which the kernel of national identity had been planted by the 
independence movements. The major task of the new governments was to provide the 
soil in which the seed could grow. Anxious to encourage national integration, the new 
African state leaders were compelled to look inward and to rank as their first priority 
the political, economic and social developments of their respective national polities. 
“National consolidation came to be perceived as the most urgent and most important 
concern, and to that extent, cooperation with other African countries became relegated 
to a subsidiary position.”125  
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          The primacy of national concerns over regional cooperation was propelled by 
the perception that meaningful cooperation necessarily implied long term 
commitments, which invariably translated to consenting to accept restraints on 
autonomous national policy making, in certain key areas - including development 
planning.126 This explanation is in line with the conventional wisdom of integration 
scholars that governments of countries preoccupied with nation building are usually 
poor partners for economic integration, as they cannot be relied upon to make vital 
decisions that might undermine their control at home.127 Arguably, in the immediate 
post independence years, African states did not display much willingness to sacrifice 
perceived national interests on the altar of regional cooperation. They entered into 
agreements to liberate trade or allocate industries on a regional basis only when such 
commitments conformed with considerations of national security and prestige, or 
economic advantage.128 
          Political and ideological differences between the newly independent African 
states have also been seen as an important explanation to the poor record of early 
efforts at regionalism in the continent. Indeed, political and ideological cleavages 
threatened even existing and otherwise viable cooperative arrangements such as the 
defunct East African Community.129 Commenting on the EAC’s failure, Ojo and 
others have argued, “the pursuance of divergent ideological paths appeared to have 
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had consequences that magnified stresses among the partners of the scheme.”130 
While socialism engendered significant socio-economic disruptions in Tanzania and 
Uganda, capitalism is assumed to have ostensibly accounted for Kenya’s socio-
political and economic stability. Therefore, while Kenya’s stable capitalist system and 
stronger economic base enabled her to attract external investment and to exploit the 
opportunities that the community offered, Tanzania’s socialist system and its weaker 
economic base had the opposite effect.131 The end result was a disproportionate 
sharing of the benefits of integration. 
        Disagreement among members over the relative shares of actual or potential 
gains of regional arrangements has therefore, been another important explanation to 
the failure of regional schemes in the 1960s and even beyond. The disparity in 
endowments and levels of development of the different states that engaged in the 
various regional schemes in the post independence years created a situation wherein 
the economically more viable countries seemed to be reaping more dividends from the 
regional arrangements than their poorer partners.  
      In the EAC, for example, Kenya, the most developed of the three members of the 
union, gained more from the union and apparently widened the gap between itself and 
the other members. Common external tariffs had the effect of protecting its industries 
against competition from outside the community and guaranteed it a market in 
Uganda and Tanzania. The latter two countries with fewer and less effective 
industries, found themselves buying Kenyan products at higher prices than they would 
have had to pay had the common external tariff arrangement not shut out similar 
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products produced outside the community. They also had to forgo the revenue from 
duties they were collecting from imports from outside the community.  
      Worse still, foreign companies that decided to establish industries in the region 
preferred Kenya because of its already well-established manufacturing base and better 
infrastructure. Thus, the net foreign private capital inflow into Kenya between 1969 
and 1976 was $184.9million compared with $95.9 for Tanzania and $31.0 for 
Uganda.132 The implication was that Kenya dominated the community trade, 
accumulated trade balances against its partners and widened the industrialisation gap 
among them.133 Compensatory and corrective measures adopted to address the 
problem of uneven distribution of gains in the EAC proved grossly inadequate, 
resulting in frustration, suspicion and mutual acrimony.134 By 1975, the situation 
became intolerable for Tanzania and Uganda and the community was irrevocably 
headed for collapse – which came in 1977. 
              In the case of the Customs and Economic Union of Central African States 
(UDEAC), the two poorest members – Chad and the Central African Republic – 
persistently complained that most of the union’s gains went to Cameroon, while they 
received little or nothing. They insisted on a system of industrial allocation that would 
guarantee that some industries are located exclusively on their territories despite their 
unattractiveness to investment. Although some concessions were made in this 
direction, the more viable states of Cameroon and Gabon were reluctant to subsidise 
their poorer partners. Frustrated by UDEAC, Chad and the Central African Republic 
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withdrew their membership and joined the former Zaire, to form the Union of Central 
African States (UEAC – Union des Etats de l’Afrique Central).135 This not only 
weakened the UDEAC, but also accentuated the problem of duplication and 
ineffectiveness of regional arrangements.  
          The situation was not very different in the various regional organizations that 
were attempted in West Africa – UDAO, UDEAO and CEAO. Dispute over the 
distribution of customs duties collected by the coastal states on goods moving to and 
from the landlocked and poorer states caused the collapse of the UDAO. Its 
corrective, the UDEAO, introduced a system of distributing the proceeds of the 
common external tariffs and fiscal charges in a way that would compensate the poorer 
landlocked partners. However, this arrangement remained a dead letter as the issue of 
uneven distribution of gains persisted as evinced in Mali’s bitter complaints of being 
cheated, particularly by the Ivory Coast, of whatever little trade increase there was 
from the regional arrangement.136 Even within the CEAO that replaced the UDEAO, 
tensions have remained among members over the relative share of regional trade and 
the industrial location. 
          Another important factor in the failure of regional arrangements in the 
immediate post independence years has been seen as the impact of external actors and 
influences. Most of the regional arrangements established in the 1960s were either 
built on pre-independence colonial foundations or were established at the instigation 
of former colonial masters as devices to maintain control over their former colonial 
empires. This was particularly true of most of the initiatives between former French 
colonial territories in West and Central Africa – in what has come to be known as 
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Francophone Africa’s neo-dependence on France. The famous umbrella organization 
for French West and Central African territories for example was formed at the 
instigation of France as a common front against Nkrumah’s radicalism in particular 
and the risk of Anglophone domination in general. So behind the avowed economic 
cooperation motives of OCAM laid a real political objective.  
          On the other hand, the Customs and Economic Community of West Africa 
(CEAO), was a French driven arrangement aimed at counterbalancing Nigeria’s 
economic and political weight in West Africa.137 Most of the regional arrangements in 
the 1960s were oriented mainly towards fostering trade with and securing aid from the 
industrialised nations (particularly former colonial masters) as a means of providing 
the necessary resources to satisfy the national aspirations for autonomous, self-
reliance development. They were therefore, necessarily dependent on the 
developments and attitudes of the former metropolitan countries for their very 
survival. Despite the rhetoric of regional solidarity, African states in the 1960s 
devoted greater attention in strengthening ties with former colonial masters than in 
strengthening interactions within the various regional groupings they had formed. 
         A tendency therefore emerged wherein African states either individually or as 
groups competed for foreign partners with the consequence being the creation of 
desperate conditions in terms of tax incentives, patent laws, labour conditions and 
foreign exchange privileges. All of these cumulated to impede the coordination and 
harmonization of national development plans with respect to external resource 
procurement so vital for the various economic cooperation and integration projects.138 
Also, competition for foreign aid helped to reinforce dependence on donors’ goods 
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and equipment, which inadvertently offset the local efforts to develop certain 
complements such as spare parts and technical skills. This rendered the goal of self-
reliance development very obscure and integration schemes found it very difficult to 
generate the necessary transactions.139  
       A second consequence of intra-community competition for foreign partnership 
and foreign aid was the duplication of inefficient mini-plants within regional 
communities – which tended to undermine the realisation of economies of scale, one 
of the principal justifications for most regional initiatives.  Moreover, the competitive 
relationship between integrating states encouraged the emergence of a form of “inter-
imperialist rivalry” – which culminated in the creation of de facto zones of influence 
in the continent. African countries became divided in the 1960s into groupings such as 
the 18 French-speaking Associated States with the EEC under the Yaounde system; 
the Commonwealth Non Associates and the Commonwealth Associated States like 
Nigeria under a special trade agreement with the EEC, signed in 1966.140 This 
alignments did not foster regionalism in Africa, and the puzzle was only partially 
resolved with the advent of the Lome Convention, in 1975, which finally united the 
Fancophone and Anglophone states in Sub-Saharan Africa in a common framework 
for economic relations with the EEC. However, even the Lome Convention only 
enhanced the outward orientation and external trade dependent nature of African 
economies. 
          The failures of the 1960s did not dampen the enthusiasm towards regional 
cooperation. However, with the experience of the 1960s, the need was realised to seek 
to establish broader, more viable and inward-looking cooperation initiatives. 
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2.3.4 THE QUEST FOR MORE VIABLE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
          One of the defining characteristics of regionalism in the 1960s was the 
smallness and multiplicity of regional initiatives that emerged in the continent. 
Indeed, within fifteen years of independence, over twenty intergovernmental, multi-
sectoral economic cooperation organisations and well over 120 single sectoral 
multinational and bilateral organisations meant to promote technical and economic 
cooperation had been created in the continent.141 This multiplicity created a serious 
problem of viability and duplication with some states belonging to as many as ten 
regional initiatives at a time. Even the supposedly “wider” regional arrangements like 
the UDEAC, MPCC, EAC, SACU and UDEAO, were not broad enough to overcome 
the constraints of economic fragmentation that informed the fervour for regionalism at 
independence.  
         Moreover, most of them were built on narrow linguistic and ideological lines 
with a very high level of dependence on former colonial masters for their very 
survival. The underlying assumption behind most of these initiatives was that 
increased trade with countries of the North, together with aid, was to bring about the 
much yeaned for autonomous development in the continent. Little effort was therefore 
made to link up these narrow cooperative arrangements to establish broader regional 
and even continental groupings as envisioned in the Pan-Africanist agenda. 
           From the mid 1970s there emerged a renewed enthusiasm for Pan-Africanism 
as an integrative force at the regional level, understandably because of the 
disappointing economic performance of African economies during the first post-
independence decade.142 The hopes of African leaders in the 1960s – that a 
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combination of trade with aid from the industrialized nations would provide the 
necessary resources to satisfy national aspirations for autonomous, self-sustaining 
development failed to materialise. The record of the 1960s was most disappointing as 
neither the trade nor the aid policies practiced by the industrialized nations appeared 
capable of accelerating economic expansion in the continent.  
         Africa thus emerged from the first United Nations Development decade (1960-
1970) as the region registering the lowest rate of economic growth among developing 
countries: 2.0 percent as against 4.1 percent for Southern Asia, 5.6 percent for East 
Asia, 4.5 percent for Latin America and 7.2 percent for the Middle East.143 Despite 
export promotion policies adopted by these regional initiatives, many African 
countries during much of the 1970s showed a pattern of sluggish economic growth, 
low levels of productivity, circumscribed and fractured industrial base, high 
dependence on a vulnerable narrow spectrum of primary export commodities, low 
levels of life expectancy and widening deficits on aggregate current account balance 
of payment.144 
       The impetus for broader and more viable regional arrangements for Africa’s 
development was strengthened by two important developments in the mid 1970s. 
First, there was the 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) (United Nations Document, 1974), which drew 
attention to economic cooperation among developing countries as its key element. 
Second, there was the signing in February 1975 of the celebrated Lome Convention 
that brought together, the hitherto divided French and English speaking African states, 
creating a new political climate and economic structure favourable to more 
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meaningful cooperative interactions. These developments led to a new rash of 
regional initiatives in Africa – supposedly broader in scope and more sustainable than 
those of the earlier decade. 
          The defining characteristic of the regional economic arrangements of the mid 
1970s onwards was that they were explicit challenges to the external domination of 
the continent inherited from the colonial era. Apart from the orthodox benefits 
promised by regional groupings in terms of expanded trade and investment, economic 
integration came to be vigorously advocated as a means of reducing external 
vulnerability. It was hoped that regional economic integration and cooperation would 
break Africa’s dependent relationship with the North, by helping each member 
country to export manufactured goods and eventually capital goods to their 
neighbours. African states and leaders hoped to be able to determine as far as possible 
their own economic policies based on their national aspirations, natural resources and 
political ideologies outside the influence of developed countries.145 
            Neo-colonial centrifugal forces against regional economic arrangements were 
strongest in West Africa, where years of conscious efforts to bridge the colonially 
induced divide between Anglophone and Francophone states in the region were all 
frustrated. Moreover, in terms of multiplicity and duplication of immediate post 
independence economic cooperative schemes and their attendant ineffectiveness, 
West Africa ranked first. Furthermore, West Africa harbours some of Africa’s 
smallest and economically unviable states (for example, Benin, Togo, Sierra-leone 
and Ghana). Understandably, the impulse to establish broader and more sustainable 
regional arrangements was strongest and most urgent in West Africa.  
                                               
145 Ibid. p. 40. 
 
 79 
           After the failure of protracted efforts by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) to bring about the economic integration of the 
Anglophone and Francophone states in West Africa, Nigerian senior diplomats in 
June 1969, identified the fourteen – nation French protected francophone organization 
(OCAM- Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache) as a political and economic 
threat to Nigeria, and as a real obstacle to broader cooperation in West Africa.146 The 
Lagos government tried to undermine OCAM through a policy of strengthening 
bilateral ties with its francophone neighbours with the ultimate goal of evolving a 
bilingual sub-regional economic grouping. The envisaged organization in the minds of 
the Lagos policy elites was intended not only to supplant OCAM, but also to open 
new markets for Nigeria’s goods.147 Building on the civil war understanding with 
president Eyadema of Togo, the Nigerian leader, General Yakubu Gowon while on a 
state visit to Lome in 1972, signed an agreement to establish a Nigeria-Togo 
Economic Community, which was to be an embryo for the West African 
Community.148  
            The task of popularising the idea of a broad-based West African Economic 
Community was entrusted to Adebayo Adedeji, the then Nigerian minister of 
economic development (later Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA)), and the Togolese Trade minister, Henry Dogo. 
After months of difficult negotiations, the much yeaned for Economic Community of 
West African States – ECOWAS, was established with the signing of the Treaty of 
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Lagos on May 28, 1975 by nine Francophone states (Cote d’Ivoire, Dahomey (today’s 
Benin Republic), Guinea, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Togo, Senegal and Upper Volta 
(present day Burkina Faso); five Anglophone states (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria 
and Sierra-Leone); and one Lusophone state (Guinea-Bissau), later joined by Cape 
Verde. By December 1975 the competent state organs of all the consenting member 
countries had ratified the ECOWAS Treaty. The main goals of ECOWAS, as 
enshrined in its five protocols agreed on at the 1976 Summit in Lome, Togo include: 
the elimination of customs duties and all quantitative and administrative restrictions to 
trade; the establishment of a common customs tariff within fifteen years; the abolition 
of obstacles to the free movement of persons, labour and capital; the harmonization of 
agricultural, industrial and monetary policies; and the establishment of a fund for 
cooperation, compensation and development to help compensate poorer countries for 
loss of tariffs.149 
          The inauguration of ECOWAS in May 1975, not only marked a breakthrough in 
the long series of efforts to institute some form of economic cooperation and 
integration embracing the entire West African region,150 but it represented the first 
indigenously negotiated post independence economic cooperation arrangements with 
a truly sub-regional character.  In the words of S.K.B Asante, “ECOWAS constitutes 
a geographical zone larger than Western Europe with a total population of about one 
hundred and eighty millions (180m), and it is the most peopled of all the Sub-regions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.”151  
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       The fact that one of the driving forces behind the creation of ECOWAS was to 
curtail the excessive dependence of francophone states on their former colonial master 
(France), the successful establishment of ECOWAS could also be seen as marking the 
beginning of the shift in African economic regionalism from an outward dependent 
orientation to an inward-looking self-reliant approach. More importantly, the 
enthusiasm with which the ECOWAS Treaty was ratified came to serve as a catalyst 
for the establishment of other region-wide economic integration arrangements, all 
geared towards evolving and promoting real inward-looking self–reliant development.    
              Therefore, inspired by the example of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the 1980s saw the emergence of broader and presumably 
more viable sub-regional economic arrangements in the continent, particularly under 
the edges of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The first OAU-ECA 
sponsored region-wide initiative was in Southern and Eastern Africa, in what has 
come to be known as preferential trade area (PTA), sanctioned by the Lusaka Treaty 
of December 1981 and effectively launched in Harare in July 1984.  In the Central 
African region, the momentum of the ECOWAS Treaty led to the establishment in 
October 1983 of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
comprising of the member states of the earlier Central African Customs Union 
(UDEAC), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes countries (CEPLGL – 
Communaute des Pays des Grands lacs). For Northern Africa, the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA), which had been in gestation since the mid 1960s, was revamped in 
1989.152  
      So between the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975 and 1983, “Africa had 
successfully established three sub-region-wide cooperation and integration schemes 
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with memberships of 16, 22, and 10 countries for the ECOWAS, PTA/COMESA and 
ECCAS respectively.”153 These sub-region-wide integration arrangements were to 
become the building blocks of the self-reliance strategy of the Lagos Plan of Action 
ratified by African leaders in 1980. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION (LPA): FROM ECONOMIC 
EXTROVERSION TO INWARD-LOOKING COLLECTIVE SELF-
RELIANCE. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
             The asymmetrical and unequal character of Africa’s economic relation with 
the industrialised world became more conspicuous in the 1970s. The multiple crises 
that hit the global economy symbolised by the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, the OPEC induced oil shocks and the resulting energy crunch, and the 
continuing stagflation of the mid 1970s, revealed the extreme vulnerability of African 
economies to external forces.154 An ECA initiated review of the development 
paradigms and strategies pursued by Africa during the early years of independence 
revealed that the continent’s performance was substantially below all the targets set 
by the United Nations Second Development Decade.155 These unsettling realities 
engendered a reassessment and redirection of Africa’s policy options – at the national 
and regional levels. 
       Consciousness of the limits of the paradigm of extroversion in Africa’s 
development strategies that emerged in the mid 1970s with the signing of the 
ECOWAS Treaty reached a turning point in 1980 with the adoption of the LPA and 
                                               
154 Asante, “Regionalism as key,” p.39. 
 
155 This review revealed that Africa’s GDP annual growth rate was 4.5% instead of the target 6%; 
its export was 2.8 percent instead of 7.0 percent; its agricultural growth rate was 1.6 percent instead of 
4.0 percent while manufacturing grew at 6.0 percent instead of the target of 8.0 percent.  Paradoxically, 
the only macroeconomic aggregate whose performance-exceeded target was import with actual growth 
rate per annum being 10 percent instead of the target 7.0 percent. For details see generally, Adedeji 
Adebayo, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and from 
the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa?” Keynote address presented at the 
African forum for envisioning Africa (Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April 2002). 
 
 84 
the Full Act of Lagos (FAL).156 The LPA departed fundamentally from earlier African 
development cooperation strategies in advocating partial disengagement from global 
economic processes and linkages and also in emphasising inward-looking, self-reliant 
and self-sustaining development.  More than any earlier African development 
initiatives, it made regional economic cooperation the centrepiece of Africa’s 
development. Moreover, in contrast to narrowly based and parallel regional schemes 
of the earlier decades, the LPA envisioned linking Africa’s five main economic 
regions into a continent wide economic space – an African common market, by the 
year 2000.157  
      Given the centrality of the LPA in Africa’s regional cooperation history and 
against the backdrop of the perception that NEPAD’s option of greater engagement 
with global economic processes constitutes a reversal of the prescriptions of the LPA, 
an understanding of the shifts contained in the NEPAD must of necessity commence 
with an evaluation of the core logic of the LPA and the context within which it was 
formulated. 
         This chapter discusses the core logic of the LPA, with a particular focus on its 
regional bent and its overall orientation to the global economy and how this sets it 
apart from earlier African economic development strategies. It also examines the 
global political and economic context within which the LPA was formulated. This is 
done within the causal framework presented in chapter 1 namely: the realities and 
context of the international political economy; the dominant international economic 
and development ideas; and the nature of North-South relations. Finally, the chapter 
                                               
        156 The Full Act of Lagos (FAL) was conceived as the implementation arm of the LPA and any 
discussion of the LPA’s self-reliance model must also refer to the FAL. For purposes of convenience 
however, I will use the LPA hereafter, to refer to both the LPA and FAL.  
 
157 See the OAU, The Final Act of Lagos (Geneva: International Institute of Labour Studies, 1981): 
99. 
 
 85 
reconstructs the continental diplomatic processes leading up to the adoption of the 
Lagos Plan of Action. 
 
3.2  THE LPA: CORE LOGIC AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION    
         The LPA represented the first continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a 
comprehensive, unified approach to the economic development of the continent.158 It 
was the offshoot of the idea that “Africa’s development could not be merely a passive 
result of the world system to which the continent had been bound by the historical 
legacies of slave trade, colonialism and the various neo-colonial associations and 
agreements such as the Lome and Yaounde Conventions with the European Economic 
Community.”159  
          It consisted of a listing of what had to be done to put the continent on a self-
sustaining growth path.160 The LPA was a short, medium and long-term programme, 
covering a broad range of issues related to the socio-economic development of the 
continent. However, a detailed examination of the contents of the LPA is not intended 
here. Rather, we focus on elements of the inward-looking economic orientations of 
the initiative and its overall regional character. These elements do not only distinguish 
the LPA from earlier African development strategies, but also define the differences 
in orientation between the LPA and the NEPAD. They are therefore, of particular 
significance for this study.  
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 3.2.1 THE LPA: UNDERGIRDING PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSPHY 
       The LPA was adopted against the backdrop of two decades of stagnation in 
output; worsening balance of payments brought about by deteriorating terms of trade; 
increasing payments for the import of high-level skills, capital goods, spare parts and 
equipment, raw material inputs, marketing, shipping and insurance services; 
widespread unemployment and mass poverty.  More importantly, it emerged in 
response to the realisation that past policies were not viable and sustainable for the 
realisation of the objectives of self-reliance, poverty eradication, reduction of 
unemployment, equitable distribution of the benefits of development and economic 
growth, sovereignty over natural resources and equitable participation in international 
decision-making processes.161 African Heads of state and Government summarised 
the background under which the LPA was formulated in the following words:  
The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has 
been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. 
Indeed, rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of 
the continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become 
more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises 
suffered by the industrialised countries. Thus, Africa is unable to point to 
any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of general well being, in 
the past twenty years. Faced with this situation, and determined to 
undertake measures for the basic restructuring of the economic base of our 
continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based 
primarily on collective self-reliance.162 
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       Formulated against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with past approaches to 
African development, the LPA was understandably conceived as an instrument for 
redressing the imbalance inherent in African economies, including their excessive 
external dependence.163 Thus, the philosophy underpinning the LPA and the FAL was 
self-reliance, at the national and inter-country levels.164 It called for the development 
of capacities and capabilities at the national and inter-country levels, to formulate and 
apply autonomous decisions, to generate and implement independent ideas, to 
identify problems and analyse them in terms of domestic, African and extra-African 
requirements for their solutions. It also emphasised the need to develop capacities and 
capabilities at national and inter-country levels to meet, albeit progressively, the 
greater parts of the region’s needs in terms of factors of production and of final goods 
and services.165 
     A corollary of the LPA’s basic philosophy of self-reliance was the concept of 
internally generated, self-sustaining development. In other words, in addition to 
basing African development and economic growth on internal factors of production, 
distribution and consumption, there was a felt need of making such development 
sustainable in terms of techniques of production, the composition of goods and 
services and of the style of development and economic growth, that was to constantly 
draw on the reserve power of the society to renew itself over time.166  
       Together, self-reliance and self-sustenance implied the need of making domestic 
human, physical and financial resources the constant stimuli for the economic growth 
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and development of the continent.167 The single theme that ran across the thirteen 
chapters of the LPA was that “Africa must actively strive to reduce its dependence on 
external nations and replace this dependence with a self-sustaining development 
strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent’s resources.”168 This 
required that African states veer dramatically from the economic paths they had 
pursued since independence and link their economic futures to those of their equally 
fragile neighbours (South-South cooperation).  
         However, self-reliance and self-sustenance in the LPA context did not mean 
autarky or complete disengagement from the global economy. Rather, it emphasised a 
meaningful redefinition of interdependence.169 This stemmed from the perception that 
from the early days of independence, African economies both individually and 
collectively through the various immediate post independence regional economic 
initiatives had been dependent on those of the North, particularly the former 
metropolitan countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The effects of this dependence had generally been negative 
and even worsened with the multiple global economic crises of the 1970s. There was 
therefore, a pressing need for a change in the nature and character of this relationship. 
 
3.2.2 OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 
         The LPA was fashioned to tackle the continent’s multifarious problems, so that 
it could not only initiate and nurture an internally generated and self-sustaining 
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development and economic growth process, but also attain national and collective 
self-reliance.170 It was designed to lay a durable foundation for internally generated, 
self-sustained processes of development and economic growth based on the twin 
principles of national and collective self-reliance. 
        The LPA emphasised the reorientation of Africa’s development strategies with 
implications for sectoral linkages, processes of planning and plan implementation, 
and participation in the development process.171 For example, for industry to function 
properly, natural resources had to receive proper attention, and transport and 
communication had to be well organised to facilitate the delivery of goods and 
services where they were needed. Its thirteen chapters therefore dealt with all 
economic and social sectors: food and agriculture; industry; natural resources; human 
resource development and utilisation; science and technology; transport and 
communications; trade and finance; economic and technical cooperation; the 
environment; least developed countries; energy; women and development; and 
development planning, statistics and population. 
         On agriculture, proceeding from the premise of gravity of the food situation in 
Africa, the LPA aimed at engendering self-sufficiency in food and a diminishing 
dependence on exports and expatriate technical assistance. Increased volumes of 
resources were to be allocated to agriculture to bring about a qualitative and 
quantitative improvement in agricultural output.172 Still within the framework of the 
strategy of limiting external dependence, the LPA cautioned against the type of 
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agricultural mechanisation that could rather increase Africa’s dependence on others. 
More importantly, emphasis was on the production for African consumption 
(markets), although African countries were urged to continue to grow export crops for 
vital foreign exchange earnings.173  
            In the area of industry, the United Nations Industrial and Development 
Organisation’s (UNIDO’s) declaration of the 1980s as “the African industrial 
Development Decade” provided the impetus.174 The LPA aimed at increasing Africa’s 
share of the world industrial production from a meagre 0.8 percent in 1980 to 1.0 
percent in the short term (up to 1985), 1.4 percent in the medium term (up to 1990) 
and 2 percent in the long term (by 2000).175 Within this time frame, it was proposed 
that at the continental level, various national industrial structures would have been 
integrated into a common continental economy. At the national level, industries were 
to be linked to one another as well as into other sectors of the economy “so as to 
promote interdependence among them and achieve harmonised industrialisation and 
overall economic development.”176 Within the LPA self-reliance philosophy, African 
countries were cautioned to select technology that was socially suitable, compatible 
with resource endowment, and that was capable of increasingly reducing Africa’s 
over dependence on the developed countries for technology.177  
       Although the need for greater cooperation and self-reliance ran through the entire 
LPA text, it was most articulate in the industry section in the series of measures that 
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had to be taken at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, to achieve the 
industrial targets laid down by the plan. At the national level for example, the LPA 
counselled individual countries: to create a machinery to coordinate and promote 
industrial cooperation between the country concerned and other countries of the sub-
region and region; and on the need for African countries to lessen their excessive 
dependence on imported industrial inputs.178  At the sub-regional and regional levels 
the LPA contended that: 
      Member states are convinced of the fundamental role of intra-African 
industrial cooperation, in all its various forms, as an instrument for 
self-reliance and acceleration of industrial development to achieve the 
Lima, target for Africa, taking into account, in particular, the 
discouraging attitude of developed countries, and of the present low 
progress in the intra-African cooperation…179  
 
In light of the centrality of intra-African cooperation in the domain of 
industrialisation, African states decided to adopt the following far-reaching measures: 
o    Preparing sub-regional and regional plans for the creation of major industrial 
complexes whose cost and production capacity would exceed national 
financial and absorptive capacities;  
 
o   Creating multinational regional or sub-regional institutions to make an 
inventory of and exploit shared national resources; 
 
o   Giving high priority to the establishment of multi-national industries in 
Africa, especially in such basic areas as metallurgy, foundry, chemicals etc., 
with high investment cost; expand bilateral industrial cooperation among 
African countries through joint ventures;  
 
o   Strengthening existing African regional institutions such as the African 
regional centre for technology; the African regional centre for engineering 
design and manufacturing; the African development fund; 
 
o  Establishing machinery to monitor industrialisation at the sub-regional level;  
o  Creating industrial cooperation areas without customs barriers;  
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o   Adopting of measures to ensure harmonisation of tax systems at the sub-
regional and regional levels in order to facilitate industrial cooperation among 
African countries;  
 
o   Creating of multi-national institutions to promote financial flows and the 
acquisition of technology to Africa; 
 
o   Undertaking measures at national, sub-regional and regional levels to 
facilitate fuller utilisation of excess industrial production capacity in Africa.180 
 
 
     The LPA’s emphasis on cooperation and integration was premised on the fact that 
the initiative had as ultimate goal the promotion of continental economic unity via the 
creation of an African economic community. This made economic integration and 
cooperation the centrepiece of the LPA. And as Browne and Cummings put it: 
‘without regionalism, the LPA collapsed both as a concept and as a strategy’.181 
Probably the most significant message in the LPA was the recognition that “Africa’s 
economic development required a far greater degree of cooperation among African 
nations than had been heretofore evident.”182 The LPA preamble emphasised that 
“efforts towards African economic integration must be pursued with renewed 
determination in order to create a continent-wide framework for the much needed 
economic cooperation for development based on self-reliance.”183 The LPA aimed at 
creating, at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, a dynamic and 
interdependent African economy that could pave the way for the establishment of an 
African common market leading to an African economic community184 
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     The approaches to planned development that emerged from the LPA twin 
principles of self-reliance and self-sustenance were premised on the thesis that in the 
circumstances of the African region at the time, and in the context of self-reliance and 
self-sustenance, the supply of natural resources and raw materials expected to be 
available for development and economic growth; and the choices of commodity and 
service composition of output was to determine the pattern of skills to be developed, 
the pattern of equipment to be imported or produced at home, and the type of 
institutional services to be organised.  
        In effect, the LPA called for fundamental restructuring of African economies, 
not only in increasing the share of goods and services, but in changing the sources of 
inputs into the process of production and distribution and the ownership of the factors 
and institutions of production and distribution.185 The LPA insisted that “Africa’s 
almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must change. Rather, Africa’s 
development and growth must be based on a combination of Africa’s considerable 
resources, her entrepreneurial, managerial and technological resources, and her 
markets (restructured and expanded), to serve her people.”186  
          In light of the fact that trade and monetary issues, constituted central elements 
in Africa’s discontent with the Post-WWII international economic order, the LPA 
resolved to make the expansion of intra-African trade the mainstay of its self-reliance 
strategy and to take measures to geographically and structurally diversify Africa’s 
trade patterns.187  
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       In the area of inter-African trade, a series of measures were recommended with 
well-defined timeframes, for the reduction and elimination of trade barriers amongst 
African states, beginning with the establishment of appropriate preferential trade 
areas within the framework of the ECA – Multinational Programming and 
Operational Centres (MULPOCS).188 This was to be followed by strengthening 
existing economic integration groupings and the creation of new ones where deemed 
desirable. The LPA also emphasized the need to explore possibilities of processing 
locally available raw materials for marketing within the African region and the 
establishment of African multinational production co-operations and joint ventures.189 
Meanwhile, to facilitate the quick and efficient movement and preservation of goods, 
the LPA recommended the establishment and improvement of the necessary transport 
and communications links among the various African states. The aforementioned 
measures were aimed at gradually reversing the ‘colonially induced’ low volume of 
trade exchanges between African states, with the ultimate ambition of establishing an 
African Common Market by 2000.190 
       In the realm of trade relations with other regions of the world, the LPA advocated 
a geographical and structural diversification of Africa’s colonial and postcolonial 
trade patterns.191 Geographically, the LPA called for a systematic exploitation and 
exploration of trade and economic cooperation potentials with other developing 
countries and regions within the framework of proposals for the establishment of a 
generalised system of trade preferences among developing countries. In other words, 
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the LPA advocated a shift from the prevalent dependent North-South trade relations, 
to presumably more balanced South-South economic relations. South-South economic 
cooperation was to be supplemented in the LPA dispensation with the expansion of 
trade and economic cooperation with the developed countries with centrally planned 
economies.192  
        Structurally, the LPA called for measures to enforce and strengthen state 
(national) control of foreign trade by way of state intervention or private indigenous 
corporations, or a combination of both.193 Meanwhile, within the ambit of calls for a 
New International Economic Order, the LPA resolved on setting up a new trading 
framework at the international level including agreement on new trading rules and 
principles covering, amongst others, structural adjustment, preferential treatment for 
developing countries, and elimination of protectionist measures that hampered access 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries to markets of 
developed countries.194 It also argued for the regulation of the operations of trans-
national corporations in the region with a view to eliminating all forms of restrictive 
business practices and controlling transfer pricing.  The ultimate goal was to increase 
Africa’s share of world trade in manufactures within the framework of the 30 percent 
target set for the developing countries as a whole.195 
     Another important area where the LPA proposed measures for restructuring to 
serve its self-reliance strategy was finance.  At the national level, it called for a 
complete restructuring and reorientation of the policies and programmes of monetary 
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and financial institutions imported into Africa (central banks, commercial banks), in 
such a way as to integrate them better in the development objectives of each African 
country.196At the sub-regional level, member states were expected to integrate their 
national monetary arrangements into sub-regional multilateral clearing and payment 
arrangements, in line with negotiations for the creation of preferential trade areas.197 
More importantly, at the regional level, the LPA envisioned strengthening the 
financial capacity of the African Development Bank (ADB), so that it could be able to 
offer more assistance to member states in their development efforts.198 It also called 
for the establishment of an African Monetary Fund and an African mutual guarantee 
and solidarity fund. These financial institutions and structures were intended to make 
African states self-reliant and less dependent on the structures and institutions of the 
Western dominated global monetary and finance order. 
        This notwithstanding, the important role of external resources for the 
implementation of the policy prescriptions of the LPA and FAL has been 
acknowledged.199 Foreign aid and technical assistance had implications for the 
viability of the LPA and the FAL. The argument was however, that self-reliance did 
not preclude relevant external assistance. The LPA expected the international 
community to assist African countries in their efforts to mobilise the necessary 
human, material and financial resources by massively transferring resources to the 
continent.200 Concretely, the LPA called for the intensification of international 
negotiations on a fundamental reform of the international monetary system; it 
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emphasised that African states take necessary steps for establishing an adequate 
international financial framework to sustain their development efforts; and appealed 
to the industrialised countries and international financial institutions to give increased 
financial assistance and aid to Africa.201 In this particular respect, the LPA, called for 
increased Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the LDCs, the softening of the 
conditions and criteria for obtaining such assistance and the cancellation of all debts 
contracted by African countries.202   
     The foregoing expectations created the impression that the initiative was only 
inward-looking in declarations, but largely externally dependent for 
implementation.203 John Ravenhill captured this perception when he argued that “for 
the most part, the plan appears to be little more than a plea for externally-financed 
self-reliance. Rather than meeting the costs of development from internally-generated 
resources, international donors are expected to foot the bills.”204 However, proponents 
of the LPA have contended that most of the resources for the attainment of the goals 
of the LPA were to be internally generated, and external resources were only a 
supplement. The LPA echoed this point by stating that: “these outside contributions 
should only supplement our own effort, they should not be the mainstay of our 
development.”205  
         The foregoing analysis shows that the LPA constituted a radical departure from 
earlier outward-oriented African development strategies. It represented a challenge to 
the nature of Africa’s links with the global economy and had as ultimate goal 
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engendering a ‘partial disengagement’ of the continent from the system.   The 
question, however, arises as to the circumstances that informed the design of such an 
arguably radical policy framework by African leaders and technocrats.  
 
3.3. THE LPA’s SELF-RELIANCE MODEL: A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 
       The LPA was the offshoot of the combined influence of the unsettling realities of 
the international political economy in terms of the constraints and limitations imposed 
on developing countries by the structures and the operational principles of the Post-
WWII trade and monetary orders; the dominant economic and development ideas as 
they tended to interpret and explain the post war global order; and the overall nature 
of North-South relations within the context of the Cold War, the lessons of the OPEC 
cartel’s concerted action and the challenge posed by the call for a new international 
economic order (NIEO). Although these external constrains were mediated by poor 
domestic institutions and policies, African leaders discounted the role of domestic 
political factors in Africa’s economic failures. They tended to believe that the removal 
of external constraints was most crucial in Africa’s development prospects. Therefore, 
the nature and character of the LPA was informed more by perceptions about the 
external environment than by considerations of the realities of the domestic 
environment. 
 
3.3.1 THE REALITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
         The Post-WWII global economic order emerged from the conviction that the 
division of the world in the 1930s into rival political and economic blocs contributed 
in the deterioration of trade, heralding a global recession that ultimately culminated in 
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WWII.206 In light of the consequences of the foreign economic policies of the 1930s, 
the need to encourage relatively free international movement of goods and capital was 
felt widely to be essential for world peace as well as global prosperity.207 It was 
towards the ends of peace and prosperity that the major Western states created two 
complementary institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
General Agreement on Tariff and trade (GATT), in 1944 and 1947 respectively.  
          These two institutions, alongside the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), founded upon liberal economic principles and ethos formed the 
foundation of multilateral efforts to prevent the political and economic consequences 
of economic nationalism that preceded WWII. Their structures and operational 
principles became the substance and overriding reality of the post World War II 
international economic order. Considering that international trade has always been the 
principal source of foreign exchange earnings for developing countries (including 
those in Africa), the functioning and subsequent decline of the post war trade and 
monetary orders had serious implications for Third World economic development 
endeavours. 
 
3.3.1a POST-WWII TRADE AND MONETARY ORDERS: STRUCTURES AND 
PRINCIPLES  
 
      The GATT is a legally binding codification of rules for the conduct of trade 
among states. Its general goal has been to maximise growth in world trade and the 
global economy through the reduction of trade barriers pursued on a non-
discriminatory basis. It has provided the international infrastructure and the locus for 
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all the major multilateral tariff negotiations since WWII. Meanwhile, the IMF was 
established to promote the stability and liberalisation of international monetary 
transactions.208 The goals of trade liberalisation inherent in the GATT would have 
been unattainable without an adequate global supply of foreign exchange and 
provisions for capital mobility to finance trade flows. The logic was that a liberal 
international economic order required the free flow of capital as well as goods.  The 
instability in the international monetary order and the shortage of liquidity were seen 
as been at the base of the trade decline, protectionism, and depression during the 
1930s.209 The IMF was therefore designed to make states internationally accountable 
to each other for their monetary policies. 
          Trade issues have long figured prominently in the political dialogue between 
less developed states and the advanced industrial ones. Less developed countries 
shared a profound sense of frustration with the international trade order that emerged 
after WWII. This frustration stemmed from a number of substantive trade practices 
and institutional characteristics of the GATT that in the view of Third World 
conspired to inhibit the development of their economies and relegated them to a 
secondary status in the global economy.210 Prominent amongst these were the tariff 
structures under the GATT.  
      Under the GATT prescriptions the general level of tariff protection was to be 
reduced through successive multilateral negotiations. The progressive lowering of 
tariffs under these circumstances was expected to stimulate international trade and 
production. Tariff reductions were to be implemented in a non-discriminatory fashion 
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in accordance with the “most-favoured-nations” (MFN) principle. This principle was 
aimed at making sure that the goods of any state in GATT entered the markets of all 
GATT members at rates of duty no less favourable than those applied to similar 
products of any country. The MFN principle was designed to accelerate the pace of 
tariff reductions and trade growth through out the world, as well as to avoid the 
creation of new preferential trade blocs protected by discriminatory tariff barriers 
except under conditions specified in the GATT.211  
         Successive rounds of negotiations under the GATT auspices reduced average 
tariffs on dutiable manufactures and semi-manufactures, to less than 5 percent 
However, the manufactured and semi-manufactured products of particular interest to 
less developed countries (such as textiles and semi-processed metal or wood products) 
typically faced tariff levels of two or even four times this average. Moreover, tariffs 
on these items were frequently ignored in the GATT negotiations. In addition, 
agriculture that is the mainstay of the economies of most developing economies faced 
a variety of trade barriers designed to protect the agricultural sector of developed 
countries.  
           More subtle aspects of tariff structures in advanced industrial states 
supplemented these explicit barriers to less developed countries’ exports. For 
example, tariff protection typically increased by stages of production, thereby 
presenting greater barriers to processed commodities than to raw materials in their 
unprocessed state. These cascading tariff structures and other trade policies of 
advanced industrialised states have been seen as imposing particularly severe barriers 
to goods that less developed countries are most capable of producing for export – 
agricultural goods, semi-processed and labour intensive consumer goods. Capital and 
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industrial goods that faced the lowest tariff barriers within the GATT dispensation 
were traditionally the exports of the industrialised states of the North.212 
         The general feeling in the less developed countries was therefore that the 
institutional characteristics of GATT contributed to these discriminatory practices 
against them, which made it difficult for them to secure trade reforms commensurate 
to their needs. The “most-favoured-nation” (MFN) principle was identified as the 
greatest problem in the GATT set-up. The MFN principle was seen as inhibiting rich 
states from granting preferential treatment to less developed countries’ exports of 
manufactured goods as a spur to their development. Hence, developing countries 
appealed for exemption from the MFN rule.213 
         Yet another inhibiting characteristic of GATT from the perspective of less 
developed countries (LDCs) was the “bargaining principle of reciprocity” underlying 
all tariff reduction negotiations. It placed the poor states at a disadvantage by the 
necessity to offer rich states an equivalent tariff concession for every tariff reduction 
they received from them. Developing states argued that reciprocity is equitable when 
applied to negotiations among states at approximately the same level of development. 
As with the MFN principle, and the whole philosophy of the Post-WWII trade order, 
“reciprocal tariff reduction was seen as a call for equal competition among 
fundamentally unequal economic units.”214 
         Although the international institutional arrangements in trade and monetary 
policies within the GATT and IMF facilitated rapid growth in trade, the benefits had 
not been distributed symmetrically across products and geographic regions. The Third 
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World in general and African states in particular, did not benefit much from the global 
growth in trade, if anything they were aggregate losers. Contrary to the logic of 
GATT and the IMF, trade problems have remained questions of high politics among 
all variety of states,215 but most especially, between the industrialised North and the 
underdeveloped South. 
         The perception in the LDCs was that the Post-WWII global trading order was a 
club created by the advanced industrialised states and managed in accordance with 
their primary interests. The conclusion was that continued participation in the liberal 
international trade order could not allow the LDCs to keep up, much less catch up, 
with the advanced industrial states (see fig. 3 below). This perception partly informed 
the LPA’s option of partial disengagement from the global economy. 
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Figure 3: LDCs and World Exports 1973-2003 (US$ billion).216 
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3.3.1b THE DECLINE OF THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE LDCs 
 
       The establishment of the Bretton Woods system ushered in an era of 
unprecedented growth in international trade and increasing global economic 
interdependence. Yet “within this global ‘Keynesianism’ lay an inherent flaw that in 
time brought down the system. The American economy became the principal engine 
of global economic growth; American monetary policy became world monetary 
policy and the outflow of dollars provided the liquidity that greased the wheels of 
commerce.”217 As other nations pegged their currencies to the dollar, a system of 
fixed exchange rates was achieved. Adjustment involved simply taking actions that 
changed the par value of a currency against the dollar. Since the dollar was the 
principal reserve currency, international liquidity became a function of America’s 
balance of payments.  
       This balance was in frequent deficit from 1959 onwards and the linchpin of the 
system was the pledge of the United States to keep the dollar convertible into gold at 
$35 per ounce.218 Understandably, the entire post WWII trade and monetary order was 
constructed on American post war hegemonic political and economic power over the 
industrialised Western world.  As long as America’s economic and political 
prominence lasted, and as long as America had no economic peer in the non-
communist world, and, to the extent that the Cold War was perceived as the most 
salient problem in international politics, the post war economic order functioned 
smoothly.219  
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         However, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, with the détente between the 
superpowers and the economic recovery and growth of former war ravaged western 
economies and that of Japan; intra-western conflicts of interests hitherto subordinated 
to the dictates of alliance cohesion began to emerge. The emergence in 1971 of the 
first US trade deficit in the twentieth century marked a watershed in America’s 
foreign economic relations and introduced an epoch of turmoil in the post war 
international economic order, with far-reaching implications for the developing world. 
The US trade and monetary policies took a decidedly more nationalistic cast. America 
less consistently shaped its own economic policies to underwrite the cost of 
maintaining an open international economic order.220 
        Arguably, the evolution in the Cold War and the economic resurgence of 
Western Europe and Japan combined to place severe strains on the cohesion among 
leading industrialised economies that held together the post war economic order. This 
culminated in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 with attendant 
ramifications for the global economy at large, and for the economies of the vulnerable 
developing world in particular. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system coincided 
with the devastating energy crisis of 1973/74 orchestrated by the Organisation of Oil 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
         The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the energy crunch of the 1970s 
caused an inflationary spiral in the industrialised world, accompanied by unparalleled 
levels of unemployment, due to the decline of industrial production. As expected, the 
non-oil producing developing countries were most hard-hit by both the energy crisis 
and the inflationary spiral of the 1970s as evidenced in their current account deficits 
(see figure 4 below).   
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Figure 4: Current account deficits of non-oil-exporting LDCs, 1973-1985 ($ billion).221 
 
 
As if this was not enough, the Western response to the multiple crises of the 1970s 
was the deepening of protectionism and increasing economic nationalism, which 
amounted to an increase in the discrimination against developing economies.222  
       It was against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with the structures and workings of 
the post-WWII international trade and monetary orders, and the impact of the multiple 
crises engendered by the economic failures of the 1970s, that the LDCs initiated 
moves for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). The 
limited outcomes of the negotiations for a new international economic order forced 
LDCs to emphasise alternative development strategies, which for the African 
continent came to be epitomised in the self-reliance strategy of the Lagos Plan of 
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Action.  However, the Third World’s call for a new international economic order and 
its outcome can only be understood within the context of North-South power relations 
in the post-WWII years. 
 
3.3.2 NORTH – SOUTH POWER RELATIONS AND THE LPA DESIGN 
 
      Our world has always been a divided world and the much-vaunted planetary unity 
has simply been a geographical metaphor. “Politically and economically, however, the 
world has always consisted of many little and unequal worlds.”223 In the 1950s and 
1960s, the world economy was simply divided into two - developed and developing. 
Since the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation of 1975/1977, the 
world economy became characterised by economic bi-polarity consisting simply of 
North and South. And although neither of the defined poles is a homogenous or 
permanent grouping, the “North” and the “South” are broadly synonymous with 
“rich” and “poor,” “developed” and  “underdeveloped.”224  
         Economic relations between the North and the South within the framework of 
the post World War II global economic order has been seen as been essentially 
asymmetrical. In the 1970s, three important developments brought to the limelight, 
the essential nature of the relationship between the world’s rich and poor. These 
developments were instrumental in defining and shaping the development options of 
the poor regions of the world, including Africa. They included the OPEC oil crises of 
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the 1970s, calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and East-West Cold 
War confrontation. 
 
3.3.2a THE OPEC INDUCED OIL CRISIS AND THE LPA DESIGN 
     The developing countries of the South have always felt entangled with the 
industrialised states of the North by a variety of asymmetrical relations, resulting 
largely from the dominant role the industrialised states exercised during the colonial 
era. Trade patterns that developed between the industrialised states and countries of 
the South during colonial times form a key historical element of this asymmetrical 
dependence.225 At independence most countries of the South were “integrated” into 
the global economy within the framework of an already established international 
division of labour, as suppliers of raw materials for the industries of the developed 
North, and as market outlets for the manufactured goods from the North. Adebayo 
Adedeji has aptly described these linkages in the particular case of the African 
countries as “hub-spoke” arrangements, with the countries of the North representing 
the hub and the poor, export-dependent African countries individually representing 
the spokes.226  
        Not only was the development of the South dependent on the North, but also, all 
global economic developments that affected the North, were bound to have serious 
implications on the dependent countries of the South. This reality became very 
manifest in 1973-74 and 1979, when the organisation of oil exporting countries 
(OPEC), initiated actions that drastically reduced the supply of oil to the world 
market, occasioning an energy crisis. It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the 
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politics of the OPEC induced energy crises. However, the OPEC cartel action had a 
three-dimensional impact on North-South relations with implications for the African 
sub-system. 
     First, the OPEC oil crisis revealed like never before the excessive dependence of 
Third World countries in general and African countries in particular, on the North and 
their vulnerability to external economic shocks. Second, the success of the OPEC 
action came to popularise the concept of strength through collective action, and 
therefore, provided a compelling case for collective “Southern” action in pursuit of 
counter-dependency ambitions. Third, with the alliance that emerged between the 
OPEC states and the less developed countries (LDCs), the LDCs found themselves in 
a position of ‘relative strength’ that emboldened them to intensify their challenge of 
the prevailing international economic order and to contemplate inward-looking, self-
reliance development strategies which in the case of Africa, was most succinctly 
articulated in the LPA.     
        The 1970s were a decade of economic upheavals and the energy crisis 
engendered by the OPEC concerted action was one of the most devastating of these 
upheavals. In many developing countries, particularly the least developed, the impact 
of the crisis was so severe that their per capita income was reduced quite 
substantially.227 John Stoessinger has contended that “if the impact of oil prices on the 
Western world was dramatic, it was devastating on the poorer nations. In 1976, for 
example, when OPEC quadrupled oil prices, the increase in the bill for the developing 
countries more than cancelled out the foreign aid they were receiving.”228 
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       The developing world in general and the weak, predominantly primary-product 
centred and external trade-dependent African economies in particular were the 
hardest-hit by the rapid sequence of energy related shocks of the 1970s.229 First, 
industrial production in the North was dependent on the cheap supply of petroleum 
energy that was, until the OPEC cartel action, a monopoly of Western controlled 
multinational oil corporations. The energy crunch forced a contraction in the 
industries of the North because of the unprecedented increases in the cost of energy. 
And since the Post-WWII economic order had made the Northern industries the 
principal outlet for the raw materials of the South, the oil induced economic squeeze 
resulted in a sharp fall in the demand for the raw materials produced by the South 
resulting in dramatic declines in prices and aggregate foreign exchange earnings and 
associated balance of payment difficulties.  
      Moreover, African countries were specialised in a narrow range of primary 
products that had little or no elasticity of supply. They could not, therefore, adjust 
their supplies in the face of the decline in demand. Meanwhile, as a result of the 
increases in the cost of production in the North, the prices of manufactured goods that 
were in high demand for development projects in the South more than quadrupled. 
Lacking the foreign exchange to pay for the much-needed manufactures, the South 
embarked on heavy borrowing, marking the beginning of the debt crisis.230 
       The Third World debt crisis originated partly from the first OPEC oil shocks of 
1973. The oil price hikes created a situation wherein, suddenly, the oil-rich nations 
earned billions of dollars – while on the other hand poor oil importing nations were 
                                               
229 Thomas M. Callaghy, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: The foreign economic relations of Sub-
Saharan African states,” in Peter Lewis (ed.), African dilemmas of development and change (Boulder: 
West view, 1998): 383. 
 
230 Julius Nyerere, “The debt bomb,” Time (January 10 1983): 46; Stoessinger, The might, p. 220. 
 
 111 
hard-pressed to pay higher prices for energy and other important imports. The practice 
of  ‘recycling petrodollars’ emerged – by which oil-rich nations deposited their excess 
wealth in the world’s major banks, which in turn lent the ‘petrodollars’ to the 
developing countries that needed to buy oil or were eager to get technology from the 
North to modernise their economies. Borrowing countries contracted ‘petrodollar’ 
loans with enthusiasm with the assurance that their economies will grow faster than 
oil prices. Besides, since international loans were mainly in dollars, and inflation in 
the United States was rising during the 1970s, borrowers (mostly developing 
countries) believed that they could repay loans in cheaper dollars.231 
        However, with the unilateral adjustment measures of the American 
administration in the mid 1970s, the American inflation was reversed, strengthening 
the dollar. Contrary to expectations, the poor borrowing countries had to pay higher 
interest rates on their loans. They found themselves unable to repay the loans, 
particularly against the backdrop of the worsening terms of trade for export 
commodities, which constituted their principal source of foreign exchange. In most 
borrowing countries, interest payments that did not even reduce the principal 
devoured more than half of the already meagre export earnings. Yet in some others, 
particularly in Latin America, debt service repayments exceeded all export revenues. 
A serious debt crunch was building up.232  
      The extreme vulnerability of the developing countries to the oil crunch of the 
1970s underscored the implications of their dependent relationship with the North. It 
equally led to the intensification of calls for a new international economic order and 
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eventually led to the formulation of alternative development initiatives, which for 
African countries was epitomised by the Lagos Plan of Action’s self-reliance strategy. 
      Although the OPEC cartel action had devastating economic effects on the 
developing world, it had the positive effect of demonstrating to Third World countries 
that they could acquire strength in their intercourse with the North, through concerted 
action. The dramatic success of OPEC between 1973 and 1979 has been described as 
a seismic event in world affairs that directly affected virtually all dimensions of 
international politics. Most Third World countries took great pleasure in seeing the 
non-western oil-producing states of OPEC wrest control over the international oil 
market from northern industrialised states and their multinationals. It ended the 
developed world’s previous domination of virtually every important dimension of 
international economic exchange.233 It therefore, emboldened Third World countries 
to contemplate other forms of collective actions to counter what they perceived as the 
exploitative and dependency enhancing post-WWII global economic division of 
labour. 
      The OPEC success enabled the developing countries to elevate North-South 
economic issues to the top of the international agenda.234 It intensified and sharpened 
the Third World’s demand for a new international economic order. More importantly, 
the close ties that developed between OPEC states and the rest of the Third World 
gave these otherwise powerless states some leverage in their interaction with the 
industrialised North.  
      Although Third World countries had been working together as a group (the Group 
of 77) since the foundation of the UN Conference on trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD) in 1964, it had previously been unable to persuade industrialised 
countries to give serious attention to its demands for global reforms. The OPEC action 
raised new concerns in the North regarding the future security of supply of raw 
materials and rendered the North more amenable to negotiations.235  
      The OPEC countries used their oil power to advance long-standing demands for 
international economic reforms of importance to all less developed countries, 
particularly in the areas of trade, aid, investment and monetary relations.236 For 
example, a few months after the oil hikes and the Arab led oil embargo of 1973, they 
led the call for convening a special session of the United Nations General Assembly 
to address the problems of raw materials and development. It was at this session that 
the “UN –Declaration on the establishment of a new International Economic Order” 
of interest to all Third World countries was passed.237 
       A further evidence of the OPEC-LDCs alliance was in OPEC’s rejection of a 
western initiative to negotiate an orderly oil production and pricing scheme in 1974. 
Rather, they insisting on and succeeded in creating a negotiation forum including 
other Third World states, the West, and OPEC states. Negotiations were based on an 
expanded agenda that addressed the gamut of less developed countries’ commodity 
trade, industrialisation, and international financing interests, in addition to oil 
production and pricing.238  
       The OPEC states linked threats for further oil price increases in late 1975 to the 
West’s willingness to negotiate seriously with the Third World within this larger 
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framework. The OPEC induced negotiations took place in Paris in the form of a 
specially created Council on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) that held 
between 1975 through 1977. While the substantive accomplishments were modest, it 
is noteworthy that it was within the OPEC induced CIEC framework that the 
industrialised North agreed to the creation of a ‘Common Fund’ as part of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTADs) Integrated Programme 
for Commodities.239 
      Another aspect of the OPEC-LDCs alliance, which served in strengthening the 
LDCs in their intercourse with the North in the 1970s, was the OPEC’s initiation of 
economic assistance to the less developed countries. The assistance was to the tune of 
US $5 billion per annum by the late 1970s. OPEC aid, as a percentage of donors’ 
gross national product (GNP), was several orders of magnitude higher than Western 
aid during the same period.240 OPEC countries, through these actions, “managed to 
forge a loose economic coalition with the Third World states and to provide the 
cutting edge in their dialogue with the industrialised states of the North over 
international economic reforms.”241  
       Although the overall financial burden placed upon oil importing less developed 
countries by the OPEC oil price increases was economically destabilising, the alliance 
between OPEC and the LDCs gave the LDCs significant leverage in their relationship 
with the powerful states of the North. This leverage gave the South the opportunity 
not only to wrest important concessions from the North, but also to adopt policies that 
were sometimes out of tune with Northern interests, and yet get away with them.  The 
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design of the LPA was in line with the OPEC inspired radicalism and ‘non-
conformism’.  
 
3.3.2b THE NIEO CAMPAIGN AND THE LPA DESIGN 
 
            The issue of a development strategy for the Third World in general and Africa 
in particular has been complex and ambiguous. The debate over a development 
paradigm for the developing world has revolved around the question of whether 
development should be conceived in accordance with the demands of the prevailing 
international order, or conversely, whether it is necessarily in conflict with it. The 
question has always been, as Samir Amin puts it, “can the international order be 
transformed and adjusted to the priority demands for Third World development, or 
conversely, can the latter only be the result of the reverse adjustment?”242 
            Against the backdrop of the perception that the post-WWII international 
economic order was both unjust and biased against the developing countries of the 
South,243 and in light of the multiple crises that emerged within the system in the 
1970s, the developing countries concluded that only a transformation of the world 
order, to incorporate their priority needs could engender genuine development. They 
conceived what became, perhaps, the most widely publicised plan for bridging the gap 
between the North and the South – the project for a new international economic order 
(NIEO).244 A detailed analysis of the NIEO Campaign is not intended here. Rather, I 
limit myself to an overview of the substance and content of the calls for a NIEO and 
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an appraisal of how the limited outcomes of the NIEO negotiations prompted African 
states to adopt the alternative policy of partial disengagement embodied in the Lagos 
Plan of Action. 
          The cleavage between periphery and centre states in the global economy was 
formalised in the United Nations Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAD) 
by a group system, in which 120 poor states (originally 77) adhered to a united 
position in making concrete proposals for the complete reform of international 
economic relations between the rich and poor states.245 During the 1970s common 
LDCs proposals for international economic reforms (first made explicit and given 
coherence by the UNCTAD) evolved to comprise a set of formal demands for a new 
international economic order.246 During much of the 1970s, the NIEO provided the 
agenda for North-South dialogue, that was however, displaced in the 1980s by an 
ascendancy of bilateralism championed particularly by the IMF and the World Bank. 
         In substance, the NIEO was the aggregated demands for economic reforms of 
interest to the LDCs. The demands were intended to bring about increased resource 
transfers from rich to poor states on improved terms and in a manner that could 
facilitate the initiation and implementation of development policies in the South.247 
The issues tabled for negotiation by the LDCs included: 
o The implementation of the UNCTAD’s Integrated Programme for 
Commodities, alongside the establishment of the Common Fund as its 
centrepiece; 
 
o The liberalisation and extension of the Generalised System of Preferences for 
LDCs exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods; 
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o Increase in LDCs’ share of the world industrial output to 25% by the year 
2000; 
 
o The establishment of a link between the creation of new special drawing rights 
in the IMF and development assistance; 
 
o Increased stabilisation of international reserves and exchange rates by 
movement away from the dollar as the linchpin of the international monetary 
system; 
 
o Increased access to IMF and commercial loans with lower interest rates, 
longer payment periods and lesser conditionalities; 
 
o A comprehensive international approach to the management of debt 
confronting the LDCs; 
 
o Conformity of advanced industrialised states with the target of 0.7% of GNP 
in official development assistance to LDCs; 
 
o Enhancement of science and technology; 
o International regulation of multinational corporations; 
o The development of enhanced research and development capacity within 
LDCs.248 
      These demands were informed by the conviction that the Northern dominated 
global economy had produced a maldistribution of income and influence at the 
expense of the South. The resource transfer that was sought in the NIEO was, in the 
view of the Third World, to eliminate the international sources of their economic and 
political weakness. Besides the call for resource transfers, the NIEO also focused on 
the establishment of new principles to guide international economic relations. 
Understandably, the NIEO was as much a demand for alteration in standards of 
conduct and norms governing economic relations as a demand for resource 
transfers.249 
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        Although the NIEO campaign hardly matched the drama of OPEC confrontations 
with the advanced industrial states and the oil multinationals, it nevertheless 
constituted an organised effort that attempted to completely transform the North’s 
established and dominated post-war economic order. The seriousness of this challenge 
was indicative of the relative power position of the South in the 1970s.  
          Because the major post-WWII international economic institutions were 
established when most Third World countries had not yet attained independence, 
these states, to enhance their position and voting power in multilateral economic 
decision making, pressed for: 1) the expansion of the membership of existing organs 
of the UNO family of institutions; 2) taking negotiations of economic importance 
from forums excluding LDCs into institutions where they were represented, and 3) 
creating entirely new international economic institutions to champion developing 
countries’ interests (such as UNCTAD, UNIDO, and the UN Commission on Trans-
national Corporations). Overall, the developing countries’ strategy consisted of 
“attempting to subordinate multilateral decision-making on economic matters in the 
IMF, IBRD, GATT, and elsewhere to the authority and supervision of organs in the 
United Nations, where less developed countries enjoyed a voting majority.”250 
           Less developed countries pressed hard to legitimise the new principles upon 
which they hoped a new world economic order had to be built through the passage of 
a number of U.N resolutions.251 Most of these resolutions pushed through the UN-
General Assembly tended to enhance the sovereignty of LDCs, and were structured to 
alter long-standing principles of international law regarding rights of foreign 
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investors, and replacing the market mechanisms with commodity agreements or 
commodity cartels in international commerce for raw materials.252 
          However, the principles advanced by the LDCs and the strategies they adopted 
for their actualisation became a bone of contention between the states of the North 
and those of the South. While the South saw the principles enshrined in the NIEO 
campaign as seeking to establish a just and equitable global order, the North 
interpreted them as an attempt for a wholesale redistribution of resources and 
political-economic power in the international system from advanced industrialised 
states of the North to countries of the Third World. The North was therefore, opposed 
to the massive restructuring of international economic institutions and the norms of 
behaviour they embodied as called for by the NIEO campaign.  
      The furthest they were willing to go was to agree to highly specific, selective 
reforms in international trade, financial, or investment relations that took into account 
particular economic needs of LDCs and over which most Northern states were in 
agreement. They essentially isolated and “domesticated” a few of the most palatable 
demands for a new international economic order on which they were willing to 
negotiate.253 And by 1979, it had become evident that the bid by the Third World for a 
NIEO was a failure. And as Adebayo Adedeji puts it: 
 
               In spite of the 6th and 7th special sessions of the UN General 
Assembly, in spite of the UNCTAD IV and V, we are no nearer to 
establishing a NIEO now than we were in 1974…one is not been 
alarmist if one says that between 1974 and now {1979} the 
international situation has gone from bad to worse.254 
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          Although the demands of the less developed countries for a far-reaching reform 
of the international economic system were not met in any comprehensive fashion, the 
continued emphasis in the NIEO performed an important agenda-setting function for 
less developed countries. “It proved the means by which Third World countries placed 
their political-economic priorities alongside Cold War issues and intra-western 
economic concerns in international diplomacy.”255 It removed Third World countries 
from the position of mere objects of world politics, to that of non-negligible actors. 
More importantly, the NIEO demands provided legitimacy and greater coherence in 
less developed countries’ regional and national foreign economic policy making. 
Indeed, it brought about increased multilateral economic cooperation among Third 
World states and emboldened unilateral bargaining by LDCs with foreign firms, 
public and private financial institutions, and advanced industrial states. It is within 
this context that the impact of the NIEO calls on Africa’s development options can be 
evaluated.  
        Although some African technocrats and scholars have argued that the issues 
raised in the NIEO negotiations were of no direct relevance to Africa’s development 
challenges,256 I contend that they played a very important role in the formulation of 
Africa’s self-reliant development strategy contained in the LPA. First, Africa’s 
peculiar situation in the global economy as the most economically backward region 
and the least prepared of all Third World regions for the NIEO invariably implied that 
if it were to benefit from the negotiations for a new international economic order, then 
it had to be well organised as a group, to be able to articulate and project its specific 
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needs and interests within the broader NIEO framework.257 Therefore, the need for 
concerted action for meaningful and fruitful participation in the NIEO negotiations 
induced greater cooperation amongst African states that eventually evolved to the 
inward-looking, collective-self reliance development strategy contained in the LPA. 
       Moreover, the failure of the NIEO negotiations clearly demonstrated to African 
countries that as the least developed region in the world, the continuation of the 
traditional patterns of economic cooperation and dependent relationship (trade and 
aid) with the prosperous industrialised states of the North was not going to help them 
become economically prosperous. To secure Africa’s long-term interests and to 
achieve the goal of economic independence, that could make their political 
independence more meaningful, African statesmen leaned on the failure of the NIEO 
campaign, to strive to put the ownership, control and management of their national 
economies in their own hands and in the hands of their citizens.258 The most concrete 
manifestation of this new African resolve was the self-reliant and self-sustenance 
agenda defined in the LPA.  
 
3.3.2c THE COLD WAR AND THE LPA DESIGN 
        The ideological cleavage between the East and the West after WWII hovered 
over all regions and countries of the globe. It became so omnipresent in the daily 
intercourse between international actors that it virtually came to be accepted as an 
axiom of international relations.259 It unavoidably became an integral element in the 
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conflict of interest between the rich countries of the North and the poor countries of 
the South. 
       The influence of Third World states on the international system could be 
measured from their three central goals: to redefine the terms of their relations with 
the former tutelary powers following their achievement of political independence; to 
build up a regional space favourable to their “milieu goals;” and to attenuate, 
individually or collectively, their subordinate position in the international system.260 
In these three situations, the former Soviet Union in the Cold War setting 
endeavoured to present itself as the “midwife” in the completion of the independence 
process of the new states, helping them maximise their territorial or regional 
positions, and posturing as the “sympathetic ally” of countries subjected to an unfair 
international order. Therefore, one of the major rules that the Soviet Union adopted 
towards the Third World countries during the Cold War was to encourage them in all 
situations with a potential for weakening Western positions, while limiting its 
commitments whenever the East-West split was not very obvious.261 
        The West headed by the USA and the East championed by the USSR became 
engaged in a contest for the loyalties of the Third World countries – with the USA 
emphasising economic and political support to regimes which it considered friendly – 
while the USSR emphasised military support to countries and insurgency movements 
which it considered most likely to advance Soviet interests. In all circumstances, both 
states put their own domestic economic systems as models for the Third World 
countries.262 The Soviet Union hoped, by supporting movements in Africa, Asia, and 
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Latin America, which were struggling against Western evils such as racism, economic 
injustices, and the last vestiges of colonialism, it could be on the winning side of 
enough conflicts so that in the long run, they could have more allies in the Third 
World than the USA, especially in areas of strategic importance.263 Therefore, during 
the Cold War, the industrial countries of the West had an interest in promoting 
economic development in the Third World. 
      To the extent that the Third World countries cared more about the political issues 
of race and colonialism, the Soviet approach earned more loyalty within the Third 
World than that of the USA. In the economic sphere, however, the combination of 
Third World scepticism about the value of adopting Soviet-styled economic measures, 
with the record of the rather limited Soviet economic aid, did hurt the Soviet Union in 
its quest for the hearts and minds of people in the developing countries. It was, 
therefore, all the more important that the industrial capitalist countries maintain an 
image at least of offering more in the economic sphere than the Soviets.264  
       As the East-West tension grew in intensity, it became imperative for the West to 
differentiate their position toward the Third World countries from the Soviet bloc. On 
the one hand, concern for Soviet involvement in specific Third World regions created 
greater willingness within Western countries to increase assistance to the affected 
regions (like in Southern Africa, Central America, and later in the Caribbean). On the 
other hand, where there was a threat to regimes which were friendly to the West, there 
was a tendency to overemphasize the importance of military aid and to overlook the 
importance of encouraging domestic social and economic reforms as a way of pre-
empting insurgency movements.  Thus, the net result of increasing East-West tension 
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was the increase in the flow of assistance to the Third World countries, even when the 
policies of these countries were not totally in line with the expectations of the West.265 
The South was therefore, in a position of relative strength during the heydays of the 
Cold War, at least, in securing aid from the West with minimum conditionality.  
        North-South relations were not limited to aid flows. Other key issues in their 
relations included; trade, monetary relations, foreign investment, differences in 
interests and outlooks resulting from the disparity and spread of industrial production 
worldwide. These issues continued to exist independently of what happened in the 
East-West relations. During the Cold War, it was in the interest of the Soviet Union to 
carry out actions that intensified and magnified the North-South conflicts by, for 
example, exacerbating differences within the capitalist industrial countries, 
dramatising the gap between the North and the South and, by so doing, facilitating 
their direct influence of the policies of the Third World through skilful diplomacy and 
military intervention. It therefore followed that it was in the interest of the West to 
insolate negotiations about changes in the regimes governing North and South 
economic relations as much as possible from issues arising from the increase in the 
East-West tension and to isolate the Soviet Union from those negotiations.266  
     Contrary to this Western design, the Third World realised that it was in their 
interest to use the increased East-West tensions as a bargaining lever in North-South 
negotiations.267 Therefore, the South did all in its power to couch their negotiations 
with the North, particularly over the establishment of a new international economic 
order, within the Cold War realities. The fear by the West of possibly losing out their 
                                               
265 Ibid. 
 
266 Ibid. pp. 150-1. 
 
267 Ibid. 
 
 125 
Third World allies to the Soviet camp encouraged them to grant some concessions to 
the South, irrespective of how minimal they were. 
       The Cold War global environment was not entirely adverse to the interests of the 
Third World in general, and Africa in particular. Despite being ‘squeezed’ by the 
forces of the two blocs, which discouraged autonomous social change, and despite 
intensification of internal conflicts due to external intervention, Third World countries 
were able to derive some benefits from the rivalry between the two camps in the Cold 
War.268 Besides enabling them to exercise some degree of autonomy, the Cold War 
also allowed Third World countries the latitude to exert some influence on the 
international system. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations 
General Assembly, the UNCTAD, and UNIDO were among some of the international 
forums that the developing countries used in their efforts to influence the global 
agenda and to participate in the global decision-making process.269  
        The Non-Aligned Movement, founded by the Third World under the dictates of 
the Cold War, to assert their neutrality and independence from the opposing camps in 
the East-West confrontation became a powerful instrument of Third World solidarity 
and strength in its relationship with the rest of the world. This was despite the fact that 
in reality, most developing countries were sacked into one side or the other of the 
ideological divide. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, the Third World presented itself as a 
single bloc despite the evident disparities between different regions and states within 
regions. It is worthy of note that this helped to probe up the African region, which left 
on its own was about the most backward and weakest regions of the globe. 
     The European Economic Community-Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (EEC-ACP) 
agreements, and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) of the GATT were 
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some of the concessions of the Cold War era from which some African states derived 
modest benefits. Although some of these concessions have been seen as perpetuating 
the asymmetries between the North and the South, the ability of the South to wrest 
them nevertheless, showed that the South was in a non-negligible bargaining power 
position vis a vis the North in the 1970s.  
       This position of relative strength, derived mainly from the solidarity between 
Third World countries under the edges of the Non-Aligned Movement, support from 
the Organisation of Petroleum exporting Countries (OPEC), and the ability to outplay 
the East against the West in the Cold War. All these emboldened Third World states 
in general and Africa in particular, to contemplate and adopt inward-looking 
development strategies, that were not in tune with Western dictates, and still expect to 
get support from the west. The LPA’s self-reliance strategy could be seen to have 
partly originated from the combined logics of the global realities of the late 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
3.3.3 PREVALENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
IDEAS IN THE 1960S AND 1970S 
 
      Prevalent economic and development ideas in the 1960s and 1970s also had a 
great influence on the design of the Lagos Plan of Action and its self-reliant approach 
to development. To begin with, the economic and development ideas behind the 
structures and operations of the post-WWII international economic order were 
dominantly of the liberal and classical Marxist (modernisation) genre. These strands 
of thought tended to see development as a process by which economic growth was 
diffused from the advanced industrialised states, to the backward traditional societies. 
Drawing upon historical lessons of European development, modernisation theorists 
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evolved an archetypal model of modernity, counterposed to a generic image of 
traditional society.270  
       Not only did modernisation theory pose a dichotomy between traditional and 
modern societies, it also indicated a unidirectional pattern of change – from traditional 
to modern attributes. The evolution of the world was viewed as diffusing the process 
of economic growth from advanced to traditional economies. The less developed 
economies were to be incorporated into the world economy and transformed from 
traditional to modern economies through the flow of trade, technology and 
investment.271  
        Modernisation theory tied the development of Third World countries to 
engagement in the global capitalist system. It was under the dictates of modernisation 
prescriptions that most Third World countries, particularly those of Africa, adopted 
development strategies that favoured external trade, transfer of foreign technology and 
other development stimuli including hiring expatriate manpower. Within the same 
logic African states at independence adopted development policies that were virtually 
imitative of western development patterns. This was particularly the case with early 
economic integration initiatives that were tailored to suit the track model of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) – from free trade areas, through customs 
unions and common markets to economic communities. African development 
strategies from the period of independence, to the turn of the 1970s were anchored on 
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development ideas and theories that were designed to rationalise the colonial patterns 
of production.272  
      Although most Third World countries had attained political independence by the 
1960s, and despite their adoption of the prescriptions of the modernisation theories, it 
was realised by the turn of the 1970s that development had eluded them. Most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Asia, the Middle East continued to be 
economically and technologically dependent – exporting mainly raw materials in 
exchange for manufactured goods. Rather than progressing into the higher stages of 
economic development in line with the projections of modernisation theories, most of 
these countries instead increased their reliance on advanced industrialised countries 
for capital, technology and even food. This situation gave rise to a rash of radical 
ideas about the development options and strategies of the developing world. This new 
thinking about Third World development gave birth to what came to be known as 
underdevelopment theories. 273 
       In contrast to the modernisation thesis, underdevelopment theory – whether in its 
structuralism or dependency versions - sees the operation of the world economy as 
detrimental to the interests of the less developed countries, in both the short and long 
run.274 The essence of underdevelopment theory is that the international capitalist 
economy operates systematically to underdevelop and distort the economies of the 
less developed economies. The rich who control the world economy were seen as 
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been responsible for the poverty of the Third World due to what Arghiri Emmanuel, 
has called unequal exchange – founded on the bias in the terms of trade in favour of 
the developed world.275 In other words, the international trading system was perceived 
as been inherently skewed toward entrenching the interests of the developed North 
and dooming the less developed South through inequitable commodity exchange to 
perpetual dependency.276 
      The seeming lack of Third World development was first addressed by the research 
of scholars like Ragnar Nurkse, Gunner Myrdal and Hans Singer.277 Their findings 
became closely identified with the work of the United Nations Commission for Latin 
America (UNCLA), under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, in what became known as 
the structuralist theory of underdevelopment.278 Structuralists focused on those 
features of the world economy that they alleged restricted the development prospects 
of less LDCs, with a particular emphasis on the deteriorating terms of trade for LDCs’ 
commodity exports. They concluded that the solution to the problems of the less 
developed countries was to be found in the reform of the international economy and 
the adoption of a development strategy based on import substitution. This structuralist 
prescription formed the theoretical base of the Third World championed NIEO 
campaign. It also spurred the adoption of policies of import substitution 
industrialisation by Third World countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
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structuralist import substitution industrialisation policy turned out to be 
counterproductive279 and developed countries largely ignored the call for a NIEO.280 
       In response to the apparent failure of the structuralist diagnosis and prescriptions 
by the late 1960s and 1970s and in light of the deepening economic problems of the 
LDCs, a more radical interpretation of, and solution to, the development predicaments 
of the Third World was evolved. This new radical formulation became known as the 
dependency theory. Dependency theory challenged the premises of both 
modernisation and structuralist theories. They proceeded from the logic that 
developing countries had a separate history from that of the industrialised capitalist 
states and that they were dominated by Western imperialism for at least a century 
before independence. Moreover, they attained independence in a world already 
stratified and dominated by the advanced industrialised countries. The principal 
premise of the dependency theory was therefore, the struggle between the North and 
the South in a stratified world.281 
        Dependency theory presents a single international model in which two spheres, 
core and periphery, are pitched in an unequal relationship. The core countries of the 
North grow wealthier by exploiting and subordinating the resources, markets and 
labour of the peripheral countries of the South. From this logic of exploitation and 
subordination, the underdevelopment of the Third World has been attributed mainly to 
the structures of the international system. 282 While liberals have defined 
underdevelopment as a condition in which most nations find themselves because they 
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have not kept up with the front-runners, dependency theorists have seen it as a process 
in which the LDCs are caught because of the inherent relationship between developed 
and underdeveloped nations.283 
       The conclusion of the dependency theory was that since the chronic 
underdevelopment of the Third World could only be explained in global terms, the 
primary objective for developing countries was to change their relation to the 
international system. They therefore admonished countries of the South to minimise 
exploitative linkages with the North and rather take collective action to change the 
dynamics of the international system. From the perspective of the radical dependency 
theorist, for poor states to escape from the economic exploitation that has condemned 
them to poverty, they needed to interrupt the existing linkages between centre and 
periphery – indeed to rebel against the existing global system.284 
       Although dependency theory has been criticised for being economically 
reductionist, and therefore, inadequate in explaining and addressing specific 
disaggregate realities on the ground, in the Third World, it was arguably the most 
popular and dependable interpretation of the Third World situation in the 1970s.285 It 
therefore, had great influence in the formulation collective self-reliance developing 
strategies in the developing world in the late 1970s. Within this context, the LPA’s 
twin philosophy of collective self-reliance and self-sustenance – partial 
disengagement from a supposedly unfavourable international political economy could 
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be seen as the most far-reaching application of dependency ideas, though not in their 
crude autarchic form. 
        Overall, a combination of the unsettling realities of the post-World War Two 
global economic order, the asymmetrically nature of North-South relations and the 
influence of the dominant economic and development ideas of the late 1960s and 
1970s, informed Africa’s formulation of an inward-looking self reliant development 
strategy contained in the LPA. But how did African statesmen and technocrats go 
about the formulating what came to be known as the Lagos Plan of Action? 
 
3.4 THE LPA: UNDERLYING INTER-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC PROCESS 
       By the late 1970s, a development gap emerged amongst African states, as the 
continent was slowly dividing into semi-peripheral and peripheral states. The former, 
relatively affluent and comparatively successful economies (Ivory Coast, Kenya and 
Malawi; and oil-exporting states like Algeria, Gabon and Nigeria) were more inclined 
to acquiesce to continued engagement in the liberal global political economy despite 
the devastating effects of the global economic crises of the 1970s. The latter (a 
majority of African states), however, were most hard-pressed by the global economic 
slump and were inclined to be supportive of disengagement from the global economic 
order.286  
      In light of the apparent divergence of interests amongst African states, it was 
certain that formulating a common approach to resolve the continent’s economic 
development dilemmas was challenging. It would therefore be of interest to ‘unpack’ 
the processes that made possible the emergence of an African consensus that 
produced the policy of partial disengagement, self-reliance and self-sustenance 
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contained in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Full Act of Lagos (FAL) in 
1980. This section gives an account of the various actions and efforts of the UNO, the 
OAU, the ECA technocrats, and African leaders that culminated in the formulation of 
the LPA and the FAL.  
       The struggle to formulate an alternative economic strategy for the economic 
decolonisation of Africa can be traced to the creation of the Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) in 1958. However, the impetus for the series of actions that 
eventually led to the Monrovia Strategy in 1979 and the LPA in 1980 can be located 
in1975. Indeed, the LPA can be seen as the culmination of a four year long effort, 
initiated and led by the Economic Commission for Africa, together with the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to review the development paradigms and 
strategies that Africa had pursued since independence in the 1960s.287 The assessment 
showed that Africa faced a serious development crisis and that of the five regions of 
the globe (Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and 
West Asia) performance in the African region was the worst.288 
         Against this backdrop and within the context of the NIEO campaign, “it became 
imperative that Africa should first put its house in order otherwise, it risked remaining 
marginalized and “peripherised” even in a reconstructed international economy.”289 
Accordingly, in 1976 the ECA crafted its first landmark document entitled, The 
Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the NIEO in Africa. This 
became the intellectual and theoretical foundation of Africa’s self-reliant and self-
                                               
287 Adebayo, “From the LPA,” p. 5.  
 
288 U.N General Assembly Resolution 3101 (S.vi) and 3202 (S.vi) of May 1974 cited in Senghor, 
Towards a dynamic, p. 309. 
 
289 Adebayo, “From the LPA,” p. 7; Adebayo, “The evolution of the Monrovia,” p.  327. 
 
 134 
sustenance strategy, upon which the Monrovia Strategy (1979), the Lagos Plan of 
Action (1980) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980), were subsequently built.290  
        The Revised Framework argued that a credible and appropriate development 
strategy for Africa must satisfy four fundamental principles: self-reliance; self-
sustenance; the democratisation of the development process; and a fair and just 
distribution of the fruits of development through the progressive eradication of 
unemployment and mass poverty.291 The ECA technocrats evolved a sort of self-
reliant development charter for the continent that had as key elements: 
o The internalisation of the forces of demand that determine the direction of 
development and economic growth process, including the patterns of output; 
 
o Increasing substitution of domestic factor inputs for external factor inputs; 
o Increasing the participation of the mass of the people in the production and 
consumption of the social product; and 
 
o Increasing self-sustenance through the promotion of the patterns and process 
of a holistic human development in which the different sectors, and 
programmes and activities mutually supported and reinforced each other, so 
that when related to the internalisation of the forces of demand and supply, the 
whole economic, social and political system develops its own internal 
dynamics.292 
 
     The revised framework was an articulation of the ECA technocrats’ idea of the 
kind of continent they envisaged for the African peoples and the development 
strategy, which had to be adopted to establish it. Their basic proposition was that an 
increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustaining development was a most 
important accompaniment of political independence since it was to lead to economic 
decolonisation. The argument was that a development strategy based on the four 
pillars – self-reliance, self-sustenance, democratisation of the development process, 
                                               
290 Ibid. 328; Adebayo, “From the LPA,” p. 7; 
  
291 Adebayo, “The evolution of the Monrovia,” pp. 328-331. 
 
292 Adebayo, “From the LPA,” p. 7. 
 
 135 
and the fair distribution of the fruits of development, called for a complete departure 
from the past. It was to be inward-looking rather than externally-oriented. The ECA 
therefore, embarked on “evolving and promoting a development strategy and 
ideology, which was to be genuinely African and not imitative of western models as 
had hitherto been the case.”293 
       Recognising that African states and their governments were the principal actors in 
the eventual operationalisation of the Revised Framework, the ECA technocrats were 
resolved on having it endorsed by the relevant African states’ auspices. Accordingly, 
in 1976, African ministers of planning and finance (who constituted the Executive 
Committee of the ECA) approved the Revised Framework. In June 1977, the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU also endorsed it. The ECA 
technocrats interpreted this endorsement as marking the beginning of a breakthrough 
in bringing about Africa’s long cherished self-reliant development strategy. However, 
the awareness persisted that a lot still had to be done.294 
      In light of this awareness, between 1976 and 1979, the ideas contained in the 
Revised Framework were expanded and improved upon through a series of internal 
ECA secretariat meetings and conferences, alongside a number of specialised 
consultations such as the “OAU-ECA Colloquium on Perspectives of Development 
and Economic Growth in Africa up to the year 2000,” held in Monrovia in February 
1979 and the Joint ECA-UNEP, seminar on “Alternative Patterns of Development and 
Life Styles for the African Region,” held in Addis Ababa in March 1979.295  
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     The continuous search for a genuinely African approach to development was given 
a great spur by the need to prepare the International Development Strategy for the 
Third UN-Development Decade (IDS).296 To ensure that Africa played an important 
role in determining the contents and the scope of the international development 
strategy for the decade of the 1980s, and to avoid been left out as in the previous 
decades, the ECA technocrats, together with African ministers of Planning and 
Development agreed to prepare a development strategy for Africa.  
        With valuable inputs from proposals worked out by a number of sectoral 
conferences (such as the conference of African ministers of industry, the conference 
of African ministers of trade and the conference of African ministers of transport, 
communications and planning),297 an African strategy was finalised during the ECA 
conference of ministers of development and planning and the fourteenth session of the 
commission held in Rabat, Morocco, in March 1979.298 After the preparation of the 
African Strategy, the African ministers of planning and development also resolved to 
prepare a “Declaration of Commitments of the Heads of State and Government of the 
OAU on Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective self-reliance in Social 
and Economic Development for the Establishment of a NIEO” (ECA Resolution 
(XIV)). These two documents were then presented to African heads of state and 
government during their meeting in Monrovia in July 1979. Upon the adoption of 
both the Strategy and the Declaration of Commitments by the African heads of state 
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and government in Monrovia, they became known as the “Monrovia Strategy and the 
Monrovia Declaration of Commitments respectively.”299 
     Meanwhile, during the Monrovia meeting, and in light of the critical importance of 
the two documents, the African Heads of State agreed to hold an extra-ordinary 
Summit devoted exclusively to economic issues in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980.  
More importantly, they commissioned the secretary general of the OAU, in 
collaboration with the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, 
“to draw up annually specific programmes and measures for economic cooperation on 
sub-regional, regional and continental basis.”300 Pursuant to this charge, the OAU and 
the UN-ECA proceeded to give substance to the Monrovia Declaration, by preparing a 
plan of action for its implementation.  
           During the ECA Conference of Ministers in Addis Ababa, in April 1980, the 
African ministers and the ECA technocrats came up with a detailed Plan of Action for 
endorsement by African heads of state and government, titled “The plan of Action for 
the implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development of 
Africa.”301 This document was adopted by the African leaders, at their Economic 
Summit in Lagos later in April, and it became known as the “Lagos Plan of Action for 
the Economic Development of Africa 1980 – 2000.”302 The LPA was accompanied by 
the Full Act of Lagos, which consisted of a statement of the kinds of economic and 
political institutions and agreements that were to be put in place for the effective 
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realisation of the principles, programmes and projects enunciated in the LPA.303 The 
Plan was also presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its eleventh 
special session in September 1980 and it became an integral part of the International 
Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.304 
 
CONCLUSION 
          This chapter has presented the core logic and underlying principles of the LPA. 
It has demonstrated that the LPA was a radical development policy framework that 
departed fundamentally from earlier strategies for the development of the continent. It 
has identified the LPA’s prescription for partial disengagement from the global 
economy and its emphasis on broad-based regional integration as the key elements of 
the initiative’s overall strategy of inward-looking, self-reliant and self-sustaining 
development.  
      The chapter has also examined the context within which this admittedly 
revolutionary development cooperation framework was formulated. The account 
revealed that the LPA model was crafted against the backdrop of African countries’ 
perceptions of vulnerability to global economic forces. This is consistent with the 
central argument that the design of Africa’s regional initiatives is informed by 
perceptions of external vulnerability.  
      In line with my causal framework, I focused on the influence of prevailing 
international realities on the formulation of the LPA and its inward-looking self-
reliance regional development strategy.  The cumulative effects of the prevailing 
realities of the international political economy (particularly the structures and 
operational principles of the GATT and IMF and the impact of their eventual 
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decline); the unbalanced nature of North-South relations (as reflected by the effects of 
the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s, the NIEO campaign, and the Cold War 
environment); and the dominant international economic and development ideas 
combined to bring about a review of Africa’s development options as reflected in the 
LPA. The LPA was largely the product of generalised revulsion against excessive 
dependence on the outside world. It was facilitated by the success of the OPEC cartel 
concerted action, and the position of relative power in which the Third World found 
itself because of the exigencies of the Cold War.  
        The chapter has also attempted to reconstruct the diplomatic processes leading up 
to the establishment of the LPA and its associated FAL. Although African states 
lacked homogeneity in their economic and political outlook in the 1970s, they were 
able to evolve a unified approach to their economic development, largely because of 
the gravity of the crisis that faced the continent. The diplomatic efforts to bring about 
the LPA were facilitated by the technocrats of the Economic Commission for Africa, 
the revived Pan-Africanist spirit within the OAU and amongst African leaders. 
Emerging from dissatisfaction with the continent’s dependent relations with the 
North, and against the backdrop of a feeling that past efforts to engendered African 
development had faltered because they were imitative of foreign models, the LPA 
content was essentially a prescription to break away from the past and to be truly 
inward-looking, self-reliant and self-sustaining. The extent to which African states 
and their leadership translated the good intentions contained in the LPA and the FAL 
into concrete reality is the object of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FROM LAGOS TO ABUJA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE  
 
           “Regional self-reliance has been given the same symbolic status in the 1980s as 
was accorded Pan-Africanism in the 1960s: a concept to which lip service is paid 
but one which is largely ignored when it comes to policy implementation.”  (John 
Ravenhill, 1986: ) 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
        The LPA’s regional self-reliance strategy became the most popularised element 
of Africa’s international relations from the 1980s onwards, forming the hub of all 
African economic development cooperation endeavours. It envisioned the broadening 
of existing regional economic groupings and creating new ones with the ultimate goal 
of establishing a continent-wide economic community.  
      However, despite the establishment and broadening of regional economic 
communities (RECs), and despite the signing of the famous Abuja Treaty in 1991 
establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), the record of achievement of 
collective self-reliance remained disappointing. From the signing of the LPA in 1980, 
to the establishment of the AEC in 1991 and beyond, the pace and pattern of socio-
economic and political development in the continent did not improve.305 If anything, 
Africa performed even worse in the 1980s and 1990s than it did in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
      This chapter appraises the level of implementation of the LPA as a prelude to 
comprehending the policy shifts contained in the NEPAD. The chapter investigates 
the reasons why despite the potential benefits of the LPA, African governments were 
unwilling to uphold its prescriptions.  
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        I argue that the authors of the LPA assumed that if policies could be shown to be 
welfare enhancing, African governments could be relied upon to implement them 
faithfully.  Therefore, leaning on the assumption that the LPA’s policy prescriptions 
portended socio-economic gains for African states and their peoples, they overlooked 
the possible impact of African countries’ domestic environments on the willingness of 
their governments to uphold its prescriptions.   
       However, African governments faced urgent domestic political and economic 
difficulties that most of the time, threatened their political futures. These difficulties 
and the threats they posed provided the lens through which they viewed the collective 
self-reliance agenda of the LPA - especially as the potential benefits of the LPA were 
somewhat uncertain and of a long-term character.  Because of the short time horizons 
of politically insecure African governments, they were very vulnerable to temptations 
to renege on long-term regional commitments within the LPA framework. 
       I argue further that individual African government’s commitment to the LPA 
depended on how many other governments demonstrated effective commitment to the 
initiative. Any African government that perceived other governments’ commitment as 
unlikely was also less likely to be committed. No African government was willing to 
see other governments reap the benefits of regional initiatives without making the 
necessary sacrifices like them. This created collective action problems, with each 
state pinning its actions on the expected actions of others. Under these circumstances, 
regional restraint mechanisms that could “lock in” African governments’ 
commitments to implementation were imperative. The numerous regional institutions 
established on the heels of the LPA lacked such incentives. 
        The rest of the chapter focuses on two broad dimensions of the problem of the 
low level of implementation of the LPA.  First, it examines the interplay between the 
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long-term benefits of the LPA and the perceived short-term costs for African 
governments; and second, it shows how inadequate institutional mechanisms 
accentuated collective action problems and contributed to the poor outcomes of the 
LPA model. 
 
4.2 THE LPA MODEL: LONG-TERM GAINS AND PERCIEVED SHORT-
TERM COSTS 
 
            Although the LPA was informed by perceptions of the exploitative nature of 
the global liberal economic system, and despite its advocacy for protectionism against 
the system, the relationship among African states within the envisaged regional 
communities was hinged on liberal economic principles of free trade. More 
importantly, the LPA aimed ultimately at restructuring and diversifying African 
countries’ economies, to make them more competitive and less vulnerable to external 
economic fluctuations.  Regional trade liberalisation and economic restructuring were 
both potentially beneficial to African economies. However, they contained elements 
perceived by African governments as constituting political costs, and this informed 
their attitude towards the initiative. 
       Trade liberalisation for example, involved the loss of tariff revenues that in most 
cases was the principal source of revenue for African governments. The loss of 
revenue had the undesired effect of constricting African governments’ capacity to 
deliver on the social needs of their populations and gratifying political allies. This 
was perceived as laying the seeds for ‘destabilising’ political contestation.  
      Meanwhile, economic restructuring and diversification especially on a regional 
scale were long-term strategies that involved diverse cooperation and distributional 
problems with political implications for African governments. Moreover, the onset of 
a multidimensional economic crisis in the continent in the 1980s and the introduction 
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of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) further complicated the political 
environment within which African governments operated. They faced the dilemma of 
making a choice between the long-term benefits of LPA and readily available 
financial resources from the Bretton Woods Institutions. This choice too had major 
political implications. 
           To place the interplay between the potential socio-economic benefits of the 
LPA and the underlying political forces behind African governments’ uncooperative 
behaviour into perspective, I focus on four issue-areas: (i) trade liberalisation and 
market expansion (ii) economic restructuring and diversification (iii) distributional 
problems of real or perceived gains of cooperation; and (iv) the opportunity costs 
involved in the choice between the prescriptions of the LPA and those of SAPs. My 
focus on these four issue-areas has been informed by the fact that they all involved 
trade-offs between economic gains and perceived political sacrifices for African 
governments, consistent with our political economy framework. Moreover, the 
choices that African leaders eventually made in all the instances clearly reflected their 
prioritisation of short-term national and individual political survival concerns over the 
long-term economic development of the continent. 
 
4.2.1 ISSUES OF TRADE LIBERALISATION AND MARKET EXPANSION 
             The conventional rationale for regionalism in Africa has been that of 
overcoming the constraints of fragmentation and smallness of the continent’s 
economic space. The LPA undertook to resolve this handicap by building broader 
regional economic communities (RECs) and ultimately establishing a continent-wide 
economic space. The benefits of a larger economic space are couched on the 
proposition of liberal economic theory that, for production of goods to be competitive 
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and profitable, there is need for large-scale production – which can only be achieved 
through the pulling together of resources and division of labour.306 
     This is particularly relevant to the characteristically small economies of individual 
African states, which do not have the economic infrastructure to produce in large 
volumes, nor the required population size to absorb the output of large-scale 
production particularly in the manufacturing sectors that involve significant fixed 
cost.307 Under such circumstances, large-scale production would only become feasible 
when an export market (integrated sub-regional and continental markets) is added to 
the domestic market (individual African states’ national markets), and labour is 
divided among the factors of production of countries, which do not have any barriers 
to trade among themselves.308  
       The LPA defined a ‘protectionist’ and preferential regional trading system whose 
basic strategy was to rely on export-led growth and specialisation, but in African 
markets rather than those of industrialised countries.309 The various sub-regional 
economic groupings envisaged in the LPA aimed at stimulating intra-community 
trade. They undertook to “gradually reduce and eventually abolish customs duties and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), so as to build potentially larger markets that were to be 
later merged to form an African common market.”310 
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         In situations where there is the free movement of labour and capital, and where 
states share common institutions and jointly formulate policies (as envisioned in the 
LPA and the various treaties establishing the RECs – ECOWAS, ECCAS, PTA), 
enterprises were likely to be pressed to copy best production practices. Under such 
conditions, hitherto protected producers had to either initiate new production or 
emulate more competitive producers to survive.311 Overall, larger African markets 
were to stimulate economic growth; with the potential of attracting much needed 
foreign direct capital investment.312 The aggregate long-term benefit of the LPA’s 
broader sub-regional and continental markets was the provision of goods and services 
at lower prices. 
     Although the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods, services and 
factors of production among member states of the LPA’s RECs was to unleash 
tremendous forces that could drive intra-African industrialisation and development at 
a faster pace,313 it invariably implied depriving individual African economies of one 
of their most vital sources of revenue. The loss of tariffs had political implications in 
terms of curtailing the financial capability of African governments to provide 
immediate socio-economic amenities to their populations, satisfy political 
constituencies and to fulfil other state functions.314  
      Although in the long run regional trade liberalisation was to bring greater welfare 
benefits to African peoples, the politically insecure African governments were wary 
of the reactions of the various national constituencies to the short-term hardships 
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likely to follow the regional trade liberalisation prescribed in the LPA. They 
perceived the trade liberalisation prescriptions of the LPA as a serious political 
gamble that they could honestly not afford. 
       Moreover, the LPA’s strategy of making the development of domestic markets 
dependent on the nature and scope of regional integration processes, through shared 
market institutions and jointly formulated policies, was perceived as a threatening 
encroachment into the discretionary authority of individual African governments over 
economic policy making. African governments needed to retain unfettered control 
over national economic policy making to be able to sustain neo-patrimonial networks 
that were vital for their continued political survival. 
       Additionally, the LPA’s regional trade liberalisation strategy raised static issues 
of trade creation and trade diversion. Customs union theory posits that although the 
formation of customs unions will lead to increased trade between union members, 
however, the desirability (profitability) of this would depend on the balance between 
trade creation and trade diversion.315 Trade creation consists of the shifting of 
production of some goods from a less efficient to a more efficient member of the 
union, while trade diversion consists of the shifting of production from an efficient 
non-union member to a less efficient union member.316  
         Scholars of Third World economic regionalism have argued that in customs 
unions arrangements amongst developing countries (especially those of Africa), trade 
diversion (at least in the short run), obviously prevails over trade creation and that on 
the basis of this balance of forces, such unions are not profitable and should be 
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discouraged.317 Beyond mere considerations of lack of profitability, however, trade 
creation and trade diversion carried potential political implications that could be 
useful in explaining the uncooperative behaviour of African governments towards the 
LPA. 
      To begin with, the shift of production from less efficient regional producers to the 
more efficient ones though perceived in customs union theory literature as 
constituting trade creation and as been welfare enhancing, however, was a potential 
threat to the economies of weaker member countries of the LPA envisaged economic 
unions. This was particularly so, in light of the production of similar goods and the 
existence of similar industrial structures in most Africa countries that made the 
“reallocation gains” expected from customs unions and other free trade arrangements 
hard to come by.318  
        African governments with weaker economies were apprehensive they would be 
losers in the envisaged regional schemes. Moreover, they feared that such liberal 
market policies could unite local owners of capital and labour against their 
governments. Fearful of the prospects of threatening labour and political unrest, 
African governments were reluctant to genuinely commit to the kind of regional 
economic liberalisation defined in the LPA. 
          Meanwhile, in light of the LPA’s prescription of inward-looking regionalism, 
the trend would have been towards shifting production from more efficient producers 
of the industrialised world to less efficient African regional producers – trade 
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diversion. Classical liberal economic analysis has focused largely on the efficiency 
and welfare implications of trade diversion.319The kind of trade diversion that was to 
be engendered by the inward-looking regionalism of the LPA was to have far-
reaching political implications, especially in African countries’ trade relations with 
traditional Northern partners. 
          African states’ existing external trade was usually larger relative to their 
domestic production and also, their intra-group trade was characteristically a minor 
component of their total trade.320The cost of redirecting trade, from traditional 
external partners to regional neighbours as warranted by the LPA, was potentially 
costly for most African states. This, despite the fact that “many politicians and 
academics considered such trade diversion to be good in itself simply because it 
symbolised self-reliance.”321  
      A rigorous implementation of the LPA’s inward-oriented strategy would have, for 
example, necessitated a review of most of the preferential trade arrangements 
between individual or groups of African states and the industrialised countries of the 
North. Good examples of such arrangements included the trade arrangements between 
African states and the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD); the arrangements within the framework of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Economic Community (ACP-EEC) 
as defined by the Lome conventions; and the common currency arrangements 
between France and her former colonies of West and Central Africa (Franc zone). 
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       According to the LPA, all these arrangements represented a perpetuation of the 
traditional exploitative ties with the industrialised world322 and needed to be replaced 
with inward-looking African arrangements or by trade relations with other Third 
World countries within the ambit of South-South cooperation.323 In light of the heavy 
reliance of most African states on tariffs and other forms of foreign exchange 
earnings derived from trade with countries of the North for their national economic 
survival, the kind of trade diversion (redirection) required by the LPA inward-looking 
regionalism was unlikely to go beyond mere rhetoric. More so, as most African states 
entered the 1980s as debtor countries, that needed even more assistance from the 
North, not only to repay their debts, but for the execution of national development 
projects. 
          Overall, the trade liberalisation and market expansion strategies defined in the 
LPA had potential socio-economic benefits for African states in the long run. 
However, they were associated with short-term economic and political costs, which 
were perceived by African governments to be of greater import both for the survival 
of their nations and for their immediate personal political future. Particularly 
important in African governments’ consideration were issues of revenue losses as a 
result of tariff suppression, the closure of supposedly less efficient national industries 
and the possible unrests due to layoffs, the political and economic costs of diverting 
trade from traditional Northern partners to regional members. These factors combined 
to serve as incentives for African governments to renege on regional cooperation 
commitments – hence the low level of achievement of the LPA model. 
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 4.2.2 ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND DIVERSIFICATION: TIME 
HORIZON PROBLEMS 
 
        Regional economic cooperation and integration in Africa is in some sense, a 
strategy for transforming the continent’s backward production and distribution 
structures.324 The LPA identified the overall lopsided nature of Africa’s economic 
structures - in terms of the volume of goods and services produced, the sources of 
inputs for industry, the direction of outputs and the ownership of the factors and 
institutions of production, and distribution as largely been responsible for the low 
level of cooperation and development in the continent.325   
      The LPA resolved to undertake far-reaching restructuring and diversification of 
African economies, at the national and regional levels so as to make them more 
complementary and competitive and, by so doing, to increase the “reallocation gains” 
of increased intra-African integration. However, the economic transformation and 
diversification envisaged in the LPA did not consist of short term marginal changes; 
rather, they were profound structural changes whose net effect could only be felt after 
a fairly long period of time.  
        Moreover, African governments were required to commit huge resources to 
these transformation efforts. Within the self-reliance framework, these resources 
could only be raised through higher taxes and by postponing the provision of basic 
social amenities to the people, with political implications. The economic restructuring 
and diversification defined in the LPA thus created a time-horizon problem for 
African governments and African governments appeared to be more concerned about 
                                               
      324 See Asante, Regionalism and Africa, p. 46; Adedeji Adebayo, “Collective self-reliance in 
developing Africa: Scope, prospects and problems,” International Conference of the Economic 
Community of West African States – ECOWAS (Lagos, 23 March, 1976): 8; H. M. Onitiri, “Towards a 
West African economic community,” Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 5 (1963): 
33. 
 
      325 Adebayo, “The LPA: main features,” pp. 4 -5; also see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 151 
providing short-term solutions to immediate national problems, as opposed to 
redirecting resources to long-term economic restructuring on a regional basis.  
       In the LPA economic restructuring strategy, the development of transport and 
communication infrastructure was of prime importance. The deplorable state of 
communication infrastructure within and between African states was perceived as a 
serious obstacle to meaningful cooperation and integration between African states. 
African governments recognised that growth in other sectors, the promotion of intra 
and extra-African trade, as well as the socio-economic integration of the continent all 
depended on the development of the transport sector. It was a prerequisite for the 
successful restructuring of the African economy, envisaged in the LPA strategy.326 
         Overall, restructuring transport and communication potentially could engender 
an expansion of African industry, agriculture, trade, forestry and mining. The LPA 
imagined that improved transport and communication could facilitate the rational 
exploitation of the immense potentials of the continent for the overall well being of 
the African people.327  Besides, the improvement of communication links between 
African states had the potential of reversing the continent’s excessive dependence on 
the North in most of its economic transactions with huge foreign exchange savings. 
        However, the development of infrastructure is generally not only a long-term 
investment, but also requires huge financial resources. African governments would 
have had to divert scarce resources from other sectors, including sensitive social 
sectors to the development of communication infrastructure. With the onset of 
economic crisis in most African countries in the 1980s, focussing on long-term 
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infrastructure development would have had the effect of deepening the sufferings of 
the masses, with political implications. 
        More importantly, the LPA’s economic restructuring and diversification, to be 
facilitated by the development of the transport and communication sector, consisted 
of amongst other things: altering the nature and the direction of the continent’s output 
of goods and services; making changes in the sources and nature of inputs for the 
production process; and making changes in the ownership of factors and institutions 
of production and distribution.328 All these changes were to have far-reaching effects 
on African economies, both nationally and regionally and in relation to the external 
environment. 
       The need to alter the nature and direction of Africa’s output of goods and services 
arose from the fact that under the logic of the colonial and post colonial international 
division of labour, Africa was assigned the role of producer of primary goods, 
specifically cash crops and minerals. These products had as principal market outlet, 
the industrialised countries of the North, which countries influenced both the prices 
and the quantities that were admissible into their markets with little or no incentives 
for African states to add value to their goods. 
       Moreover, African countries usually specialised in the production of single 
minerals or crops with the result that in times of poor harvests or falling prices (as 
was usually the case, particularly beginning in the late 1970s), these countries, had 
little room for manoeuvring. Their economies were usually most hard-hit by 
international commodity price fluctuations. Against this backdrop, the LPA called for 
a shift from the production of essentially cash crops and minerals to the production of 
intermediate, semi-finished and finished manufactures. It also envisaged a shift from 
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northbound export of cash crops to increased exchanges of manufactured goods and 
services between African states within the framework of regional economic 
communities and the ultimate continental common market.  
        The potential benefits of the shifts in the continent’s output of goods and 
services included; a reduction in the dependence of African economies on those of the 
industrialised countries, and by the same token a reduction of their vulnerability to 
global market shocks like those occasioned by the OPEC induced energy crisis in the 
1970s. Besides, diversification was to enable African economies to be able to adjust 
to different forms of economic shocks and changes globally and regionally.  
       However, despite the obvious economic benefits of the envisaged changes in the 
nature of Africa’s output, they were equally going to delay in coming. Moreover, 
these shifts portended serious conflict between African governments and their 
traditional Northern economic partners. For example, the LPA’s injunction for 
African ownership and control of natural resources was an appeal to curtail the grip of 
Northern dominated multinational companies in the continent. Though potentially 
profitable, the challenge to the existing international economic order could not be 
executed by African governments that had grown increasingly dependent on the 
financial goodwill of the North. 
          Aside from changes in the nature and direction of Africa’s output, the LPA’s 
economic restructuring and diversification was also to involve alterations in the 
sources and the nature of inputs for the production process. This was premised on the 
fact that import substitution industrialisation policies adopted by a majority of African 
states in the 1960s and early 1970s to jump-start development in individual national 
economies were dependent on the importation of technology, spare-parts and the 
technical expertise from the North. Not only was this imported technology very 
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costly, it was also most of the time difficult to maintain and ill-adapted to African 
realities. Moreover, the lack of qualified African manpower to manage this Western 
imported technology, informed the hiring of expatriates at exorbitant rates. These 
factors conspired to bring about the failure of national import substitution 
industrialisation in the post independent Africa.  
        In light of this failure and in order to build strong and viable African economies, 
the LPA undertook to promote autonomous industrialisation within the regional 
economic communities (RECs) through the development of large intermediate and 
capital goods industries, promotion of the multinational enterprises, and especially the 
development of the region’s strategic natural resources, with the view to establishing 
an industrial base to support the development of agriculture and other key sectors. 
The integration of industry and the other sectors was meant to help trigger a process 
of autonomous and self-sustained economic development and internal accumulation 
and put African economies in a better position to counter international competition.329 
        The development of autonomous industrialisation was also to be beneficial to the 
continent in terms of savings for importation of technology and manpower. Moreover, 
the desire to develop autonomous industries, implied that Africa needed to train its 
own manpower, to develop and staff the industrial plants that were envisaged in the 
LPA. Therefore, the change of the nature and sources of inputs was to help ignite a 
process of manpower development, which was lacking in the continent in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  
      However, like other aspects of the LPA’s restructuring strategy, regional import 
substitution industrialisation was long-term in nature and required huge financial 
resources. Even the training of the required manpower was to take time and money. 
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African governments faced with domestic political and economic difficulties were not 
willing to accommodate such time horizons. 
        Another aspect of the restructuring envisaged in the LPA, consisted of changes 
in the ownership of factors and institutions of production and distribution. The 
African continent is endowed with enormous natural resources. However, Africa’s 
political independence that in principle conferred sovereign authority to African 
governments did not grant them real control over these resources. They remained in 
the hands of Northern based and controlled multinational corporations. The architects 
of the LPA concluded that these natural resources were not been exploited to the 
benefits of the continent. They emphasised the need for a change in the control and 
ownership of these resources and the institutions charged with their exploitation. 
       Concretely, the LPA called for the replacement of developed countries’ 
multinational corporations with African owned and controlled multinational 
corporations. The hope was that if Africans exploited their natural resources 
themselves or if they had control over the institutions that exploited them, proceeds 
from such exploitation could be used in developing the host countries, rather than 
have them used for the exclusive development of the North. However, the issue of 
control over the continent’s natural resources was a “political land mine” in that it 
could provoke some real confrontation with Western powers. In light of the political 
insecurity of many African governments and conscious of the capability of the West 
to unseat them from power, none of them was willing to genuinely commit to such a 
confrontational regional policy. 
          Overall, the diversification and restructuring of African economies envisaged in 
the LPA was to have considerable long-term benefits for individual African states and 
the African region as a whole. It was capable of facilitating the socio-economic 
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transformation of the African economies, which was itself going to result in the 
alleviation of poverty through sustained recovery and growth.330 However, the 
perception by African governments that such benefits were unsure and that they 
would only be reaped after a long time, together with the highly controversial 
political implications of some aspects of economic restructuring and diversification, 
discouraged African governments’ commitments to the initiative. 
      Aside from problems of long-time horizons for the envisaged economic 
restructuring and diversification to start yielding fruits, African governments faced an 
additional problem of the distribution of the real or perceived benefits of the various 
regional economic arrangements. 
 
4.2.3 THE LPA’S COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE MODEL: INTER-STATE 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
 
        The case for a country’s participation in any integration or cooperation scheme 
rests on the benefits the country in question will obtain from the scheme. “The case 
for supporting integration arrangements is not a case for helping others; rather, it is a 
case for helping oneself.”331 Understandably, there is consensus that “economic 
integration and cooperation cannot be viable unless member states perceive 
themselves to be net beneficiaries.”332 Yet, it must be appreciated that cooperation 
will not benefit one country, or not for long, unless it also benefits the others. 
Therefore, inasmuch as the desire for cooperation arises essentially from self-interest, 
the pursuit of self-interest requires the interest of others to be simultaneously served. 
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As a matter of fact, “either the benefits of integration/cooperation are for everyone, or 
they are for no one.”333  
           The key to the sustainability and viability of cooperation schemes in Africa has 
been the capacity to balance the benefits of cooperation in a manner acceptable to 
their members. This balance has been difficult to achieve because of the asymmetry 
in size, economic endowments and levels of development of the participating 
countries, which has had as ultimate outcome, polarised development.  Little wonder 
Fouratan contends that “the economic differences among Sub-Saharan African 
countries have constituted the major obstacle to the realisation of trade and factor 
market integration.”334 This has made the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
integration the focal point of the integration exercise, with implications for Africa’s 
regional cooperation agenda.335  
       This section of the thesis highlights three dimensions of the problem of the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the LPA inspired regional initiatives: (1) the 
concern by the less viable members that the gains of regional cooperation initiatives 
accrue disproportionately to the more viable members of the unions; (2) the concern 
of the ‘supposedly’ more viable members over the burden of having to prop up less 
viable partners; and (3) the shortcomings of the measures aimed at bringing about 
some level of equitable distribution of the gains from regional integration schemes. 
        A common concern amongst the economically weaker or less viable members in 
Africa’s regional economic initiatives has been that the benefits of integration will 
gravitate towards the relatively more viable regional members (particularly, those 
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countries whose manufacturing sectors are relatively more developed).336 The 
perception that more viable member states stand to gain or have effectively gained a 
disproportionate share of the proceeds of integration have usually led to moves that 
have constricted the very scope of regional cooperation.337  For example, the fear of 
uneven distribution of the gains of integration has been an alibi for selective and 
limited liberalisation schemes whose sole design has been to protect less advanced 
regional members from domination by more developed ones.  The result has been that 
the movement towards free trade in Africa’s RECs has mainly focused on 
unprocessed products.338 Tariff reductions in manufactured and semi-manufactured 
products have been lagging behind. The effect has been to reduce the potential for 
economic integration. “And in light of the considerable homogeneity in primary 
products in the regional groups – free trade limited to these products has not been able 
to produce significant intra-regional trade.”339  
         Moreover, although the less viable members of Africa’s regional schemes could 
still expect to benefit in the long-term from cooperation within the regional schemes, 
none of their governments was sure to last long enough to reap the long-term benefits 
of their cooperative behaviour.340 They tended to emphasise national policy planning, 
with short-term solutions to immediate national problems. 
          Despite the ‘founded’ perception by less viable members that the more viable 
members or “regional economic hegemons” are the principal beneficiaries of the 
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various regional initiatives in the continent, the so called “regional hegemons” were 
themselves unwilling and unable to make the initial, necessary sacrifices, for 
example, propping up their weaker partners by footing the bills of compensation for 
the loss of tariff revenues due to regional trade liberalisation. Worse still, even the 
regional hegemons were not in a position to sustain the cost of the long-term horizon 
for the benefits of regional integration to start accruing. Like the less viable states, the 
supposedly more viable African states equally faced very volatile political domestic 
environments that disposed them to short-term, rather than long-term solutions 
offered by the various regional initiatives. And as S.K.B Asante puts it:  
            Unless governments can be convinced that economic cooperation 
and eventually integration will strengthen their capacity to cope 
with urgent domestic problems better than they could on their own, 
they will continue to be preoccupied with managing policy issues 
with a national orientation and lose sight of the significant benefits 
that regional cooperation can bring.341  
 
Overall, concerns with uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of regional 
integration, together with the inability of politically insecure African governments to 
sustain the long time horizons defined in the LPA led African governments to renege 
on commitments to the LPA prescriptions.  
      To mediate imbalances resulting from the uneven distribution of the costs and 
benefits of regional cooperation, two alternative solutions have been attempted. The 
first has been to evolve compensatory schemes to provide some form of monetary 
compensation to less favoured countries in regional economic schemes. Such 
compensation classically has been calculated with reference to estimated customs 
revenues forgone.342 In the case of ECOWAS, for example, “member countries will 
be compensated for their loss of import duties resulting from the reduction of tariffs 
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on processed and industrial products.”343  Although such compensatory schemes may 
seem altruistic, they have hardly worked, except to the extent that they have hindered 
integration. They have been plagued by numerous implementation problems. For 
example, agreeing on the effective formula for contributions into and allocation of the 
compensation fund has been a complicated task. Moreover, focus on the loss of 
import revenues has tended to neglect the positive impact of reduced tariffs to 
consumers and the efficient allocation of resources.344  
         Besides, since few regional organisations in Africa (including the LPA’s RECs), 
have independent sources of revenue, compensation has been dependent on direct 
contributions from the relatively more viable governments in the regional 
groupings.345 Such compensation payments have constituted a cost to these so called 
“privileged states.” They have, therefore, not only been politically unpopular, but, 
given the near perennial situation of scarcity, exacerbated by the crisis of the 1980s 
and beyond, also posed economic difficulties for the governments concerned. 
Frequently, these governments have fallen behind in payments. Even if the 
mechanism worked smoothly, the provision of monetary compensation is seldom 
regarded as adequate by recipient countries, since they claim to have “lost” not only 
customs revenue, but also the various learning and multiplier effects associated with 
the establishment of their own industries.346 
            Overall, the experience of the LPA induced regional economic initiatives has 
been that while the purportedly more viable members have been reluctant to bear the 
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burden of floating the various tariff compensatory mechanisms, less viable members 
have always considered the compensation payments inadequate and incommensurate 
to their revenue losses. From either perspective, there has been a lack of incentive to 
be supportive of Africa’s regional economic communities, building blocks of the LPA 
strategy. 
            The LPA’s self-reliance and self-sustenance development model was 
anchored on a strategy of regional import-substitution industrialisation. The basic idea 
behind import-substitution industrialisation is to create an economy sufficiently 
flexible, diversified and responsive, that it can weather shocks, can respond to and 
indeed create opportunities for growth, and can on its own continually generate 
increasing welfare for its people.347 For less developed countries to make up their 
economies in the manner defined above, they need protection for a while at least, 
from industrialised countries of the North. Because of the smallness and fragmented 
nature of the individual African countries, and in light of the failure of national 
import-substitution industrialisation strategies adopted shortly after independence, 
African states resolved in the LPA, to shift from national to collective (or regional) 
import substitution industrialisation. 
            While regional import-substitution industrialisation aimed to shield the 
generality of weaker African regional economies from competition from the more 
advanced economies of the North, it failed to protect weaker African economies from 
their stronger and more advanced peers within the regional settings. Regional import 
substitution industrialisation tended to accentuate the problem of uneven distribution 
of gains of cooperation, as industries gravitated essentially to the territories of the 
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more viable member states of regional economic communities, which offered 
investors the best opportunities to maximise profits.  
           One strategy that could resolve the problem of the uneven distribution of the 
benefits of regional import-substitution industrialisation has been the attempt to move 
beyond “negative integration,” consisting essentially of removing tariff barriers, to 
the construction of regional schemes that include provisions for industrial location 
planning. The assumption here is that, the benefits of production for larger regional 
markets can be maintained while ensuring that all participating countries share in the 
import-substituting industry that is been created.348 Planning in these lines requires a 
coordinated approach to foreign investors, with the potential of achieving the counter-
dependency objectives of improving bargaining positions with external economic 
actors – a cardinal goal of the LPA strategy. For most observers and commentators, 
regional industrial planning has been seen as the only viable option if larger markets 
are to be constructed and maintained.349 
           This option too has been problematic in the African regional cooperation 
process.  While economic integration could be seen as an incentive to both domestic 
and foreign capital to invest in a given region, however, to which countries investors 
commit resources, has always been contingent on a number of factors such as; the 
state of infrastructure, available human resources, domestic policies, and political 
conditions. Ideally, market forces should dictate the location of industries. Therefore, 
the direct interference implied in the regional industrial planning approach is itself 
counter-productive as it tampers with the very benefits expected from economic 
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integration in the form of increased competition and efficiency.350  Fine and Yeo have 
argued that “regional import substitution industrialisation politicised the location of 
industries and made regional integration politically unattractive.”351 
          For example, the more developed member states’ acceptance of industrial 
planning has depended on the perception that gains from free access to regional 
markets outweigh the potential costs imposed by industrial location planning – not 
only in terms of the loss of industries, but also in constraints on economic policies, 
that would probably inhibit their pursuit of an outward oriented strategy.352  
Meanwhile, governments of less developed member countries have always been 
adamant on having industries located in their territories even in situations where, 
“locational” conditions are glaringly unfavourable.  
         Moreover, regional industrial planning requires harmonisation of industrial 
incentives, so that countries that had previously offered generous treatment to foreign 
investment in the hope of serving as export platforms for trans-national corporations 
ran the risk of losing these privileges and were, therefore, most reluctant embracing a 
regional industrial planning strategy. For example, “the gains derived by the Ivory 
Coast, from and expanded CEAO market hardly outweighed those that accrued to the 
country, serving as a strategic base for exportation to the EEC.”353       
         In the final analysis, although the LPA had been wildly over-optimistic 
regarding the prospects of economic growth based on a strategy of regional import 
substitution and collective self-reliance, the polarisation effects of this strategy and 
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the subsequent remedial measures, turned out to be unbearable costs to both the more 
viable and less viable members of the LPA’s sub-regional components. The strategy 
of import-substitution industrialisation and its accompanying industrial location 
planning remedy, served more as disincentives than as incentives for the 
implementation of Africa’s regional agenda defined in the LPA. The 1980s 
proclaimed as Africa’s “industrial development decade” in fact saw a negative trend 
towards de-industrialisation.354  
      Aside from the interstate distributional problems, the advent of the economic 
crisis in the 1980s and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
in a majority of African countries, created a political dilemma for African 
governments regarding the continuous adherence to LPA prescriptions.  
 
4.2.4 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE 1980, SAPs, AND THE FATE OF THE 
LPA 
 
            Africa’s persistent economic failures gave rise to two alternative sets of 
arguments: The one peddled by African governments argued that most of the 
continent’s economic problems arose from the structures and management of the 
international economy; the other advanced by managers of the global economy, and 
their “sponsors” in industrial countries argued that most of the problem was with the 
structure and management of African states.355 In the early 1980s, these two 
arguments became concretely encased in two policy frameworks: the LPA (defending 
the management of African states) and the World Bank’s Accelerated Development in 
Sub Saharan Africa (AD) popularly known as the Berg Report, after its American 
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author, Elliot Berg (defending the international economic system). It was on the basis 
of the diagnosis of the Berge Report that the World Bank conceived and introduced 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the continent, to correct identified 
macro-economic dysfunctions in African economies. 
        Given their divergent diagnosis of the causes of the continent’s economic 
problems, the prescriptions of these two policy frameworks (SAPs and LPA) were 
understandably incompatible. While SAPs measures consistently pushed for liberal 
and market-oreinted approaches to economic management across all societies, 
irrespective of their levels of development, the LPA emphasised rather, the imperative 
of a distinctive development model to suit the specific African realities.356 While the 
LPA argued that partial disengagement from the global economy was a prerequisite 
for the continent’s development,357 the SAPs “conditionalities” rather aimed to 
establish and transmit international policy norms that tended to increase the 
integration of African economies into the World economy.358  
          The Bank and the Fund generally lacked interest in regionalism, which, 
unfortunately was the centrepiece of the LPA design. They believed that the 
fundamental requirement as far as a country’s external economic relations was 
concerned was to undertake “unilateral trade reforms” that would “open up” the 
domestic economy and integrate it more closely with the world economy at large.  
Moreover, “while the Bank and the Fund were concerned with individual African 
states in the world system, and with exchange rather than production, the LPA set out 
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to deal with the collectivity of African states and with production, not just trade.”359 
From the perspective of the Bretton Woods institutions, regionalism, and inward-
looking regionalism for that matter, “was at best, an irrelevance and, at worst, a 
diversion from the fundamental goal of lowering tariffs towards the world at large.”360        
        This was consistent with the then popular neo-liberal thesis that “countries with 
“open” trade regimes consistently out performed those with “closed” regimes, both in 
times of international economic stability and in times of international shocks.” Africa, 
therefore, came to be seen in the SAPs dispensation as the prime example of a region 
where efforts to promote import substitution industrialisation led to adverse economic 
outcomes.361 
         Moreover, the World Bank preferred the privatisation of economic relations 
(disengagement of the African states from economic management) whereas the OAU-
ECA inspired LPA strategy was compatible with state control over the means of 
production and distribution – it was indeed a state-led project.362 The twin 
conditionalities of SAPs – an across the board liberalisation of trade and privatisation 
of investment and production were aimed at facilitating imports and expanding 
exports against the central dictates of the LPA regionally based protectionism.363 
Little wonder, OAU, ECA, and ADB technocrats were of the opinion that SAPs 
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amounted to the externalisation of the economic management of African economies 
and that overall: 
         The goals, objectives and characteristics of the strategy contained in the     
[Berg] Report are in many ways inconsistent with those of the LPA…     
The implication of the recommended approach is to make Africa more 
dependent on external markets for its agricultural and mineral products 
and for its essential factor inputs. This is contrary to the principles of 
self-reliant and self-sustaining development of the LPA.364 
 
               If SAPs were incompatible with the objective of promoting collective self-
reliance through regionalism, then African states could only uphold the collective 
self-reliance prescriptions of the LPA if they refused adopting SAPs. However, 
beginning with Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius and Senegal in 1980/81, structural 
adjustment programmes, spread over much of the continent like a “plague,” such that 
“by 1993, virtually all Sub-Saharan Africa and its adjacent islands had been obliged 
to implement adjustment programmes of one sort or another, with the sole significant 
exception of Angola and the states of the Southern African Customs Union.”365  
    African scholars’ analyses of the impact of SAPs on the LPA have focused largely 
on explaining away the failure of the LPA on the “imposition” of SAPs on African 
countries. While accepting that the adoption of SAPs by African countries in the 
1980s and beyond eclipsed the enthusiasm towards the LPA and therefore, served as 
an incentive for African states to overlook its prescriptions, the focus here is on 
examining the domestic political and economic factors that favoured the adoption of 
SAPs over the sustained pursuit of collective self-reliance.  
        Although a majority of African governments were probably more sympathetic of 
the LPA’s economic model of collective self-reliance, their financial circumstances in 
the 1980s made the immediate resources provided by the Bretton Woods Institutions 
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more attractive than the long-term and conceivably uncertain benefits of the LPA. 
Therefore, in interpreting the adoption of structural adjustment programmes in Africa 
in the 1980s and beyond, the question of which of the alternative diagnosis of the 
African crisis (that of the LPA or that of the World Bank/IMF) was broadly right, or 
more plausible, the share of the responsibility for the economic plight of the 
continent, which should be apportioned to each of them, scarcely however, mattered. 
What tended to matter most was that one side (or in other words, those who had the 
money – the World Bank) was in a position to enforce its explanation for the 
problem, and the policy measures which followed from it (i.e., Structural Adjustment 
Programmes – SAPs). The other side (or in other words, those who desperately 
needed the money – African states) was not366 and therefore, had to renege on the 
fundamentals of its policy preferences (i.e., the self-reliant and self-sustaining 
regionalism). 
          SAPs, constituted exchanges, in which on the one hand, international financial 
institutions and other donors provided loans to desperate African governments, and 
on the other hand, the governments agreed to pursue the economic policies stipulated 
by those institutions as a condition for receiving the loans.367 And since the 
preferences of the LPA were in the most part at variance with those of the World 
Bank, a precondition for securing the much-needed IMF-World Bank-SAPs loans 
invariably consisted of de-emphasising the LPA option. The existence of this “trade 
off” is valid despite claims by both the World Bank and the IMF to the effect that 
SAPs were compatible with successful regional integration.368 
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       The role of economic stagnation and decay in leading to dependence on the 
uncertain and conditional charity of donor states and international institutions has 
been underscored in the literature.369 By the early 1980s, Africa’s already established 
economic vulnerability became compounded by the onset of a debt crisis, resulting 
from the global economic shocks of the 1970s and inappropriate domestic policies. 
Africa had indeed become more entangled to the outside world than she was in the 
1950s and 1960s. Although the rhetoric of self-reliance became the centrepiece of 
intra-African diplomacy, African states and governments were in desperate need of 
financial assistance from the international community - the World Bank and other 
multilateral and bilateral donor agencies - for their economic and even political 
survival. Therefore, from the 1980s onwards, “Africa’s complex of problems became 
most clearly reflected in the economic needs of African states, and their subjection to 
the conditions imposed by external donors as the price for meeting those needs, which 
in turn became the overriding preoccupation of Africa’s external relations.”370 
        The choice between the LPA and the SAPs for African states was therefore, 
contingent on the continent’s needs, the means to meet those needs and the time 
horizon within which these needs could be met.  African states were in dire need of 
finances for the repayment of debts and swelling interests on debts contracted in the 
1970s, and also desperately needed more loans for the execution of development 
projects and the daily functioning of their respective national governments. The 
resources to meet these needs could not be immediately provided by the LPA self-
reliant regionalism, because the fruits of regional cooperation are generally not only 
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slow to come by, but they are also not very evident both in the eyes of African 
governments and the masses. Conversely, the World Bank - SAPs provided 
immediate financial resources for the execution of tangible national projects that were 
to have a direct and visible impact on the African societies. 
       Although such loans were contracted at very high “costs” in terms of satisfying 
the conditionalities set by the IFIs and other creditors, the penetration of domestic 
policy making by external actors and possible political alienation and related 
destabilisation due to the hardships brought about by SAPs, they were still preferred 
by governments over the not too obvious benefits of the LPA self-reliance 
regionalism. For deeply impoverished states with often-desperate problems in raising 
domestic revenue, SAPs loans and aid provided the essential means for the functions 
of government to be carried out. For most African states, it furnished a high 
proportion of the disposable resources, which could be used to maintain political 
support. “Development projects of one sort or another provided the currency in which 
the demands of political constituencies were commonly expressed, and through which 
they could be gratified.”371 These projects could only be financed with funding from 
SAPs loans, given the liquidity crisis that faced the African states. Considering the 
discomfiture of individual African states with subjecting their national development 
plans to regional scrutiny, the SAPs emphasis on financing national rather than 
regional projects, served as a good alibi to overlook regional commitments. 
         Moreover, the time horizon for the dividends of the LPA self-reliant regionalism 
to start accruing to African states was too long and the dividends not too evident for 
politically insecure African governments.  In the final analysis, the adoption of SAPs 
by a majority of African states implicitly marked the political triumph of the World 
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Bank’s SAPs over the regional self-reliant model of the LPA. Hence, underscoring 
the acknowledged low level of implementation of Africa’s much publicised self-
reliant, self-sustaining development option.   
       The long time horizons defined by the LPA were thus not compatible with the 
urgent domestic political and economic difficulties that African governments faced. 
These difficulties called for immediate and short-term solutions, especially as they 
threatened the very survival of African governments.  This made African 
governments particularly vulnerable to temptations to ignore or renege on long-term 
regional commitments. Under these circumstances, credible regional institutions to 
“lock in” African governments their commitments in the LPA might have made a 
huge difference. However, the LPA design did not provide for such mechanisms, and 
even when they were created, they turned out to be inadequate. This constitutes the 
focus of the next section. 
 
4.3 INSTITUTIONAL INADEQUACIES AND THE FATE OF COLLECTIVE 
SELF-RELIANCE 
 
      Institutions are sets of formal and informal rules, regulations, and compliance 
procedures designed to constrain and shape human interaction and structure the 
incentives of actors involved in exchange relations in order to maximise the wealth or 
utility of these actors.372  Against the background of domestic political and economic 
vulnerabilities that created strong incentives for African governments to renege on 
regional cooperation commitments, institutional mechanisms to “lock-in’ their 
commitments to regional arrangements were imperative if the LPA was to make any 
inroads. 
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         However, within the logic of assumptions of political “voluntarism” that 
underpinned the LPA design, the authors of the initiative did not pay adequate 
attention to endowing the regional institutions they envisaged or effectively 
established with such ‘restraining’ capabilities. Rather, the LPA inspired regional 
arrangements constituted forms of compromise institutions that tried as much as 
possible to avoid meddling with the discretionary authority of African governments – 
assigning them an essentially apolitical role of providing technical support and 
coordination - with no prerogative to monitor or enforce compliance. 
      The failure to endow the LPA inspired regional initiatives with adequate 
restraining mechanisms gave African governments the latitude to free riding and 
reneging on regional commitments. Since the entire LPA framework was premised on 
collective action, every other African government pinned their actions on the actions 
of others. The failure to sanction non-compliance served to discourage even the most 
ardent proponents of collective self-reliance - explaining therefore, the perceived gap 
between the strong rhetoric of regional self-reliance and the weak record of 
implementation. However, by the late 1980s, it was realised that the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms was a major handicap to Africa’s regionalism. Therefore, in 
the Abuja Treaty of 1991, an attempt was made to endow regional economic 
cooperation institutions with supra-national authority to sanction non-compliance 
with regional engagements.  
      The section that follows, seeks to explain how inadequate enforcement 
mechanisms compounded collective action problems and how this contributed to the 
low level of implementation of the LPA. It concludes with a brief overview of the 
institutional changes introduced by the Abuja Treaty and their potential to resolve 
enforcement problems. 
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        While many cooperation arrangements in Africa were ostensibly modelled after 
the European Union, most of them lacked the necessary mechanisms to enforce their 
treaty and other related obligations. In Africa unlike in Europe and North America, 
the documents establishing the various sub-regional economic groupings were 
summaries of “loosely-formulated” general proposals without quantitative projections 
or accurately detailed legal and institutional frameworks.373  And until the advent of 
the Abuja Treaty of 1991, most of the treaties and decisions of Africa’s regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), building blocs of the LPA, had no binding force on 
the member states. Thus, not only was their effective impact on member countries 
difficult to assess, but more importantly, it was difficult to compel member states to 
observe fundamental commitments made in treaties and conventions.374 The outcome 
was remarkable inconsistency between national legislations and integration 
commitments, helping account for the poor record of the entire LPA regional 
cooperation agenda.            
          By order of priority and responsibility, the African states come first as far as the 
implementation of the treaties establishing the various economic communities are 
concerned. This was underlined in the LPA, which emphasised the responsibility of 
African states to take “measures to effect the establishment of an African common 
market that would lead to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the African 
Economic Community.”375 However, although integration organisations have been 
duly established in all the sub-regions, as envisaged in the FAL, cooperation 
agreements have not been internalised in national administrations and development 
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plans. There has been not only a lack of political commitments to decisions taken at 
the regional level, but also a failure to develop the domestic institutional measures 
which are required to follow up and manage these regional decisions.376  
        As a result, member states have continued to independently develop their own 
strategies, plans and priorities, with regional cooperation hardly reflected in them. 
Although African countries have continued to speak of collective action for regional 
cooperation, no single state has as yet designed its national plans to be consistent with 
the promotion of effective integration. More disappointingly, most African countries 
involved in RECs have hardly even developed a national apparatus for monitoring 
and coordinating their involvement in the different intergovernmental 
organisations.377   The lack of commitment to regional commitments has also been 
reflected in the delays in the payment of budgetary contributions and the low level of 
participation in community meetings, as well as in delays or even outright refusal to 
ratify and implement protocols, acts and decisions of the various regional groupings.  
        For example, at the end of March 1992, the total arrears owed to the Executive 
Secretariat of ECOWAS alone was over US$ 30million.378 The attitude of member 
states towards regional groupings has been encouraged by the lack of punitive 
sanctions. As a matter of fact, the lack of sanctions for disrespect of regional treaties 
and conventions has reduced membership in regional organisations to a “costless” 
exercise. African states have developed a culture of agreeing to treaties, with no real 
intentions to ever make good their commitments. This has not augured well for the 
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entire integration process in the continent and more especially, the regional self-
reliant strategy of the LPA.      
         While elsewhere governments are held accountable externally by the institutions 
that administer agreements (like the case of the WTO and the EU) in Africa, regional 
blocs have been painstakingly cautious not to offend any country; so punitive 
measures for those who fail to honour or who renege on treaty commitments are 
minor and even uncommon.  African regional blocs have been more interested in 
“swelling” their membership than on the commitment of members,379 perhaps due to 
the multiplicity of regional arrangements in the continent, that place regional 
groupings in the awkward position of competing over members.  It seems as though 
those regional groupings with the least stringent conditionalities are more likely to 
attract greater membership.   
      The lack of power of enforcement of the LPA inspired regional economic 
communities has been reflected in the treaties establishing the RECs. For example, in 
the ECOWAS treaty of 1975 and even the PTA treaty of 1981, there was the glaring 
absence of any provisions to grant these organisations any power to bind their 
member states. With the exception of the decisions of the Court of Justice (Article 
56), and the provision of Article 54(3) on sanctions for non-payment of budgetary 
contributions, not even the decisions of the highest organ of ECOWAS – the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government – were binding on member states. Such 
decisions and directives are only binding on the “institutions of the community” 
(Article 5[3]).380   
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         The institutions of RECs thus lacked the fundamental quality of supra-
nationality, which is very essential for facilitating the enforcement of treaty 
provisions, protocols and other related instruments.381 Whereas the AEC and EU 
treaties envisaged the establishment of supra-national institutions to oversee and 
enforce integration processes, the LPA and its RECs – beginning with the ECOWAS 
treaty did not contemplate any such institutions, inadvertently creating room for free 
riding by member states. However, following on the example of the Abuja treaty, 
Africa’s regional communities began endowing their institutions with supra-national 
authority.382 
        Enforcement mechanisms in the form of dissuasive or punitive sanctions are 
capable of playing the vital role of discouraging free riding and also helping align 
actors’ incentives with long-term regional cooperation objectives. Sanctions are a 
necessary condition for the effectiveness of law in that law stipulates rules of conduct 
deviations from which should involve certain legal consequences.383 If it is the case 
that one (in this case states) can act in contravention of stipulated norms, without 
attracting any consequences, then the rule of law has no binding value. To the extent 
that it has no binding value, it would hardly serve as an instrument for attaining 
stipulated goals and objectives. This was the plight of the treaties, conventions, and 
protocols that sanctioned the LPA inspired sub-regional economic groupings. 
Arguably, the loose and unbinding character of most of these agreements gave 
member governments little incentive to cooperate. 
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        The LPA inspired regional schemes have generally been very unsuccessful – 
with little or no impact on the economic growth of participating countries.384 Overall, 
even as the political rhetoric persisted within the ECOWAS, ECCAS, 
PTA/COMESA, and AMU that their primary goal was the eventual establishment of 
an African economic community, the reality however, was that “these schemes did 
not show any immediate (or short-term) demonstrable benefits to their participants, 
nor any good reason in terms of viable cooperative action to believe that such goals 
could be realised.”385  
       For example, although almost all the LPA inspired RECs adopted the market 
integration approach, progress towards trade liberalisation that was the preliminary 
objective of these schemes remained painfully low. This has been evident in the poor 
intra-trade performance of groupings, especially when viewed in terms of the 
percentage accounted for intra-group trade in the group’s total exports (see table 5 
below). 
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Figure 5: Intra-regional Trade as a Percentage of Total Exports of Regional       
Group 
                                              1970            1980                 1985                1990                         1992 
AMU                                      1.4                 0.3                   1.0                   2.3                             3.0 
UDEAC                                 4.9                 1.8                    1.9                   2.4                             2.1  
ECCAS                                  2.4                 1.6                    2.1                   2.3                             2.1  
ECOWAS                              2.9                10.1                   5.2                    8.3                            7.8 
CEAO                                    6.6                  9.8                   8.3                    9.9                          10.5  
Mano River Union                0.2                   0.8                   0.4                    0.3                            0.0 
 
Economic Community  
Of the Great Lakes                0.4                   0.2                   0.8                    0.3                            0.4 
PTA                                       9.6                 12.1                   5.6                    6.6                            6.7 
SADC                                    5.2                    5.1                   4.8                    5.2                           4.4 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (Geneva: 1993). 
 
       Despite the flurry of regional integration treaties and trade liberalisation 
agreements, the percentage of intra-sub-regional trade has remained very low, 
averaging below 5 percent. Africa’s trade has remained predominantly oriented 
towards the North, perpetuating the dependence of the continent on exports, against 
the dictates of the LPA inward-looking self-reliant options.386 The gap between stated 
goals and effective achievements reflected in the area of market integration mirrored 
the situation in other areas of cooperation such as infrastructure development and 
monetary and financial integration. 
      Little wonder, John Ravenhill has concluded that: “Lagos whose initial target 
dates for trade liberalisation have already passed provides little beyond a statement of 
faith to convince observers that it can and will be realised.”387 Paradoxically, in 1991, 
                                               
386 Asante, Regionalism and Africa, pp. 46-7. 
 
387 Ravenhill, Africa in crisis, p. 24. 
 
 179 
African leaders claimed, “efforts already made in the sub-regional and regional 
sectoral economic cooperation are encouraging and justify a larger and fuller 
economic integration.”388 This informed the decision to sign the Abuja treaty 
establishing an African economic community (AEC). 
 
4.3.1 THE ABUJA TREATY: AN IMPROVEMENT ON RESTRAINT 
MECHANISMS 
 
          The ultimate objective of the LPA was to establish a continent-wide economic 
community.389 This, however, was to be contingent on the level of progress of 
integration at the sub-regional and regional levels. In light of the poor performance of 
the LPA inspired RECs, the signing of the Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC has 
been controversial. Fine and Yeo have summarised this perception in the following 
words: 
         The fact that African leaders, first in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 
1980 and then in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, have elected to pursue the 
quixotic goal of an African Common Market – in spite of their continual 
failure to begin removing even the modest impediments to the flow of 
goods and services within the region – would suggest that their agenda is 
driven by political rather than economic considerations and by domestic 
rather than regional pressures.390  
 
      However, proponents of the Abuja Treaty have hailed it as providing a continental 
framework, with the potential of rationalising the continent’s integration institutions 
and organs.391 It has been described as a giant step towards Africa’s long-cherished 
goal of unifying the fragmented and vulnerable national economies into a single, 
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more powerful economic bloc with a view to translating into reality the dream of pan-
Africanism and continental integration.392 
        Although the Abuja Treaty has been showcased as the culmination of a long 
process of efforts at continental consolidation, beginning with the OAU charter in 
1963, through various OAU summits to the LPA however, concerns about the risks of 
the further weakening and marginalisation of Africa in the global economy against 
the background of the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s, constituted the most 
immediate impulse for the signing of the Treaty.393   
         The Abuja Treaty marked the beginning of a shift in the orientation of and 
approach to Africa’s regional integration and cooperation.394 This was reflected in the 
character of post-Abuja regional initiatives, which were based on the precepts of 
economic openness and market efficiency.  These initiatives embraced different 
principles “for achieving progressive economic cohesion than their fait-driven 
predecessors which were based on protectionist, closed economy policies of the kind 
which typically pervaded development thinking in Africa, for more than three 
decades.”395  
        In this regard, the signing of the Abuja Treaty, rather than being the culmination 
of the LPA inward-looking regionalism, could be seen as marking the beginning of 
the capitulation of African governments to the ethos of the liberal paradigm. Not only 
did the Abuja-inspired regional groupings reflect respect for and observance of 
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certain fundamental principles and basic undertakings, they equally shifted the 
exclusive focus on government, to involving the people, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the civil society and the private sector.396  
            This shift from states to markets, influenced by externally imposed structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPS), has aimed at revamping the African development 
model since 1985. This shift has resulted in what Percy Mistry has seen as “second 
generation” integration attempts, gathering steam since 1992, certainly under the 
behest of the Abuja Treaty. In principle, this new approach abandoned the “ossified, 
static, protected-fortress approach” to integration among closed, state-run economies. 
It has been seen as “a means of consolidating national economic policy shifts towards 
greater liberalisation, market orientation, competitiveness and efficiency.”397  
        Nevertheless, like the LPA, post Abuja regional integration initiatives have had 
to rely on achieving these ambitious objectives at the sub-regional and regional levels, 
before attempting to achieve them at the global level, in a world where Africa has yet 
to overcome a large number of disadvantages in order to compete.398  Therefore, like 
the LPA, regional economic communities are central building blocks of the Abuja 
Treaty’s objective of establishing a pan-African community.399  
       And although the Abuja treaty was signed in disregard of the failure of Africa’s 
sub-regional communities to achieve their stated objectives, it is seen to have inspired 
the reform and transformation of the continent’s regional economic groupings, 
supposedly making them more likely to attain stated goals. For example, it led to the 
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transformation of the PTA into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) in 1994; it also saw the transformation of the Southern African 
Development and consultative Council (SADCC) into the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in 1992; the re-lunching of the activities of the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1998; the revival of the 
defunct East African Community (EAC) in 1999; and more importantly, it brought 
about the review of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. 
    The AEC inspired (revised treaties) of the various regional communities are said to 
be more elaborate, containing measures that could help overcome the obstacles that 
bedevilled the implementation of the earlier initiatives and specific arrangements to 
enforce treaty agreements. Of particular importance are measures to harmonise 
national strategies and policies with those of the region and to refrain from any 
unilateral action that could hinder the attainment of the regional objectives. For 
example, member states have pledged, in accordance with their respective 
constitutional procedures, “to take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and 
dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of the 
provisions of the Abuja Treaty.”400 This has been in light of the fact that 
dissimilarities and divergences in national laws and policies of member states 
regulating key areas of cooperation have been a major legal impediment to economic 
cooperation.401 
       In the area of community institutions, the AEC treaty and the reviewed treaties of 
RECs seem to have endowed them with greater powers of supranationality than had 
been allowed under the LPA dispensation. For example, the Abuja Treaty establishes 
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a transparent organic link between the supreme institution of the Community and the 
member states. In this regard, Article 8(3) of the treaty confers on the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, the supreme organ of the Community, power to 
‘give directives, coordinate and harmonise the economic, scientific, technical, cultural 
and social policies of member states’. More importantly, the Abuja Treaty has made 
the decisions of the Community binding on member states. For example, the 
decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State, and the resolutions of the Council of 
Ministers are binding on member states as well as the subordinate institutions (Article 
10(1) and Article 13(2)). The revised treaties of Africa’s major RECs have all 
adopted this binding character of community decisions on states from the AEC.402 
             Besides, unlike the LPA and the earlier regional communities, ECOWAS, 
PTA and ECCAS, which have focused attention essentially on market integration, 
Abuja primarily adopts a production focused approach or, specifically, collaboration 
for expansion and diversification of material production. This approach emphasises 
broadening the regional production base and agricultural production in the framework 
of a variety of cooperative schemes and arrangements. It is based on the premise that 
expansion of mutual trade can take place only if the African countries are able to 
produce the desired merchandise in sufficient quantities to meet each other’s demand. 
Therefore, gradual harmonisation of industrial and agricultural policies and joint 
industrial and agricultural planning and production are complementary to 
integration.403 
          However, Abuja like the LPA and the earlier regional economic integration 
schemes has adopted the traditional linear pattern of integration, with the aim of 
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moving the continent within the space of twenty five years into a customs union, a 
common market and finally the African Economic Community.404 Embracing all 
aspects of African economic and social life, the Abuja Treaty is said to provide a 
framework for the re-examination of the roles of the myriad of African organisations 
and institutions, streamlining their activities and mobilising them purposefully to 
address the pressing problems of African economic and social development. Given its 
all embracing character and mandate, Abuja even more than the LPA has faced the 
great challenge of having to move from talk and prescriptions to action and to change 
the assumption that once goals for regional cooperation have been set, 
implementation will automatically follow. 405 
          Although it may sound harsh to qualify the Abuja treaty as a failure, however, 
its fate has not been too different from that of the LPA. Despite its innovativeness, 
both in terms of goals, methods and orientation, the Abuja Treaty like the LPA has 
thus far remained only a declaration of intent, with minimal concrete achievements. 
Signed in 1991, the AEC only became operational in 1994, because of the reluctance 
of member states to ratify the treaty. The rationalisation of Africa’s multiple regional 
organisations, a central element in the Abuja Treaty is yet to bear fruits, ten years 
after the signing of the treaty. Moreover, the decision to merge the Secretariats of the 
AEC and the OAU seemed to have submerged the community and rendered it 
ineffective. And in 2001, with the emergence of a new African economic initiative 
(NEPAD), and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union, the role and 
place of the AEC in Africa’s regional economic development agenda has become 
even more obscure.  
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CONCLUSION 
          This chapter has examined the political economy of Africa’s strategy of 
collective self-reliance defined by the LPA and restated by the Abuja Treaty.  It has 
analysed the reasons why despite the potential socio-economic benefits of collective 
self-reliance, African governments were unable to uphold its prescriptions. The 
chapter has examined the problems of the low level of implementation of the LPA 
from two broad perspectives: First, from the perspective of the interplay between 
potential long-term benefits and the perceived short-term costs involved in the 
implementation of the LPA; and second, from the perspective of the inadequacy of 
regional institutional mechanisms to actualise the collective self-reliance agenda. 
     I have argued that the assumptions that underpinned the LPA design namely that 
“because the LPA portended substantial socio-economic benefits for African states, 
African governments were to faithfully implement it,” were faulty. African 
governments were faced with pressing domestic political and economic difficulties 
that created time horizons that were not compatible with the long-term perspectives of 
the LPA. Rather than view the LPA’s envisaged market expansion and liberalisation; 
economic restructuring and diversification; and the building of less dependent African 
economies exclusively in terms of their potential economic benefits, African 
governments viewed them rather in light of their accompanying political and 
economic costs and also in terms of the delays and uncertainties of their envisaged 
benefits. 
         Seen from the perspective of the liberalisation effects of trade creation and trade 
diversion, distributional problems arising from collective action, polarisation effects 
of a regional import substitution industrialisation and even the choice between the 
LPA and the SAPs, the balance of forces from the standpoint of the politically 
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insecure African governments appeared to be in favour of greater sacrifices – over 
long term and unsure benefits. Therefore, the losses involved in trade diversion, the 
exigencies of engagement in SAPs and the tariff losses involved in the import-
substitution industrialisation strategy, conspired to serve as incentives for African 
governments to renege on their commitments to the LPA. 
        I have argued that, under the circumstances of domestic political and economic 
insecurities that created incentives for African governments to renege on regional 
commitments, credible regional institutions to align African governments’ incentives 
to the long-term goals of regional economic cooperation would have made the 
difference in the LPA. However, still influenced by assumptions of “political 
voluntarism” of African governments, the authors of the LPA did not endow the 
envisaged regional institutions with mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance 
with regional agreements.  
       Despite the establishment of a plethora of regional institutions at the behest of the 
LPA, these institutions were assigned essentially apolitical roles of providing 
technical support and coordination of the actions of member governments, with no 
mandate to sanction non-compliance with regional engagements. The absence or 
inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms rendered membership in the various regional 
economic groupings, a costless exercise as states signed treaties and conventions 
without any real intentions to abide by them. Moreover, the failure to sanction non-
compliance created a situation wherein even states that could be very faithful to the 
LPA became reluctant to commit their efforts and resources to the initiative, since in 
the final analysis its success depended on the actions of other states. 
        The Abuja Treaty was intended as a corrective to the institutional inadequacies 
of the LPA. However, although the Abuja Treaty appeared to have strengthened 
 187 
Africa’s regional communities, by endowing them with supranational institutions, the 
impact of these transformations has been minimal. Contrary to expectations, the 
endowment of regional institutions with supranational authority seemed to have 
increased the lethargy of African governments to engage in regional arrangements. 
African governments appeared to have developed the perception that the Abuja treaty 
imposed maximum constraints on their discretionary decision-making powers with 
minimal prospects for the realisation of immediate benefits. 
          In the final analysis, despite the surviving rhetoric of commitment of African 
states to the goals of the Abuja Treaty, they have remained as unwilling as ever to 
make the necessary sacrifices for its implementation. Abuja, like Lagos and most of 
the related regional economic communities, has remained a paper organisation 
“whose elaborate treaties have become nothing more than memorials to faulty 
development strategies.”406 Cooperation and integration have not advanced in the 
continent and Africa’s development predicaments that informed the formulation of 
the LPA and then the Abuja treaty, have persisted or even worsened, calling 
therefore, for new approaches. A recent reaction is the emergence of Africa’s new 
regional economic initiative – the NEPAD. This transition from Africa’s traditional 
inward-looking orientation to cooperation epitomised by the LPA to the new extra-
regional partnership evolved by the NEPAD is the object of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
406 Ravenhill, African crisis, p. 101. 
 188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT: 
THE MARKET DRIVEN EXTRA-REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP 
MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 189 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD): 
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF A PARADIGM SHIFT 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
         African countries have had a long history of resistance against greater 
engagement with the global economy. However, the continent’s suspicion of the 
global economy reached a turning point in the early 1980s with the adoption of the 
LPA, which advocated “partial disengagement” from the “supposedly exploitative 
international economic system.” Although the LPA was overshadowed by the 
institution of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in almost all African 
countries from the early 1980’s onward, and notwithstanding liberalists’ perception in 
the 1990s that the “Washington Consensus” had attained universal validity, the 
African attitude towards the global economy remained ambivalent.407  
        Mass protests across the continent against the liberal prescriptions of SAPs and 
the disappointing outcomes of the programmes have been vindicated as proof of the 
lack of a constituency for the liberal paradigm in the continent.408  African 
technocrats and politicians’ perception survived over the years that Africa has been 
victim of a grossly unjust liberal global economic system, justifying the continued 
emphasis on state-led, inward-looking orientations in Africa’s regional economic 
cooperation agenda.409 Although the Abuja Treaty of 1991 heralded what some have 
                                               
407 Jeffrey Herbst, “Africa and the international economy,” p. 63. 
 
408 See variously, Ibid. p. 65; Mengisteab, Globalisation and autocentricity; Civil Society-Indaba, 
“Resolution on NEPAD,” (South Africa: Johannesburg, May 4 2002). 
 
409 The role of the state was for example emphasised in the OAU’s, African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development (Arusha, February 1990); UNECA’s, Africa’s Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs) (UNECA, 1989); the AU’s, Council for Security, 
stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA); UNECA’s Proposal for a mechanism on the 
challenge of globalisation and information age for Africa; and by Albert Trevoedjre, in “Vaincre 
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described as a new generation of African regional economic initiatives, supposedly 
more tolerant of liberal ethos410 the continent’s fear and suspicion of the global 
economy has persisted. 
             Despite Africa’s deep-rooted distrust of the global economy, however, the 
continent has been unable to shield itself from the effects of an increasingly 
interdependent global system. Accordingly, at the dawn of the twenty first century, 
African leaders felt obliged to evolve a new continental economic blueprint – the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to meet the exigencies of the 
new phase of globalisation. This new initiative departs from traditional thinking and 
practice about African development in at least two ways:  first, in terms of economic 
principles; and second, in terms of the importance accorded domestic governance in 
the development prospects of the continent.  
         On economic principles, not only does the initiative accommodate the liberal 
principles of the international economic order that have been energetically resisted by 
earlier African initiatives, it equally and more importantly prescribes greater 
engagement with the global economy. On governance, the NEPAD in its diagnoses of 
the continent’s development crisis strongly suggests much of Africa’s economic 
failures are attributable to domestic factors – particularly poor governance. It 
therefore sees domestic governance reforms as a precondition for the development of 
the continent. These shifts have evoked a mixture of enthusiasm and scepticism, 
making the initiative the focus of academic and policy discourse. The question arises 
however, as to what has informed this change. 
                                                                                                                                      
l’humiliation: Rapport de la commission sur l’Afrique et les enjeux du 3eme millinnaire” (PNUD, 
{n.d.}). 
 
410 Mistry, “Africa’s record.” 
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           This chapter examines the international politics of the shifts in approach to 
African development: from the traditional state-led, inward-looking development 
paradigm (LPA), to a market driven and outward-looking paradigm (NEPAD); and 
from the peripheral role of governance in the development prospects of the continent 
under the LPA, to the pride of place of governance under the NEPAD dispensation. 
The chapter is two-pronged: First, it analyses the extent to which the NEPAD 
represents a shift in orientation in Africa’s regional economic cooperation 
endeavours; second, proceeding from the premise that NEPAD constitutes a shift in 
orientation, the chapter then examines the realities and circumstances that have 
informed this shift. 
           
5.2 NEPAD: A SHIFT IN AFRICA’S REGIONAL APPROACH TO 
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES?     
 
        The NEPAD has been understood and interpreted differently by different 
categories of people. More importantly, there seems to be disagreement over the 
actual orientations of the initiative. While its critics see it as essentially outward 
oriented,411 some of its proponents contend that the initiative, like its predecessor 
initiatives such as the LPA, is internally oriented.412  
                                               
411 See variously, Adedeji Adebayo, “NEPAD: A view from the African trenches,” Key note 
Address in Doreena Bikoe and Chris Landsberg (compilers.), “NEPAD: African initiative, new 
partnership?” Draft Report of the Policy Forum on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
International Peace Academy in cooperation with the Permanent Missions of Algeria, Egypt, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa to the United Nations (New York: UN, July 2002): 
38-43; Patrick Bond (ed.), “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: An annotated critique” 
(South Africa: Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), 2002); BOND, “Africa and 
the G8: Whose development? What partnership?” in http://aidc.org.uk/networker/june02/g8.htm; Leon 
Pretorius and Saliem Patel, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A critical 
review,” Policy Review, Labour Research Service Report (LRS) (South Africa: Woodstock, 2002) in 
http://aidc.org.za/NEPAD/LRS.html; Dot Keet, “The New partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the African Union: Unity and integration within Africa? Or integration of Africa into 
the global economy? (Alternative information and Development Centre (AIDC), October 2002); 
“NEPAD regional or Global integration of Africa,” African Agenda, Vol. 5, no. 2&3 (2002); Jimi, 
Adesina, “NEPAD and the challenge of Africa’s development: Towards the political economy of a 
discourse,” in Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) – Human Science Research 
Council (HSRC), “African Commentaries on NEPAD” (South Africa: March 2000a) 
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              Moderates have however, argued that the initiative combines both elements 
of inward orientation and outward orientation.413 They have described the NEPAD as 
the offshoot of an eclectic combination of ideas deriving from different paradigms 
and constituencies. It has been seen as a politically pragmatic attempt to 
accommodate a variety of interests and approaches, from within and outside of 
Africa. “It tries simultaneously to address itself to a variety of international agencies 
or potential “partners” or realities; to the full panoply of African leaders and 
technocrats; and even to the people of Africa.”414 The framers of the initiative were 
interested, given Africa’s experience in the areas of integration and development, in 
identifying what could possibly work for the continent. They therefore, “borrowed” 
from various and different earlier initiatives and models – regardless of their 
orientations. In the end, “they came up with a pragmatic and non-ideological 
document,”415 the NEPAD that appears to combine all these perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000326/index.php; Jimi Adesina, “NEPAD, the Post 
Washington consensus,” African Agenda, Vol. 5 no. 2&3 (2002b): 16-17; Adebayo Alukoshi, “Africa, 
from Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD,” African Agenda Vol. 5, no. 2&3 (2002): 8-9; Yao Graham, 
“From liberation into NEPAD,” African Agenda Vol. 5, no. 2&3 (2002): 4-5; Ian Taylor,  “Towards 
the African century or another false start?” African Agenda, Vol. 5, no. 2&3 (2002): 10-12; Kwasi 
Anyemedu, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD,” African Agenda Vol. 5, no 2&3 (2002): 8-9. 
 
412 This was the view expressed during interviews this researcher had with Mr Smunda Mokeona, 
Deputy Director General, NEPAD Secretariat and member of the NEPAD Steering Committee 
(Midrand, South Africa, May 9 2003); Mr. Dave Malcomson, head international liaison and 
coordination, NEPAD Secretariat (Midrand, South Africa, May 26 2003); Professor Okey Onyejekwe, 
Development policy management Division (DPMD), UNECA (Addis Ababa, June 2003). 
 
413 This was the position advanced during the interviews this researcher had with Dr. Jinmi Adisa, 
Head Council for Security Stability development and cooperation (CSSDCA), African Union 
Secretariat (Addis Ababa, June 26 2003); His Excellency J.K. Shinkaiye, Ambassador of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria to the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and to the African Union (Addis Ababa, June 
23 2003); Mr. Sunday T. Dongonyaro, principal programme coordinator, NEPAD Secretariat 
(Midrand, South Africa, May 22 2003); Professor Stephen Gelb, Director Edge Institute 
(Johannesburg: Braamfontein Centre, April 11 2003). Professor Gelb was research coordinator for the 
South African Government’s MAP team, until July 2001. He also served as consultant to the NEPAD 
Secretariat between January and June 2002; Abdul K. Mohammed, UNECEF Special Representative to 
the African Union and to the ECA (Addis Ababa, June 2003). 
 
414 Keet, “The NEPAD and the African Union,” pp. 22-23. 
 
415 Abdul Mohammed, interview 2003. 
 193 
          It is difficult to disagree with the moderates’ contention that the NEPAD 
derives from diverse paradigms and initiatives and combines elements of outward and 
inward orientation. However, on the balance, the initiative is more outward oriented 
than it is inward oriented. Overall, it leans more towards the liberal paradigm than to 
the protectionist and state interventionist paradigm. More precisely, it constitutes a 
shift in Africa’s regional cooperation thinking and practice in pushing for greater 
engagement with the processes of globalisation despite Africa’s traditional suspicions 
of the global economy reflected in the prescriptions of earlier African led initiatives. 
Although the NEPAD restates some of the prescriptions of the LPA and its associated 
initiatives, it departs from them over key issues, such as the respective roles of the 
state and the market in the development process and also in its diagnoses of the 
causes of the continent’s economic crisis and the solutions to it.  
         A critical examination of NEPAD’s primary objectives, its underlying 
principles and the strategies for its implementation seem to give credence to the 
foregoing arguments. This section of the thesis explores these three dimensions, 
aiming to highlight the external orientations and the paradigm shift of the NEPAD. 
However, a detailed discussion of the contents of the NEPAD is not intended here for 
this is readily available in various NEPAD documents and other related literature. 
 
5.2.1 NEPAD: PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
      The NEPAD is a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal, designed to 
address current challenges facing the continent. Its primary objectives are to eradicate 
poverty in the continent and to bring about sustainable growth and development. 
Specifically, NEPAD aims to achieve and sustain an annual growth rate in Africa’s 
GDP of 7 percent for the next fifteen years; to attract US $64 billion a year in foreign 
 194 
direct investment (FDI) to continent; to increase investment in human resource 
development; to promote the role of women in the development process; and to 
reduce Africa’s poverty rate by half by 2015 in line with the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).416 Linked to this is the desire to reduce the gap between 
the industrialised countries of the North and Africa.417 Thirdly, the NEPAD aims to 
ensure that the Africa participates meaningfully in the global economy and body 
politic, given the realities of the unfolding processes of globalisation. And in the 
words of its authors: 
       The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African 
leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, 
that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their 
countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable 
growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively 
in the world economy and body politic. The programme is anchored in 
the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent 
from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising 
world. The poverty and backwardness of Africa stands in stark 
contrast to the prosperity of the developed world….418 
 
      Thus, the NEPAD is an attempt to establish a new way of doing business in 
Africa – and for the leadership of the continent to strive to operate in different ways, 
for business, civil society and women to be assigned different roles. More 
importantly, NEPAD aims at positioning the African continent within a transformed 
global environment and to ensure that Africa, “rather than simply only suffering from 
the “negatives” of globalisation must also strive to start reaping some of its 
                                               
416 See AU, “NEPAD 2001,” paragraphs 67-70; Policy Forum on NEPAD, “Draft Report” (2002): 
2; Ernest Harsch, “Africa, preparing its own recovery plans: Leaders aim for new drive to combat 
continent’s poverty, global marginalisation,” Africa Recovery, Vol. 15, no. 1&2 (June 2001): 3. 
 
417 See AU, “NEPAD 2001,” introduction, paragraph 2. 
 
418  Ibid.  paragraphs 1 & 2. 
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“positives.” It is also an agenda for the reorganisation of the entire international 
system, to make it more equitable and more responsive to Africa’s needs.”419  
            What emerges is that the NEPAD unlike the LPA and its associated initiatives, 
does not see Africa’s economic problems as emanating from its engagement with the 
global economy per se. Rather, the initiative suggests that the continent’s problems 
derive from domestic and international difficulties of becoming well integrated into 
the system and its exclusion from global economic processes. Therefore, the NEPAD 
embodies a resolve to integrate Africa more effectively into the global economy, as 
opposed to the LPA that strove to partially disengage from the system, at least in the 
short run. And as Ian Taylor puts it, “…the trajectory chosen amounts at best to 
attempting to join the system, to play by its rules and having discovered that the game 
is set unfairly, to adjust these rules somewhat in the Third World’s [Africa’s] 
favour.”420 The NEPAD is designed “to assist the African continent to take its rightful 
place in the world by building strong, competitive economies as the world moves 
towards greater liberalisation and competition.”421 
             For the authors of the NEPAD, building strong and competitive economies 
within the context of globalisation requires greater liberalisation and openness of 
African economies to global markets. However, African markets are underdeveloped 
and have been unable to deliver on the continent’s development needs and to 
withstand international competition. The emphasis under SAPs wherein markets were 
seen as providing the exclusive solution to economic development have been 
moderated in the NEPAD by the contention that “markets can only function if there is 
                                               
419 Malcomson, interview. 
 
420 Taylor, “Towards the African century,” pp. 61-84. 
 
421 AU, NEPAD October 2002, chapter IV paragraph 50. 
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a conducive environment for them to develop, which conducive environment can only 
be provided by a capable state.”422 The other key objective of the NEPAD is that of 
putting into place the (state) institutional framework for a more market-friendly 
investment environment.423 
       Although NEPAD’s architects have attempted to invoke the initiative’s goal of 
building a capable state as a point of convergence with earlier self-reliance African 
regional initiatives that assigned a central role to the African state in the development 
process, the much vaunted objective of creating a capable state in the NEPAD is 
ultimately aimed at facilitated the effectiveness of the market. This fits with the 
World Bank’s latter accommodative attitude towards the state in economic 
management, in which the state is vital for putting in place the appropriate 
institutional foundation for markets. In the language of the ‘evolved’ World Bank 
position: 
Development – economic, social, and sustainable – without an 
effective state is impossible. It is increasingly recognised that an 
effective state – not a minimal one – is central to economic and social 
development, but more as partner and facilitator than as director. 
States should work to complement markets not to replace them.424  
 
     This contrasts with the earlier approaches that placed the state at the centre of the 
development process, with public and para public agencies, acting as initiators and 
planners, and as the investing, implementing and monitoring agents of the state. The 
role of the private sector was located within the multilaterally agreed regional and 
national frameworks, and with economic “market forces” been guided and regulated 
                                               
422 Abdul Mohammed, interview. 
 
423 Adesina, “NEPAD, Post Washington consensus,” p. 17. 
 
424 World Bank, Development Report –WDR 1997: The state in a changing world (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997): 18; Leon Pretorius and Saliem Patel, “Policy Review,” p. 13. 
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by publicly defined concerns and considerations.425 The NEPAD constitutes a shift in 
orientation in Africa’s regional cooperation endeavours to the extent to which it 
removes the locus of the impulse for Africa’s development from the state, as was the 
case under the LPA, to private capital. 
        More importantly, the aims of regional cooperation and integration within the 
NEPAD depart from those of the LPA, although the rationale for cooperation is 
rhetorically the same – the need for collective action by weak African states to 
address development on the continent.426 While appearing to favour internal 
economic linkages within and between African states, “the ultimate goal of the 
NEPAD regional cooperation agenda appears to be the provision of important 
frameworks and inducements with which to attract foreign direct investment and offer 
larger markets to international capital.”427 NEPAD for example aims at building 
cross-border and trans-African transport and communication infrastructure, and to 
consolidate joint energy, water and other systems to allow for the benefits of 
economies of scale.428 It acknowledges that creating such “essential public goods” 
and inter-linkages is vital to “enhance regional cooperation and trade” and crucial to 
integrated African development. The NEPAD aims at addressing these projects on a 
planned regional basis without which the renewal process of the continent will not 
take off.429  
      While the structural linkages that were sought under the LPA self-reliant and self-
sustaining strategy were aimed at increasing the volume of transactions within and 
                                               
425 Keet, “The NEPAD and the AU,” p.  8. 
 
426 AU, “NEPAD 2001”, paragraphs 90-91. 
 
427 Keet, “NEPAD, Regional or global,” p. 26. 
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between African economies and by so doing to curtail their excessive dependence on 
external economies, “it seems that the infrastructure linkages sought within the 
NEPAD are intended to serve as attractions for foreign investment into Africa.”430 
The major aim as highlighted in the NEPAD document is “to bridge the existing gaps 
between Africa and the developed countries so as to improve the continent’s 
international competitiveness and to enable it participate in the globalisation 
process.”431 NEPAD, for example, offers its huge infrastructure projects as “great 
opportunities for investment”432 together with the guarantee of governmental 
supports, particularly through “public-private partnership” (PPPs) and with promises 
of ‘lowering the risk facing private investors.”433  
     The aims of the NEPAD regional cooperation agenda veers more towards serving 
private capital and facilitating greater integration into global markets than towards 
curtailing external ties of dependence through greater inter and intra-African 
exchanges. In this regard, it could be said to constitute a shift in orientation towards 
the embrace of greater liberalism both within and outside the continent. 
 
 5.2.2 NEPAD: UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
            The NEPAD is underpinned by the principles of African ownership, African 
leadership and African management. Linked to this is the claim that the initiative is 
based on African resources and on the resourcefulness of African peoples. The 
second underlying principle is that the initiative is based on new partnerships – 
                                               
430 Keet, “The NEPAD and the AU,” p. 24. 
 
431 Ibid.  paragraphs 95 and 98. 
 
432 This was the central premise of the infrastructure-focused Omega Plan that was eventually 
merged with the MAP to produce the New African Initiative (NAI), later named NEPAD. See for 
example, AU, “NEPAD 2001”, paragraph 100. 
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“between African governments and their peoples, and between African states and the 
developed countries of the North – including multilateral institutions of trade and 
finance.”434 
             In the former regard, NEPAD is seemingly in consonance with Africa’s 
traditional faith in inward-looking self-reliant and self-sustaining development. This 
is supported by its insistence that the resources for the initiative should be mobilised 
as much as possible by African countries, with less reliance on traditional external 
sources such as aid and loans. Its authors have declared: “We must and can move 
away from measures that further entrench the dependence of Africa on aid.”435 They 
have further emphasised: “It is necessary that the peoples of Africa gain the 
conviction that they are not, and must not be wards of benevolent guardians, but 
instruments of their own sustained upliftment,”436 and that the scheme is based on the 
agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition 
to shape their own destiny.437 Wiseman Nkuhlu has added that the NEPAD represents 
the first time that African leaders are taking responsibility for having themselves 
transformed, coming forward and saying that “we accept that as African leaders we 
have not been accountable to the African people over the years and that we also share 
responsibility for the wars in the continent, for the poverty over the years, but that the 
time has come for things to change.”438 
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       The claim of African ownership and leadership has been “publicised” as a key 
distinguishing feature of the NEPAD, setting it apart from previous plans and 
initiatives in support of Africa’s renewal. The centrality of African ownership in the 
NEPAD is premised on the realisation that “ownership of policy reforms matters 
because it directly affects programme acceptance and implementation.”439 Although 
there is consensus even amongst the authors of the NEPAD that the most effective 
policies and programmes are those based on domestic processes of consultation and 
decision-making because they tend to generate political support and buy-ins by 
stakeholders, the NEPAD has been flawed by the lack of consultation with internal 
stakeholders.440 Indeed, the diplomacy behind the NEPAD reflects greater concern 
with “winning” the support of external stakeholders than involving internal 
stakeholders, weakening the claims of African ownership and strengthening the 
perception that the initiative has been externally inspired. Little wonder Jinmi Adisa 
has concluded that “the theory of the NEPAD appears to be completely divorced from 
the practice, in that while the theory emphasises African ownership and leadership, 
the practice clearly reflects external dependence and orientation.”441 
          The outward orientations of the NEPAD are most manifest in the initiative’s 
principle of partnerships. The partnership principle emerged from contemporary 
consensus on African development cooperation thinking that “development 
partnerships work best where the aid regime devolves delivery systems, empowers 
local communities, and puts Africans in charge of their development efforts, with the 
development partners recognising and supporting Africa’s leadership and 
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responsibility.”442 Although African leaders claim ownership and responsibility for 
the initiative, in an effort to secure the recognition and support of the continent’s 
development partners they had to incorporate and address a wide range of issues and 
requirements set out by these external actors.  
         NEPAD’s partnership framework seeks to address present day realities such as 
globalisation, the neo-liberal paradigm of international relations, and it also pays 
attention to the political and economic “conditionalities” usually demanded by the 
Western powers for granting aid to developing countries.443 These conditionalities 
converge with the neo-liberal prescriptions of the “Washington Consensus,” which 
include: steps towards establishing market-oriented economies based on open trade 
and investment policies; the protection of property rights; supportive tax and 
expenditure policies; appropriate monetary, financial and exchange-rate policies; the 
control of corruption; and the explicit promotion of private sector activity, including 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises.444 In the face of these considerations, 
whose ultimate effect would be the reduction of the role of the state in economic 
management and accelerating the continent’s integration into the global economy, the 
rhetoric of inward-looking self-reliance gives way to practical outward orientations. 
Also, the internal dimensions of NEPAD’s partnership seeking to redefine state-
society relations (through political and corporate governance), while responding to 
the aspirations of African masses for greater participation in state affairs and for 
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enabling environments for self-fulfilment, are also indirectly (and ultimately) aimed 
at altering the negative perceptions held about Africa as a high risk region for foreign 
capital as demonstrated below.  
 
5.2.3 NEPAD: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
           The NEPAD is a three-pronged strategy: creating preconditions for 
development; addressing priority issues; and mobilising resources.445 Its strategy for 
promoting sustainable development in the continent is hinged on six priority issues: 
First, to bridge the infrastructure gap between Africa and the rest of the world by 
closing the digital divide and by investing in information and communications 
technologies, energy, transport, water and sanitation. Second, to enhance the 
continent’s human resource development capacity, with the aim of reversing Africa’s 
“brain-drain,” reducing poverty, bridging the education gap, and channelling 
investments to health and other social sectors. Third, to increase and diversify 
agricultural production by removing structural and institutional impediments to 
private investment. Another important priority area of the NEPAD is that of 
development in science and technology aimed at developing state-of-the-art 
information and expertise to achieve growth in manufacturing and industrial 
sectors.446 
             Although NEPAD’s priorities sectors are vital for the overall development 
and economic viability of African countries, however, to address them there is need 
for huge and sustained resource mobilisation. These resources will be mobilised 
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under the NEPAD capital flows and market access initiative. NEPAD’s capital flows 
initiative seeks to encourage domestic resource mobilisation, debt relief, the reform 
and increase of ODA, private capital flows and FDI. Meanwhile, NEPAD’s market 
access initiative seeks to encourage the diversification of Africa’s production while 
securing greater access to markets of the countries of the industrialised North in 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, tourism, and services.447 
        The outlay of the NEPAD resource mobilisation strategy suggests that the bulk 
of the resources required to address priority projects are to come from external 
sources through debt relief, increased ODA, FDI and greater access of African 
products to markets of the North.448 Although the NEPAD identifies increases in 
domestic savings, as well as improvements in public revenue collection systems as 
strategies to fill the annual resource gap of 12 percent of its GDP (US $64 billion) it 
nevertheless, leans on the goodwill of its extra-regional partners to provide the bulk 
of the needed resources. The NEPAD focuses on debt reduction and overseas 
development assistance (ODA) as complementary external resources required in the 
short to medium term. Meanwhile, private capital flows are addressed as a longer-
term concern, with effective increases on capital flows being contingent on improved 
economic and political governance performance.449  
          NEPAD’s emphasis on securing more aid (including debt cancellation) and 
increased FDI is premised on the fact that the continent is not an attractive destination 
for private capital, and that current income levels are too low to permit any significant 
increases in domestic savings. However, efforts to secure external resources and to 
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make the continent an attractive destination for FDI have overshadowed efforts to 
boost domestic savings, giving credence to the perception that in the final analysis, 
the NEPAD’s call for Africans to take control of their own destinies is mere 
rhetoric.450 This perception is further strengthened by the attitude of the leaders of the 
NEPAD who have made the attendance of G8 Summits and other related western 
forums, the most important item in the NEPAD resource mobilisation agenda – 
converting the initiative into a kind of “begging bowl.”  
            Finally, the NEPAD is based on the assumption that to be able to wrest 
resources from external partners to address the continent’s development priorities, the 
continent will have to address fundamental internal governance issues to the 
satisfaction of these external actors - in what has been popularised in the NEPAD as 
preconditions for Africa’s development.   These preconditions are: (1) peace, security, 
democracy and political governance, (2) economic and corporate governance, with a 
focus on public finance and management and (3) regional cooperation and 
integration.451 
         Governance improvement is at the heart of Africa’s development agenda, 
constituting the centrepiece of the NEPAD initiative. This is based on the reasoning 
that “improved economic governance in an individual country is capable of providing 
substantial direct economic benefits in terms of more effective delivery of public 
goods and services, both to the poor, and to firms.”452 It is also based on the 
expectation that good political governance and democracy would spare Africa some 
of its conflicts and bring about national and regional peace and stability, which are 
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essential for development. From this perspective, the NEPAD’s strategy of creating 
preconditions for development, through pledges to institutionalise good economic and 
corporate governance in the continent, is aimed at serving vital internal interests and 
could be said to be inward-looking.  
     Yet, the NEPAD’s governance improvement agenda is vital to secure greater 
resource flows from the industrialised world.453 From this perspective, NEPAD’s 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) though publicised as an African self-
monitoring mechanism, is an externally directed strategy, aimed ultimately at trying 
to change perceptions about the continent and to assure private capital of the 
protection of their long-term interests and by so doing, to increase, foreign direct 
investment into the continent. In a nutshell, the NEPAD rests on the idea of a trade-
off:  “In exchange for Africa’s governing elites holding each other politically and 
economically accountable for responsible governance, the industrialised powers are 
asked to make commitments on greater ODA flows, FDIs, market access for African 
goods, and debt relief and cancellation.”454 
             Although the NEPAD is a derivative of both inward and outward 
orientations, and although it attempts to assign the African state a role in the 
development process, on the balance, the initiative is substantially more outward-
oriented than previous African initiatives. Moreover, NEPAD’s emphasis on creating 
capable states is ultimately aimed at facilitating the operations of the market. 
Therefore, although moderates have argued that it is an eclectic initiative that 
combines both liberal and intervention paradigms, overall, it leans more towards 
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market liberalism than towards state involvement. The NEPAD arguably constitutes a 
shift in orientation in Africa’s traditional thinking and practice in its development 
cooperation efforts. The question that arises is, what explains this shift? 
 
5.3 NEPAD: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF A PARADIGM SHIFT 
          Africa’s earlier regional initiatives, including the LPA and AAPSAP, were 
designed to tackle the extreme extroversion of African economies – by restructuring 
and reorienting economic interactions within and between African states, while 
creating economies that were both more internally and regionally integrated. The 
further overt aim was to regain greater self-reliance in order to minimise Africa’s 
exposure to external shocks from international economic processes over which it had 
little control, and to reduce Africa’s extreme dependence within the international 
economy.455 Meanwhile, the NEPAD, while fully conscious of the constraints that the 
global economy places on the continent’s development prospects, strongly believes 
that engagement with the system is the only realistic way out - explaining the 
initiative’s resolve to reverse the continent’s exclusion from global economic 
processes.456  
              To explain this shift in orientation, it is important to recognise that the global 
economic and political environment into which the NEPAD has been born is 
fundamentally different from the one to which the LPA and its related initiatives were 
born. I argue that the shifts in orientation contained in the NEPAD have been 
informed by changes in international realities and circumstances. I examine these 
changed circumstances and how they conspired to inform the new orientations in the 
NEPAD. This is done within the ambit of my analytical framework, which identifies 
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changes in three independent variables as possible explanations to the shifts contained 
in the NEPAD. They are: (1) the changed realities and context of the international 
political economy; (2) shifts in the prevalent economic and development ideas; and 
(3) the altered nature of North-South power relations. These external dynamics 
coincided with a transformed domestic (African) political environment to produce the 
momentum for the NEPAD. 
 
5.3.1 NEPAD: A RESONSE TO A TRANSFORMED INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY.  
 
        However African countries perceive the global political economy, developments 
in the system have always had important implications for the viability of the African 
sub-system and have prompted rethinking of the development options of the 
continent. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the global political economy witnessed 
groundbreaking transformations marked by: a more “ruthless phase” of globalisation 
that placed the market over and above the state; dramatic transformations in the 
operational principles of multilateral trade and monetary institutions - particularly the 
shift from the GATT to the WTO trade regimes with a reduction in trade concessions 
and privileges to developing countries; plus the increasingly intrusive conditionalities 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions on hitherto exclusively sovereign prerogatives. 
These, together with dramatic changes in international financial markets (particularly 
in the nature of foreign direct investment (FDI)), have been part of the impetus for 
African leaders to rethink their development options. 
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5.3.1a A NEW WAVE OF GLOBALISATION: THE TRIUMPH OF THE MARKET 
OVER THE STATE 
 
            Globalisation is an age-old phenomenon, dating back to at least the seventeenth 
century.457 However, the current phase of globalisation that began around the 1980s 
has been more complex. Rapid advances in information and communication 
technology spur it and it is characterised by unprecedented flows of goods, capital 
and people across the globe.458 It is driven by uncontrollable and unparalleled 
international financial market forces and dominated by large trans-national companies 
that source, invest, produce and market wherever their economic advantage 
dictates.459 These new global market forces are beyond governance by states, 
suggesting that states have little choice, than adjust to the dictates of world 
markets.460  
            This phase of globalisation directly constrains the social policies of states, 
ushering a kind of conventional wisdom namely that: “states’ policies that deviate 
from the minimum standards acceptable to international finance capital will render 
the society in question uncompetitive and lead to capital flight.” Thus, public policy 
in any state or region should follow the needs of international capital rather than try to 
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alter the behaviour of global economic actors.461 In other words, if you cannot 
challenge globalisation, then join it. Being part of the globalisation process, would 
provide an opportunity for the continent to influence it. To borrow from Hamdock, 
“the present global environment clearly leaves the continent with no option than to be 
part of it, unless the continent wants to lean on some wishful thinking that it could 
chart an independent course, in isolation from the rest of the world - which option is 
simply not available at the present moment.”462        
       Some have interpreted this as meaning the triumph of the market over the state 
and that the roles remaining to states, are to promote competitiveness of national and 
regional economies and to make them as attractive as possible to inward investment 
by internationally mobile capital.463  In this new dispensation, the state has emerged 
as facilitator of globalisation, acting as an agent in the process.464 This contrasts with 
the divergent views about the state in the 1980s by the Bretton Woods institutions and 
proponents of the LPA respectively, as an obstacle to global liberalism that therefore, 
needed to be dispensed with at all cost; and as the principal economic manager that 
had to define and direct the economic agenda for the continent. 
       The concern with international competitiveness has emerged as the prime 
companion of globalisation.  The choice of some developing countries to improve 
their investment climates and to open up to foreign trade and investment has been 
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seen as one of the distinguishing features of this new wave of globalisation.465 At the 
down of the twenty first century, it had become evident that Africa unlike the other 
regions of the developing world had not made the necessary adjustments to benefit 
from globalisation – this, despite two decades of SAPs. Conceivably, the continent 
more than any other region, faced a real danger of further marginalisation. 
         A review of the volume of Africa’s recent economic transactions with the rest of 
the world bears out the dangers of further marginalisation that the continent faces. 
Africa’s relative share in global output and trade declined sharply from 3.5 percent in 
the early 1980s to 1.8 percent in the late 1990s. Overall, the growth of African 
economies in the 1990s in comparison with other developing regions and the world at 
large was very sluggish. While African countries registered an average growth rate of 
2.5 percent during the 1990s, Asian economies grew by 7.4 percent and those of Latin 
America and the Caribbean by 3.0 percent. Within the same period, Africa’s share of 
global trade declined from 5 percent to a meagre 2 percent. Moreover, many of 
Africa’s exports remained concentrated in primary commodities, with limited gains 
made in diversification and the export of manufactures.466  
        Even more disturbing was that the continent’s ability to attract vital private 
capital flows remained very constricted. For example, despite the seventeen-fold 
increase in international capital flows in the last decade, flows to Africa increased 
merely twofold and remained concentrated in a few resource-rich sectors and 
countries.467 Notwithstanding the liberalisation efforts embarked upon by many 
African countries under SAPs and despite the numerous laws enacted to attract 
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foreign private capital, the continent is yet to become a popular destination for FDI.   
Although FDI flows to the continent rose from $ 8billion in 1998 to $10 in 1999, 
Africa’s share of global FDI flows has remained a staggering 1.2 percent and barely 5 
percent of total FDI into all developing countries.468 A majority of African countries 
are still not trusted as a destination for FDI because of the stigma of political 
instability, corruption and the lack of transparent legal systems. In fact, returns on 
investment in the continent dropped from 30.7 percent to a mere 2.5 percent in the 
1980s.469 The dysfunctional transport and telecommunications infrastructure, 
underdeveloped monetary and banking systems, and the inadequacy of human capital 
have added to the perceptions of the high risk of doing business in Africa.470 
       Yet, one of the key elements of the new world economy is the volume of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which has now replaced exports as the fastest economic 
growth component and also overtaken official development assistance (ODA) 
transfers as a channel for development resources. FDI emerged in the 1990s as the 
largest source of external financing for many developing countries that have found it 
more stable, particularly during financial crises. Attracting significant flows of FDI 
and stimulating domestic private investment are of crucial importance to sustained 
recovery and growth in Africa.471   
     However, as demonstrated earlier, the African region has not been a popular 
destination for FDI, which has been directed largely to the European Union countries, 
the United States and Japan, and to a lesser extent to the newly industrialised 
countries. This solidification of investment patterns that exclude African countries 
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has meant that the continent has been left out of the principal channel of development 
resource flow. The NEPAD emerged within the context of Africa’s exclusion from 
the principal channel of development resource flow and it is intent on creating the 
appropriate domestic environment to reverse the trend.  
        Related to the emergence of the market as the principal organising force in the 
new global economy is that the current globalising world is rapidly moving towards 
knowledge-based economic structures and information societies that comprise 
networks of individuals, firms, and countries linked electronically in interdependent 
and interactive relationships. Consequently, there is a diminution in the role of the 
traditional sources of comparative advantage, such as large labour forces and 
abundant natural resources, as determinants of international competitiveness. The 
comparative advantage gaining ascendancy now is man-made, based on knowledge, 
and the application of information technology (IT). As a result, information 
technology will increasingly determine the pace of economic growth and the level of 
human welfare.472 Even in this domain, Africa lags behind.   
      These global transformations offer considerable opportunities to accelerate 
economic progress through out the world. At the same time, experience suggests that 
countries that fail to adjust enough to integrate themselves into the mainstream of the 
global economy risk marginalisation. The present phase of globalisation, as reflected 
in the preceding analysis, much like that of the nineteenth century, portends leaving 
Africa permanently marginalized unless African governments redirect their efforts to 
manage it successfully to their own advantage.473  To borrow from Weiss, “although 
globalisation renders the nation-state powerless, governments can and should seek to 
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influence the sequencing, speed and scope of engagement of their economies, and 
collectively seek to shape the nature of globalisation as an ongoing historical process” 
– that is “managed openness.”474   
          African leaders faced with the harsh realities of the new forces of economic 
globalisation, particularly the threats of further marginalisation, resolved to craft a 
collective initiative that would enable the continent to reap the benefits of the process 
while at the same time reducing its negative impact. Evidence of the NEPAD being 
informed by the realities of globalisation is aptly summarised in the following 
excerpt: 
      The world has entered the new millennium in the midst of an economic 
revolution. This revolution could provide both the context and the means 
for Africa’s rejuvenation. While globalisation has increased the cost of 
Africa’s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively 
managed integration present the best prospects for future economic 
prosperity and poverty reduction.475 
 
The NEPAD is the African region’s reaction, response, adaptation and adjustment to 
the processes and exigencies of globalisation. This African response was made even 
more expedient by the significant changes that occurred in the architecture and 
operational principles of global multilateral institutions of trade and finance. 
 
5.3.1b THE EVOLUTION IN THE WORKINGS OF MULTILATERAL 
INSTITUTIONS OF TRADE AND FINANCE  
 
      Issues of trade and finance have been at the centre of Africa’s relation with the 
global economy. Understandably, changes in the nature and workings of global 
institutions of trade and finance are bound to have far-reaching implications on the 
continent’s development options. The global transformations that began in the 1980s 
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altered the workings of global institutions of trade and finance placing new 
constraints on African governments. This section examines how these new constraints 
contributed in bringing about the policy shifts contained in the NEPAD. The focus is 
two-dimensional. First, in the area of finance the thrust is on the evolution of the 
IMF/WB conditionalities, with a particular focus on the institutions’ emphasis on 
questions of governance and how this informed the NEPAD good governance agenda. 
Second, in the area of trade, the focus is on the shift from the GATT to the WTO and 
how it has affected Africa’s relations with the North within the framework of 
preferential trade arrangements such as the European Union-African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific countries (EU-ACP) agreements and other emergent bilateral trade 
arrangements such as African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD).  
 (i) The evolution of donors’ conditionalities and the NEPAD governance agenda 
         The lending policies of multilateral and bilateral institutions have imposed an 
external constraint on the governments of developing countries, particularly as such 
lending has been conditional on the pursuit of policy reforms. However, this 
conditionality widened dramatically in the 1980s, as bilateral assistance from the 
advanced industrial states became increasingly anchored on new concerns with 
domestic policy reforms, including political governance.  
         The idea of good governance was introduced into African development 
discourse by the World Bank in its 1989 study of Africa’s “long-term perspective.” It 
suggested that “underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems, there was a 
crisis of governance.”476 This marked the beginning of a shift in the World Bank’s 
research and policy actions away from purely economic factors, especially the narrow 
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emphasis on “getting prices right” of the early 1980s, towards an acknowledgement 
of the role of political and institutional variables in the process of development in 
Africa and elsewhere.477 At the same time, the Bank and the Fund came to recognise 
the importance of the state in African economic management and to treat it as a 
partner to be bargained with rather than an obstruction which had to be removed as 
far as possible from the economic realm. Although this new approach appeared to 
have embraced some of the structural inadequacies of SAPs that African critics of the 
programmes (particularly the ECA technocrats) had been highlighting in the early 
1980s, however, this changed appreciation also carried with it assumptions about the 
desirable character of the state itself which were markedly at variance with important 
features of most African states as they existed. In Clapham’s words, “the Bretton 
Woods Institutions’ discovery of a relationship between “governance” and 
development carried with it the danger of still more threatening conditionalities 
relating to the structure of domestic government itself.”478  
         The World Bank’s forays into the business of governance – and by extension, 
the political economy of development was later adopted by bilateral and other 
multilateral donors who have over the years stressed its democratic version and used 
it to impose political conditionality on development lending.479 Since the late 1980s, 
therefore, “policy norms embodied in conditional lending emerged as a reference for 
reform efforts in developing countries.”480 
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           With both commercial lending and foreign direct investment in the retreat, the 
relative importance of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral 
donors increased. Moreover, the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the 
IMF and the widespread domestic dissatisfaction with previous sets of import 
substitution industrialisation policies led to an outward orientation becoming the 
norm rather than the exception among developing countries.481 Hamdock has 
contended that, “structural Adjustment Programmes had actually rendered individual 
African economies out-ward oriented and what the NEPAD initiative actually did was 
to take cognisance of this reality and to formalise it at the continental level.”482 The 
prominence of the good governance agenda in the NEPAD is partly aimed at 
satisfying a minimum of these conditionalities so as to be able to wrest higher ODA, 
FDI and debt cancellation. This does not, however, suggest that good governance is 
not ordinarily good for the African countries. Indeed, it is an indispensable condition 
for sustainable development in the continent. 
(ii) The evolution of the international trade regimes: from GATT to WTO 
       Changes in international regimes governing world trade and investment have 
been yet another source of pressure on developing countries’ governments to review 
their options in dealing with the global economy and could be seen as part of the 
changed global context for the NEPAD’s formulation. The changes in the global trade 
regime are embodied in the WTO that replaced the GATT on January 1, 1995. 
       The emergence of the WTO regime has created new and greater challenges for 
the African economies. Apart from seeking to remove trade concessions previously 
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granted to the less developed countries, the Uruguay Round brought trade in 
agriculture and textiles within WTO rules and disciplines. Moreover, the agreement 
embraced a wide range of new issues: service, trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs), and trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPs), which had not 
been covered in previous GATT rounds.483 Besides, the coincidence of the emergence 
of WTO rules with the new wave of regionalism in the 1980s has meant that the new 
regionalism has had to be ‘open’ (outward-looking) in conformity with WTO rules, as 
opposed to the closed (inward-looking) regionalism of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
This has compelled African states to formulate outward-looking rather than an 
inward-looking regional cooperation frameworks. 
           While the new trade regime has significantly reduced the costs of goods and 
services through out the world, however, the benefits have not accrued equally to all 
countries. The least developed countries, particularly those in Africa have been ill 
equipped to make meaningful gains from the WTO multilateral framework, partly 
because of inadequate productive and entrepreneurial skills base, inadequate science 
and technology infrastructure, and weak government institutions.484 The NEPAD’s 
emphasis on developing the appropriate infrastructure, building the necessary human 
capacities and strengthening Africa’s weak institutions of governance is to enhance 
African countries’ ability to benefit from the WTO multilateral framework. 
           The WTO regime while upholding concessions relating to preferential and 
differential treatment of less developed countries provided for in earlier GATT 
negotiated agreements (such as the MFN principle) on grounds of the awareness of 
the comparative weaknesses of these countries however, emphasises the eventual 
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‘phasing out’ of such concessions. The new strategy of ‘phasing out’ concessions to 
LDCs equally impinges on preferential trading arrangements reached between 
individual and groups of developed countries with less developed regions, such as the 
EU-ACP agreements. The WTO has provided a timeframe during which such 
preferential trading arrangements must be brought in line with rules of equal 
treatment, irrespective of the disparities in levels of development between countries 
and regions.  Furthermore, WTO rules require that regional economic groupings 
conform to the principle of non-discrimination against third parties. The main 
operational principle of the new global trade regime embodied by the WTO appears 
to be the ‘homogenisation’ of the rules governing global economic relations and 
development cooperation in particular.485 
            In line with the dictates of the WTO regime, the EU-ACP countries concluded a 
new twenty-year Partnership Agreement that replaced the Lome Convention in 
February 2000. Although the Cotounou Agreement still allows non-reciprocal 
preferences to LDCs, it structured to progressively scrap major concessions that were 
granted under the Lome Convention, in favour of liberal principles of open markets 
and global competitiveness. The EU has shifted its focus from aid to trade as the main 
instrument of cooperation. This effectively constitutes a reconstruction of Europe’s 
relations with the South to reflect the dominant neo-liberal multilateral norms of 
international trade defined in the WTO. The key elements of this agreement are: 
o Rolling over the non-reciprocal Lome trade preferences for eight years to 31      
December 2007 under a waiver from the WTO; 
 
o No improvement in market access for the ACP into the European Union 
market during the transitional period; 
 
o No firm commitment on maintenance during the transitional period of any     
protocol product, except sugar, which has a life of its own; 
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o Introduce reciprocity from 2008 in the form of free trade areas between EU 
and ACP regions 
 
o Start negotiations about these free trade areas in September 2002 and finish in 
2007. 
o Cooperate in multilateral trade. 
o Produce trade agreements that are WTO – compatible. 
            What the new EU-ACP agreement represents is, fundamentally, an end to non-
reciprocal treatment – a “rebalancing or evening up” of obligations and benefits and a 
subordination of Lome and all African regional trade and integration arrangements to 
the WTO.486 It is a partnership that aims, eventually, at fully integrating the ACP 
countries into the world economy. 
                   In the spirit of the new global trend towards ‘equalising’ obligations and benefits 
in trade relations in the global economy, the United States Congress adopted the 
African Economic Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).487  AGOA is a free-trade 
arrangement in which SSA countries will be able to export raw materials and light 
manufactures into the United States market almost duty free. In return, African 
countries are expected to privatise industry, cut corporate taxes, open their economies 
to foreign goods and to pursue economic reforms, including strict budgetary and tax 
controls to protect private property, reduce state participation in the economy, support 
the growth of private sectors, and remove restrictions on foreign investment. The 
AGOA agreement also requires beneficiaries to guarantee intellectual property rights, 
protect foreign investment, and adhere to good democratic governance.488  Like the 
Cotonou agreement, the AGOA, also pushes for a greater integration of African 
                                               
486 For greater details on trends towards “equalising” obligations and benefits in trade relations 
between EU-ACP countries in conformity with WTO rules, see Ibid.  p. 29. 
 
487 See United States Congress, The AGOA, no. S.1387 (Washington D.C, 2000) 
 
488 Cheru, African renaissance, roadmaps, p. 28; Botha, “The NEPAD,” pp. 12-13. 
 
 220 
economies into the global economy, through free trade agreements with greater 
reciprocity. 
     Another important bilateral arrangement that had an influence on the formulation 
of the NEPAD was the Tokyo Conference on African Development (TICAD I and II) 
held in October 1993 and October 1998 respectively. Organised by the government of 
Japan in collaboration with the United Nations and the Global Coalition for Africa 
(GCA), the TICAD formulated the concepts of “ownership” and “partnership” as 
guiding principles of Africa’s economic relationship with the developed world. These 
two concepts were later adopted by the DAC of the OECD and by the G7/ G8 
countries at their annual Summits in 1996, 1997 and 1998.489 Ownership and 
leadership emerged as a central element in Africa’s relationship with the 
industrialised countries and therefore informed the NEPAD underlying principle of 
African ownership, leadership and resourcefulness.  
         Notwithstanding the introduction of the notions of ownership and leadership in 
Africa’s economic relations with the North, the overall inclination of the new global 
trade environment has been to emphasis equal treatment and reciprocity in trade 
relations, despite the persistent asymmetries between partners. This has posed greater 
difficulties for African economies whose structural and institutional weaknesses have 
made it difficult for them to mitigate the negative effects of these global trade 
transformations. These structural weaknesses have also prevented the region from 
taking advantage of opportunities offered by these new multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements. It is within this context that African leaders crafted the NEPAD, which 
aims at helping African countries to collectively take advantage of the opportunities 
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of global transformations in trade rules while at the same time, reducing their 
negative effects.  
 
5.3.2 NEPAD: THE OUTCOME OF THE CHANGED NATURE OF NORTH-
SOUTH RELATIONS 
 
          Although Africa has since independence been the weaker “partner” in North-
South relations, the global transformations of the late 1980s and 1990s worsened the 
continent’s position.  The debt crisis and the changed institutional focus – from the 
dominance of “one-man-one vote” multilateralism within the UN-General Assembly 
and UNCTAD, to “quota-based” voting in international financial institutions (IFIs); 
the demise of the Cold War, and the weakening of Southern solidarities due to the 
widening developmental disparities between states of the South, all conspired to 
further weaken Africa’s standing in North-South relations. This greatly constricted 
the continent’s ability to advance and uphold a strategy that challenges the neo-liberal 
ethos of the Northern dominated global economic order. This section of the thesis, 
examines how Africa’s high debt burden, the shift from multilateralism to 
bilateralism, the end of the Cold War, and the weakened South-South solidarity 
placed Africa in a weaker position in the global economy - pushing for the continent’s 
embrace of the liberal global economy as contained in the prescriptions of the 
NEPAD. 
 
5.3.2a THE DEBT CRISIS, THE PROMINENCE OF IFIs AND NEPAD’S DESIGN  
          By 1990, Africa’s foreign debt had swollen to $ 272 billion almost double the 
level in 1980. This was equivalent to over 90 percent of the region’s annual 
production and represented about 112 percent of its GDP, higher than any other 
region of the world. To service this debt, African countries needed to pay well over 
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$20 billion per year in interest - nearly 30 percent of all of Africa’s export earnings.490 
In many African countries, this figure was even higher. For example, Uganda’s debt 
servicing in 1989 was about 81 percent of its export earnings and for Algeria, Ghana, 
and Madagascar, the ratio was 50 percent.491 African countries have been unable to 
service these debts, creating a complex web of defaulting, increased arrears on 
interest and a swell in the overall debt. At a time when Africa’s growth prospects had 
been severely constrained by its limited import capacity and an overall decline in 
ODA, the debt burden emerged as the primary obstacle to Africa’s development 
prospects in the 1990s and beyond. This rendered African states particularly 
vulnerable and dependent on the goodwill of the donor countries and IFIs in terms of 
their willingness to reschedule or forgive the continent’s debts. 
            With the emergence of issues of debt as the most prominent item in North-
South relations, the institutional focus of North-South diplomacy shifted from 
multilateral forums such as the UN-General Assembly and the UNCTAD where all 
states had equal voting power to international financial institutions (IMF and WB) 
characterised by quota-based voting that favours North countries that make the 
highest financial contributions to these institutions. While the equal voting system of 
the multilateral forums had given the Third World the latitude to advance its specific 
interests and to challenge issues that threatened their survival, the workings of the 
IFIs do not give them much voice. They are at the receiving end of whatever policies 
the industrialised states insist on having on the WB and IMF agenda. 
           Africa, unlike most other developing regions, owes most of its debts (60%) to 
official creditors – international financial institutions (IFIs) and governments. And 
with the advent of Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s, the share of debts 
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owed the IFIs by SSA rose to 25 percent by the end of the decade. Meanwhile, their 
share in debt servicing was much higher at 40 percent, partly because of the very 
short-term nature of some IMF lending and also because of the market rate of interest 
that it charged on most of its loans in the first half of the 1980s. In the particular case 
of SSA, the IFIs to whom the continent owes most of its debts have traditionally been 
opposed to rescheduling these debts. Despite initiatives taken to lessen the continent’s 
debt burden and despite an ‘acclaimed’ increased commitment of the IMF to the 
continent, Africa paid back to the IMF more than it gained in new resources in all but 
one year in the period 1986-1990. Net repayments totalled $ 3 billion, of which $ 1.8 
billion came from SSA. And in 1990, roughly half of all African countries were, on 
balance, net exporters of financial resources to the IMF.492  
      On their part, other official creditors (developed countries of the North) undertook 
a number of initiatives to reduce Africa’s debt burden – ranging from rescheduling, 
through easier repayment terms, to partial write-offs. In 1988 for example, the Group 
of Seven (G7) offered partial write-offs and easier repayment terms for some non-
concessional credits. However, in 1989, savings from these measures amounted to 
only $100 million compared to the $10 billion of total debt repayments by SSA.493  It 
is noteworthy that since the onset of the debt crisis, a number of international 
initiatives and mechanisms aimed at assisting indebted countries cope with their 
external financial obligations have been implemented.494 Not only have these 
initiatives failed to alleviate the continent’s debt burden, but they have also carried 
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with them conditionalities that have enhanced the influence of international financial 
institutions and creditor countries of the North.495  
         With very few exceptions, the rescheduling of commercial and public debts has 
been contingent on the negotiation of high-conditionality, ‘upper-tranche’ 
programmes with the IMF, usually supported by the World Bank and regional 
development banks. The debt crisis also led to substantive changes in the 
‘conditionality norm’: the presumption that multilateral and bilateral financial 
assistance is granted contingent on policy adjustment by the recipients. In other 
words, to secure more loans or have existing loans rescheduled, the recipient 
countries were expected to adopt measures to open up their economies to the global 
economy and at the same time abide by international trading and investment 
norms.496 
        Against the background of Africa’s weakened position as a near “insolvent 
debtor” and the North’s enhanced position as an apparently uncompromising creditor, 
bent on posing increasingly more stringent conditions for loan repayments, African 
leaders, meeting in Sirte, Libya mandated presidents Boutaflika and Mbeki to 
intercede on their behalf with the industrialised North to lessen their debt burden. It 
was this mandate to negotiate the continent’s debt that eventually evolved into a 
comprehensive economic recovery blueprint for the continent – the NEPAD.  
       Because the impulse for the initiative came from the debt overhang, NEPAD’s 
initiators had to incorporate a minimum of the preconditions set by these actors to be 
able to wrest some concession from them. Therefore, unlike the LPA that “clashed” 
with the World Bank’s Berg Report, the NEPAD conforms with and endorses 
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programmes put forward by various developed countries and multilateral 
institutions.497 The objective of endorsing these programmes according to the 
NEPAD “will be to rationalise these partnerships and to ensure that real benefits flow 
from them.”498 However, the real explanation to this attitude is that, conscious of their 
weakened position in global politico-economic power relations African states opted 
for the pragmatic strategy of adjusting to the prescriptions of their Northern partners, 
rather than trying to challenge them. 
 
5.3.2b THE WEAKENING OF SOUTH-SOTUH SOLIDARITIES AND NEPAD’S 
ENGAGEMENT OPTION 
 
         A unique feature of the current phase of globalisation has been the success of 
some countries of the South to harness the potential of their abundant labour to break 
into the global markets for manufacture and services – even superseding developed 
countries’ growth rates.499 To the extent that this development has been good for the 
well being of the global economy, it has had the unfortunate effect of weakening the 
solidarity amongst countries and regions of the South, which enabled them to 
formulate the formidable challenge against the Northern dominated Post-WW II 
global economic order in the NIEO campaigns of the 1970s. It is noteworthy, that 
Africa’s courage to evolve the bold inward-looking policies contained in the LPA 
partly came from the strong bonds of solidarity that prevailed between countries of 
the South in the 1970s. 
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       The emergence of some countries of the South as ‘success cases’ through greater 
integration with the global economy has brought about divergence in the interests of 
countries of the South, and by implication, the splintering of the Southern bloc in 
North-South politics. While the more industrialised and export oriented states of the 
South have developed strong constituencies that are supportive of global economic 
liberalism because of the calculated interests involved, particularly through 
multilateral forums like the GATT/WTO, the less developed countries of the South, 
including the vast majority of African economies have persisted in their perception of 
the global economy as being largely exploitative.  
        Moreover, the differential levels of development of countries of the South have 
given the North a justification to begin to push for discrimination in the application of 
concessions to economies of the South under bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment arrangements. A good example of this new attitude is the North’s 
emphasis on “conditional most favoured nation principle” that consists of slowly 
phasing out the more developed countries of the South from preferential treatments 
particularly under the WTO regime, bringing them in line with the principle of equal 
“opportunities and obligations” in global trade and investment.  
        Politically, the demise of the Cold War equally weakened the bonds that existed 
between countries of the South within the framework of the Non-Aligned-Movement 
(NAM) that were a source of strength to the African region during the 1970s. And 
although the NAM continues to exist in name, its role has diminished with the 
disappearance of the Cold War environment that informed its creation. Moreover, 
splits in the Arab world and the discovery of alternative sources of energy have 
conspired to weaken the solidarities within the OPEC cartel, whose actions in the 
1970s served as a demonstration of the potentials of South-South collective action in 
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North South relations and emboldened African states to adopt the inward-looking 
collective self-reliance stance contained in the LPA. 
       All the forces and factors that made the South a “near homogenous” entity in the 
1970s, and that was their source of strength, disappeared by the turn of the century. 
Africa emerged as the most vulnerable region with the disappearance of these bonds 
of unity. It had to look for strength from within, informing therefore, the designing of 
the NEPAD, which is a collective effort by the continent to reposition itself within the 
context of a globalising world, where the South has become even more weakened and 
vulnerable than ever before. 
 
 5.3.2c THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AFRICA’s WEAKENED POSITION AND 
NEPAD’S DESIGN   
 
        The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union removed 
the global conditions that had shielded African governments from external political 
interference in domestic economic management. It also curtailed African 
governments’ leverage to wrest substantial resources and far-reaching concessions 
almost unconditionally from both sides of the Cold War divide. More importantly, it 
triggered a marked shift in the dynamics of international politics with the geo-military 
factor ceding prominence to strategies for meeting the challenges of economic 
internationalisation.500 The removal of these bargaining levers placed African states 
in a weaker position in North-South relations, leaving them with little option but to 
adopt policies that would incorporate elements of Western conditionalities. 
      Although African states’ domestic economic policy making was heavily 
penetrated by external forces (particularly under SAPs) that constrained the power of 
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the state, they had a free hand over the management of their domestic politics during 
the Cold War. However, “the end of bipolarity abruptly removed the protection that it 
afforded African governments and rather exposed them to the monopoly diplomacy 
of a triumphant Western alliance reinforcing the external economic constraints that 
had been in place since the early 1980s.”501 The demise of the Soviet Union 
weakened the “clientelist” alliances between African governments and the West and 
opened the way for the imposition of political conditionalities that mirrored the 
economic conditionalities imposed under SAPs: 
They were in principle the programme of an alliance, comprising 
international financial institutions, seeking to bring about the capitalist 
transformation of African economies; the Western governments, 
flexing their diplomatic muscles in the aftermath of the Cold War; 
Western public opinion, outraged at the brutality and corruption of 
African regimes; and finally, the African publics who vociferously 
demonstrated their own discontent with the prevailing order, and on 
whose behalf the Western aid donors could claim (wrongly or rightly) 
to speak.502  
 
       These conditionalities emphasised three principal elements: concern for human 
rights, concern for democracy, and concern for governance more broadly. First, the 
concern for human rights – encompassing freedom from politically motivated killings 
and torture, imprisonment without trial and the other related abuses with which 
African regimes had been associated. 
        Second, the concern for democracy, characteristically conceived in Western 
liberal terms and notably including the institutionalisation of freely chosen 
governments. In principle, this embraced the promulgation of constitutions 
guaranteeing certain rights and procedures, laws liberalising the political space in 
terms of the flourishing of political parties, freedom of the press and the holding of 
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periodic and transparent elections to be monitored by international agencies and the 
continued observance of democratic procedure by regimes that were so elected. 
Additionally, North recognised that democracies to be sustained required a range of 
supportive conditions, which could to some extent be encouraged with external aid. 
Much of this aid was directed to civil society organisations that were out of the realm 
of state apparatuses and that were indeed to serve as a check to the excesses of the 
African state.503  
            Thirdly, the Post-Cold War conditionalities involved a more general concern for 
what has come to be seen broadly as ‘governance’ – regarded technically as 
encompassing a set of procedures for ensuring that the business of government was 
carried out as honestly and as efficiently as possible, together with training measures 
to create a body of civil servants capable of understanding and implementing these 
procedures. At its broadest, it could be extended to include measures that were 
intended or expected to produce better governments, including issues of democracy 
and human rights.504 
              Taken together, the post-Cold War political conditionalities were an ambitious 
project for reforming and reordering African states, in accordance with external 
models and subject to external controls. In the Post-Cold War environment where the 
attitudes and interests of the major Western states broadly coincided, they 
increasingly acted as a consortium seeking to exercise tutelary guidance over a 
weakened and “choiceless” African continent.505 In this regard, the language of 
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human rights, democracy and governance provided the West with a discourse through 
which they could use their enhanced bargaining power against the weakened African 
states. “It provided them the latitude to either intervene in hitherto exclusively 
domestic politics or alternatively withdraw from previous obligations without fear of 
creating a vacuum that could be filled by the then rival communist alternative.”506  
      French president François Mitterrand set the tone for the likely Western response 
to non-compliance with political reform by threatening, “those African governments 
which sought to defy the demands for popular political participation arising through 
out the continent could not expect to receive French support.”507 That this came from 
France, with its record of supporting some of Africa’s regimes with the poorest record 
of governance during the heydays of the Cold War showed how much the West’s 
position had become enhanced in the post-Cold War era. The same could be said of 
the USA, whose defence of the “free world against international Communism” had 
previously cornered her into otherwise “unholy alliances” with states which could not 
by any plausible criterion be described as free. The removal of the communist threat, 
emboldened the USA not only to revive its ideals of democratic governance on a 
global scale – but, more importantly, to link it up to the spread of Western capitalism. 
As a result, America’s aid programmes became increasingly geared towards 
sustaining the basis for democracy, particularly by supporting African civil society 
organisations.508 The British position was even more threatening when they declared 
that “governments which persist with repressive policies, with corrupt management, 
and with wasteful and discredited economic systems should not expect us to support 
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their folly with scarce resources.”509 Even the European Union moved away from its 
traditional indifference to link its aid to the respect for human rights, democratisation, 
a free press and honest government in a resolution adopted in 1991.510 
     What emerges is that the demise of the Cold War liberated the industrialised states 
from geo-strategic and ideological considerations that had hitherto compelled them to 
acquiescing African governments’ deviations from preferred Western institutional 
norms. African governments finding themselves in a weaker bargaining position as a 
result of the disappearance of the communist alternative had no choice, but to 
capitulate to the dictates of Western conditionalities. It is within this context that the 
NEPAD emerged – an initiative that seeks to respond and adjust to the realities of a 
post-Cold War era, which is indisputably commanded by an alliance of triumphant 
Western liberalism. 
 
5.3.3 NEPAD: AN ALIGMENT TO TRIUMPHANT LIBERAL ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT IDEAS OF THE 1980 AND BEYOND 
 
       Africa’s development choices, beginning with the immediate post independence 
socialist planned economic orientations and the export promotion strategies, through 
the inward self-reliant prescriptions of the LPA, to the infamous World Bank inspired 
SAPs, have been products of “borrowed thinking.”511 Despite claims that the NEPAD 
constitutes a “historic break” with Africa’s tradition of imitating and copying 
economic development ideas coming from outside,512 I argue that the initiative is 
                                               
509 Ibid. 
 
510 Ibid. 
 
511 Hamdock, interview. 
 
        512 See for example, Bruno Bekolo-Abe, “Le NEPAD et la reflexion sur le development,” in 
Hakim, and Kasse, Le NEPAD et les enjeux  p. 142. 
 
 232 
indeed a product of and an alignment to the triumphant western liberal economic and 
development thoughts of the 1980s and beyond. 
         The demise of the Cold War did not only herald global convergence on Western 
political model of democratic pluralism, but equally engendered consensus on 
Western-styled economic organisation and thought, relegating alternative models to 
the background. This was particularly so because the rapid growth of some Asian 
economies, through greater liberalisation and engagement with the global economy, 
“destroyed any plausible basis for those ‘dependency’ theories which had argued that 
the economic development of the Third World was rendered impossible by the 
domination of the global economy by the already industrialised capitalist powers.”513 
         This gave an enormous boost both to the power and the self-confidence of the 
Western capitalist states. By discrediting the ideologies of single-party statehood and 
“statist” economic management which had served to uphold African as well as 
communist regimes, “it left Western liberal capitalism in sole control of the global 
economic terrain, and provided a precise political equivalent to the “monoeconomics” 
(the belief that the same economic principles applied equally to developing as well as 
industrial economies) which had sustained SAPs.”514 After the Cold War, the 
application of Western liberal models to Africa and to other regions of the globe, 
could no longer be regarded as an imposition of values derived from one culture or 
stage of development on other cultures or developmental trajectories to which they 
were fundamentally unsuited as variants of dependency thesis had sought to 
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demonstrate in earlier decades. “Rather, it became increasingly perceived as the 
simple transfer of political technologies of universal validity.”515 
        In Africa, this was facilitated by the triumph of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) that put on hold, all prospective thinking about alternative 
development options in the continent (this, despite the adoption of the AAPSAP). 
With the advent of the debt crisis in the 1980s, African countries resigned themselves 
to evolving policies that could facilitate their securing desperately needed SAPs 
resources. While in the earlier decade of the 1970s African states were concerned 
about establishing the internal bases for economic development, during the era of 
SAPs the region embarked on fundamental policy reorientations with the focus being 
its incorporation into the global economy under the dictates of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions.  
            The resultant liberalisation perspective emphasized privatisation and the 
dismantling of public sector enterprises, the overall reduction of the role of the state, 
liberalisation of price mechanisms and a host of other measures directed at 
accelerating the opening up of the economies to both internal and external 
competition.516 By the time of the demise of the Soviet model in the late 1980s, 
individual African economies had already adopted liberal and outward-looking 
economic policies. Although resistance persisted against the liberal prescriptions of 
the SAPs, it succeeded in forcing some far-reaching transformations on African 
economies. Arguably, NEPAD constitutes “a pragmatic formalisation of the already 
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prevailing liberal and outward orientation of individual African countries at the 
continental level.”517 
           Neo-liberalism emerged as an overwhelmingly dominant model for economic 
organisation. The central element in the development of economic liberalism has been 
the belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy and entrepreneurs as 
a good and necessary social group. Economic liberalism revolves around these two 
fundamentals and the propagation of the culture, norms and social framework of 
power and relations that sustain both ideas. In this regard, “market forces are not only 
morally necessary but also, inherently good and are the most appropriate ways to 
allocate resources and create incentives in society.”518 Ethiopian Prime Minister, 
Meles Zenawi, a supporter of the NEPAD concedes that the initiative emerged under 
the dictates of the triumphant neo-liberal thought when he argues that:  
    It is true that the NEPAD strategies are based on promoting macro-
economic stability. It is also true that NEPAD envisages Africa’s 
development within the context of a globalised and free market 
economy. These are concepts that are also central to the neo-liberal 
paradigm of the Washington consensus. But in my view, these 
concepts are the rational kernels of the paradigm. Any development 
strategy that is not based on these fundamentals is totally unrealistic 
and cannot succeed. 519 
 
   
5.4 THE TRANSFORMED AFRICAN DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT: A 
REINFORCEMENT OF GLOBAL DYNAMICS 
 
         The transformed international context coincided with important changes in 
Africa’s domestic environment to provide the impulse for the NEPAD process. These 
internal factors included; the democratisation of African countries’ polity, which 
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itself gave rise to a vibrant civil society and a new breed of African leadership, the 
emergence of a non-racial South Africa and the end of military rule in Nigeria, the 
transition from the OAU to the AU, and to some extent, changes at the helm of the 
UNECA.  
          Samuel P.Huntington averred rather pessimistically in the 1980s that “most 
African countries are by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics, 
unlikely to move in a democratic direction.”520 A few years later however, his 
judgement was invalidated by the embrace of democratic systems by a greater 
majority of African states. Although this wave of democratisation was in many cases 
only forced on African leaders by unrelenting civil societies and international 
pressures, its momentum was so powerful that many have come to see the 1990s as 
Africa’s second independence.   
       This wave of democratisation did not only result in the emergence of more open 
and competitive political regimes,521 but more importantly, “it reinforced broader 
approaches to governance – moving from a narrow focus on public-service reform to 
include the more ambitious goals of fostering political responsiveness and 
accountability.”522 This conception has continued to exert a profound influence on 
Africa’s regional development agenda and conceivably, partly informed the 
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endorsement of democracy and good governance as preconditions for sustainable 
development in the NEPAD dispensation.523 
              Moreover, the political liberalisation of the 1990s facilitated the emergence of a 
“new breed” of leadership in the continent. This new leadership appears more 
committed to building a strong and enduring culture of democracy, respect for human 
rights and accountability in their countries.524 Part of the impulse for the emergence 
of the NEPAD came from this new generation of African leadership.525 The lead role 
played by presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, 
Abdel Aziz Boutaflika of Algeria and Obasanjo of Nigeria, bears out the catalytic role 
of the emergent new leadership in formulating the NEPAD. The emergence of these 
leaders was facilitated by the end of apartheid in South Africa and also the end of 
military dictatorship in Nigeria.526 
            The end of apartheid brought the African National Congress (ANC) to power in 
South Africa.  Because of the history of the liberation struggle, the ANC attaches a lot 
of importance to the upliftment of the African peoples, not just in South Africa, but 
also in the continent at large.  In 1993, just before the ANC took power, it declared 
that one of the “new South Africa’s foreign policy objectives should embody a belief 
that the country’s policy should reflect the interest of the continent of Africa.”527 
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Africa emerged as a high priority in the “new non-racial South Africa.” And 
according to an ANC foreign policy document entitled “Developing a Strategic 
Perspective on South African Foreign Policy,” this priority is informed by the 
following considerations: 
o  South Africa is part of the African continent, and its economic development 
is linked to what happens on the continent as a whole; 
 
o  South Africa has an important role to play in the economic and political 
revival of the continent; 
 
o  The economic development of the African continent as a whole will be a 
significant step in overcoming the North-South divide.528 
 
The most immediate implication of these ANC foreign policy considerations was 
a strong concern with the “renewal” of the continent. For the ANC, the concept of an 
African renaissance came to be seen as the main pillar of South Africa’s international 
relations. In this and many other ANC documents, the African Renaissance was 
raised to, or equated with, South Africa’s national interest.529 Between May 1996 and 
2000, Mbeki and the ANC popularised the concept of an African ‘renewal’ within 
and outside the continent.530 The emergence of a non-racial South Africa, under the 
leadership of the ANC with its Africa focused foreign policy, was one of the 
transformations in the continent that provided the germ for the emergence of an 
African renaissance philosophy that provided a context for the formulation of the 
MAP and later the NEPAD. 
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Meanwhile, Nigeria had been the major actor behind earlier African regional 
initiatives (ECOWAS, LPA, the Abuja Treaty, and the CSSDCA). However, years of 
military rule, robbed the country and its leadership the moral credentials and material 
capabilities to continue to play this leadership role. The end of military dictatorship in 
1999 created the political space for Nigeria to resume her continental leadership role. 
The election of Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigeria’s first civilian leader after more than a 
decade of military rule came at the most opportune moment for the pursuit of a 
continental agenda. To borrow from Francis Kornegay: “with Obasanjo’s re-entry 
into the political scene against the backdrop of a new inter-African environment, 
influenced by a post-apartheid South African campaign for an African Renaissance 
under Mbeki, a happy convergence of South African and Nigerian agenda began 
unfolding.”531 The MAP and eventually, the NEPAD emerged within the context of 
this newborn Nigeria-South African entente and continental leadership.532  
        Closely related to the democratisation process in the continent was the 
emergence of a divergence between African states and the societies that constituted 
them. At independence, African leaders were for the most part leaders of national 
movements, with a majority of the masses united in the struggle against the 
colonialists. Civil society during this time, and during the early years after 
independence, did not exist as a separate entity, rather it was part of the nationalist 
movements that constituted the independence governments in African states. 
However, shortly after independence, the continent was gripped by a spate of military 
coups d’etats, the disbanding of plural democratic systems and the institutionalisation 
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of various forms of despotic and autocratic governments, betraying the trust of the 
African masses on their leaders. The outcome was a divorce between the African state 
and its constituent societies. As a result of this divergence, “civil society emerged as a 
separate entity in Africa’s political space, mobilising broad masses against state 
despotism and other forms of state oppression.”533   
           However, because of the ruthlessness of African despots, the emergent civil 
society could not be very vocal until the 1990s, with the demise of the Cold War that 
removed the protective external shield offered the African leaders against external 
pressures. In the post-Cold War environment, African civil societies gained 
unprecedented prominence, partly because of the willingness of Western state and 
non-state actors to treat with them directly to the detriment of official state 
apparatuses.534 This further exposed African leaders’ economic and political 
mismanagement and informed even greater conditionalities from the North – insisting 
on the restructuring of state-society relations in Africa. It was equally within the 
context of new pressures of transformed state-civil society relations in the continent 
that the NEPAD processes emerged. The internal dimensions of NEPAD’s 
partnership, which seek to redefine the relationship between African states and their 
peoples shows the extent to which a vibrant African civil society was a factor in 
NEPAD processes, even though there was very little prior consultation with civil 
society in the formulation of the NEPAD. 
          Yet another change in the domestic environment for the formulation of the 
NEPAD was the transformation of the OAU to the AU. At the close of the twentieth 
Century, a consensus emerged amongst African leaders and OAU staff that the 
                                               
533 Adisa,  interview. 
 
534 See Clapham, Africa and the international system, chapters 7 & 8. 
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continental organisation had served its time, as an instrument of decolonisation. 
African leaders equally recognised that the OAU had grown inefficient and therefore, 
there was need for a transformation of the character of the organisation to respond to 
the challenges of the period – globalisation.535 The OAU was largely a politically 
focused organisation - with emphasis on removing the last vestiges of colonialism and 
conflict management. With Namibia’s independence in 1990 and with the end of 
apartheid in South Africa, African leaders felt the OAU had accomplished its primary 
political mission of effacing colonialism from the continent.  
         Moreover, at its inception in the 1960s, the OAU was guided by the philosophy 
that “seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto it. 
Yet Africa got political freedom and for over three decades nothing was added, 
development remained an illusion.”536 Understandably, in the post-Cold War 
environment, development concerns became paramount in the minds of African 
leaders. The challenge of finding a socio-economic strategy, to facilitate the 
refocusing of the continental organisation’s thrusts took centre stage within OAU 
circles. It was within the context of the desire and need to transform and refocus the 
OAU - to blend its largely political thrusts with a viable economic orientation, 
relevant to Post-Cold War realities and to a globalising world that the NEPAD 
process emerged. The adoption of the NEPAD as the transformed continental 
organisation’s (AU’s) socio-economic programme bears this out, not withstanding the 
controversies surrounding the relationship between the two.537 
                                               
535 Adisa, Interview. 
 
536 Ibid. 
 
       537 See Francis N. Ikome, “The African Union and the New partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD): The complex interface,” Centre for Africa’s International Relations (CAIR) update 
(Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, July 2003). 
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       Another transformation favouring the emergence of the NEPAD was the change 
at the helm of the UNECA. The UNECA like other UN economic commissions was 
designed to serve as the main continental policy formulation institution for the 
economic development of the continent. True to this mandate, it has been the brain 
behind the formulation of almost all the important economic development policy 
frameworks for the continent – beginning with the LPA through the AAPSAPs to the 
ECA Compact.  
       While Professor Adebayo Adedeji headed the institution, most of its formulations 
were greatly informed by the inward-looking self-reliant paradigm of the dependency 
genre. Conversely, the new Executive Secretary, Dr. K. Y. Amoako, has been seen as 
belonging to the progressive neo-liberal school, more supportive of liberal market 
principles and greater engagement with the global economy.538 Abdala Hamdock 
sums up the transformations at the ECA in the following words: “The thinking even 
at the ECA has changed considerably with the emergence of a new executive 
secretary. Which is to say the inward-looking emphasis of the ECA that characterised 
the leadership of its former Executive Secretary under whom the LPA and its related 
initiatives were conceived have lost their verve.”539 Although the ECA’s role in the 
NEPAD processes has been greatly downplayed, the institution’s outward-looking 
neo-liberal orientations defined in its global compact were influential in the 
formulations contained in the NEPAD. 
 
                                               
538 During an interview with Dr. Patrick Asea, Director, Economic and Social Policy Division 
(ESPD) of the UNECA (in July 2003 at the ECA head quarters in Addis Ababa) he declared: “there 
was no reason to be apologetic about the ECA’s sympathies with liberal economic principles and that it 
was rather a mark of the new impetus brought to the ECA by its progressive Executive Secretary and 
his young and dynamic team.” On his part, Dr. Naing apparently of the old guard was pointedly critical 
of the ‘excessive inclinations’ of the new Executive Secretary to liberal economic principles of the 
genre of the Washington consensus (Interview, ECA Head Quarters, Addis Ababa, June 2003). 
  
539 Hamdock, interview. 
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CONCLUSION 
       This chapter has demonstrated that although the NEPAD combines both elements 
of inward self-reliance and outward orientation, on the balance the initiative is more 
outward oriented than it is inward oriented. The chapter has argued that although the 
initiative contains some prescriptions of the LPA and related earlier African 
initiatives, overall, it constitutes a shift in the traditional thinking and practice of 
African regional cooperation. The chapter has also argued that this shift in orientation 
has been informed by changes in the realities and circumstances of the international 
political economy. It has also demonstrated that these changing international realities 
coincided with changes in Africa’s domestic political landscape to provide the 
momentum for the NEPAD initiative. The weight of my analysis has been that the 
NEPAD consist a shift in orientation from Africa’s traditional inward-looking self-
reliant regional cooperation agenda, to a focus on extra-regional partnership. The 
question that arises from this is: how was this shift negotiated? This is the object of 
the next chapter, the diplomacy behind the NEPAD. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NEPAD:  THE UNDERLYING DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES 
   
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
           Against the backdrop of Africa’s worsening economic situation and conscious of 
ongoing global transformations, African leaders devised new strategies to address the 
continent’s economic woes. The outcomes were a number of parallel initiatives, 
designed to bring about the economic turnaround of the continent. Although accounts 
of the processes leading up to the establishment of the NEPAD lack consensus, there 
is tacit agreement that the NEPAD originates from two main conceptual documents: 
the Millennium African Development Plan (MAP), championed by three African 
leaders – Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika of Algeria; and the Omega Plan, conceived by Senegalese president 
Abdoulaye Wade. These two initiatives benefited from technical and analytical inputs 
from the “Global Compact for Africa’s Development,” conceived by Africa’s 
traditional development policy think tank – the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA).540 
            Contrary to anxiety over possible rivalry between the authors of these diverse 
initiatives, African leaders successfully combined them into a common and unified 
framework.541 Moreover, unlike in the early 1980s, when the continent’s historic 
recovery plan, the LPA, was quickly countered and ‘subverted’ by an externally 
inspired ‘rival’ policy framework, the Word Bank sponsored Berg Report and its 
accompanying SAPs, African leaders have succeeded in mobilising the support of 
bilateral and multilateral institutions and processes, and individual governments of 
                                               
540 See African Recovery, Volume 15, no. 1&2 (June 2001): 3. 
 
541 Jeune Afrique Economique (JAE), no. 341 (du 18 juine au 08 juillet 2002): 56-57 
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the industrialised world behind the new initiative. The merging of these initiatives 
and the pledges of support from the continent’s external partners, have emerged as 
unprecedented feats in Africa’s regional economic cooperation history.  
            However, these otherwise positive developments raise a number of pertinent 
questions: What, for example, was the origin of the precursor initiatives to the 
NEPAD, and what were their principal thrusts? How closely related or divergent were 
the ideas and preferences that the authors of these initiatives set to promote, and how 
were these finally knitted together to produce the unified NEPAD framework? 
Finally, how and to what extent did the involvement of external actors in the NEPAD 
processes influence its contents and orientations? To answers these questions, this 
chapter focuses on two dimensions of the NEPAD process. First, it attempts to 
reconstruct the inter-African diplomacy behind the NEPAD – retracing the emergence 
of the MAP and the Omega Plan, and establishing the role of African institutions (the 
OAU and ECA) in their establishment and eventual merger. Second, the chapter 
examines the consultations that the African leaders of the NEPAD process had with 
extra-regional actors, with the objective of establishing how such consultations might 
have influenced the content and orientations of the initiative. 
I argue that the precursor initiatives to the NEPAD began as independent parallel 
processes, which however, later received approval from the OAU, formally making 
them continental policy blueprints. Originating from a common concern about the 
continent’s ever-growing poverty and underdevelopment, these initiatives had a lot in 
common, facilitating their eventual merger. More importantly, because the NEPAD 
processes emerged against the backdrop of Africa’s increased vulnerability in the 
global economy due especially to its unsustainable debt burden, the NEPAD 
diplomacy was characterised by extensive consultations with extra-regional actors, 
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which apparently took precedence over internal consultations.  The prominence of 
external actors in the NEPAD diplomacy facilitated the injection of their policy 
preferences for the continent into the final NEPAD framework. This contributed to 
the perceptions that the initiative’s prescriptions (particularly its emphasis on political 
and economic liberalism) have been externally inspired.  
        The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, I reconstruct the diplomacy 
behind the establishment of the MAP, highlighting both the centrality of the debt 
crisis in the birth of the initiative and the prominence of external consultations; next, I 
examine the emergence of the Omega Plan and the merger process, followed by an 
analysis of the transition from the NAI to the NEPAD; and the politics of the AU-
NEPAD interface. The chapter closes with an appraisal of the controversies 
surrounding the role of the ECA in the process. 
 
6.2 MAP: FROM A DEBT CANCELLATION MANDATE TO A CONTINENT 
RENEWAL BLUEPRINT 
 
         The roots of the Millennium African Plan (MAP) can be traced back to 
separate but related mandates given three African leaders to intercede for Africa in 
particular and the “South” in general in their economic relationship with the North. 
More precisely, during the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirtre, Libya, in 
September 1999, African leaders mandated two of their peers - Presidents Boutaflika 
of Algeria and Mbeki of South Africa, in consultation with the “OAU Contact Group 
on Africa’s External Debt” - to engage Africa’s creditors on the total cancellation of 
the continent’s external debt.542 About seven months later, the South Summit of the 
                                               
542 OAU, Fourth Extra-Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Sirte 
Declaration, EAHG/Draft/Declaration (IV) Rev.1 (Libya, 1999); also see South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA) (1), “NEPAD Background 2: A historical overview,” (February 28 2002) in 
www.dfa.org.za/docs/nepad2.htm; Nazeem Mahatey, “Presidential address to the G8 Summit and its 
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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77), sitting in Havana, Cuba 
in April 2000, mandated presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo, chairman of the NAM and 
the G77 respectively, to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions.543 
       There is consensus that separate mandates were given to three African leaders, 
revolving around the economic predicaments of the continent and the South, but it is 
not clear how these mandates eventually coalesced to the detailed blueprint contained 
in the MAP – that is, how a mandate to negotiate the continent’s debts 
“metamorphosed” into a plan of action as broad and as embracing as the MAP.  
      Nigeria’s ambassador to Ethiopia and to the African Union, J. K. Shinkiaya has 
argued that: “the idea of putting together a broader economic plan for the continent 
that transcended the ‘debt mandate’ emerged in course of the “working together” of 
these three leaders within the framework of these mandates.”544 Stephen Gelb 
corroborates this by contending that “it was during the process of shaping the 
discussion of the debt question, and when it became evident that Africa was 
dominating the representation of the countries of the South to the Okinawa Summit in 
2000 that the discussion got transformed from a mere discussion of debt relief, to 
talking about development generally, and about African development in 
                                                                                                                                      
implications for the South” (IGD, 2000). Accessible online at 
http://www.igd.org.za/publications/global_dialogue/official_view/presidential.html 
 
 543 The Havana mandate to Obasanjo and Mbeki was confirmed in separate interviews this 
researcher had with Ambassador Shinkiaya (June 2003); Mokoena (May, 2002); Malcomson (May, 
2003) and Dongoyanro (May 2003); It has also been reported in DFA (1), “NEPAD, Background 2;” 
Dani W. Nabudere, “NEPAD: Historical background and its prospects,” Paper presented at the African 
Forum for envisioning Africa (Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April, 2002a); “Africa in the twenty first 
century: The African Union and the New partnership for Africa’s Development,” Paper presented at 
the OSREA – CASAS Symposium on Africa in the twenty first century: Problems and prospects 
(Johannesburg: Sunnyside Park Hotel, 15 – 16 November 2002): 15. 
 
544 Shinkaiya, interview. 
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particular.”545 It appears that during these discussions, the G8 asked the African 
leaders to craft a plan of action for the continent, stating clearly what Africa’s 
expectations from the North were.546 The G8’s request thus actually kick-started the 
processes that culminated in the MAP, and later the NAI and NEPAD.547 For this 
reason, the perception emerged amongst the NEPAD’s critics that the impulse for the 
process came from outside the confines of the OAU and the continent and therefore 
that it is an externally inspired initiative. 
     The NEPAD Initial Action Plan document of July 2002 acknowledges that the 
MAP had its roots from the Okinawa Summit when it posits: “The origin of NEPAD 
goes back to the participation of Presidents Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Mbeki at the G8 
Summit in Okinawa in 2000, which gave birth to the Millennium Partnership for 
Africa’s Recovery programme (MAP) document.”548 However, NEPAD authorities 
have sought to demonstrate that the ‘impulse’ for the initiative came from within the 
continent by arguing that: “it was rather the African leaders themselves who gave 
notice to the G8 of their intention to prepare a detailed programme.”549 According to 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs:  
Faced with the challenge of addressing poverty and underdevelopment, 
both in their respective countries and on the continent, and with 
demands to address world forums on African issues, the presidents 
resolved to request the OAU to mandate them to prepare a 
comprehensive development programme that could serve as a 
foundation for the regeneration of the continent and the forging of a new 
partnership with the rest of the world, more specifically the 
industrialised countries and multilateral organisations.550   
                                               
545  Stephen Gelb, Interview with author (Johannesburg, May 2003). 
 
546 Adesina, “NEPAD and the challenge,” p. 2. 
 
547 Ibid; Gelb, interview. 
 
548 NEPAD, Initial Action Plan July 2002, p. 4. 
 
549 Mokoena, interview. 
 
    550 NEPAD, “Background document 2001,” p. 2 
 248 
 
             In this account, at the OAU Summit in Lome, Togo during July 10-12 2000, 
Mbeki presented the Assembly of Heads of State and Government with a proposal to 
engage the developed North with a view to developing a constructive partnership for 
the regeneration of the continent.551 The OAU Summit approved the proposal and 
mandated the three leaders - Bouteflika, Mbeki and Obasanjo - to work on this 
programme.552 The foundation for engagement with the world’s industrialised 
countries over the issue of the development of the continent was thus laid. On this 
foundation, the three presidents raised the issue of a partnership with the leaders of 
the G8 at their (Okinawa) Summit in Japan, during July 21-23, 2000. The work on 
developing the MAP then began in earnest and the process of engagement on bilateral 
and multi-lateral levels was set in motion, beginning with a presentation on MAP to 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001.553  
         However, the Lome Declaration of the OAU 36th Ordinary Session and Fourth 
Ordinary Session of the AEC of July 2000 does not indicate that any mandate to 
develop a new development framework for the continent was given to some African 
leaders.554 I contend that there was no second mandate from the OAU after the debt 
cancellation mandate granted Mbeki and Bouteflika at the extra-ordinary Session of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
    551 See DFA (1), “NEPAD, Background 2;” also see John Kuhn, “A brief history of the most 
recent attempts at Africa intra-continental cooperation: From the African Renaissance to NEPAD,” 
Research paper presented at postgraduate seminar on African economic cooperation (Department of 
International Relations, Wits University, June 2002): 13.  
 
    552 Ibid. pp. 13-14; Thabo Mbeki (1), “Letter from the president,” ANC Today, Volume 1 no. 26 
(20-26 July 2001) in http://www.anc.org.za 
 
553 DFA, “NEPAD Background 3: International engagements with the NEPAD process,” (March 11 
2002); Nabudere, “NEPAD, historical background,” p. 15. 
 
    554 See OAU, “Declarations and statements adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government, and the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Economic 
Community (AEC),” AHG/Decl. 1 –6 (Lome Togo, 12 July 2000); Adesina, “NEPAD and the 
challenge.” 
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the OAU in Sirte Libya in September 1999. Moreover, the claim that the troika 
notified the G8 of their intention to prepare a detailed plan of Action for Africa is also 
not backed by any tangible evidence. 
         The request for a detailed plan of action for the continent came from the G8, in 
response to the pleas of the three African leaders at the G8 Okinawa Summit. It 
seems, however, that because of the emphasis on African ownership and leadership of 
the initiative, and in a bid to rebut charges that the initiative had been externally 
inspired, the promoters of the NEPAD have found it politically apposite to down play 
the G8 request. In fact, after receiving the Sirte and Havana mandates, it appears that 
the troika “took matters into their hands” and acted more or less independently of 
their peers and the organisations that had mandated them in the first place. This is 
reflected in the fact that “shortly after the Okinawa meeting, the troika gave president 
Mbeki the responsibility to start developing the “workable plan” requested by the G8, 
without first consulting with their peers of the OAU nor with the OAU Contact Group 
on Africa’s External Debt as the Sirte mandate had intimated.”555  
        The first concept paper for engagement with the developed North with the view 
of developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the continent was 
prepared by Mbeki and was only later approved by Boutaflika and Obasanjo in 
September 2000.556 This was followed in October by the setting up of a Steering 
Committee to which each of the three heads of state appointed two officials with the 
mandate of developing a more detailed proposal. In February 2001, after a number of 
consultation meetings with the three heads of state aimed at evaluating past and 
current development agendas for the continent, the Steering Committee produced a 
                                               
555 Ibid. p. 2. 
 
556 Kuhn, “Brief history;” Nabudere, “Africa in the twenty first century,” p.16; DFA  (1), NEPAD, 
Background 2. 
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policy framework document titled Draft 3 (a).557 This draft document was intended 
both as a vision statement and as an outline of a programme of action for the political, 
social and economic recovery of the continent. It argued the case for the initiative, its 
timing and its strategic focus, as well as outlining actions, duties and responsibilities 
for African leaders and for the industrialised countries. The following four months 
were dedicated to the formulation of a more detailed programme of action.558 
      South Africa and specifically Mbeki, was the “prime mover” of the MAP project. 
The task of developing the first draft of the “workable plan” for the continent was 
entrusted to a small team working within the South African presidency in Pretoria, 
“explaining, the dominantly South African reading of the development challenges 
facing the continent and the prognoses for Africa “extricating itself” out of its 
development quagmire.”559 Although South Africa in championing the MAP project, 
tried to give it a Pan-African outlook, the country’s liberal trade-focused interests 
remained the primary consideration. Ranieri Sabatucci has argued: “It was only in the 
later stages of the development of the MAP that aspects of other African countries’ 
prime interest – such as development related concerns and debt reduction, found their 
way into the framework, refining and broadening the initiative as it moved from MAP 
to NEPAD.”560   
          South Africa and Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” ideas constituted the 
philosophical foundations behind the MAP diplomacy.561 The internal dynamics of a 
                                               
557 Ibid; Taylor, “Towards the African century,” p. 11; Kuhn, “Brief history,” p. 14; Nabudere, 
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new South Africa concerned about redressing the country’s racial past provided a 
framework for the emergence of a “black renaissance” within South Africa. However, 
this black renaissance project was later explored, especially under Mbeki’s 
presidency to reconnect a liberated South Africa to the rest of the continent. Hence 
the emergence of the notion of the South African championed African renaissance 
that effectively set in motion the processes that eventually culminated in the MAP. 
        But according to Stephen Gelb, who worked on the MAP out of Mbeki’s office, 
“while it may be true that the South African leader played a more active role in the 
processes preceding the MAP, it would be unfair to reduce the initiative to a purely 
South African brainchild.”562 Mbeki’s dedication to the processes of MAP, NAI and 
eventually NEPAD is doubtless a product of his philosophical interest in the notion of 
an African Renaissance. However, at the time the diplomatic processes leading up to 
MAP gathered momentum, Mbeki’s renaissance philosophy had not had any 
resonance beyond the confines of South Africa.563 
      Although there was no explicit link between the African renaissance discourse 
and the processes preceding the MAP/NAI/NEPAD, it must be conceded that Mbeki 
definitely had a commitment to this philosophy and this defined his interaction with 
the other two leaders – Boutaflika and Obasanjo. More importantly, the African 
renewal strategy that emerged out of the interaction of these three leaders was 
facilitated by the existing close bilateral interactions between Nigeria and South 
Africa and more especially between Mbeki and Obasanjo. The two countries, by 
virtue of their economic, demographic and military standings, perceive themselves as 
the ‘pre-ordained’ leaders of the continent. And the emergence of Mbeki and 
                                               
562 Gelb, interview. 
 
563 Kuhn, “Short history,” p. 12. 
 
 252 
Obasanjo in the political landscape of the continent in the late 1990s was more than 
timely.564 
       The two leaders were conscious of their countries’ roles in the continent, as 
reflected in the declarations of some of their principal collaborators. Speaking at the 
first meeting of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission, Nigerian vice 
president Atiku Abubakar said that “South Africa and Nigeria had a unique 
responsibility in assisting the rest of the African continent at the dawn of the new 
millennium.”565 In his response, the South African deputy president Jacob Zuma gave 
the South Africa – Nigeria bilateral interchange an African renaissance flavour when 
he declared: “By virtue of their relative strengths, our two countries have the ability – 
acting in concert with sister countries – to lead the continent into the mainstream of 
global socio-economic development within the broad objectives of an African 
renaissance.”566 Nigeria and South Africa’s recognition of their mandate to lead the 
continent served as an essential pillar supporting a “mandate to renegotiate the 
continent’s debts,” into a broader and more embracing economic recovery plan for 
the continent. Obasanjo’s personal experience with poor leadership in his country, 
which earned him years of incarceration and his desire to reverse Nigeria’s continuing 
economic downslide, gave him an additional reason to support a continental agenda 
that emphasised governance reforms.  
       The continental vision instilled by Mbeki’s renaissance philosophy, along with 
the notion of an ordained continental leadership role for Nigeria and South Africa, 
facilitated the realisation that there was a correlation between the two mandates and 
                                               
564 Mbeki and Obasanjo became heads of state of Nigeria and South Africa, within two weeks of 
each other – Obasanjo was sworn in on  May 29 1999 and Mbeki was inaugurated on the June 16 of 
the same year. 
 
565 Independent Online, October 4 1999 in http://www.iol.co.za 
 
566 Ibid. 
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the fact that debt relief formed but one critical aspect of the overall development 
agenda for Africa. Against this background, the call by the G8 for a “workable plan” 
for the continent came as a timely catalyst to the emergence of a consensus amongst 
the three leaders that there was need to evolve a broader and more comprehensive 
blueprint for the renewal of the continent. 
       At about the same time the idea of developing a detailed programme of action for 
the continent beyond a debt mandate was taking shape, the three African leaders had 
many international exchanges, particularly with countries and groupings of the 
industrialised North. This had implications for what was to become the MAP. In May 
2000, Mbeki met with British Premier Tony Blair and American President Bill 
Clinton. In June, Mbeki took part in a Conference on Progressive Governance that 
held in Berlin, Germany, also attended by the leaders of the USA, Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, Germany, France, Portugal, Canada, Italy, Greece, New Zealand, 
Netherlands and Sweden. Still in June 2000, Mbeki addressed a meeting of leaders of 
the Nordic states.  
      Mbeki addressed the leaders of the European Union again at a meeting of the 
European Council that held in Portugal in June 2000. In July 2000, Mbeki, Boutaflika 
and Obasanjo held discussions with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. While in 
Tokyo, Mbeki met with James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank. Upon his 
return to Pretoria the same month, he held discussions with the managing director of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Horst Kohler. Prior to this, the three leaders 
had met with the United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan. Finally, in 
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September 2000, Mbeki addressed the United Nations Millennium Summit in New 
York.567 
     Although these international interactions were relevant to the development of the 
MAP and in rallying support and the commitment of the North around the idea of a 
new and concerted effort to address, among others, the challenge of African poverty 
and underdevelopment,568 they later cast doubts on African leaders’ claims that the 
processes leading to the establishment of the initiative were genuinely internally 
driven. These high-level consultations with the North, coming at the early gestation 
period of the initiative, created the impression that the authors of the initiative went 
out sourcing for ideas and suggestions on exactly what kind of initiative the North 
would be willing to support. Given the convergence of the prescriptions of the MAP 
with the kinds of liberal political and economic ideas that have been peddled over the 
years by these external actors, it is conceivable that in the final analysis, external 
actors had influenced the contents and orientations of the MAP project. This has 
turned out to be one of the most controversial issues of the entire NEPAD process    
        It seems that these external consultations took precedence over internal inter-
African diplomacy. This is borne out by the fact that the MAP was first presented 
outside of the continent, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 28 
January 2001. As John Stremlau puts it: “Whereas all previous Pan-African initiatives 
were launched in Africa and exclusively for Africans, Mbeki choose first to showcase 
                                               
567 The convergence of the NEPAD Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with the UN 
Millennium Goals is a reflection of the influence of the UN Millennium Summit on the contents of the 
NEPAD. See for example Kuhn, “Short history,” p. 14. 
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his Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP), the little changed precursor of 
NEPAD, at the 2001 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.”569 
     The choice of the World Economic Forum (WEF) as the arena for presenting MAP 
and the desire to secure the support of external actors for the initiative are well 
captured in Mbeki’s declaration: “It is significant that in a sense the first formal 
briefing on the progress in developing this programme is taking place at the World 
Economic Forum meeting. The success of its implementation would require the buy-
in from members of this exciting and vibrant forum.”570 The low level of internal 
consultation even with other African leaders is evidenced in Mbeki’s report to the 
ANC Today shortly after his briefing in Davos:  
We intend to brief African Heads of State over the next few months. Our 
aim is to be as inclusive as possible. Thereafter, substantive 
consultations with the leaders of the developed countries and multilateral 
institutions would take place…. The implementation of the plan will 
commence as soon as briefings have been completed and commitments 
made by a critical number of African countries…. Countries that are not 
ready will be welcome to join later. 571 
 
Mbeki’s briefing, at Davos, clearly demonstrate that very few African heads of state 
knew about the details of the new continental blueprint and that even if they had 
mandated the three leaders to draft the detailed programme as the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs holds, they were yet to be served the final outcome of 
this mandate.572   
        Moreover, the selective character of the MAP summed up in Mbeki’s declaration 
was alien to and at variance with the “all-inclusive” operational principles of the 
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OAU. The initiative could not be said to have emerged from an expressed OAU 
mandate nor could it be said to be an OAU initiative at this stage. And as Nabudere 
sees it, “this was essentially a personal initiative, without and before coming to any 
agreement with other African leaders and African civil society.”573 The Zimbabwean 
Independent Newspaper makes the same point about the entire NEPAD process in the 
following words: “After the leading African heads of government [those from South 
Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria] had discussed NEPAD among themselves, they 
appear to have gone first to the Western capitals and the representatives of 
international private capital before consulting with their own people.”574 
      The decision of the three African leaders to work out the details of the MAP 
outside the OAU was informed by the desire to circumvent the complicated 
“politicking” characteristic of OAU/AU processes that “robbed earlier African 
initiatives the requisite seriousness of purpose.”575 In this regard, the common 
denominator in OAU/AU diplomacy has been the element of consensus in decision-
making. The need to work out the details of the MAP outside the OAU was made 
even more expedient by the Libyan leader’s agenda for an accelerated political and 
economic unification of the continent. At the time of the MAP process, Qadafi 
through financial and military largesse towards less viable African states, succeeded 
in winning their sympathy. In light of the numerical strength of poorer states at the 
OAU, it was feared the MAP agenda risked been greatly distorted or even derailed if 
it were subjected to the broader OAU consensus formula at this early stage.  
                                               
573 Dani Nabudere, cited in Adesina, “NEPAD and the challenge,” chapter 3, p. 3 of 4. 
 
574 See for example, Yaspal Tandon in The Zimbabwe Independent, April 2002; and The Seatini 
Bulletin, February, 2002. 
 
575 Abdul Mohammed, interview. 
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      Moreover, the Libyan leader’s attempt to champion continental processes was 
perceived as an affront to Nigeria’s and South Africa’s claim to continental 
leadership.576 Perhaps the “Qadaffi phobia,” further enhanced the level of 
collaboration between the troika, particularly Nigeria and South Africa to craft a 
counter initiative to the Libyan continental union agenda outside the consensus-based 
OAU. It is also conceivable that the fear of the Libyan leader’s radicalism partly 
explains the early (even if only rhetorical) support the NEPAD received from the 
North over and above even the parent African Union. 
             It was only after ascertaining that the essentials of the framework document 
aimed at guiding the programme of action of MAP had been worked out that the 
troika decided to brief their peers on the progress in executing their “mandate:” A 
debt cancellation mandate had become a continent renewal blueprint. This briefing 
was at the fifth Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in March 2001. 
The Summit unanimously endorsed the framework document and mandated the three 
leaders to continue work on MAP.577 This was understood by these leaders as a 
mandate to further engage with the international community. Accordingly, Obasanjo 
presented a keynote lecture on “MAP” at the “Africa Day symposium” held at the 
United Nations University in Tokyo in May 2001. Meanwhile, Mbeki during a state 
visit to the United Kingdom solicited and received support for MAP.578 
 
                                               
576 On Qaddafi’s aspirations to champion continental processes, see generally, Francis Kornegay, 
“Beyond the OAU.” The influence of the Qadaffi phobia in strengthening cooperation between other 
African leaders, especially between Mbeki and Obasanjo was strongly echoed by Churchill Ewumbua-
Monono, interview with the author (Addis Ababa, July 2003). Mr. Ewumbua-Monono is Minister 
Plenipotentiary and Second Councellor at the Embassy of the Republic of Cameroon in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. He has also served as consultant with the OAU/AU on a number of occasions. 
 
577 Mbeki (1), “Letter from the President;” Kuhn, “Short history,” p.15. 
 
578 Ibid; also see W. Dhlamini, “Africa’s economic recovery plan yet to win financial backing,” 
(June 19 2002). 
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6.3 THE OMEGA PLAN AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A MERGER:  
 
      At about the same time that the troika was working out the details of the MAP, 
the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade engaged in crafting a parallel initiative – 
the Omega Plan.  The emergence of the Omega Plan has been seen as falling within 
the logic of the traditional Francophone-Anglophone conflict of interest that has 
characterised the politics of African regional cooperation.579 However, Senegalese 
diplomats have argued “the Omega Plan was an original and independent initiative 
informed by Wade’s long-standing vision for the development of the continent that 
preceded his election as Senegal’s head of state.”580     
        The Omega Plan has been presented by Senegalese diplomats as the product of 
the work of a select group of high profile experts, mostly economists, commissioned 
by Wade to reflect on the continent’s worsening economic situation. These experts, 
working in commissions overseen by President Wade, focused on five priority areas – 
infrastructure; new technologies of information and telecommunication (ICT); 
education and human resource development; health; and agriculture – to develop 
what became known as the Omega Plan. This document was presented for public 
scrutiny in an international seminar held in Dakar Senegal from 11-13 June 2001 to 
discuss its “coherence, logic and feasibility.”581  
        What remains opaque, however, is the timing of the initiative to coincide with 
the MAP, particularly in light of the claim that the MAP emerged from an OAU 
                                               
579 See for example, Pretorius and Patel, “The NEPAD, a review;” Adesina, “NEPAD and the 
challenge,” chapter 4. Mr. Dongonyaro also stressed the notion of a Francophone-Anglophone 
bifurcation in an interview with this author in June 2003 at the NEPAD Secretariat. 
 
580 There was agreement on this point by various Sengalese diplomats in separate interviews with 
this author (H.E. Balla Sy June 2003; Consul Bassirou Sene June 2003; H.E. Samba Buri Mboup May 
2003). 
 
581 Dr.Salif S. Sall, personal interview with author, Addis Ababa, June 2003. Dr. Sall is an 
economist with the Policy Analysis Support Unit (PASU), of the African Union. He served as a 
member of the Commission created by President Wade that drafted what became the Omega Plan. 
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mandate to Mbeki, Obasanjo and Boutaflika in Lome Togo, in 2000. If a mandate 
was given by the OAU to these three leaders to develop a continental blueprint, then 
it is likely that Senegal was part of the OAU assembly that granted this mandate. 
Therefore, Wade’s decision to craft a parallel initiative is controversial and lends to 
two interpretations. The first possible interpretation is that no mandate was given 
these leaders to craft a development framework for the continent, in which case, 
Wade could not be seen as attempting to counter his peers knowingly. The second 
interpretation is that a mandate was effectively given, but that Wade still decided to 
craft a parallel initiative, in which case the thesis of the ‘unseen hand’ of the 
Francophone-Anglophone rift been behind the Omega Plan would be tenable. 
            Beyond the controversies surrounding the emergence of the Omega Plan is the 
fact that, like the MAP, it was informed by the obstacles posed to Africa’s 
development by the debt overhang. It therefore, converged on a number of issues with 
the MAP. For example, both initiatives recognised the need for Africa to keep pace 
with the new phase of globalisation and to reduce the development gap between 
Africa and the industrialised world. They equally converged on the importance of 
regional economic cooperation for the development of the continent. Both initiatives 
were also concerned about restructuring the economic relations between Africa and 
the industrialised world, particularly in relation to ODA, FDI and market access. 
Overall, the initiatives had as ultimate goals laying a durable foundation for the 
economic renewal of the continent and the reduction of poverty. This convergence of 
goals created complementarities between the two initiatives, which facilitated their 
eventual merger into a unified framework.  
           However, the merger did not happen as smoothly as many commentators 
suggest. The explanation could be found in the fact that the initiatives diverged on the 
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prioritisation of issues and the strategies to achieve common goals. For example, the 
MAP emphasised the entrenchment of democracy, human rights and good political 
and economic governance as the most urgent priority, being a precondition for 
achieving other development goals for the continent. This was premised on the 
judgement that with the establishment of good governance, resources (domestic and 
external) currently dedicated to the resolution of conflicts – resulting largely from 
poor governance – could be freed for more rewarding development endeavours. The 
MAP, therefore, prioritised peace, security, democracy and good political and 
economic governance – including deepening regional cooperation and integration – as 
preconditions for African development.582 
     The Omega Plan meanwhile contended that the bulk of Africa’s financial 
resources  (domestic and external) were dedicated to the financing of basic 
infrastructure and developing human resources (educational and health facilities). 
Therefore, if Africa could develop its basic infrastructure to the same level with 
developed countries, it could allocate resources to production and improving 
productivity to the point of withstanding international competition. It therefore 
identified the development of infrastructure, the development of human resources and 
investments in agriculture as the primary concerns for any renewal plan for the 
continent.583 The Omega Plan asserted that only after the African states have freed 
themselves from the burden of investment in infrastructure and human resource 
development would they have the required budgetary resources for:  
 
                                               
582 See generally, The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery programme (MAP), Draft 
3a (February 2001): paragraphs 56-64. 
 
      583 See generally Abdoulaye Wade, Omega Plan for Africa: An African strategy for globalisation 
(Republic of Senegal, June 2001): Paragraphs 24-84. 
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o Creating an enabling macro-economic and institutional environment for 
private investment; 
 
o Formulating a more production friendly fiscal policy; 
 
o Managing monetary policy and exchange risk; 
 
o Instituting amortization funds and recurrent expenditure management; 
 
o Reforming trade policies;  
 
o Managing social protection and social security funds.584 
 
     With these divergences in the prioritisation of issues, pulling together the MAP 
and the Omega Plans, involved serious negotiations and compromises.  The 
difficulties involved in the negotiations were reflected in the gaps found in the final 
NAI and later NEPAD documents, which have been rightly described as products of a 
“cut and paste” process. Ambassador Shinkiaya sums up the context of the merger 
negotiations in the following words:  
            A close reading of the ‘yellow document’ produced in October 2001 
reveals lots of gaps, especially as various actors at the time were still 
trying to protect their respective interests and perspectives. However, 
after the merger, particularly after a considerable period of working 
together within the framework of the heads of state and government 
implementation committee, greater mutual trust has developed and 
African leaders of the NEPAD have become more willing to make 
concessions to move the initiative forward – rendering the thinking 
behind the initiative radically different from what it was at the 
conception of the precursor initiatives.585 
 
      The merger process can be traced back to the World Economic Forum, in Davos 
on January 30 2001 during which both the MAP and Omega Plan were first presented 
to the international public. They were later presented to the OAU Extra-Ordinary 
Summit in Sirte Libya in March 2001.  And it was upon the separate presentations of 
the MAP and Omega Plan by presidents Obasanjo and Wade respectively at the fifth 
                                               
   584 Ibid. 
 
          585 Shinkiaya, interview. 
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century Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, that the decision for a merger was 
arrived at.  
       The Summit endorsed the work that was been done by the four presidents – 
Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade, and decided that “every effort should be 
made to integrate [all] the initiatives being pursued for the recovery and development 
of the continent.”586 In reaching this decision, the Summit recognised the synergy and 
complementarities between these initiatives. At this stage, it dawned on African 
leaders that the continent had to present a single, coordinated initiative to its 
international cooperation partners, if it was to be taken seriously. “And that to have 
more than one initiative will be confusing to Africa’s partners, will undermine 
credibility and will lead to splitting of scarce resources, focus and capacity.”587 The 
main motive for appealing for a merger of the two initiatives was thus to meet the 
requirements of Africa’s dealings with its external partners, strengthening therefore, 
the perception of the external inspirations of the initiative. 
         The merger process began in May 2001, at a Conference of African Ministers of 
Finance in Algiers. During this meeting, the ministers urged the experts behind the 
two initiatives to work together to achieve a merger.588 On the heels of this 
recommendation, a meeting of experts from nine African countries – Algeria, Egypt, 
Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania and Mozambique, including 
the MAP Steering Committee – was held in Abuja, Nigeria from 2-4 June 2001. By 
this time, according to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Senegal and 
                                               
    586 NEPAD, “Background document November 2001,” p. 1; DFA (1), “NEPAD Background 2.” 
  
    587 Ibid; Nabudere, “Africa in the twenty first century,” p. 17;” This logic was corroborated in 
various interviews conducted by this author, for example H.E Balla Sy June 2003; Consul Bassirou 
Sene June 2003, H.E Samba Mboup May 2003. 
 
    588 DFA (1), “NEPAD Background 2,” p. 3. 
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Egypt had been included in the Steering Committee of MAP.589 The Abuja meeting 
discussed the issue of the merger generally. However, much of the meeting was 
dedicated to further develop the MAP programme of action. Input papers were 
presented by a number of states under eight themes that were then extensively 
reviewed to arrive at a consolidated background paper per theme. The meeting also 
decided on the constitution of an “integration team” that was to assemble at the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) with a mandate to ‘fine-tune’ the 
Abuja document into a comprehensive and coherent plan. This task was 
accomplished.590 
        The accounts of some Senegalese diplomats differ slightly from that of the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs. The Senegalese hold that an invitation was 
extended to Senegal to attend the MAP meeting that was held in Abuja from the 2-3 
June 2001. During this meeting, there were suggestions for the merger of the two 
initiatives. Yet, Senegal could not consent to such a merger on the grounds that it had 
scheduled a crucial meeting in Dakar in a fortnight to work out the final details of the 
Omega Plan. This meeting eventually held from the 11-13 June 2001 with delegations 
from some MAP initiating states, including South Africa and Algeria. According to 
this account, it was after the Abuja and Dakar meetings that it was realised that the 
two initiatives were “feasible,” but that it was imperative for the continent to avoid 
dispersing its energies by maintaining two different plans with basically the same 
objectives – the socio-economic development of the continent. “It was within this 
                                               
589 Ibid; Nabudere, “Africa in the twenty first century;” Kuhn, “Short history,” p. 16. 
 
590 DFA (1), “NEPAD Background 2,” pp. 3-4. 
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framework that the OAU at the time was brought in to coordinate and give a sense of 
direction to the two emergent initiatives.”591  
       After the Dakar meeting, the MAP Steering Committee held a meeting in Cairo, 
Egypt from 18-21 June 2001. The five lead Steering Committee States, plus Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Libya attended the meeting. It aimed to 
finalise the MAP Programme of Action document. However, a discussion of the 
merger of the MAP and Omega Plan was also in the agenda, and Senegal at this stage 
is said to have committed itself to the merger. “In light of this commitment, a 
framework and procedure to guide the integration process was subsequently agreed 
upon.”592  
       The integration process continued after the Cairo meeting and culminated in the 
production of the MAP Final Draft 3 (b) on 29 June 2001. A few days after, a 
meeting of the five lead MAP Steering Committee Countries was summoned in 
Pretoria, to which the OAU and the ECA were also invited. During this meeting, the 
experts presented MAP Final Draft 3, which was then vigorously debated. The 
outcome was a final, common and consolidated document for presentation at the 
OAU Summit in Lusaka Zambia. The consolidated document was entitled: A New 
African Initiative (NAI): Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African 
Recovery Programme and the Omega Plan, which was unanimously approved by 
members of the Steering Committee. 
       Presidents Mbeki and Wade held an important consultation meeting in Pretoria 
on 7 July 2001 before departing for Lusaka where the consolidated NAI was to be 
presented to the other lead states. According to Ambassador Balla Sy, “the two 
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leaders approved of it, and together, they left Pretoria for Lusaka – to demonstrate 
that they were agreed on the final document.”593  In Lusaka, Zambia, a meeting of the 
foreign Ministers of the five Steering Committee States was held on 8 July 2001 to 
discuss the finalised common initiative and the procedure and modalities for 
introducing the document to the Summit. On 9 July, the Steering Committee formally 
presented the consolidated initiative to the five initiating presidents and their 
representatives in Lusaka.  
        On 11 July 2001, the NAI was officially presented to the Thirty Seventh Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Lusaka, where it was unanimously 
adopted as a Declaration of the Summit.594 Under this declaration, a fifteen-member 
Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) was appointed 
to follow up the implementation of the programme. It was to be chaired by Obasanjo, 
assisted by Wade and Boutaflika, with Mbeki to serve as Secretary. The HSGIC was 
scheduled to meet thrice a year and to facilitate their task they decided on the 
establishment of a Steering Committee and a Secretariat that was to be temporarily 
located in South Africa. The Steering Committee, which was composed of two 
representatives from each of the lead states of the initiative, was actually intended to 
service the HSGIC. 
                Much of what goes for “a merger of the MAP and the Omega Plans” was thus 
in some sense a cooptation of the Omega Plan by the MAP. The authors of the MAP 
probably because of their numerical strength and their geo-strategic standing in the 
continent had an edge in the negotiations over the sole author of the Omega Plan – 
Wade. Most of the “merger meetings” were primarily summoned to work out the 
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details of the MAP initiative, and discussions of a merger of the initiatives were 
almost always peripheral.  
       More importantly, the leaders of the MAP succeeded in aligning the priorities of 
the final NEPAD framework to the original preferences of the MAP. For example, the 
overall structure of the NEPAD identifies three groups of issues, with important inter-
linkages and relationships. However, governance issues are given top billing as 
preconditions for development, together with regional cooperation and integration – 
as opposed to infrastructure and human resource development as prioritised in the 
Omega Plan. Stephen Gelb relating his personal experience observed: “South Africa 
insisted on governance issues remaining as the primary focus, resisting substantial 
pressure to demote them down the list from some of the African partners in 
sponsoring the initiative.”595 He goes further to explain that within the section on 
priority sectors, “a number of compromises had to be made in identifying and 
ordering issues, as a trade-off for retaining the focus on the issues of governance.”596 
 
6.4 THE POST LUSAKA DIPLOMACY: FROM NAI TO NEPAD 
       After the Lusaka Summit, African leaders shifted their focus to lobbying support 
for the emergent initiative, particularly from the continent’s external partners. On the 
20 July 2001, a group of African leaders attended and presented Africa’s latest 
renewal plan to the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. The initiative was welcomed by the 
leaders of the G8 and endorsed as “the Genoa Plan for Africa.” The G8 committed 
itself to forging a new partnership with Africa to address the continent’s 
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developmental issues. They also made a commitment to help promote the initiative in 
multilateral forum. 
       The Summit then appointed a Committee of Personal Representatives to work 
with the African leaders to develop a plan of action for adoption by the G8 Summit 
that was to be held in June 2002 in Canada. Prior to this, the leaders of the three lead 
states – Mbeki, Obasanjo and Boutaflika – had presented the initiative at the UN-
ECOSOC Ministerial meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 16 July 2001. The 
presentation of the initiative to the UN was aimed to take advantage of the friendly 
environment offered the continent by the United Nations as reflected in the 
Millennium Declaration adopted by the United Nations Millennium Summit held 
earlier in September 2000.597 
      A further meeting was held between the G8 and a select group of African leaders 
in Chequers, United Kingdom, in September 2001. A few weeks later, on 10 October 
2001, an African delegation comprising the chairman of the OAU, the heads of state 
of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria, including a personal representative of 
the Egyptian leader met in Brussels with a European Union delegation to discuss the 
New African Initiative (NAI). Both sides indicated their resolve to develop a regular 
dialogue on the subject.598 
                                               
597 The Declaration devoted a section to meeting the special needs. of Africa – with particular 
emphasis on supporting Africa in the areas of consolidation of democracy; encouraging and sustaining 
regional and sub-regional integration and sub-regional mechanisms for preventing conflict and 
promoting political stability; addressing the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable 
development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced ODA; and 
helping Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious 
diseases. For further details, see ECA, “Global Compact for African Recovery” (2001): paragraph 2. 
Accessible on:  
http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/conference_of_ministers/25/compact_fo 
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        Finally, on 18 October 2001 the first meeting of the personal representatives’ 
committee of the G8 and the Steering Committee of the NAI within the framework of 
forging a new partnership between Africa and the G8 was held in London. Shortly 
after this meeting, members of the NAI Steering Committee travelled to Abuja, 
Nigeria to prepare for the first meeting of the Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee and to finalise various documents that were to be 
presented to the heads of state for endorsement.599 It was during this first HSGIC 
meeting that held in Abuja on 23 October 2001, that a decision was arrived at to 
change the name of Africa’s new Economic renewal blueprint, from the “New 
African Initiative” (NAI) to the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” 
(NEPAD).600  
      Although this change of name has been seen as been logical in light of the fact 
that the NAI was merely intended as a “working title for the purposes of the OAU 
Summit,”601 it seems that it had to do with the commitment of the G8 during the July 
2001 and subsequent meetings to “forge new partnerships with Africa” and also, “the 
pledge of continued dialogue with the European Union” during the October 2001 
meeting between the NAI leaders and the EU. Moreover, the fact that the change of 
name came only a few days after the first meeting between the G8 Personal 
Representative Committee and the NAI Steering Committee on the 18 October 2001 
was probably not a simple accident.  
      Put simply, the renaming of the initiative as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development was tailored to “factor in” the requirements of Africa’s engagements 
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with the industrialised countries of the North.602 This, together with the flurry of 
consultations with the industrialised North, which characterised the diplomatic 
processes leading up to the establishment of the initiative, is evidence of its external 
inspirations. This is despite claims by proponents of the NEPAD that “the notion of 
partnership has both internal and external dimensions – first, a partnership between 
African governments and their peoples and, second, a partnership between Africa and 
the rest of the world, particularly the developed world.”603 
        It was equally during the Abuja meeting that a definitive text (the Yellow Book) 
defining the management structure, priority areas, the mandates and the relationship 
between NEPAD and other African processes was produced. The management 
structure defined by the Abuja HSGIC consisted of the Implementation Committee, 
which was scheduled to meet thrice a year, and that was to report annually to the AU 
Heads of State Summit; a Steering Committee, comprising personal representatives of 
the five initiating presidents and a Secretariat, to be based in South Africa at the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). The Abuja HSGIC meeting also 
identified a list of five priorities that were to be pursued in the short term. According 
to Nabudere, this meeting actually marked the beginning of the critical 
implementation phase of the initiative.604 
 
 
 
                                               
602 Numerous questions have been raised about the change of name from NAI to NEPAD. See for 
example, Yashpal Tandon, “NEPAD and FDIs : Symmetries and contradictions,” Paper presented at 
the African Scholars’ Forum on the NEPAD (Nairobi, 26 April 2002): 2. 
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6.5 THE NEPAD: FROM ABUJA TO DURBAN 
       After the Abuja meeting, the diplomacy of the NEPAD continued both within 
and outside the continent.  Highlights of the post-Abuja diplomacy have included 
president Mbeki’s visit to China in December 2001, during which he secured China’s 
commitment to the NEPAD;605 a second meeting of the G8 personal representatives 
with the NEPAD Steering Committee in Addis Ababa on 7 December, 2001; a 
Strategic Partnership Meeting with the World Bank in Paris, France in January, 2002; 
followed closely by the participation of a group of African leaders at the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) in New York in February 2002 during which the African 
leaders engaged the North on the NEPAD process. Then the NEPAD Steering 
Committee met once more with the G8 Personal Representatives Committee, in Cape 
Town on 14 February 2002. This was followed shortly by a meeting of NEPAD heads 
of state and the French President, Jacques Chirac, in Paris during February of 2002.606  
      Still in February 2002, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, one of the strongest 
Northern supporters of the NEPAD, undertook a tour of West Africa that took him to 
Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria, with the NEPAD featuring prominently in his agenda. In 
March 2002, the NEPAD was presented at the “Financing for Development 
Conference” that held in Monterrey, Mexico. This international crusade was 
interspersed with a NEPAD Steering Committee Meeting (12-15 March), followed by 
the second HSGIC meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 26 March 2002 during which far-
reaching decisions were arrived at.607 
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      There was also an important conference in Dakar, Senegal in April 2002 on 
financing NEPAD. This was shortly followed by a tour of some African states by 
Canadian prime minister, chair of the G8, later in April same year. In June 2002, the 
World Economic Forum hosted an African Economic Summit on NEPAD in Durban, 
South Africa. Later in June 2002, the NEPAD leaders reopened their international 
crusade on NEPAD by attending the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, where once more the 
NEPAD featured prominently.608 Meanwhile, earlier in May 2002, the NEPAD 
Steering Committee had met in Paris with representatives of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), during which meeting the OECD 
made a commitment to intensify its support for NEPAD.609 
      In July 2002, during the first Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the emergent 
African Union in Durban, South Africa, the chairperson of the NEPAD HSGIC 
president Obasanjo presented a Progress Report and Initial Action Plan towards the 
Implementation of the NEPAD.610 Obasanjo also presented a “Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance,” including a document 
on the development of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).611  The AU 
endorsed the Progress Report and the Initial Action Plan of the NEPAD and urged 
that the programmes in each priority area be urgently implemented. The AU also 
called on each member state to provide assistance in the further development and 
implementation of these programmes and in the continued popularisation of the 
NEPAD amongst all sectors of the African society.  
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           The African leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and 
core values contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and 
Corporate Governance. More importantly, they mandated the NEPAD’s HSGIC and 
its Steering Committee to continue to elaborate the NEPAD framework and ensure 
the implementation of NEPAD’s Initial Action Plan until reviewed at the Assembly 
of Heads of State and government of the AU in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2003.612 To 
reflect the geopolitical composition of the continent, the Assembly also decided to 
increase the number of the members of the Implementation Committee by one per 
region of the African Union, bringing the total number of members of the Committee 
to twenty.613 
 
6.6 FROM DURBAN TO MAPUTO: NEGOTIATING THE AU-NEPAD 
INTERFACE   
 
            Although I have sought to demonstrate that the processes that eventually 
culminated in the NEPAD largely evolved outside the purview of the OAU, from the 
moment these supposedly parallel initiatives (MAP and Omega Plan) were presented 
to the OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, they presumably wore the garb of continental 
policy frameworks. More importantly, the OAU advised on the need for a merger 
explaining therefore, the presentation and endorsement of the NAI at the OAU 
Lusaka Summit. This officially made the emergent initiative an OAU programme and 
process. During the transformation of the OAU to the AU in Durban in July 2002, the 
NEPAD was officially adopted as the emergent union’s socio-economic 
programme.614  
                                               
612 Ibid. paragraphs 8-13. 
 
613 Ibid. paragraph 15. 
 
614 Keet, “The NEPAD and the AU,” p. 1. 
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            Yet, the incorporation of NEPAD ideas and policies into mainstream AU 
processes soon proved to be problematic.  Serious tensions arose between the parent 
AU and its offspring, the NEPAD, even before the Durban Summit and deepened 
thereafter. Negotiating the interface between the AU and the NEPAD emerged as the 
centrepiece of inter-African diplomacy. 
            To begin with, the official explanation for the decision to establish a separate 
secretariat for the NEPAD away from the AU headquarters has been that the AU was 
still in transition and could not harbour the NEPAD processes, particularly as some of 
them needed to be fast-tracked and therefore, could not wait until the institutions of 
the AU became operational. However, it would seem the real reason for this decision 
was that of “shielding the NEPAD from the stigma of inefficiency that the emergent 
African Union had inherited from the OAU.”615 This interpretation is particularly 
borne out by the attitude of Africa’s external partners616 and even African leaders 
themselves who seemed very disposed to give the NEPAD greater prominence than 
they did to the AU. The perception therefore developed within AU circles that “there 
was a deliberate attempt to marginalize the AU – not only in the NEPAD processes, 
but also more broadly in the continent’s overall intercourse with the international 
system.”617   
            More specifically, suspicion developed that “the small, mainly South African 
staff at the NEPAD Secretariat was trying to entrench themselves as a permanent 
                                                                                                                                      
 
615 Anonymous, interview by author. 
 
616 The misunderstanding between, the Canadian Prime Minister and President Mbeki of South 
Africa over role of the APRM in May/June 2003 was a classic manifestation of this divergence; it is 
also well documented in Papaconstantinos, “Explaining the logic behind donor behaviour.” 
 
617 Anonymous. Interview by author 
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bureaucracy.”618 The following excerpts from a Report by an AU staff on the 
Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development 
that was held in Johannesburg from 16-21 October 2002 are very revealing: 
               The international and African opinion is becoming more and more 
focused on NEPAD, rather than on the African Union. In fact, the 
deliberations in Johannesburg reflected more a concern for closer 
cooperation between the ECA and the NEPAD, but no mention of the 
AU…. With only a skeleton Secretariat of what seems to be a few part-
time staff, NEPAD has turned completely to the ECA for more than 
technical support. The danger here is that with no intermediary between 
the NEPAD Steering Committee (which is not steering and cannot steer 
anything) and the HSGIC, ECA ideas will be transmitted right through to 
the AU Summit, via the HSGIC… 
                The draft ministerial statement prepared by the ECA Secretariat reveals 
a lot, regarding the attitude towards NEPAD and the AU. In a document of 
25 paragraphs, NEPAD appears 13 times, but there is no single mention of 
the AU. The attempt of the AU participants to introduce a balance in the 
text was refused by the chairperson of the meeting, on grounds that the 
AU was an observer in a meeting of African Ministers convened to discuss 
a programme of the AU… There is need to raise this matter at an 
appropriate level. It was only with the assistance of the Rwandan 
ambassador and Minister that paragraph 3 of the statement was amended 
to link the NEPAD to the AU as its (AU) programme.619 
 
          This perception of marginalisation of the AU in the NEPAD processes created 
discontent within the AU and other African diplomatic cycles that engendered the 
resolve to contain the NEPAD secretariat staff to prevent the AU from been reduced 
into an irrelevance. The disgruntled AU Secretariat leadership and other African 
diplomats apparently succeeded in convincing the NEPAD leadership and the broader 
AU ministers and heads of state on the need to curtail what they perceived as the 
counterproductive ambitions of the NEPAD Secretariat staff.620 This was reflected in 
the communiqués adopted by the HSGIC in March 2002 and November 2002 that 
                                               
618 Ibid. 
 
619AU, “Report on the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Economic 
Development,” Internal Memo (Johannesburg, 16-21 October 2002): 10-11. 
 
       620 Anonymous interview by author. 
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made it a point of duty to clarify the status of the NEPAD and its Secretariat in South 
Africa. In March 2002, the HSGIC affirmed that the NEPAD is a programme of the 
African Union. In November 2002, the leaders also asserted that the NEPAD 
Secretariat is “an interim arrangement especially to service the HSGIC, pending the 
completion of the transition process of the African Union.” The November 2002 
communiqué emphasised “the eventual take over of the NEPAD by the African 
Union” and that “at the appropriate time in future, NEPAD should be fully integrated 
into AU structures and processes.” The HSGIC has also implied and stated that this 
would take place after the AU’s capacity has been strengthened or enhanced. 
            On the eve of the all-important Maputo AU Summit, it would seem that the 
authorities at the AU secretariat were contemplating three options for the integration 
of the NEPAD into the AU: 
o First option was allowing the NEPAD maximum autonomy or independence. 
This was perceived as a “worst case scenario” for the African Union and those 
African states that have not been at the forefront of the NEPAD processes. 
However, it would have been the preferred option for the NEPAD Secretariat 
staff and those who share in the thesis of the stigma of AU ineffectiveness; 
 
o The second option was that of integration, but not necessarily assimilation or 
absorption. This could consist of upgrading the NEPAD secretariat into an AU 
regional office, but with the obligation to report to or be answerable to the 
AU, at least to its Chair and not exclusively and directly to the HSGIC as was 
defined by the Lusaka Declaration. This was perceived as a win-win scenario, 
whose feasibility however, was to be contingent on restructuring the NEPAD 
Secretariat and defining the place and role of both the HSGIC and the Steering 
Committee. It would have also required restructuring of the staffing 
composition of the regional office to align it to the AU principle of 
representativeness characteristic of all AU processes. This would have 
required that remuneration of the current NEPAD staff be reviewed, in a bid 
to harmonize the salaries of the staff of the hypothetical regional AU office 
with the salaries at the AU headquarters;621  
 
o The third option was a wholesale integration or assimilation or absorption of 
the NEPAD into the AU institutions and processes. This was seen as the best-
case scenario for the AU staff and all those who were critical of the apparent 
                                               
       621 At the moment, the NEPAD is staffed largely by appointees from the South African Presidency 
and the Department of foreign Affairs, a majority of whom are on fixed short-term contracts. 
 276 
prominence of the NEPAD at the expense of the AU, and particularly those 
states and interests that felt marginalized in the NEPAD processes. Proponents 
of this option felt that full integration of the NEPAD into the AU would give 
all states equal say in its affairs, and would strengthen the highly cherished 
principle of sovereign equality in the management and running of the NEPAD 
affairs. However, proponents of keeping the NEPAD separate from the AU 
reasoned that this option would impact negatively on the NEPAD’s original 
idea of been essentially a “club of the willing.” They perceived this option as 
an attempt to “drag” the NEPAD into the OAU/AU philosophy of “all 
inclusiveness” that has been seen as a major source of weakness of OAU/AU 
institutions and processes. This was a worst-case scenario for those who held 
the perception that the NEPAD could be bogged by the excessive ambitions of 
the AU and even more by the stigma of ineffectiveness inherited from the 
defunct OAU.622 
 
              Realising the dangers of blindly adopting any of the options enumerated above 
– and to check against the NEPAD suffering the same fate as the now obscure and 
moribund African Economic Community (AEC) – the African Commission and the 
NEPAD Secretariat agreed on the following terms of reference for the study of the 
integration of the NEPAD into the structures and processes of the African Union: 
o Review the structures of the NEPAD (Secretariat, Steering Committee and 
HSGIC) in terms of the effectiveness, representativeness of the wider interests 
of the continent, and capacity to provide information on NEPAD activities to 
all 53 member states; 
 
o Examine the processes and procedures of NEPAD and the extent to which 
they reflect the wider concerns and interests of the continent consisting of 53 
Member States, and taking into account the corresponding structures and 
procedures of the AU; 
 
o Analyse the impact of the integration of the NEPAD as a programme of the 
AU on its programme areas (in terms of selectivity and reprioritising) vis-à-
vis those of the Commission and Directorates of the AU recognizing the 
enhanced socio-economic mandate of the AU; 
 
o Take into account the directives of the Abuja Communiqué of November 
2002 on the requirements for legal incorporation of the NEPAD within AU 
framework and subsequent processes; 
 
o Examine the commonality of interest between the MOU of the CSSDCA and 
the APRM of the NEPAD, and the issue of complementarities; 
 
                                               
622 These scenarios were painted in separate interviews granted this researcher by two anonymous 
senior staff of the AU Secretariat at the AU Commission in June 2003. 
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o Develop a conceptual approach to the issues of “Integration of NEPAD into 
the AU structures and Processes” and “take over of NEPAD by the AU” and 
propose modalities and options to this end.623  
 
 
        The accent in the terms of reference was however, on the eventual full 
integration of the NEPAD into the parent AU processes with little consideration 
towards the option of having the NEPAD continue to evolve as a separate process. 
These proposals were apparently intended to bring the NEPAD in line with the 
overall logic of “all-inclusiveness” and “representativeness” that have been the 
defining characteristic OAU/AU processes. More importantly, the much-awaited 
Maputo Summit seemed to have resolved the contentious issue of the marginalisation 
of the AU in NEPAD processes in favour of the AU – by granting it a greater say and 
implicit oversight authority in the NEPAD processes.  
           Specifically, the Maputo Summit mandated the Chairperson of the 
Commission of the African Union, in consultation with the Chairperson of the 
HSGIC; to operationalise the following processes with the flexibilities as may be 
required: 
o Establish appropriate linkages between the NEPAD Steering Committee with 
the relevant organs of the African Union including the permanent 
Representatives Committee and the Executive Council in order to ensure 
integrated inputs into the work of the HSGIC;  
 
o Enter into temporary host agreement with the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa with a view to providing the NEPAD Secretariat with a legal 
status of an AU office operating outside the African Union Headquarters for a 
transitional period of three (3) years as from July 2003, or until such a time 
that the relevant structures of the African Union are fully operational, 
whichever comes first; 
 
o Formalise the working relations between the AU Commission and the 
NEPAD Secretariat, especially for programme co-ordination and 
harmonisation; 
                                               
623 This details were extracted from an AU inter-office memorandum from Mr. E. B. Akpan, 
Economic Advisor Bureau of the Interim chairperson (BIC) to the Interim Chairperson, on the 
conclusions of the meeting between the AU Commission and NEPAD officials that held on May 16 
2003 
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o Align and harmonise the conditions of service, rules of recruitment and 
accountability with those of the AU Commission; and develop a sustainable 
funding mechanism for NEPAD after its complete integration into the AU 
structures and processes.624 Meanwhile, paragraph (10) of the Maputo 
Declaration mandated the Chairperson of the AU Commission in consultation 
with the Chairperson of the HSGIC, to appoint the Executive Head of the 
NEPAD Secretariat during the transitional period.  
 
        The mandate given the AU Chairperson by the Maputo Summit reflected the fact 
that the diplomacy of the AU-NEPAD integration seemed to have worked in favour 
of the AU. The AU achieved its desired goal of taking control of its socio-economic 
programme. The Maputo Summit not only granted powers of oversight to the AU 
Chairman over the staff of the NEPAD Secretariat, but actually removed ambiguity in 
the NEPAD-AU relationship by providing a legal framework formally linking the two 
processes. Although it remains to be seen how much this AU control of the NEPAD 
processes will enhance or derail the prospects of its implementation, by strengthening 
the hands of the AU over the NEPAD, the Maputo Summit has shifted the focus of 
the initiative to building consensus and securing the “buy in” of the various interests 
of African states. This, according to ECA’s Abdalla Hamdock, “has considerably 
altered or even distorted the original thrusts and designs of the initiative.”625 
 
6.7 THE ECA COMPACT: MORE THAN JUST TECHNICAL AND 
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT 
 
        Established in 1958, the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has served 
as the principal think tank in formulating the continent’s economic development 
frameworks. Most of the continent’s major development initiatives – such as the 
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Africa’s Alternative Framework to Structural 
                                               
624 AU, “Assembly of the African Union, Second Ordinary Session,” (Maputo, Mozambique 10-12 
July 2003) Assembly/Au/Decl. 8 (II) page 3, paragraph 8 (i–v). 
 
625 Hamdock, interview. 
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Adjustment (AAPSAP) – were conceived and developed by the ECA, with African 
leaders and the OAU giving political approval.  This does not seem to be the case 
with the development of the NEPAD, particularly as accounts of the diplomacy of the 
NEPAD do not seem to accord the ECA any major role. Some insiders of the ECA 
however suggest that the ECA, through its “New Global Compact for Africa’s 
Recovery,” played a greater role in the development of the NEPAD than official 
accounts acknowledge.  
          The ECA’s role in the NEPAD process has been downplayed for political and 
strategic reasons. African leaders seem to want to appear to have broken with past 
practices in which the formulation of regional economic initiatives was entrusted to 
African technocrats (mostly of the ECA) with African leaders providing only political 
approval. Moreover, claims of African ownership and leadership of the initiative have 
meant that African leaders needed to detach the origins of the initiative as much as 
possible from any processes and institutions that appeared to have very close ties with 
extra-continental actors. The ECA, though designed to direct African development, 
has very strong links with the UN system. More importantly, the institution has in 
recent times been seen to have very strong sympathies for the kinds of liberal 
economic policies propagated over the years by global financial institutions – the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
         The Compact represented the ECA’s response to the implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration. The idea of developing the compact 
emanated from a speech made by the executive secretary of the ECA, Mr. K.Y. 
Amoako, to the eighth Session of the ECA Conference of African Ministers of 
Finance held in Addis Ababa in November 2000. In his speech, Amoako called for a 
Compact with Africa in which the developed countries would invest the necessary 
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resources through aid, debt relief and market access to give African economies the 
jump-start they needed. In turn, Africa would put in place the necessary political 
reforms to ensure that their economies take off.626 Endorsing his proposal, the 
Conference adopted a resolution requesting the ECA to develop the details of the 
Compact for consideration by the Joint ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance and 
Ministers of Economic Development and Planning in Algiers in May 2001. The 
resolution also suggested that the executive secretary consult with individuals and 
institutions, including the United Nations and Africa’s development partners, who 
had the potential to best assure the Compact moved to implementation.627   
         In course of the ECA executive secretary’s execution of this mandate, the ECA 
became aware of and involved in the MAP process. The introductory background to 
the ECA Compact specifically states: 
   As the process of articulating the Compact and the related consultations 
evolved it emerged that presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of 
Nigeria and Boutaflika of Algeria were developing an initiative known 
as the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme 
(MAP)… The MAP recognises that a new and effective partnership with 
the international community is essential to its success, even as it stresses 
that African governments and people have the primary responsibility for 
its implementation. These are also the goals of the Compact, which is 
indeed conceived as a technical input to the elaboration and 
implementation of the MAP.628 
 
        The ECA’s involvement in the NEPAD process could thus have began much 
earlier than the NEPAD architects admit. If the ECA’s Compact was conceived as a 
technical input to the elaboration of the MAP as indicated above, then it might have 
had something to do with the shaping of the MAP contents, even before merger 
processes. If this was the case, the similarity in the contents and goals of the ECA 
                                               
   626 ECA, Compact, paragraph 3 
 
   627 Ibid. paragraph 4. 
 
   628 Ibid. paragraphs 3-5. 
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compact and the MAP could not be simple coincidence. Rather, it could be explained 
by the role of the ECA in the crafting of the MAP.  
      However, a preponderance of opinion has it that the role of the ECA in the 
NEPAD process only began during the Algiers African Ministers of Finance meeting 
in May 2001, that is said to have initiated the merger process. During this meeting, 
the executive secretary of the ECA, K.Y Amoako presented the ECA’s Compact 
alongside the presentation of the MAP and the Omega Plan by their respective 
authors. It seems that the African Ministers of Finance urged the experts of the three 
initiatives to work together to achieve the merger and consolidation of the initiatives; 
MAP, Omega Plan and the ECA Compact.629  
       Given of the ECA’s financial, human and logistical resources capabilities, the 
task of facilitating the merger was actually entrusted to the ECA. The ECA 
effectively played this role, as demonstrated by its active involvement in all the MAP 
processes and meetings, particularly after the Algiers Ministers of Finance meeting.  
However, conflicts of interest emerged between ECA experts and experts of the MAP 
Steering Committee that represented the lead heads of state of the initiative. In the 
words of Ambassador Balla Sy and Consul Bassirou Sene, “the ECA tried to do a 
little too much – in course of which it overstepped its mandate. The perception 
therefore developed that it was attempting to steal the show from the African 
leaders.”630  
        Arguably, the ECA’s sidelining in the official accounts of the processes leading 
to the establishment of the NEPAD may be explained by the desire of the African 
heads of state to retain ownership and leadership of the initiative. The notion of 
                                               
   629 NEPAD, “Background document 2001,” p. 3. 
 
   630 H.E Balla Sy, interview; Consul Bassirou, interview 
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political ownership and leadership by heads of state distinguish the NEPAD from 
earlier initiatives. More importantly, it seems African heads of state feared close links 
of the NEPAD to the ECA because of the ECA’s links with the United Nations, and 
the unpopular neo-liberal policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions. This was 
reflected in the attitude towards the ECA’s governance project and the location of the 
APRM secretariat. 
       In fact, during the June 2002 heads of state and governments’ implementation 
committee meeting, in Rome, it was agreed that, in light of the detailed nature of the 
ECA’s governance project, it should be used as the basis for the entire NEPAD 
APRM process – a position put forward by South Africa.631 Committee members 
equally recommended that the proposed secretariat of the APRM be located at the 
UNECA seat in Addis Ababa. In time, however, these recommendations became 
hostage to a number of other agendas.632 During the HSGIC meeting in Abuja, the 
Nigerian leader, Obasanjo, specifically reversed the Rome decision on the location of 
the APRM, arguing, “the UNECA was a non-African institution and was therefore, 
inappropriate to host such a strategic African process, especially as it represented the 
interests of the Washington consensus.”633 He therefore, pushed for the APRM 
secretariat to be located at the AU headquarters.  
      Despite attempts to downplay the Compact document in the NEPAD processes, 
however, evidence suggest that the ECA has contributed more than just technical and 
analytical inputs into the NEPAD process. “Much of the content and ideas of the 
ECA Compact have found their way into the final NEPAD document, particularly in 
                                               
631 See African Security Review, Vol. 11 no. 4 (2002): 2. 
 
632 Ibid. 
 
633 Ibid. 
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the domains of the governance initiative and the whole notion of new partnerships 
with the industrialised countries of the North.”634 Moreover, the ECA is still the 
principal institution entrusted with crafting the details of the corporate governance 
initiative. This is despite claims that “the ECA Compact was never intended to be part 
of the Omega-MAP merger, and that it has survived this merger as an independent 
and parallel process.”635 
 
CONCLUSION 
       Overall, this chapter has argued that the precursor initiatives to the NEPAD 
began as independent parallel processes, later presented to the OAU to make them 
legitimate continental blueprints. Originating from a common concern about the 
continent’s poverty and underdevelopment, the main precursor initiatives converged 
on many issues. However, they diverged on the prioritisation of issues and the 
strategies to be employed for the realisation of the common goal of economic renewal 
for the continent. This therefore, warranted intense negotiations and compromises 
between the leaders of the two main precursor initiatives to be able to come up with a 
common and unified framework.  
Because the NEPAD processes emerged against the backdrop of Africa’s 
increased vulnerability in the global economy, especially as a result of its 
unsustainable debt burden, the NEPAD diplomacy was dominated by the desire to 
satisfy a minimum of the requirements of external actors so as to earn their support. 
Despite attempts to assert the initiative’s exclusively internal origins, evidence 
                                               
634 Hamdock, interview. 
 
635 According to Senegalese Consul Bassiruo (interview) evidence of this is found in the fact that 
in a meeting of African ministers of the Environment in Addis Ababa during May 2003, the ECA 
executive Secretary in continued to refer to the ECA Compact as a parallel programme for Africa. 
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suggest that the diplomatic processes behind the NEPAD were dominated by contacts 
between the leaders of the initiative and extra-regional actors – the G8, the European 
Union and other bilateral and multilateral partners. Consultations with African states, 
African processes, groups and institutions, including the OAU were secondary. I have 
argued that the prominence of external actors in the NEPAD diplomacy enabled them 
to glean their preferences into the final NEPAD document (particularly long-
cherished principles of economic and political liberalism). This has created and 
enforced the perception that the initiative has been externally inspired.  
Although the ECA’s role has been deliberately downplayed in accounts of the 
NEPAD process, the prescriptions of its Compact have found their way into the 
NEPAD framework. To borrow from Nabudere, “the key role of the Compact came 
out more clearly in establishing the basis for developing the partnership with the 
donor community.”636More importantly, the ECA’s Compact “supplied” MAP and 
Omega Plan with the details of “good governance” that later formed the foundation 
on which “enhanced partnerships” with the donors was envisioned.637 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
636 Nabudere, “NEPAD, historical background,” p. 9. 
 
637 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN         
NEPAD, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION: 
A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE  
 
7.1 Introduction 
       At the beginning of the twenty first century, the NEPAD has emerged as the 
most important item about Africa in both continental and global development agendas 
– generating much hope and expectation.638 The perception has persisted amongst 
sceptics however, that Africa’s development cooperation initiatives have been very 
good at raising hopes and expectations, but have remained painfully short at delivery.  
The NEPAD document acknowledges “there have been attempts in the past to set out 
continent-wide development programmes. For a variety of reasons, both internal and 
external, including questionable leadership and ownership by Africans themselves, 
these have been less than successful.”639 Although it asserts “there is a new set of 
circumstances which lend themselves to integrated practical implementation,”640 the 
legacy of poor performance of earlier initiatives and the link that the NEPAD 
establishes between otherwise sensitive sovereign issues of governance and the 
prospects of African countries’ economic development have increased the challenges 
of its implementation.   
                                               
638  See Alence, “Notes on the international relations of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD),” Paper presented at the Africa Talks Seminar (Ghana, 2002): 1; Ajulu, “Why 
the NEPAD,” p. 9; K. Morais and S. Naidu, “Libya’s Africa policy: What does it mean for South 
Africa and NEPAD?” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9 no. 2 (Winter 2003); 
Hope, “From crisis to renewal,” p. 397; Richard Cornwell, “The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development: Last chance for Africa? Africanus: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 32 no. 43-55 
(2002); Ravi Kanbur, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): An initial 
commentary,” Draft Paper (Cornell University, 2001); Martin Okouda, “Le NEPAD, un nouvel 
espoir,” p. 30; Policy Forum, “Security and NEPAD” (GCA/PF/No.02/01/2003) (Accra Ghana, 
January 22-23 2003). 
 
639AU, “NEPAD 2001”, p. 9. 
 
640 Ibid. p. 9 
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        Earlier African initiatives, particularly the LPA, assumed that if policies 
promised economic rewards, African governments could be relied upon to implement 
them faithfully. The likely impact of African countries’ domestic political 
environments on their governments’ willingness and ability to uphold commitments 
to long-term development goals defined in regional agreements was overlooked. 
Moreover, in an effort not to hurt each other’s interests, African leaders designed 
regional initiatives in a manner that placed little emphasis on establishing and 
sustaining credible regional restraint mechanisms that could elicit the desired 
behaviour from governments. 
         The NEPAD breaks with earlier assumptions about African states by 
emphasising the importance of reforming domestic institutions and processes of 
governance. It assumes African governments’ perceptions of internal political and 
economic insecurity that have prevented them from committing to long-term 
development have stemmed from poor economic and political governance. Africa’s 
weak institutions and hostile political environment have encouraged neopatrimonial 
practices, centralisation of power and its arbitrary exercise.641  
         NEPAD’s designers have recognised the need to strengthen the African state by 
identifying a set of political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and 
standards as preconditions for development.642 They have also established a regional 
self-restraint and self-monitoring mechanism – the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) to ensure that these norms and standards are upheld. The NEPAD’s 
governance reform agenda and the APRM set it apart from all earlier African regional 
                                               
641 Alence, “Political institutions,” p. 7; Callaghy, “The state, leviathan;” Zolberg, “The structure 
of conflict.” 
 
642 See AU-NEPAD, “Declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance,” 
(AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 1 (2002): 8-17. 
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economic cooperation initiatives. Whether the NEPAD succeeds or fails depends 
largely on what becomes of its governance agenda. Accordingly, this chapter focuses 
on the challenges and prospects of implementing the NEPAD’s good governance 
prescriptions. 
       The chapter seeks to answer two main questions. First, how would NEPAD’s 
envisaged governance reforms enhance prospects of achieving African countries’ 
long-term development goals? Second, how likely is the APRM to align the 
behaviour of African governments to regionally agreed norms and standards of 
governance? 
       I argue that the implementation of Africa’s regional economic cooperation 
initiatives is structured by expectations of potential benefits, the cost of compliance to 
states and the existence of institutions to monitor and enforce compliance.643 
Although governance reforms potentially could resolve problems of political 
insecurity and economic vulnerability that have prevented African governments from 
committing to long-term economic development strategies, the institutionalisation of 
good governance also carries political costs for African governments – to whom 
entrenching good governance could mean committing “political suicide.”644 Despite 
perceptions that the APRM is potentially the most important component in ensuring 
the successful implementation of the NEPAD,645 its potential to serve as a credible 
                                               
643   See causal diagram to research question II in chapter II of this thesis. 
 
644  For example, good governance would involve organising transparent and truly competitive 
elections, which would definitely see unpopular incumbents voted out of office. In the present 
dispensation, electoral rules in a majority of African states are ‘twisted’ to favour incumbents, ensuring 
their victory in the facades that go for plural political contests. 
 
645 Bikoe and Landsberg,, “NEPAD, African initiative,” p. 36; Jakkie Cilliers, “NEPAD’s Peer 
Review Mechanism,” ISS Paper 64 (November 2002b); “Peace and security through good governance: 
A guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism,” ISS Paper 70 (April 2003); Group of Eight 
(G8), “G8 Africa Action Plan (Canada: Kananaski Summit, 2002) on website 
http://www.g8.gc.ca/kan_docs/afraction-e.asp  
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restraint mechanism is contingent on the viability of its incentive structure – that is, 
membership criteria, nature of review process and the credibility of the reward-
sanction incentive. 
       NEPAD asserts a strong causal link between improved governance institutions 
and long-term development prospects of states. Dysfunctional or inadequate 
governance institutions breed political insecurity that encourage governments to 
behave in ways that are potentially harmful to long-term development prospects, 
including potential gains from regional economic cooperation. This is consistent with 
the position of rational choice institutionalism that although individuals or groups 
involved in cooperation may expect gains from their cooperative behaviour, however, 
they usually face various types of incentives problems that make them vulnerable to 
short-term temptations to defect from cooperation.646 Although NEPAD’s governance 
reform could lead to long-term benefits, the temptation to renege is still rife amongst 
the still largely unaccountable and politically insecure African governments. Issues of 
compliance are therefore paramount in the NEPAD. The question arises as to how 
politically and economically unresponsive African governments could be made to 
comply with governance reform prescriptions. Put simply, how can politically 
insecure African governments police governance reforms? The NEPAD’s answer to 
this question lies in the establishment of the APRM.   
       However, some literature highlights the limits of internal institutions of restraint 
in Africa and emphasizes that external restraint mechanisms could be more effective 
in aligning African governments’ behaviour to governance standards.647 This 
                                               
646 Weingast, “Rational choice,” p. 23; also see North and Weingast, “Constitutions and 
commitment,” p. 806; Williamson, Economic institutions, pp. 48-9. 
 
647 Collier, “Africa’s external relations” pp. 339-356; Collier and Gunning, “Restraint, cooperation 
and conditionality;” Diamond, “Promoting real reform,” pp. 278-285. 
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literature suggests that the NEPAD’s peer review processes be anchored on prospects 
of greater external resources flows – in the form of market access, debt relief, ODA 
flows and greater FDI. Even with prospects of anchoring the APRM on external 
restraints, the question persists as to how its overall design is suited to the 
requirements of a regional restraint mechanism capable of ‘locking in’ African 
governments commitments to good governance. 
         The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, I examine evidence of the 
causal link between governance quality and economic development, focusing on the 
potential internal benefits of compliance with good governance.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the costs and challenges of compliance with good governance for 
African governments. I then proceed to examine African countries’ expectations from 
external partners. This is followed by an assessment of the uncertainties associated 
with expectations of external support. I then proceed to assess the APRM as a 
credible restraint mechanism, focusing on its incentive structure – membership 
criteria, nature of review process, and the presence of an externally anchored reward-
sanction incentive. 
 
7.2 NEPAD GOVERNANCE AGENDA: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
 
         To correct Africa’s multiple internal political, economic and structural 
inadequacies and its skewed relationship with the external environment, the NEPAD 
is structured into two compacts: “an internal compact, which defines the envisaged 
relationship between African governments and their peoples; and an external 
compact, which defines the new relationship between Africa and the international 
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community.”648  The potential socio-economic benefits of the NEPAD are examined 
here from two perspectives – benefits that could accrue to African countries 
individually and collectively from internal governance reforms (intrinsic benefits); 
and benefits that could result from changes in the nature of Africa’s relationship with 
external partners (extrinsic benefits). While African governments’ compliance with 
governance reforms involves political costs, their expectations of external support are 
surrounded by uncertainties 
 
 7.2.1 NEPAD’S INTERNAL COMPACT 
      The NEPAD identifies creating an enabling domestic environment as the 
foundation to the socio-economic transformation of the continent. The central 
elements of this foundation are peace, security, good governance and regional 
cooperation. Upon this foundation priority development projects in the areas of 
infrastructure, human resources development and technology innovation are put 
forward.649 I focus here on the potential long-term development benefits of the 
institutionalisation of peace, security, democracy, and good governance because they 
are the preconditions for development. 
       Scholars and policy analysts are agreed on the need for good economic 
governance and basic political stability for meaningful development.650 The absence 
of peace and security, the shallowness of democracy, and the prevalence of poor 
economic and political governance in a majority of African countries have combined 
                                               
648 Abdul Mohammed personal interview, Addis Ababa, June 2003. 
 
649 OAU, NEPAD October 2001, chapter 5. 
 
650 In the case of Africa, this consensus has been most remarkable in the convergence of the 
positions of the ECA and the World Bank on the imperative of good governance for Africa’s 
development. See for example, UNECA, Perspectives on Africa’s development: Selected speeches by 
K. Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary, Economic commission for Africa (New York: UN, 2000): 135-155; 
World Bank, Can Africa claim the twenty first century (Washington DC: WB, 2000). 
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to deepen poverty and underdevelopment. This is particularly so as peace, security 
and good governance intertwine on several levels in Africa.651  Conflicts are, for 
example, more likely to occur in countries with dysfunctional governments, 
characterised by weak, undemocratic economic and political institutions. Conversely, 
the more democratic a society, the higher its capability to provide outlets for 
grievances and room for compromises - reducing the risk of conflict.652 This is 
despite the argument that democracy intensifies internal divisions (religious, ethnic 
and cultural) and promotes conflict by encouraging factional competition for power 
and economic resources.653  
      Although scholars of both the left and right challenge claims that democratic 
societies are necessarily more stable than undemocratic ones, many of Africa’s 
numerous civil wars have occurred in the face of highly authoritarian and abusive 
governments.654 The World Bank for example argues that “about one African in five 
lives in a country formally at war or severely disrupted by conflict that on average 
lowers economic growth by at least two percentage points every year it persists.”655  
      Moreover, substantial amounts of Africa’s scarce resources are devoted to 
building strong armies, procuring arms and executing destructive inter and intra-state 
                                               
651 Ibid; Policy Forum, “Security and NEPAD.” 
 
652 K. Y. Amoako, “The economic causes and consequences of civil wars,” Address at the Seventh 
Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, Algeria (July 8 1999) in UNECA, 
Perspectives on Africa’s development, pp. 45-53. 
 
653 See for example, J.R. Scarritt, S.M. Macmillan and S. Mozaffar, “The interaction between 
democracy and ethnopolitical protest and rebellion in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 34, 7 
(2001): 800-827; Z. K. Smith, “The impact of political liberalisation and democratisation on ethnic 
conflict in Africa: An empirical test of common assumptions,” Journal of Modern African studies 38, 
1 (2000): 21-39; Sandbrook, R., Closing the circle: Democratisation and development in Africa 
(London: Zedbooks,, 2000). 
 
654 Stephen Stedman and Terrence Lyons cited in Diamond, “Promoting Real reforms,” p. 271. 
       655 World Bank, Can Africa, pp. 39-40  
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wars.  Following armed conflicts, huge resources are devoted to efforts at 
reconciliation, reconstruction and resettlement – which resources would otherwise be 
directed to gainful economic activity if the African states were well governed as to 
avert these conflicts in the first place. And as K. Y Amoako puts it, “in the trade-off 
between ‘guns and butter’ African leaders have too often chosen to use available 
resources to produce [procure] guns for civil and international conflicts over 
‘butter’.”656 
       Yet African regional initiatives formulated in the 1970s and early 80s blamed 
most of the continent’s economic failures on external factors – unfavourable 
commodity prices and the skewed global economic order. Beginning in the late 1980s 
“consensus emerged that dysfunctional political and economic governance 
institutions bear much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic 
performance.”657Arguably, this consensus has informed the NEPAD’s assumptions 
that; improved governance (political, economic and corporate) will reduce Africa’s 
conflicts, curtail corruption and mismanagement and generally create the incentives 
for African governments to adopt policies and commit resources to profitable long-
term socio-economic development.  
        Generally, the African state has been a very weak state – state power here 
meaning “the density and quality of institutional networks linking state and 
society.”658 The typical African state is characterised by “dysfunctional, shallow, 
brittle, highly personalised set of structures and institutions, captured by a narrow 
elite for their own ends, and lacking a larger sense of autonomous purpose and 
                                               
656 Amoako, “Economic causes and sources of war,” p. 48. 
 
657 Alence, “Political institutions,” p. 163; Also see Diamond, “Promoting real reforms,” p. 271; 
African Development Bank (ADB), African Development Report 2003, p. 38. 
 
658 See Gelb, “South Africa’s role,” p. 4. 
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mission.”659 Most African states have been unable to institutionalise restraints on state 
power, resulting in the entrenchment of the abusive use of discretionary state 
authority.660 Moreover, although African states inherited bureaucratic and civil 
service structures at independence, these too have remained unprofessional, lacking 
the neutrality and probity characteristic of public services elsewhere.661 Meanwhile, 
banking and monetary systems are underdeveloped in a majority of African countries, 
acting as a real obstacle to economic activities. Overall, weak state institutions have 
encouraged unaccountability and lack of transparency in both political and economic 
activities, conspiring to hold back development in the continent.662  
         In the political realm, the political space remained constricted several years after 
independence. Despite the political liberalisation of the 1990s onwards, the 
democratic process remains shallow and has even shown signs of regression in some 
countries. Human rights violations are still rife, civil society organisations are still not 
very strong, press freedom is still a pipe- dream in many African countries, and more 
importantly, opposition parties are yet to make an impact in many polities, 
particularly as electoral rules are usually manipulated to favour incumbents.663 This 
has left the democratic process in the continent very volatile. 
                                               
659 Diamond, “Promoting real reforms,” p. 270. 
 
660 See for example, Robert H. Jackson, Personal rule in black Africa: Prince, autocrat, prophet, 
tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political domination 
in Africa: Reflections on the limits of power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
661 Thomas M. Callaghy, “The state as lame leviathan: The patrimonial administrative state in 
Africa.” 
 
662 Nicholas Van de Walle, African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999 
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663 For insights on democratisation in Africa, see Issa G. Shivji (ed.), Fight my beloved continent: 
An African debate on democracy (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1992); M. Chege, A.K. Gitonga, E.S.A 
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         Yet, growing comparative evidence suggests that good political governance 
impacts positively on development. For example, the promotion of democratic 
processes of political representation, such as well functioning electoral institutions, or 
the enabling of effective “voice” in the policy formulation process for social groups, 
including the poor, produces economic policy outcomes which are more “elastic,” 
capable of absorbing external shocks more effectively, and hence contribute to 
sustainable growth.664 Institutional and bureaucratic quality in general favour 
economic growth by securing property rights, checking on corruption, promoting and 
protecting individual and group rights and freedoms; and generally restraining 
abusive government discretionary power.665 Conversely, the absence of transparent 
and predictable institutional frameworks allows the use of discretionary interpretation 
that could give rise to rent-seeking and corrupt practices. These diminish public 
confidence, distort the operation of economic activity, weaken political stability and 
thereby hamper economic growth and development.666 
         In the area of economic and corporate governance, weak African states’ 
institutions have encouraged corruption, poor service delivery, the lack of integrity of 
monetary and financial systems and poor regulatory frameworks – including 
                                                                                                                                      
Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa (New York: Cambridge 
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ineffective accounting and auditing systems.  Corruption is one of the greatest 
obstacles to development in Africa. A priority concern of the NEPAD economic 
governance initiative is the fight against corruption. As the UNECA puts it, “more 
effective government and greater benefits from markets require tougher action by 
African countries to deal with the cancer of corruption.”667 Corruption often 
flourishes where institutions are weak, where the rule of law and formal rules are not 
rigorously observed, where political patronage is rife, where the independence and 
professionalism of the public sector have been eroded, and where civil society lacks 
the means to generate public pressure.  
        Once entrenched, corruption hinders economic performance, increases the cost 
of public investment, lowers the quality of public infrastructure, decreases 
government revenue and makes it burdensome and costly for citizens – particularly 
the poor – to access public services. Corruption also undermines the legitimacy of 
governments and erodes the fabric of society.668 Moreover, the prevalence of 
corruption reduces the level of investments a government can attract.669 Overall, 
corruption undermines growth and development, which in turn, has enormous effect 
on poverty.670 The NEPAD’s prioritisation of the fight against corruption is 
potentially capable of altering the perception about the African environment to both 
domestic and external investors. 
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        According to UNECA economic and corporate governance reforms envisioned 
in the NEPAD matter to Africa because, among other things, they potentially 
contribute to macroeconomic stability, enhance governments’ ability to implement 
development and poverty reduction policies, enable public management functions to 
be executed accountably and contribute in creating credible policy environments in 
which domestic and international investors can have confidence and where trade can 
be advanced.671 They also strengthen states’ absorptive capacity to attract and 
mobilise development assistance flows, enable the demonstration of transparent and 
participatory economic policy-making and execution as well as an open flow of 
information available to all stakeholders. Economic and corporate governance 
reforms also serve as signals to governments’ adherence to standards of institutional 
functioning, free of corruption or other such rent-seeking behaviour. They represent a 
source of comparative advantage, attract private domestic and foreign investment and 
broaden and deepen local capital markets.672 Overall, guaranteeing the rule of law and 
the enforceability of contracts, establishing efficient institutions, bureaucracies, and 
judicial systems, avoiding corruption and being otherwise accountable and 
responsible to their citizens constitute a set of government actions having substantial 
development benefits.673 And as Rehman Sobhan opines, “improved economic 
governance in an individual country provides substantial direct economic benefits in 
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terms of more effective delivery of public goods and services, both to the poor and to 
firms.”674  
        The nature and quality of governance institutions, and the types of policies that 
governments choose, have a huge impact in shaping how economies perform, and 
whether and how rapidly people will escape from mass poverty.675 NEPAD’s 
governance reform aims to promote policies and practices that could be welfare 
enhancing. However, like most policy prescriptions, there are costs and challenges 
associated with implementation as shall be seen in the section that follows. 
 
7.2.2 COMPLYING WITH NEPAD’s GOVERNANCE AGENDA: COSTS AND 
CHALLENGES FOR AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS  
 
     In the NEPAD strategy, realising the potential benefits of both the internal and the 
external compacts of the NEPAD hinges on the establishment of structures and 
processes of good governance. However, issues of governance have traditionally been 
very sensitive and highly guarded domains in Africa’s international relations. 
Therefore, despite the valuable potential benefits of governance reforms, African 
governments and other stakeholders face daunting challenges implementing them. 
Richard Cornwell had this in mind when he quipped “to succeed, even moderately, 
NEPAD is going to demand the commitment of political leaders here and elsewhere 
to policies [and governance practices] that may cause them considerable discomfort 
in the short to medium term.”676 
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     Good governance, like other policy choices, implies trade-offs with far-reaching 
political implications. Linking the benefits of the NEPAD to subjecting the 
management of individual African states to intrusive peer review processes is indeed 
a “self-denying ordinance.”677 I examine here, the political costs and challenges of 
NEPAD’s good governance prescriptions for individual African states and how this 
could influence their attitude towards the initiative.   
      Perhaps the greatest sacrifice expected of African leaders for the successful 
implementation of the NEPAD is in the area of sovereignty. The NEPAD, particularly 
its peer review process, would involve substantial intrusions into the domestic policy 
making processes of African states – by their own peers and indirectly by extra-
regional actors. Yet African governments have historically been unwilling to 
compromise sovereign authority for the common good of the continent. The enormity 
of the problem of sovereignty therefore, becomes obvious in the NEPAD process.678  
        NEPAD’s proponents claim there is sufficient political will amongst African 
leaders to offset the sensitivities related to sovereignty. However, there is little from 
the experience of the past decades to suggest that current African leaders would be 
willing to commit to the objectives of this revolutionary project. Although the 
emergence of a new breed of leadership in the continent gives some reason for 
optimism, however, this group still constitutes the minority. Many current African 
leaders are of the despotic, largely unresponsive old guard, whose distinctive 
hallmark has been the systematic deployment of the state for predatory activities. The 
restraint on African governments’ discretionary policy making authority, including 
the broadening of Africa’s political space called for in the NEPAD will amount to 
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committing political suicide for a greater majority of African regimes.  Indeed, “the 
main [problem] facing NEPAD comes from leaders who see it as the first real threat 
to their domestic power.”679 
         Strengthening civil society, respecting human rights, promoting press freedoms 
and generally empowering the “voiceless” as envisioned in the NEPAD tantamount to 
placing formidable internal restraints on the actions of Africa’s ruling elites. Equally, 
establishing of functional and credible institutions of governance would greatly 
constrict the ability of politically insecure African governments deploying state power 
and resources to placate specific groups and interests for their short-term political 
survival.680 Promoting good economic and corporate governance potentially threatens 
African countries’ deeply rooted neo-patrimonial and corrupt networks. For example, 
“circumventing the rule of law, gives governing elites opportunities to adapt policies 
to the political exigencies of the moment. Meanwhile, corruption allows patronage 
bureaucracies for nepotism.”681 Groups that have benefited from this order of things 
will have an incentive to derail the NEPAD process. 
       Even wars have become profitable politico-economic ventures in the continent, 
that give their authors control over strategic resources (gold, diamond petroleum, 
wood) which they would not be able to control under the kinds of stable political 
environments envisioned in the NEPAD.682 The prevalence of conflicts and the 
continuous control of these resources are vital for the continued political relevance of 
these groups’ elites. A successful implementation of NEPAD’s good governance 
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agenda that would bring about peace and security in the continent would deprive such 
groups of this seemingly strategic source of economic and political power.  
Conceivably, as far as their interests and future go, it might be more likely they could 
throw obstacles to its implementation. 
         Meanwhile, the NEPAD seeks to promote the proper functioning of the market, 
through greater openness to the global economy. While this offers African economies 
the opportunity to share in the benefits of globalisation, it nevertheless risks exposing 
African countries’ admittedly less competitive firms to the more competitive and 
better-organised ones of the North and elsewhere.683 Unlike the LPA’s closed 
regionalism that sought to shield African firms and industries from ‘unfair 
competition,’ the NEPAD’s open regionalism would require that African businesses 
compete on equal terms in the global market. Although this has the potential of 
eventually making them more competitive, in the short run it could actually lead to 
the demise of the very weak ones with attendant political implications.684 The leaders 
of the NEPAD therefore, face the challenge of managing the liberalisation implied in 
the NEPAD in such a way as to mitigate the unhealthy socio-economic costs 
involved.  
          Aside from the foregoing obvious costs, successful implementation of the 
NEPAD is also contingent on overcoming sensitive relational and organisational 
challenges. First, too many African initiatives in the past have failed as a result of 
bureaucratic subterfuge and the unchecked egos of political leaders. African leaders 
have in the past avoided engaging in activities that could diminish their real or 
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perceived regional or international standing to the benefit of other states. Although 
the NEPAD outlines a concrete organisational structure to facilitate implementation, 
for it to make meaningful inroads into the rather volatile inter-African diplomatic 
landscape, it would need to be vigilant to monitor and expose actions and behaviours 
that signal bureaucratic or political infighting.685 The tension the prevailed between 
the African union bureaucrats and the staff of the NEPAD secretariat until the 
Maputo AU Summit of 2004 was a manifestation of such infighting. The 
implementation of the NEPAD therefore, depends on putting the politics between the 
initiative and related African institutions and processes with which it shares the 
mandate of developing the continent on the right pedestal. 
         More importantly, in the past, African leaders have professed a desire and 
commitment to the ownership of their development programmes, while their actions 
and hopes have been that external support will be most crucial for their 
implementation. The NEPAD appears to lean on this logic more than any earlier 
African initiative. Therefore, another challenge that needs to be overcome for the 
sustained implementation of the NEPAD is that of reversing this tendency. The 
notion of African ownership and leadership should not be a mere rhetoric, it has to be 
translated and reflected in the behaviour of African leaders in the way they steer the 
NEPAD process. 
       Related to the challenge of effectively taking ownership of the NEPAD, is the 
challenge of involving all stakeholders at the level of implementation. “Although the 
NEPAD emerged as an “elite driven” programme, for it to succeed, civil society, the 
private sector and various other continental and external public constituencies have to 
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be mobilised.”686 Although proponents of the NEPAD argue engagement is ongoing 
with these stakeholders, the initiative is still little known to the larger African publics, 
who are supposedly the owners of the initiative.  Moreover, it does not suffice to 
engage the various African stakeholders. What is even more urgent is the dire need to 
overcome the challenge of building the requisite capacity to drive and sustain the 
benefits of the NEPAD.687 
        Finally, for the NEPAD to be successfully implemented, it would have to 
address the issue of generating too much expectation. The way the initiative has been 
marketed thus far renders it too ambitious and seemingly unrealistic. It seems to 
embrace virtually every aspect of Africa’s social, economic and political 
development, resulting in overlaps and frictions with existing African processes and 
institutions.688 And as CSSDCA’s head, Jinmi Adisa sees it: “there is need for the 
NEPAD to simmer down on the rhetoric of expectations and to watch out against the 
risk of becoming over-rated as this will have very serious implications on its 
delivery.”689 More importantly, the NEPAD would have to be cautious about 
expecting too much from external partners although their support for the initiative is 
crucial for its success. In the sections that follow, we analyse first, the potential 
benefits of NEPAD’s external compact and second, we appraise the uncertainties 
associated with the expectations of external support. 
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7.2.3 NEPAD’S EXTERNAL COMPACT: EXPECTATIONS AND 
UNCERTAINTIES 
 
7.2.3a EXPECTATIONS FROM EXTERNAL PARTNERS 
      Although most of the criticisms against the NEPAD centre on the relationship it 
seeks to establish with extra-regional actors and processes, the envisaged new 
partnerships portend substantial economic benefits for African countries. These new 
partnerships centre around four major issues – official development assistance 
(ODA), foreign direct investment, debt and market access.690 The benefits expected 
from NEPAD’s external compact can be appraised from these four issue areas.   
      First, the architects of the NEPAD expect improvements in the quality, quantity 
and predictability of development assistance (ODA) to the continent. They have 
argued that not only has the volume of ODA sharply declined over the years, but also 
that it has been very fragmented, unpredictable and costly to have any positive impact 
on African countries’ development prospects.691 As G. K. Helleiner puts it, “aid 
relationship as presently practiced, is a wholly unsatisfactory basis for linking Africa 
with the world…it comes in forms and in terms that undermine, rather than support, 
long-term African development.”692 To borrow from UNICEF’s Abdul Mohammed, 
“African countries have had to spend much time trying to negotiate with and account 
to multiple donors, that usually have numerous and at times conflicting 
conditionalities and requirements.”693  
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         Moreover, aid donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have been 
perceived as driving far too much of Africa’s policy change, with the inevitable result 
that there is insufficient indigenous “ownership” of public programmes.694 For this 
reason, the NEPAD envisages the establishment of a forum of African countries to 
develop a common African position on ODA reforms, and engagement with donor 
countries to develop a charter underpinning the development partnership. This charter 
identifies the economic governance initiative as a prerequisite for enhancing the 
capacity of African countries to utilise increased ODA flows. It also proposes a 
complementary, independent assessment mechanism for monitoring donor 
performance.695 
    The NEPAD’s desire to reform ODA is an attempt to “internalise” the 
conditionalities that have for the past decades accompanied development assistance. 
African governments’ pledges to establish and institutionalise good political and 
economic governance is hinged on the expectation that the donor community would 
reward those African countries that have good governance structures and processes in 
place – those that manifest a genuine will and strive to establish them – with higher 
volumes, better quality and more predictable resource flows.  This reading of the 
NEPAD process informed Canada’s Robert Fowler’s contention that “NEPAD offers 
a different kind of paradigm. It offers the prospect of concentrating engagement on 
those countries that are prepared to take political and economic decisions necessary to 
make this new plan work.”696 
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         Overall, improvement in the volume, quality and management of ODA is 
expected to increase the prospects of achieving the ultimate goals of development 
assistance – better economic performance, economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Moreover, because of the centrality of aid to African countries’ economic survival, 
expectations of higher aid flows could help align African governments’ behaviour to 
the NEPAD’s governance standards. 
     The second expectation of NEPAD’s external compact, closely linked to the first, 
is to attract higher volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI) or private sector 
investment into the continent. As demonstrated elsewhere, FDI flows emerged in the 
1990s and beyond as the most important channel for development resources. Yet, 
Africa has not been a popular destination for FDI due to Africa’s unfriendly domestic 
political and economic environments – in terms of political instability; corruption; 
lack of transparent legal systems; inadequate physical, human and institutional 
infrastructure.697   
     The thinking behind the NEPAD is that improvements in African countries’ 
governance, together with the development of appropriate physical and human 
infrastructure, would alter perceptions about the continent as a high-risk investment 
destination. This, it is imagined, would increase the volume of foreign direct 
investment to the continent that would in turn create more jobs, reduce poverty and 
engender sustained economic recovery and growth.698 These are strong economic 
incentives to encourage African governments to align their behaviour to the 
prescriptions of NEPAD. 
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      The third expectation of NEPAD’s external compact is that developed countries 
and other international actors will facilitate Africa’s engagement with globalisation, 
primarily by allowing greater access to African products (particularly agricultural 
products) into their markets. Unlike the LPA model, that was suspicious of the global 
economy, and that was intent on minimising engagement with it as much as possible, 
the NEPAD seeks to be fully engaged with the system. It however, insists on the rules 
of the game to be made more clearly defined and respected.  
       Countries of the North would have to reduce subsidies to their farmers and also 
remove various disguised tariff and non-tariff barriers on African products entering 
their markets. Such measures would make African products more competitive in 
international markets and potentially narrow down Africa’s marginalisation in the 
global economy. This in turn, would result in higher foreign exchange earnings for 
African economies, going a long way to address their nearly permanent balance of 
payment deficits. This is expected to bring about economic growth and enhance the 
development prospects of the continent generally.  
      The fourth and probably the most immediate expectation is that of reducing 
Africa’s debt burden, which is perhaps the continent’s greatest development obstacle. 
It is worth recalling that Africa’s unsustainable debt burden was the most immediate 
impulse for the formulation of the NEPAD.  In the 1990s Africa’s debt was seen as 
been equivalent to over 90 percent of African countries’ annual production and 
represented about 112 percent of the regions’ GDP. Moreover, Africa was expected to 
pay over US $20 billion per year in interest on loans alone.  This is to say about 30 
percent of Africa’s earnings were been used to service its external debts,699 making 
the continent a net exporter of financial resources.700  
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     The effects of heavy indebtedness are numerous. For example, debt service 
requirements burden the budgets of government, divert investment resources away 
from key social and economic sectors, erode the confidence of the private sector, and 
weaken the prospects for sustainable growth and for reducing poverty.701  This has 
been the plight of most African countries. Arguably, the NEPAD debt relief strategy 
has the potential of releasing and redirecting resources from debt servicing to meeting 
Africa’s more urgent and long-term socio-economic development needs.    
     According to the NEPAD document, “Africa, needs to fill an annual resource gap 
of 12 percent of its GDP, or US $64 billion, to be able to meet the estimated 7 percent 
annual growth rate needed to meet the international development goals (IDGs) – 
particularly, the goal of reducing by half the proportion of Africans living in poverty 
by the year 2015.”702 Although the NEPAD debt relief initiative is contingent on 
African countries’ participation in the economic and political governance initiative, it 
is imagined that the economic benefits associated with debt relief in terms of 
releasing desperately needed resources for poverty alleviation and economic growth 
would serve as an incentive for African governments to behave in ways that would be 
supportive of the initiative. 
     Overall, issues of debt relief, increased volumes and better quality of ODA, higher 
inflows of FDIs and greater market access for African products, have potential socio-
economic benefits for African states both individually and collectively that could 
serve as inducement for them to support the NEPAD.   However, the potential 
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benefits of the NEPAD’s external compact are surrounded by uncertainties relating 
especially to prospects of non-delivery by external partners. In the section that 
follows, I examine the uncertainties associated with expectations of external support. 
 
7.2.3b UNCERTAINTIES ASSOCIATED WITH EXPECTATIONS OF EXTERNAL 
SUPPORT 
 
       Although the North has welcomed the emergence of the NEPAD, and even as it 
has pledged to support its implementation, however, this is not the first time the North 
has pledged to assist the continent overcome its perennial problems of 
underdevelopment. Unfortunately, the North does not seem to have an enviable 
record of fulfilling such promises. Understandably, many have received the external 
pledges of support for the initiative sceptically. This mode of scepticism is well 
captured by the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, a major actor in the 
NEPAD process: 
   That African countries and governments have a direct stake and interest 
in the development of Africa goes without saying. The primary actors 
and beneficiaries of Africa’s development can only be Africans 
themselves. What might not be so clear is what the interests of the rest of 
the world and most particularly, those of the developed world are in 
Africa’s development.703 
 
      The leaders of the NEPAD have reasoned that Africa’s development should be the 
concern of the North because, while the continent would benefit from increased 
investment and economic growth, the Northern would benefit from having an 
investment destination and consumer markets for its goods.704 More importantly, 
African leaders seem to justify their expectations from the North on moral and 
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historical grounds: compensation for Africa’s contribution to global ecological 
stability; the North’s indebtedness to Africa for its role in the slave trade and 
colonisation; the indispensability of Africa’s natural resources to the viability of the 
North; and probably more importantly the global interdependence reinforced 
particularly by the 11 September 2001 terrorist assault on the hub of the capitalist 
system - America. The popular argument is that poverty and underdevelopment 
anywhere in the global village is not just a threat to the poor, but also a great menace 
to the security and stability of the rich. Therefore, rescuing Africa from the scourge of 
poverty and underdevelopment would be a cheaper way of fighting global 
insecurity.705  
    However, the architects of the NEPAD in formulating their expectations from the 
North ignore the fact that questions of increased ODA, FDI, debt cancellation and 
market access are political issues and that the leaders of the North and the multilateral 
institutions that have pledged to support the NEPAD operate within political 
environments that impose constraints on their ability to deliver on pledges. The 
NEPAD assumes that once African countries commit to norms of good governance, 
industrialised countries and multilateral institutions will systematically deliver on 
their own part of the deal in terms of increased ODA, FDI, debt cancellation and 
market access.  
       It is however, “doubtful the North would open a “new chapter” with Africa just 
because African leaders have made declarations on a new beginning.”706 I argue that 
the prospects of industrialised countries’ governments and multilateral institutions 
keeping their commitments to the NEPAD will not necessarily depend on African 
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governments’ commitments to good governance, but also and probably even more so, 
on the dynamics of Northern countries’ interests and related operational constraints 
that underpin the workings of multilateral institutions.  
       Talking about interests for example, it is noteworthy that other poor countries, 
including Russia and its former satellite states compete for ODA and FDI with Africa. 
These countries are of greater economic and strategic importance to the North than 
Africa. Former communist states of Eastern Europe for example, are prospective 
members of the expanding European Union and it makes more political and economic 
sense to dedicate more resources to facilitate their eventual integration into a united 
Europe than to probe up Africa. And as far as Russia is concerned, the North has a 
particular strategic interest to assist its economically so as to check against a misuse 
of its huge nuclear arsenal. This explains why “while the African continent was 
promised a paltry $6 billion by 2006 for poverty reduction, the G8 handed out $20 
billion to Russia, to help decommission its nuclear weaponry safely.”707 Even if 
Africa successfully transformed its political and economic environment through good 
governance, there is no guarantee they would suddenly become a popular destination 
for resources from the industrialised North. 
        Moreover, the emergence of more urgent priorities and presumably more 
important demands on the North, such as the war against terrorism further threaten to 
render NEPAD’s plea for more resources less likely to be heeded. For example, 
African leaders became increasingly concerned, and justifiably so, that the war in Iraq 
and the resource requirements for post war reconstruction could detract attention from 
Africa. Despite assurances that Africa would remain a priority in the North’s 
development assistance agenda, a comparison of the resources eventually allocated 
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for the reconstruction of Iraq, with what was pledged in support of the NEPAD within 
the framework of the G8 – Africa Plan of Action, demonstrated clearly that in terms 
of strategic importance, Africa still mattered less to the North. Describing Africa’s 
disappointment with the resource flows outcome of the G8 Kananaski Summit, The 
Sunday Times reported that: “At what was meant to be an Africa oriented Summit, the 
G8 leaders diverted their attention to other issues – and then unveiled an African 
Action Plan which restated all their old pledges to the continent. Little in the way of 
new money and nil [nothing] in the way of opening markets was forthcoming.”708  
       More importantly, although there is growing consensus that official development 
assistance should only flow to countries that are likely to use it well, as judged by 
their governance records, “however, available evidence does not reflect any link 
between a country’s reform efforts and the disbursement rate of aid funds.”709 Part of 
the explanation to this paradox has been that the steady flow of aid is a source of 
income to many interest groups in the donor communities. Therefore, their dominant 
concern has been their income and not necessarily the well being of the aid 
recipient.710 Another explanation relates to the incentives of bureaucrats in aid 
agencies.  In this particular respect, Gus Edgen has posited: 
Both donors and recipients have incentive systems which reward reaching a 
high volume of resource transfer, measured in relation to a predefined 
ceiling…. In many administrations, both bilateral and multilateral, the 
emphasis is on disbursements and the country allocations. Non-disbursed 
amounts will be noted by executive boards or parliamentary committees and 
may result in reduced allocations for the next fiscal year…results are 
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measured against volume figures, with no regards for the quality…711 
 
                Even the selfless bureaucrats whose main interest is in genuinely helping the 
recipient faces the dilemma of choosing between enforcing governance conditionality 
that will hurt the very people the aid is meant to help, and overlooking the violation 
of conditionality. The tendency as empirical evidence shows has been to succumb to 
the temptation of overlooking the violations of conditionality.712 
                Given the manner in which aid disbursement has operated in the past, the 
NEPAD’s assumption that the donor community would direct more resources to 
African countries that demonstrate commitment to good governance while 
withholding it from those that have not may be illusory. Aid disbursement would only 
become selective and more efficiently managed if the donor community is willing and 
able to alter the incentive systems that underpin the aid regime. There are prospects 
for these incentives to be changed under the edges of the mutual accountability pact 
and charter between African countries and the donor community envisaged by the 
NEPAD.713 However, it is doubtful, that the donor community would be willing, 
seriously to oblige to such a pact. 
       Like with ODA flows, there is as yet no evidence that African countries that have 
thus far demonstrated considerable gains in governance have become popular 
destinations for FDI.714 The observable trend is that foreign investors in the continent 
have continued to concentrate on huge and quick rent-yielding sectors – like 
petroleum and related minerals, irrespective of whether such resources are located in 
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well-governed or poorly governed countries. It is unlikely that improvements in the 
investment environment envisaged in the NEPAD through good governance will alter 
this trend. This is explained by the fact that foreign investors simply do not yet have 
any compelling reasons to invest more in economic sectors in the continent where 
short term and immediate profitability is not guaranteed, but which could lay the 
foundation for the long term socio-economic transformation of the continent. 715  
     The narrowness of African markets, the shallowness of individual purchasing 
power and the weak level of human capital have remained serious constraints to 
attracting long-term foreign investments into the continent. The NEPAD programme 
has adopted strategies to address these handicaps – through its human resource 
development and regional integration programmes. However, these are long-term 
strategies and, until they take root, foreign investors will continue to concentrate on 
their traditional investment sectors and patterns in the continent. 
              If industrialised countries’ pledges to the NEPAD for higher FDI flows are 
anything to go by, Western entrepreneurs must transcend concerns with narrow 
immediate economic gains and become involved in long-term development oriented 
investments in the continent. However, this is not a government prerogative. Rather, 
it is a question of returns to capital and profit. Therefore, although the APRM has 
been vaunted as a signalling mechanism for higher FDI, it may not be the principal 
determinant of the investment decisions, which may continue to be premised on 
objective profitability assessments than on subjective political judgements that may 
result from the peer reviews. 
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       On the sensitive issue of market access, the authors of the NEPAD are justified in 
accusing the North of hypocrisy in terms of preaching global economic liberalism, 
while practicing protectionism. It is however noteworthy that while the liberal 
framework has provided evidence of the rather high costs of protectionist trade 
policies, politicians the world over, have been inclined to providing protectionist 
legislation.716 Public choice literature argues that the desire to influence trade policy 
arises from the fact that ‘trade policy changes’ benefit some groups, while harming 
others. Consumers are harmed by protectionist legislation; however, ignorance, small 
individual costs and the high costs of organising consumers prevent them from being 
an effective force.  Conversely, workers and other resource owners in an individual 
industry are more likely to be effective politically because of their relative ease of 
organisation and their individual large and easy-to-identify losses. Therefore, 
politicians interested in their political future and that of their political parties are more 
likely to respond to the demands for protectionist legislation of such interest groups 
than to remain sensitive to the wisdom of the overall economic benefits of 
liberalisation.717 This logic does not elude leaders of the industrialised world. 
         G8 leaders, fearful of hurting the interests of domestic farmers and possibly 
alienating them, spurned a bid by African countries during the 2002 G8 Summit in 
Kananaski for a rethinking on subsidies, which are seen as harming Africa’s global 
competitiveness.718 The lessons from the G8 Summit at Kananaski are that the 
NEPAD’s assumption that leaders of the North would be willing to make the “playing 
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ground level” by suppressing subsidies to their farmers and by uplifting various forms 
of protective measures shielding their producers from unfavourable competition in the 
global economy is simply myopic. The political costs (in terms of alienating 
formidable capitalist and labour interests) for the leadership of the industrialised 
world are too high to be borne, particularly on some narrowly moral grounds of 
wanting to assist apparently distant African countries to catch up with the rest of the 
world. And as Jinmi Adisa puts it: “The assumption of charity from the North that is 
expected to give up the present global asymmetrical pattern of exchange that favours 
them, in order to help Africa is faulty and utopian.”719 
        Finally, as far as the issue of debt is concerned, although Africa’s debt burden 
has been greater than that of Latin America, the overall volume of African debt pales 
in comparison to that of Latin America. The modesty of the volume of Africa’s debt 
and the continent’s insignificance to the overall international economic system has 
limited the impetus for more concerted debt relief for the continent, even as the debt 
overhang has been threatening the viability of economic growth in the continent.720 
Moreover, the prospects of negotiating more radical reductions of Africa’s debts has 
been complicated over the years by the divergent interests and perspectives of the 
three main categories of creditors to the continent, particularly over questions of 
sharing the burden of forgiving Africa’s debts, this, in spite of the rhetoric of greater 
debt relief. 
         Africa’s debts can be broken down as follows: bilateral debts account for 39 
percent; commercial debts about 35 percent; and multilateral debts about 26 
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percent.721 The largest component of Africa’s debt is bilateral, which incidentally is 
amenable to debt reduction explaining therefore, the substantial bilateral debt 
reduction programmes that gained momentum beginning in 1990. However, “while 
bilateral debt relief made the important conceptual breakthrough of legitimising the 
principle of debt reduction, it has not had a large cash-flow impact, since it focuses on 
that portion of African debt, which already had the lowest ratio of repayment.”722  
         With the rapid increase in the volume of Africa’s multilateral debts from the 
1990s onwards, it became evident that Africa’s debt crisis, though apparently of little 
consequence to the overall welfare of the international financial system, required a 
more radical approach, particularly from multilateral institutions. Hence, the 
formulation of the famous HIPC initiative that has been accepted by the NEPAD, 
with calls however, for it to be broadened to benefit more African countries.723  
      However, available literature on debt relief demonstrates that debt relief 
initiatives (with the exception of the HIPC initiative) have not necessarily resulted in 
higher resource flows to African countries. More importantly, they have not been 
selective enough as to reflect the implied trade-off between improved governance and 
better institutions on the one hand, and debt relief on the other. Rather, “the mounting 
debt stock and the resulting debt crisis locked donors in some form of defensive 
lending to high-debt countries, depriving them of selective and sufficient leverage 
with respect to recipient country policy.”724  Creditors and donors have been anxious 
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to help countries avoid arrears, particularly to multilateral institutions because of their 
preferred creditor status. Rather than withhold debt relief on grounds of inappropriate 
governance institutions, donor behaviour has been tailored to granting new transfers 
to finance debt service, avoid embarrassing arrears, and starve off growing risks of 
documented development failures. There has also been a concern with the 
reasonableness of supporting official colleagues in each country who were struggling 
to institute change and build institutions while managing increasing debt service 
falling due.725  
        For debt relief to deliver on the expectations of the NEPAD, donors and 
creditors must overcome their reluctance to share the burden of forgiving Africa’s 
debts. They would also have to face up to the need to change their behaviour and to 
tailor their decisions to effectively meet the requirements of selectivity – in terms of 
granting greater debt relief to countries that have established or are striving to 
establish good governance institutions and processes. Finally, to bring about the net 
increases in resource flows envisaged in the NEPAD, Africa’s creditors would have 
to be willing to bear the financial cost of combining debt relief with increased ODA 
and to avoid the practice of trading off debt relief for ODA flows.726 
      The foregoing analysis suggests industrialised countries’ attitude towards Africa 
would be determined more by considerations of their economic and strategic interests, 
than by improvements in governance under the NEPAD framework. However, 
whatever the potential internal and external benefits of the NEPAD’s governance 
reform agenda, for the self-interested African governments to be made to comply 
with its prescriptions, there is need for credible regional restraint mechanisms.  
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7.3 THE APRM: A CREDIBLE RESTRAINT MECHANISM? 
         The inadequacy of restraint mechanisms has been a key explanation to the lack 
of compliance with past African regional economic cooperation initiatives. The 
authors of the NEPAD have responded to this by established a self-selective “lock-in” 
instrument – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is perhaps 
the most innovative element of the NEPAD, upon which its implementation hinges.727 
Three key elements distinguish the APRM from earlier African regional enforcement 
mechanisms.  
       First, unlike existing African regional cooperation instruments that have based 
membership on the location of states on the African soil, membership in the APRM is 
contingent on commitment to a set of agreed governance norms and standards.728  
Only African countries that are willing to commit to these agreed norms and 
standards are admitted to the APRM process – hence, the notion of NEPAD being a 
“club of the willing” with a “voluntary and self-selective” character.   
      Second, the APRM, like most inter-state peer review systems is “non-adversarial 
and non-sanctioning” in character. That is, the outcomes of the peer review processes 
will not lead to any form of legally binding decisions. 
     Thirdly and most distinctively, the APRM, unlike existing peer review 
experiments, is based on an implicit “penalty-reward” assumption between African 
states and their extra-regional partners. African leaders have agreed to hold each other 
accountable in their commitment to institutionalise norms of democracy, political and 
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economic governance in their respective states, in exchange for which external 
partners have pledged to grant them higher resource flows in the form of ODA, FDI, 
debt relief and greater market access.729 
          The APRM does not impose an overarching central authority. Rather, it is 
founded on a plausible model of self-restraint by still perceivably unresponsive, 
unaccountable and politically insecure African governments. While proponents of the 
APRM are optimistic about the model, they have failed to address problems of 
incentive incompatibility. Conversely, pessimists have been quick at dismissing the 
instrument as yet another misguided effort that cannot work. Against this background, 
understanding the incentive structure of the APRM must be central to any assessment 
of the NEPAD’s prospects. 
       In this section, I analyse the challenges of institutionalising compliance with 
potentially gainful, but politically costly regional initiatives in the absence of an 
overarching central authority. I focus particularly on the potentials of the APRM’s, 
self-restraint model to police African governments’ compliance with NEPAD’s 
governance norms and standards. I argue that, the viability of the APRM model is 
contingent on a complex pattern of interactions between member governments, 
regional institutions and external partners. This is within the ambit of the APRM’s 
underlying incentive structure defined in terms of membership criteria (voluntarism 
and selectivity), the character of the review process (non-adversarial and non-
sanctioning), and the credibility of the reward-sanction incentive (role of external 
resource based anchor).730 I specifically attempt to answer three questions: First, to 
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what extent would the NEPAD voluntary/discriminatory accession principle enhance 
the prospects of African states adherence to the NEPAD prescriptions? Second, can 
the APRM genuinely serve as an effective restraint mechanism given the “non-
adversarial and non-sanctioning” character of its review processes? Third, what 
difference could the implied externally anchored “penalty-reward” incentive of the 
APRM make in its effectiveness to ensure compliance with agreed norms and 
standards of governance? 
 
7.3.1 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA: VOLUNTARISM AND SELECTIVITY 
     The APRM is a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily acceded to by some 
member states of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism.731 
Although it is open to all member states of the African Union, membership is 
contingent on individual African countries signing up to the NEPAD Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, economic and Corporate Governance and undertaking to 
submit to and facilitating periodic peer reviews.732  
          Subscribing states must also agree to be guided by agreed parameters of good 
political and economic governance.733 The mechanism avails African governments 
the opportunity to assess the costs and benefits of membership prior to deciding 
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whether or not to sign on as participants.734 It also makes a distinction between 
countries that are adhering to democracy and good governance standards, and 
therefore qualify for “enhanced partnership status,” those that lack the capacity to 
meet those standards but are trying to do so and therefore merit assistance as 
“aspiring partners,” and those that are derelict and should be denied NEPAD 
benefits.735 
         Overall, participation in the APRM is selective and discriminatory as opposed 
to membership in earlier African cooperation initiatives that have traditionally been 
all-inclusive. The “conditionality” involved in acceding to the APRM is an 
unprecedented attempt to draw a line between African states that are allowed into a 
supposedly all-African regional initiative – the NEPAD “club” – and those that are 
excluded from it. This has emerged as “the trickiest diplomatic and political challenge 
to the promoters and supporters of the NEPAD initiative.”736 Yet “voluntarism” and 
“selectivity” are important operational principles that influence the viability of the 
APRM as a restraint mechanism. 
     The APRM’s voluntary accession principle means that only states that subscribe to 
the peer review processes and that commit to be guided by the agreed parameters of 
good governance will be subject to its rulings.737 Conversely, African states that 
chose not to subscribe cannot ostensibly be judged under the provisions of the 
framework. 
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       The underlying assumption of the APRM voluntary accession principle is that 
although non-subscribing poor performers may not be accountable to the APRM, 
their decision not to join, will serve as a negative signal, discouraging national and 
international resource and investment flows. Conversely, those states that sign up to 
the peer review process signal their resolve to eradicate the instability and uncertainty 
characteristic of African states and would be more likely to attract greater investment 
resources. Therefore, although non-subscribing states may not be directly subject to 
peer pressure within the APRM framework, their being sidelined in sharing in the 
dividends of membership, would presumably serve as a positive incentive that could 
eventually induce them to sign up for the APRM.  
      The potential of exclusion from sharing in the dividends of membership to serve 
as a positive incentive for states to join and abide by the APRM is very constricted. 
For example, most development projects identified in the NEPAD are of a regional 
character. It would be difficult to prevent non-conforming states from sharing in the 
positive spillovers of regional projects. How, for example, would a poorly governed 
state be sidelined in a regional railway project or a common water resource project or 
a trans-African road or rail network? In other words, no matter how selective 
membership of the APRM is, it cannot rule out free riding.  Knowing that there is 
such latitude to benefit from the NEPAD without necessarily committing to its 
prescriptions, some African states may not be in any real hurry to abide by its norms. 
Moreover, states that are willing to sign up to the prescriptions of the APRM may 
indeed be discouraged by the knowledge that their peers may not do same, yet share 
in the dividends of the initiative. 
           Another assumption that underpins the principle of voluntary accession to the 
APRM is that African states that effectively sign-up are genuinely committed to the 
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initiative. The reasoning is that by allowing African states the choice not to join the 
initiative if they do not buy into its prescriptions, those states that will effectively join 
the process will be genuine in their actions and commitments. This contrasts with 
earlier all-inclusive regional initiatives, which were joined by most African states out 
of the fear of being perceived as obstructing processes to which a majority of their 
peers had agreed. Political commitment is thus seen as the catalyst that would make 
the APRM a viable restraint mechanism, which will facilitate the implementation of 
the NEPAD.  
         However, the poor governance record of many African states that have signed 
up to the APRM process raises questions about the real motives of membership. 
Some states seem to have joined the initiative (or that may eventually join) may be 
doing so not out of commitment to good governance, but out of the perception that 
the initiative is a “clearing house” for increased resource flows. Seen from this 
perspective, it would be difficult to imagine the APRM serving as a credible restraint 
mechanism.  
      More importantly, otherwise relatively well-governed states have either been 
cynical about the initiative, or simply characterised it as an irrelevance. In April 2003, 
for example, the Namibian Prime Minister, one of the rare African states highly rated 
on political and economic governance, but that has refused to join the APRM 
characterised the APRM as a digression that needed to be ignored when he declared:  
         Let me now take up the much talked about, but manifestly deceptive issue 
of the NEPAD so called Peer Review Mechanism (PRM). Firstly, I shall, 
with due respect, consign it to the dustbin of history as a sham. Secondly, 
PRM is an unworkable notion. I see it as a misleading, new name for the 
old, discredited structural adjustment fiasco, under which African leaders 
have been clustered between good guys and bad guys. …Neo-colonialism, 
which is what the PRM is – [is] a killer disease; we must run away from it. 
NEPAD should confine itself to issues of economic growth, investment, 
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employment… NEPAD has no business dealing with political, security 
and conflict resolution issues.738  
 
This underscores the fragile nature of the political will that is assumed to underpin the 
APRM process. The voluntary accession principle may thus only serve to dissemble 
rather than build consensus around the process. 
        Worse still, voluntarism is not limited to accession to the APRM, but extends to 
the attitude towards the outcome of the review process – particularly as pertains to the 
right of states to opt out of the process when and if they choose. The case for 
withdrawal from the APRM is made in the following words:   
A participating state may terminate its participation in the African Peer 
Review Mechanism by giving written notice to this effect to the NEPAD 
Secretariat, which in turn will inform the participating states in writing. 
The effective date of termination will be six months after the receipt of 
the termination notice.739  
 
Although this voluntary exit channel from the APRM may be intended to remove the 
impression that commitment to the APRM is irrevocable, in which case many African 
states would be reluctant to subscribe, it creates a window for African states that 
eventually find the review process too intrusive or that find the peer review reports 
too critical to simply opt out of the process midstream or after getting the benefits.  
      However, opting out of the peer review process midstream can be expected to be 
politically costly, sending clear signals to both national and international public 
opinion that the government in question is not committed to genuine political and 
economic change. The fear of critical public opinion potentially can restrain states 
from revoking their membership once they sign up to the APRM. In which case, the 
APRM would be a viable “lock-in” mechanism. 
 
                                               
738 See Theo-Ben Guirirab, Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia, Speech at the Dinner of 
the Chamber of Mines of Namibia (Windhoek, 4 April 2003). 
 
739 OAU/NEPAD, Memorandum of understanding (2003), paragraph 32. 
 325 
7.3.2 CHARACTER OF REVIEW PROCESS: NON-ADVERSARIAL AND NON-
SANCTIONING 
 
     Peer review refers to the systematic examination and assessment of the 
performance of a state by other states (peers), by designated institutions, or by a 
combination of states and designated institutions. The ultimate goal is to help the 
reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practices of governance, and 
comply with established standards, principles, codes and other agreed commitments. 
Peer review examinations and assessments are conducted in a non-adversarial 
manner, relying heavily on mutual trust and understanding between the states being 
reviewed and the reviewers, and on their shared confidence in the process.740  
    Peer reviews can be conducted based on subject areas or themes. However, 
whether based on subject areas or on themes, individual country peer reviews are 
typically undertaken on a regular basis with review exercises resulting in a report that 
assesses accomplishments, indicates shortcomings, and makes recommendations.741 
More importantly, peer reviews never imply a punitive decision, sanctions, or any 
form of legally binding acts or enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, peer reviews 
seek to create, through reciprocal evaluation processes, a system of mutual 
accountability.742 
      Associated to the concept of peer review is the concept of peer pressure 
(persuasion) upon which the effectiveness of peer review relies. The peer review 
process can give rise to peer pressure through, for example: a mix of formal 
recommendations and informal dialogue by peers; public scrutiny, comparisons and 
                                               
740 UNECA, “APRM, process and procedure,” p. 7; Fabricio Pagani, “Peer Review,” pp. 15-16. 
 
741 Ibid. pp. 8-16; UNECA, “APRM, process and procedure,” pp. 7-8. 
 
742 Ibid. 
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ranking among countries; and the impact of these on domestic public opinion, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders.743   
       While peer review as a working method has been employed by several inter-
governmental organisations and international programmes, the OECD has had the 
most extensive development of the peer review practice.744 Peer review has been a 
core element in the working methods of the OECD since its creation. True to the 
conventional logic of peer review practices, the OECD peer review process has been 
non-adversarial and collegial, relying on mutual trust and understanding between 
countries.745 The APRM has been inspired by the experience of the OECD peer 
review processes. It has therefore adopted the principles of “non-adversarialism” that 
relies on “peer pressure and dialogue,” transparency and public scrutiny, and capacity 
building. 
     Specifically, the mandate of the APRM is to encourage participating states in 
ensuring that their policies and practices conform to political, economic and corporate 
governance values, codes and standards, and also to achieve mutually agreed 
objectives in socio-economic development contained in the Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.746 
    The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards 
and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable 
development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration 
through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, 
                                               
743 Ibid. p. 16. UNECA, “APRM, process and procedure,” p. 8. 
 
744 Ibid. Pagani, “Peer Review,” p. 17. 
 
745 Cilliers, “NEPAD’s Peer Review,” p. 1. 
 
746 See NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU 09 March 2003, paragraph 6; also see NEPAD, 
APRM Base Document AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1 paragraph 2. 
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including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.747 No 
sanctioning or binding legal regime is intended or implied in the NEPAD peer review 
process, even though it stipulates that at some point in the review process, “if 
dialogue proves unavailing, the participating heads of state and government may wish 
to put the government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with 
appropriate measures.”748  
      Lacking sanctioning powers, the question arises as to how the APRM would 
restrain subscribing African governments from reneging on commitments to norms of 
good governance. Put differently, would the APRM’s strategy of ‘soft enforcement’ 
through peer pressure and dialogue, transparency and public scrutiny, and capacity 
building secure African governments’ compliance with NEPAD’s governance 
standards?  
     Fabricio Pagani argues that while an important function of peer review is to 
monitor and enhance compliance by countries with internationally agreed policies, 
standards and principles, however, unlike traditional legal enforcement mechanisms, 
peer review works as a sort of “soft enforcement and soft law” system resulting in 
non-coercive final reports and recommendations rather than binding coercive acts, 
such as sanctions. 749   
       At face value, the soft law nature of peer reviews, such as the APRM, potentially 
makes the instrument undependable, with wide latitude for free riding by participating 
African states. At the extreme, soft enforcement portends reducing membership of the 
APRM to a costless exercise for African governments to which as usual, they will 
                                               
747 NEPAD, APRM base Document, paragraph 3. 
 
748 Ibid. p. 24. 
 
749  Pangani derives his notion of soft law from Salmon J. (ed), Dictionnaire de droit internationale 
publique (Bruxelles, 2001). 
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attach no seriousness of purpose.  If this is the case, the potential of the APRM as a 
restraint mechanism would be very constricted and the prospects for sustained 
implementation of the NEPAD via its instrumentality would be very shallow.  
         However, Pangani contends that the soft law nature of peer reviews can prove 
better suited to encouraging and enhancing compliance than traditional enforcement 
mechanisms. For example, unlike a legal enforcement body, peer reviewers have the 
flexibility to take into account a country’s policy objectives, and to look at its 
performance in a historical and political context.750 The APRM addresses the need for 
flexibility by providing that:  
            Bearing in mind that African countries are at different levels of 
development, on joining the mechanism, a country will be assessed (the 
base review) and a timetable (Programme of Action) for effecting 
progress towards achieving the agreed standards and goals must be 
drawn up by the state in question, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of that state.751  
 
      Peer review can in this way assess and encourage trends toward compliance, even 
amongst relatively poorly performing countries, while noting negative trends in 
countries that may presently have a higher performance record. Peer review can also 
enhance compliance by helping clarify differences in policy positions among 
countries, thereby leading to resolution of differences.752 The non-adversarial 
character of the APRM could thus serve as an incentive for states at even the lowest 
levels of governance ratings to sign up to the initiative with a determination to strive 
to copy best practices from those with more positive records, while at the same time 
ensuring that states whose policies are already aligned to good practices do not 
relapse to lower performance levels. Here, the APRM would be a viable mechanism 
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capable of bringing about the changes defined in the NEPAD, even while lacking 
coercive enforcement powers. 
       However, the effectiveness of “soft enforcement” to align African governments’ 
behaviour to agreed norms of good governance would largely depend on the 
consistency of policy dialogue and peer pressure, the level of transparency involved 
in the review processes, the level of public scrutiny that it would be able to generate, 
and finally on the capacity building capability of the process.  
        For African leaders, the APRM is designed to encourage each other to 
implement decisions and promote policies that will facilitate upholding agreed norms 
and standards of governance. It is intended to “use the good example of those that are 
faithfully upholding and promoting these norms as a means of putting pressure on 
others or encouraging them to copy these examples of good practice.”753 
Conventionally, during the peer review process, countries systematically exchange 
information, attitudes and views on policy decisions and their application.754   
      Moreover, the reviewed country is given the chance during a peer review to 
present and clarify national rules, practices and procedures and to explain their 
rationale. For example, the review involves a study of the political, economic and 
corporate governance and development environment of the country to be reviewed. 
The review team’s report is first discussed with the government concerned, with the 
intention of ascertaining the accuracy of the information gathered and also to provide 
governments the opportunity both to react to the team’s findings and to put forward 
its own views on how the identified shortcomings may be addressed. 
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        The team’s report is expected to be clear on whether or not there is a will on the 
part of the reviewed government to take the necessary measures to address the 
identified lapses. It is also required to specify the resources available and necessary to 
take these corrective measures. According to the APRM document, “If the 
government under review shows demonstrable will to rectify the identified 
shortcomings, then it will be incumbent upon participating governments to provide 
assistance and to urge the donor community to support the efforts of the country 
reviewed.”755 This is despite African governments’ reputation of expressing political 
will, without any real intention of complying. 
         However, even when the necessary political will is not forthcoming from the 
government, “the participating states are expected to do everything possible to engage 
in constructive dialogue and only when dialogue proves unavailing could 
participating states serve notice of their collective intention to proceed with 
appropriate measures.”756 The “appropriate actions” (sanctions) alluded to here, are 
not intended to be executed by the APRM-NEPAD. Rather, they will be a prerogative 
of the relevant African Union institutions – such as the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the envisaged African Security Council, the African 
parliament, and the African Court of Justice.757 
     The periodic reviews envisaged in the APRM aim at constantly engaging African 
states to ascertain that they progressively adopt policies and practices to achieve 
mutually agreed goals and standards outlined in the Declaration on Democracy, 
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757 See generally, AU-NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (March 2003). 
 
 331 
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.758 From this perspective, “policy 
dialogue (peer pressure) could potentially be a basis for further cooperation, through 
for example, the adoption of new policy guidelines, recommendations or even the 
negotiation of legal undertaking.”759 The peer review dialogue is expected to spur 
countries to consider seriously, the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal 
political stability and economic growth, but also on neighbouring countries. 
         Broadly, the APRM is capable of and intended to promote mutual 
accountability, as well as compliance with best practices in four main areas: 
democracy and political governance; economic management; corporate governance; 
and socio-economic development.760 However, observers of Africa’s regional 
cooperation landscape have pessimistically contended, for example that:  
There is little in the recent or distant past to suggest that African 
leaders – most of whom themselves are drenched in the very 
problems of corrupt, neopatrimonial, patronage politics that NEPAD 
is supposed to combat – are prepared to allow blunt and probing 
evaluations of their own and their fellow governments’ 
performance.761  
 
The APRM’s peer pressure incentive is likely to be vulnerable to yet another form of 
free riding – bearing on the obligation of member states to condemn deviations from 
NEPAD governance norms. For example, although every subscribing state to the 
APRM process would like to see governance standards enforced, none of them would 
relish the political controversy associated with condemnation and punishment of 
peers. Situations are likely where member states may be aware that the performance 
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of one of their peers has fallen short of the NEPAD standards, yet none would want to 
appear to take the lead in publicly condemning the peer in question.         
       The response to the post-election political crisis in Zimbabwe by African 
governments approximates this scenario. At the time of the crisis Zimbabwe had not 
signed up for the APRM, so it could not be bound by its prescriptions. Sceptics who 
however, were willing to give the APRM the benefit of the doubt hoped that at least 
the lead states of the NEPAD process could publicly condemn the situation in 
Zimbabwe to signal commitment to the democratic values embodied in the NEPAD. 
However, not even South Africa was willing to publicly criticise the undemocratic 
developments in Zimbabwe, even though this silence threatened NEPAD’s 
credibility.762 The Zimbabwean experience mirrors the possible collective action 
problems that may plague the envisaged peer pressure incentive of the APRM.  Given 
this reality of African politics, peer pressure may be insufficient to align the 
behaviour of African states to agreed governance standards. Nevertheless, the 
transparency of review processes and the level of public scrutiny they might generate 
are possible remedies. 
         A unique feature of peer review processes is that they are usually very 
transparent. The APRM, unlike all African enforcement instruments envisages a high 
level of transparency and public involvement at all the stages of the review process. 
For example, the priority order of business of the review team during its visit to a 
country under review is “to carry out the widest possible range of consultations with 
the government, officials, political parties, parliamentarians and representatives of 
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civil society organisations (including the media, academia, trade unions, business, and 
professional bodies).”763  
       Documentation and evidence so gathered is put at the disposal of member 
countries and also the national and international publics. By involving opposition 
parties, the media and various segments of the civil society in the review process, the 
APRM could sensitise them to certain ills of their governments about which they 
could otherwise be ignorant or simply complacent. Moreover, the availability of the 
peer review data to the various publics encourages public scrutiny. Analysts of peer 
review processes contend that such public scrutiny has the most effect in the peer 
review process in terms of its potential to coerce change and corrective action.764 
Therefore, even without the force of legal sanction, public scrutiny is perceived as a 
viable channel to force African governments to implement the changes envisaged in 
the NEPAD.  
        Peer review is a mutual learning process in which best practices can be 
exchanged. The process can therefore, serve as an important capacity-building 
instrument – not only for the country under review, but also for countries 
participating as examiners, or simply as members of the responsible collective body. 
Moreover, involving civil society groups and other interests out of government in the 
review process and by availing them with information gathered during the peer 
review process, the APRM process might help empower these groups. Better 
informed about the situations in their countries and the realities in other countries, 
such groups will be better placed to pressure their governments for changes in line 
with the good governance prescriptions of the NEPAD. 
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7.3.3 THE APRM: THE CASE FOR EXTERNAL ANCHOR 
         Despite being the most innovative element of the NEPAD, the APRM is the 
most politically controversial component of the entire process. This derives 
particularly from the fact that the bulk of international attention that has been 
accorded the NEPAD has centred on expectations about the APRM process.765 To 
borrow from Robert Rotberg of Harvard’s School of Government, “There is nothing 
in NEPAD without peer review. There is nothing coming out of Africa to make the 
US or Europe say that it has got its act together. African leaders have to act. They 
have to be tough-minded about peer review or no one will pay attention to it.”766 Peer 
review has been perceived as “providing public, private and multilateral donors a 
framework on considering how to condition levels and priorities of their assistance in 
accordance with NEPAD standards.”767 Although Africa’s international partners have 
been reminded that the APRM has been inspired by the OECD peer review 
experience and therefore that it is essentially non-adversarial, they have continued to 
perceive and interpret it as constituting a sort of sanctioning mechanism.  From this 
perspective, the NEPAD is about a “quid pro quo” between developed countries and 
Africa, with the APRM serving as a sort of clearinghouse. If developed countries see 
improvements (through the APRM lens) in the political, economic and social 
circumstances of Africa, they will give, in return, greater concessions in trade and 
aid.768 
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       The interpretation of the APRM as a “good governance-resource” based trade-off 
between African countries and the North has been described by African leaders of the 
NEPAD as a misreading of the entire process. According to Ambassador J. K. 
Shinkaiye:   
As far as African leaders could see, the G8 will want a mechanism that 
will enable them pursue more or less the similar role (conditionality) 
that the World Bank and the IMF imposed on the continent in the 
1980s. Their perception of the APRM is therefore that of a regime of 
sanctions. However, this is not in line with the African leadership’s 
conception of the APRM. Moreover, African leaders have agreed to 
democratic values, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, not 
because the G8 and other external actors desire it, but more because 
African leaders have realised that these values and practices are good 
and necessary for their peoples, their countries and their continent.769 
 
         This statement suggests that NEPAD’s good governance agenda, to be overseen 
by the APRM is an exclusively African process that has nothing to do with the 
expectations of the continent’s external partners. However, a closer reading of the 
original NEPAD document reveals that there is indeed an implied trade off in the new 
form of relationship that Africa intends to establish with the North.  For example, 
under the capital flows initiative, it is stated that: 
            However, the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from 
outside the continent. The NEPAD focuses on debt reduction and 
overseas development assistance (ODA) as complementary external 
resources required in the short to medium term, and addresses private 
capital flows as a longer-term concern. A basic principle of the capital 
flows initiative is that improved governance is a necessary requirement 
for increased capital flows, so that participation in the economic and 
political governance initiative is a prerequisite for participation in the 
capital flows initiative.770 
 
It is further spelt out in the NEPAD document that to increase private capital flows 
into the continent, the first priority is to address investor’s perception of Africa as a 
“high risk” continent, especially with regard to security of property rights, regulatory 
                                               
769 Shinkiaya, interview. 
 
770 See AU, “NEPAD 2001”, Mobilising resources, paragraph 144. 
 
 336 
frameworks and markets. The key elements identified in the NEPAD to reduce this 
investor perception conspicuously include good political and economic 
governance.771  
       The APRM, which constitutes the hub of the NEPAD good governance agenda, 
is a framework for implementing this implied “governance-resource flow” based 
trade-off.  The idea of a trade-off has been upheld, at least by the North, as a 
constructive basis for the effectiveness of the APRM.772 Going by the position of the 
former Canadian Prime Minister, Jean-Chretien, which seems to suggest that it is 
either African states deliver on good governance and human rights or the North 
would not keep its pledges to the NEPAD,773 it is imperative to examine the 
implications of this implied trade-off for the implementation of the NEPAD.  
       The question that arises from this interpretation of the APRM is: would the 
effectiveness and credibility of the APRM be enhanced by having the North acting 
(either by default or by design) as an external anchor (restraint) via the 
instrumentalities of ODA, FDI, debt relief and market access? Would such a ‘price 
tag’ serve as an incentive for African states to sign up to and abide by the 
prescriptions of the NEPAD or would it simply serve as a facade to force African 
states to sign up to the APRM, get the required resources, and renege on 
commitments as it has been the case with earlier conditionality regimes? 
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       While there is consensus among proponents and critics of the NEPAD that the 
APRM represents a long overdue agency of restraint on African governments’ 
behaviour, with great potential for improving accountability and the continent’s 
image, there is much disquiet amongst critics over attempts to link the mechanism to 
any form of conditionality posed by external actors. First, because of claims that the 
APRM-NEPAD are African owned and African led processes and, second, because of 
the legacy of the conditionality norms of structural adjustment programmes (SAP).  
        A key lesson from international efforts to stimulate governance reforms is that 
fundamental reforms are only sustainable when they are home grown.774 Besides, if 
changes in policies and institutions are merely responses to international pressures, 
they will not be seriously and consistently implemented. According to Larry 
Diamond, “imported and imposed initiatives confront the perennial problem of 
needing to build commitment and ownership and there is always the question of 
whether, espousals of willingness to pursue reform are genuine or not.”775 Since many 
African governments are sufficiently uncomfortable with the perceived intrusiveness 
of the peer pressure envisioned in the NEPAD, an excessive emphasis on the 
APRM’s “governance reform-resource flows” trade-off could serve more as a 
disincentive, than as an incentive. This is because, Northern conditionality is 
generally perceived by African leaders and masses as an intolerable intrusion into the 
sovereignty of African states. 
      From this perspective, the idea of a trade off between African states and the North 
as the basis for operationalising the APRM would be a faulty premise. At the very 
least, it could engender a replay of the sort of “cat-mouse” game that characterised 
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relations between African governments and donors during the era of structural 
adjustment programmes. African states perceiving engagement with the APRM as a 
means of securing greater resources might sign up for the APRM, get the resources 
and renege on commitments to good governance.  
      To prevent such a scenario some scholars like Larry Diamond have suggested that 
“rewards [increased resource flows] must be granted for demonstrated performance 
[what governments actually do and keep doing], not for promises that may be 
repeatedly made and broken.”776 Such an approach may not help enhance the role of 
the APRM, because in some circumstances, resources are actually needed to carry out 
governance reforms – for example where shortcomings are identified during the 
APRM review process and the government demonstrates a willingness to rectify them 
but lacks the resources to do so or in situations like those of African countries 
emerging from conflict and that need to be supported in reconciliation and 
reconstruction efforts.  
      From any perspective, linking the APRM to external conditionality is unattractive, 
both to African governments and to the masses, and it could be a disincentive to their 
support for the NEPAD. However, the record of internal (national and regional) 
mechanisms of restraint has been unenviable, as they have failed to induce African 
governments to respect the rule of law, human rights, democracy and good 
governance. It is doubtful peer pressure and persuasion alone as envisaged in the 
APRM will succeed in bringing real change in African governments’ practices. Paul 
Collier and Willem Gunning have concluded that African governments are not in a 
position to create viable domestic agencies of restraint and that if African 
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governments are to benefit from agencies of restraint, these agencies can only be 
extra-regional.777  Larry Diamond corroborates this by contending:  
            The political will for fundamental governance reform is not going to 
come from ‘peer’ review among African governments because, the 
incentive to fudge and dissemble are simply too powerful. The political 
costs of ripping up entrenched clientelistic networks and closing off the 
channels and practices of corrupt patronage are just too great. The habit 
of covering for and excusing each other’s failings is too ingrained.778 
 
       He makes the case for the North to serve as “external anchor” to the NEPAD peer 
review mechanism, arguing that African leaders will embrace fundamental reform 
only when they have no choice. “When the cost of bad governance become too great, 
because the international community denies bad rulers the external resources, with 
which to govern and the international social and financial access with which they 
enjoy the good life.”779 
    Bikoe and Landsberg – while acknowledging that the viability, and the credibility, 
of the peer review mechanism is highly ambitious, challenging, and potentially 
difficult to implement – see the offer of increased aid, investment and debt relief as a 
positive incentive for African leaders to practice “good governance.”780 For them, the 
purpose of the peer review process is to create an external source of pressure on the 
weak African state, intended to enable these states address domestic governance 
inadequacies. These external restraints potentially could provide them with the power 
to impose a more appropriate orientation on those domestic groups, which have an 
interest in maintaining and reinforcing the poor governance status quo.781  
                                               
777 Collier and Gunning, “Restraint, cooperation and conditionality,” p. 74. 
 
778 Diamond, “Promoting real reforms,” p. 278. 
 
779 Ibid. p. 21. 
 
780 Bikoe and Landsberg, “NEPAD, African initiative,” p. 19. 
 
781 Gelb, “South Africa’s role,” p. 28. 
 340 
     While there is nothing intrinsically wrong in anchoring domestic or regional 
policies on external restraints as implied in the APRM’s “penalty reward” framework, 
a peculiarity of Africa’s external relations is that external agencies of restraint have 
always been very pervasive.782 Accounts that condemn Africa’s internal mechanisms 
of restraint ignore the fact that external agencies have also been greatly flawed. For 
example, to be effective, external agencies of restraint must uphold the credible 
penalties at their disposal. They must also possess and be willing to use a persuasive 
reward incentive. While the North (industrialised countries and multilateral 
institutions of trade and finance) seems to possess penalties that could be held against 
defaulting African states (in terms of ODA, FDI, debt relief and market access), it is 
not certain that they will be willing and able to use them objectively to enforce 
compliance with NEPAD’s governance prescriptions.  
     Donor-recipient relations’ discuss holds that for recipient governments to subject 
themselves to an external agency of restraint, they must be confident that the interests 
of the agency are congruent with theirs, so that the agency will not abuse its power to 
extract behaviour the governments did not choose.783 Despite an apparent consensus 
between African governments and the international community on the desirability of 
democracy, human rights and good governance for Africa’s development, suspicion 
persists that the North still has interests that do not converge with those of African 
countries. 
         Some African governments feel the North is not genuine in its commitment to a 
new partnership with Africa within the NEPAD framework and that it might therefore 
use the APRM “penalty-reward” framework to promote its own agenda. For example, 
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while the G8 has emphasized the fulfilment of commitments made by African 
governments as a precondition for supporting the NEPAD – African leaders have 
been unable to extract commitments from non-complying G8 member states – casting 
doubts on the balance of the much vaunted new partnership between the North and 
Africa. African governments fear the G8 will apply subjective criteria to African 
states’ compliance to the APRM prescriptions to achieve its own goals.784 
      Inasmuch as African owned and African managed restraint instruments have 
historically been ineffective and although peer pressure may appear inadequate to 
engender the kind of sea change envisaged in the NEPAD, projecting a framework 
where the North would serve as anchor to a supposedly African owned initiative 
would not augur well for African governments. If the NEPAD is a truly African 
conceived and African owned initiative, then its principal restraint mechanism 
(APRM) must be internalised. Writing off African governments as being incapable of 
mutually restraining their behaviour to standards and norms they have agreed upon is 
to suggest that the NEPAD’s ideas and prescriptions – contrary to claims of African 
ownership – have been dictated from elsewhere. Moreover, an insistence on “penalty-
reward” conditionality reminiscent of World Bank-IMF conditionalities suggests that 
the nature of the partnership between the North and Africa has not changed after all. 
 
CONCLUSION 
        The NEPAD breaks with earlier African regional initiatives in its emphasis on 
the importance of governance reforms on the development prospects of the continent. 
I have showed that domestic governance reforms could potentially resolve the issues 
of political insecurity and economic vulnerability that have plagued African 
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governments over the years. This could then yield significant long-term benefits to 
African states both individually and collectively. However, the institutionalisation of 
good governance involves huge political costs for African governments, and issues of 
compliance therefore remain paramount.  
             The chapter has examined the potential capability of the APRM to bring 
about African governments’ compliance with regionally agreed governance norms. I 
have contended that the APRM is not an overarching central authority; rather, it is 
founded on a plausible model of self-restraint. The viability of this model would 
depend on a complex pattern of interactions between member governments, regional 
institutions and processes, and extra-regional partners guided by the APRMs 
incentive structure defined in terms of voluntarism and selectivity, non-
adversarialism, and the presence of an external anchor. 
       The voluntary and selective character of the APRM accounts for its uniqueness. 
Though it may leave room for free-riding by African states that may choose not to 
sign up for its prescriptions, those states that will effectively sign up to the initiative, 
will be motivated to do so by a genuine political commitment to abide by its 
stipulation.  
          On the non-sanctioning character of the APRM, I have demonstrated that while 
at face value, it would appear to make the entire peer review process a costless 
exercise for African states, a deeper look at the principle reveals that it is indeed 
capable of aligning African states’ polices and practices to agreed governance norms. 
This could be facilitated by the exercise of regular peer pressure and dialogue, the 
transparency of the peer review processes and the public scrutiny they are expected to 
generate 
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       Because of the established reputation of African leaders to “cover-up” for each 
other – and with increasing pessimism about whether they are willing and able to hold 
each other accountable as envisioned in the APRM framework – the chapter has also 
examined the option of tying the APRM to an external anchor, Africa’s external 
partners. I have examined the implied “good governance-resource flow” based 
“reward-penalty assumption” that seems to underpin the implementation of NEPAD’s 
external compact.  
     Although African leaders may not be depended upon to put pressure on each other 
to bring about the required changes in the management of their states, invoking the 
use of an external anchor carries the undesired effect of rendering the entire APRM 
process very unpopular. Not only might it amount to externalising a supposedly 
African-owned and African-led initiative, it could give credence to the perception that 
the principles underpinning the NEPAD process have been dictated from outside. In 
this case, it will only discourage African states and their peoples from rallying behind 
the NEPAD. 
       If the NEPAD is indeed an African-owned and African-led initiative, then the 
momentum for its implementation must come from within and not from external 
pressures. However, the “soft law” nature of the APRM, despite its identified merits, 
may not be adequate to bring about the radical changes in the behaviour of African 
states envisioned in the NEPAD. Therefore, the leaders may have to devise more 
internally rooted strategies, endowed with credible sanctioning powers to give added 
impetus to the NEPAD process.  
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
 
      This study has examined the design and implementation of African regional 
economic cooperation initiatives, with the LPA and the NEPAD as comparative case 
studies. Regarding design, it has analysed the shift, from the traditional state-led, 
inward-looking, collective self-reliance prescriptions of the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA) to the outward-looking, market-orientated prescriptions of NEPAD. Regarding 
implementation, it has examined the challenges of institutionalising compliance with 
economically gainful, but politically costly regional initiatives in the absence of an 
overarching supranational authority. It focused on analysing the level of 
implementation of the self-reliance model of the LPA, and the prospects of and 
challenges to be overcome for the sustained implementation of the NEPAD.  
       The thesis has advanced two main sets of arguments relating to the design and 
implementation of African regional economic initiatives. First, it has argued that 
African states’ common concerns about political and economic vulnerability in the 
global economy have inspired the design of several ambitious regional economic 
initiatives in the continent. Within this context, I have contended that the shift in 
orientation from state-led inward-looking collective self-reliance (LPA), to market-
friendly extra-regional partnership (NEPAD) has been informed by changes in 
international realities and circumstances (specifically, the emergence and prevalence 
of liberal international “consensus,” the ascendancy of asymmetry-based multilateral 
institutions in global economic policy making and the weakening bargaining position 
of Africa in North-South relations).  
     My argument about the design of African regional economic initiatives has thus 
been located in the field of international political economy. Precisely, the study 
employed neo-liberal and nationalist perspectives of international political economy 
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to explain how the economic opportunities offered to and constraints imposed on 
African states by the global economic system, including ongoing global 
transformations have dictated the continent’s regional economic cooperation options 
over the years.  
      To capture differences in the contexts within which the LPA and the NEPAD were 
crafted and the resultant differences in their contents and orientations, I presented a 
causal model informed by a combination of a “historical explanation” and a 
“structured focused” comparison methodology. The combined logic of these two 
methods enabled me to select three clusters of independent variables (based on our 
research objectives) that were then causally related to dependent variables (the LPA 
and the NEPAD). Through structured focused comparison, the study gave two 
separate, but linked accounts of the processes producing the design of the two 
initiatives. In these two accounts, the study highlighted the observed changes in the 
values of the independent variables (realities and context of global political economy, 
dominant international economic and development ideas, and the nature of North-
South relations) between the formulation of the LPA in the early 1980s and the 
crafting of the NEPAD at the turn of the century. The observed changes helped 
explain the shifts from the orientations of the LPA to those of the NEPAD.  
       Second, the thesis has argued that individual African government’s concerns with 
political and economic vulnerability domestically have been responsible for the low 
levels of implementation of regional economic cooperation initiatives. I have 
contended that prospects for sustained implementation of regional cooperation 
initiatives are structured by expectations of aggregate socio- economic benefits, the 
cost of compliance to states and the regional institutions to enforce compliance. 
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      My argument about the implementation of African regional economic initiatives 
has been anchored on the field of comparative political economy. Precisely, the study 
employed national perspectives of comparative political economy to explain the 
internal political and economic dynamics underlying the attitude of African 
governments towards long-term development goals, including goals defined in 
regional economic initiatives. It emphasized the interplay between socio-economic 
benefits of regional initiatives, and the domestic political costs for African 
governments.  It borrowed from insights on new institutional economics to analyse the 
potential of responsive domestic institutions of governance to align otherwise insecure 
African governments’ behaviour to long-term development goals and the role that a 
capable state can play in the development process in the continent.  Finally, the thesis 
employed rational choice institutionalism to analyse the difficulties of 
institutionalising compliance with regional policy prescriptions in the absence of 
supranational authority. 
         Like with design, the study adopted a causal design informed by a combination 
of the structured focused comparison and historical explanation. A set of independent 
and intervening variables were identified, which were then causally linked to the 
dependent variable or final outcome – the observed level of implementation in the 
case of the LPA and the prospects for sustained implementation in the case of the 
NEPAD. 
    To place the shift from the LPA to the NEPAD in historical perspective, the thesis 
began with an account of efforts at region building prior to the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA), focusing on the overall rationale for regionalism in the continent. I have 
observed that regional cooperation emerged as a central element in Africa’s 
international relations as early as the first years of independence. It was recognised as 
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a necessary condition for the transformation and long-term sustainable development. 
The strongest rationale for regionalism was that it had a great potential for assisting 
African countries overcome the economic constraints imposed on them by the 
smallness and fragmented nature of their markets. It was an alternative development 
strategy to nationally oriented strategies, which could assist African countries in 
expanding their domestic markets and resource bases, increasing industrial 
opportunities, diversifying agricultural production and expanding inter-African trade – 
particularly through improved infrastructure. It also had the potential of ultimately 
strengthening the continent’s overall position in relation to the developed countries of 
the North, through greater independence and self-reliance.  
        The original Pan-African vision of economic regionalism involved establishing a 
continent-wide regional initiative that could ultimately lead to the economic 
unification of the continent. However, a combination of internal and external political 
forces conspired to frustrate this vision, preventing the establishment of sufficiently 
broad-based regional economic initiatives. The multiple, narrowly based regional 
economic initiatives that emerged in the immediate post independence years proved to 
be economically unviable and externally oriented, particularly towards former 
colonial metropolis.  
       Moreover, these early initiatives were plagued by problems of conflict of interests 
between concerns with national consolidation and regional exigencies, political and 
ideological differences between the newly independent African states, external 
interference, and disagreement over the relative shares of actual or potential gains of 
regional arrangements. These difficulties and the resultant poor performance of post 
independence regional economic arrangements formed the basis for efforts to 
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establish broader, more viable and more inward-looking regional initiatives from the 
1970s onwards. 
       The thesis has shown that the defining characteristic of regional economic 
cooperation initiatives of the 1970s onwards – culminating in formulation of the LPA 
– is that they directly challenged Africa’s external economic orientation inherited 
from colonialism. Therefore, apart from the orthodox benefits promised by regional 
economic groupings in terms of expanded trade and investment, economic 
cooperation and integration came to be vigorously advocated as a means of reducing 
external vulnerability.  
       The LPA constituted the high watermark of Africa’s revulsion against the 
paradigm of economic extroversion that characterised the continent’s immediate post 
independence development strategies. Its main thrust was to reverse the excessive 
dependence of African economies on the outside world – through partial 
disengagement from a supposedly unfavourable international political economy. The 
design of the LPA emphasised the need to break with the past and to create African 
economies that could become truly self-reliant and self-sustaining.  
      The centrepiece for the realisation of the LPA’s twin objectives of self-reliance 
and self-sustainability was accelerated regional economic cooperation and integration. 
The LPA’s continent-wide economic cooperation agenda, together with its 
prescription for partial disengagement from the global economy, set it apart from 
earlier regional economic initiatives. More importantly, the LPA’s prescription for 
partial disengagement from the global economy – through the strategy of regional 
import substitution industrialisation – contrasts with the option for engagement 
chosen by the NEPAD. 
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       To clarify the break of the LPA with the thrusts of earlier regional cooperation 
initiatives, the thesis investigated the internal and international contexts within which 
the LPA and its inward-looking self-reliant regional development strategy were 
formulated.   It showed that the cumulative effects of the realities of the international 
political economy (particularly the unfavourable structures and principles of the 
international trade and monetary regimes – GATT/IMF - and the impact of their 
eventual decline); the unbalanced nature of North-South relations (as reflected by the 
devastating effects of the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s, the calls for a new 
international economic order (NIEO), and the execution of the Cold War); and the 
popularity of the dependency thesis as the leading development economic thought in 
the 1970s, converged to bring about the review of Africa’s development options 
contained in the LPA. 
       The ability of African countries to formulate such a development framework, 
which attempted to challenge the existing global economic order, was facilitated by 
the demonstrative effects of the potential power of the Third World through concerted 
action as evinced by the impact of the actions of oil producing nations’ cartel (OPEC) 
on global economic policy making. Furthermore, African states adopted a policy 
framework that was contrary to the preferences of the industrialised countries of the 
North because they had some leverage in their relations with the North as a result of 
the exigencies of the Cold War, combined with the strong bonds of solidarity amongst 
Third World countries within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  
        Overall, African leaders and technocrats came to perceive the LPA and its 
collective self-reliance strategy as a viable framework for reversing the continent’s 
dependence and underdevelopment. Beginning in the 1980s, self-reliance regionalism 
occupied centre-stage in Africa’s development options, forming the hub of all African 
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development and cooperation initiatives. However, decades after the adoption of the 
LPA, the record of achievement of self-reliant regionalism remained disappionting. 
The study therefore analysed the weak record of implementation of the LPA as a 
prelude to comprehending the shifts in orientation in Africa’s regional cooperation 
efforts embodied in the NEPAD. 
      Although the potential benefits of the LPA’s prescriptions for expanded regional 
markets and for restructured, diversified and less dependent African economies were 
great, African states and their leaders were unable or unwilling to make the necessary 
political sacrifices for its sustained implementation. The thesis has attempted to 
explain this seeming paradoxical outcome of the LPA self-reliant model from two 
broad perspectives: First, from the perspective of the interplay between the long term 
potential economic benefits of the LPA and the short-term political costs of 
compliance to African governments; second, from the perspective of regional 
institutional mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance.  
       My explanation of the disappointing performance of the LPA has been anchored 
in the contention that the LPA’s assumptions about the behaviour of African 
governments were faulty. The technocrats who formulated the LPA appeared to be 
guided by assumptions of political voluntarism, then common among development 
economists – seeing African governments as benevolent maximisers of the social 
welfare of their populations. Their thinking was that if policies could be shown to be 
economically sound, African governments could be relied upon to implement them 
faithfully.  Therefore, they overlooked the political environments within which 
African leaders were operating and the political realities they faced. 
        In fact, that the political reality for most African states at the time of the LPA 
was that of deep political insecurity. Concerns with immediate short-term national 
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difficulties, including issues of political survival, became paramount and were crucial 
in defining African governments’ attitude towards the long-term visions of the LPA.  
Even the most ardent supporters of the LPA’s economic rationale recognised that the 
major benefits of the initiative were going to take time to materialise and were subject 
to substantial uncertainty. These benefits could be delayed because they depended on 
fairly long-term processes of structural transformation. And they were uncertain 
because they depended on the ability and willingness of other governments to 
undertake sustained implementation. In the final analysis, in the trade-off between the 
long-term and unsure economic benefits of the LPA and the protection of short-term 
political interests, African governments emphasized the latter.  
        This was manifest in African governments’ unwillingness and inability to respect 
the many commitments made in regional treaties and conventions for concerted 
regional self-reliant efforts.  Despite the signing of a plethora of treaties establishing a 
myriad of regional and even continental institutions envisaged in the LPA, the 
institutions remained weak and generally failed to align the policies of African states 
to agreed regional programmes and policy strategies. I argued that the inability of the 
LPA’s regional cooperation institutions to align the behaviour of African states to 
agreed policy prescriptions could be explained partly by the absence or inadequacy of 
institutions to monitor and enforce compliance.  
       Because of the political sensitivity of African governments to questions of 
sovereign interest and political survival, most of the mechanisms set up to facilitate 
self-reliant regional cooperation were limited to providing apolitical technical and 
coordination directives. This made membership in regional economic groupings a 
politically costless exercise – with states signing treaties and conventions without any 
real incentive to abide by them. The outcome was that self-reliant regionalism defined 
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by the LPA registered little success and the continent’s economic development 
problems remained or even worsened 
         The fate of the LPA was also profoundly influenced by the multi-dimensional 
economic crisis in the continent in the 1980s. The intensity of the economic crisis 
made it difficult for African leaders to avoid adopting structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Prescriptions of 
SAPs were at variance with the principal tenets of the LPA, posing a dilemma for 
African governments. They had to make a difficult choice between implementing 
SAPs and upholding the LPA. Given African countries desperate need of SAPs 
resources to ensure the continuous functioning of government services, to execute 
vital development projects, and to appease potentially challenging political 
constituencies, they were forced to choose the SAPs prescriptions over the LPA’s 
goals. 
       In the end, the LPA strategy that emphasised a greater role for the state and for 
self-reliant development was overtaken by SAP’s prescriptions for scaling back the 
state’s economic role and pursuing a more outward-looking orientation. Although the 
rhetoric of self-reliance survived to the end of the century, available economic 
indicators – particularly the debt burden – showed that the continent had grown more 
dependent on the outside world than it was on the eve of the formulation of the LPA. 
It was therefore against the backdrop of poor performance and sidelining of the LPA 
strategy, and the worsening economic situation of the continent – particularly the 
unsustainable debt burden – that African leaders crafted the NEPAD. 
       The NEPAD emerged in 2001 and quickly became the most important item in 
Africa’s economic cooperation agenda.  However, it has been understood and 
interpreted differently by different observers resulting in some disagreement over its 
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actual economic orientations and paradigmatic underpinnings. Some of its proponents 
present it as an inward-looking and self-reliant initiative, with the ultimate goal of 
strengthening the African state to play a more meaningful role in economic 
development. Yet, many critics have seen the initiative as a market driven, outward-
looking framework, directed at curtailing the role of the African state in economic 
management in line with the neo-liberal economic paradigm. Still others have seen the 
initiative as combining both elements of inward orientation and outward orientation, 
and as been informed by a combination of liberal and statist economic paradigms.  
      Given this controversy, this study placed the orientations and the paradigmatic 
underpinnings of the NEPAD into perspective, to allow for a better understanding of 
the initiative and the challenges it faces. While accepting that the NEPAD is derived 
from diverse paradigms and combines both elements of outward and inward 
orientation, I have argued that the initiative breaks in significant ways from earlier 
African regional economic cooperation efforts, including the LPA.  
       The thesis has detailed the nature and contents of this break, and it has also 
analysed the changed international and internal circumstances that brought about the 
policy shifts contained in the initiative. It has also attempted to reconstruct the 
diplomatic processes through which the details of the changes reflected in the 
initiative were worked out. Finally, it has examined the prospects of and the 
challenges to be overcome for the new orientations contained in the initiative to be 
implemented, focusing especially on its innovative implementation mechanism – the 
APRM.  
     The thesis has argued that the NEPAD represents a paradigm shift in at least two 
main ways: first, in terms of the programme’s economic principles and contents, and 
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second, in terms of the relative importance of issues of domestic governance in the 
development prospects of the continent.  
    On economic content and principles, the NEPAD represents a shift from inward-
looking, the state-led and self-reliant orientations of the LPA to an outward-looking, 
market-driven, and liberal economic orientations. The NEPAD’s push for greater 
engagement with the processes of economic globalisation, despite the continent’s 
established suspicion of the system as reflected in calls for partial disengagement by 
the LPA, is a remarkable shift in orientation in Africa’s regional economic 
cooperation thinking and practice.   Moreover, although the NEPAD seems to 
embrace diverse paradigms and combines both elements of outward and inward 
orientation, on the balance, it is more outward oriented than it is inward oriented. 
Overall, the initiative has been found to lean more towards the liberal economic 
paradigm than on the protectionist and state-interventionist paradigm that underpinned 
the LPA and related earlier African initiatives.  
       Regarding the importance of governance issues in the development prospects of 
the continent, the thesis has contended that NEPAD constitutes a real break with the 
LPA in two major ways. First, unlike the LPA that blamed the lack of development in 
the continent almost exclusively on external factors, the NEPAD emphasises that the 
inadequacy of domestic institutions and processes of governance has been a major 
obstacle to development, and that improvements in both economic and political 
governance are preconditions for the development. Second, the NEPAD unlike earlier 
African regional initiatives that stressed the need for African states to have unfettered 
sovereignty over domestic issues of governance, the NEPAD, by establishing an 
otherwise politically intrusive, though voluntary enforcement and monitoring 
mechanism – the APRM recognises the need to put some restrains on politically 
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unresponsive and unaccountable African governments. Although the good governance 
agenda had become relatively popular with African institutions like the OAU and the 
ECA and amongst many African states since the late 1980s, its strong endorsement in 
the NEPAD sets the initiative apart from all previous African initiatives. 
       Concerning the circumstances and context within which the shifts in orientation 
occurred, I have demonstrated that the global political and economic environment in 
which the NEPAD was crafted has been fundamentally different from those 
surrounding the formulation of the LPA and related earlier initiatives. The shifts in 
orientations contained in the NEPAD were informed by these global changes. The 
thesis has detailed the nature of these global changes and how they conspired to bring 
about the new orientations in the NEPAD. These global changes included; the 
changed realities and context of the international political economy, the changed 
nature of North-South relations, and shifts in prevailing economic and development 
ideas, including issues of governance. These external dynamics coincided with the 
transformed African domestic political environment, to produce the momentum for 
the innovations in the NEPAD. 
        Beginning in the mid 1980s, the global political economy witnessed great 
transformations which included: a new wave of globalisation that saw the market 
gaining greater prominence over the state in directing economic development; 
changes in the operational principles of multilateral institutions of trade and finance – 
particularly the shift from the GATT to the WTO, with an increasing diminution of 
concessions and privileges to developing countries and a growing tendency to 
gradually institute equality of treatment among economic actors in global trade, 
growing conditionality norms of Bretton Woods Institutions – that increasingly 
encroached on sovereign issues of economic and political governance, and dramatic 
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changes in international financial markets, particularly in the nature of foreign direct 
investment. These changes were the impetus for African leaders to rethink their 
development options as reflected in the NEPAD. The NEPAD has been crafted to try 
to maximise Africa’s gains from these global economic transformations, while at the 
same time mitigating their negative effects on the continent. 
        The thesis has also argued that although conventional wisdom holds that Africa 
has since independence been the weaker “partner” in North-South relations, the 
continent found itself in an especially weak bargaining position with the North in the 
late 1980s and 1990s compared with its position in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when the LPA was formulated. The advent of SAPs and the resultant deepening of 
Africa’s debt crisis, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the 
weakening of “South-South” solidarities due to the emergence of disparities in the 
level of development between developing countries, all conspired to further weaken 
Africa’s standing in her interaction with the rest of the world and greatly constricted 
her ability to advance and uphold a development strategy challenging the prevailing 
global economic order. 
       Regarding shifts in economic and development ideas, I have shown that unlike in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, where the ideas that underpinned Africa’s 
development cooperation options were at variance with those propagated by the 
global economic institutions (explaining the ‘clash’ between the LPA and SAPs), at 
the turn of the century, there emerged some degree of convergence between African 
states and African institutions and global multilateral institutions on liberal 
institutionalism. Within the same period, partial consensus equally developed over the 
role of the state in economic management. The sharp differences that pitched the LPA 
against SAPs in their interpretation of the continent’s economic problems and the way 
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out of them had narrowed considerably by the late 1990s. Although structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) failed to achieve the envisaged recovery of African 
countries’ economies, they succeeded in slowly aligning a majority of African 
countries’ economic policies to liberal economic principles and practices.  
       I have argued that the alignment of African states’ policies to liberal market 
economic principles was not a deliberate policy choice, but rather emerged out of the 
desperate need to secure the financial resources offered by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Western styled liberal economic organisation and thought gained even more 
strength with the demise of the Cold War, which relegated alternative economic 
models to the background. The astonishingly rapid growth of some of the Asian 
economies through greater liberalisation and engagement with the global economy, 
served partially to undermine dependency theories that argued that economic 
development in the Third World was held back by the domination of the global 
economy by the already industrialised capitalist economies. 
      In the aftermath of the Cold War, the application of Western liberal models to 
Africa could no longer be perceived as an imposition. Rather, it came to be perceived 
as the simple transfer of viable economic organisation models of universal validity. 
The NEPAD emerged under the dictates of the dominance of these liberal economic 
thoughts and more importantly, its outward orientations consist of a pragmatic 
alignment to the global trend towards greater economic liberalism. 
       The thesis has also shown that the transformed international environment 
coincided with important changes in Africa’s political landscape, providing the 
impulse for the policy shifts defined in the NEPAD. These internal changes included, 
the rebirth of political pluralism in a majority of African states – which itself gave rise 
to a vibrant civil society and a new breed of African leadership – the emergence of a 
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non-racial South Africa and the end of military dictatorship in Nigeria. It also 
included the shift from the politically focused OAU to a more progressive continental 
organisation – the African Union, and also changes at the helm of Africa’s economic 
think tank – the UNECA. 
      Democratisation not only resulted in the emergence of more open and competitive 
political regimes, but also reinforced broader approaches to governance – moving 
from a narrow focus on public service reforms to include broader goals of reforming 
politically unresponsive and unaccountable government institutions. This conception 
continued to exert a profound influence on Africa’s regional development agenda and 
has been seen as partly informing the endorsement of democracy and good 
governance as preconditions for sustainable development in the NEPAD dispensation. 
     The political liberalisation of the 1990s onwards facilitated the emergence of a 
“new breed” of leadership in the continent, which has been seen as been more 
committed to democratic and related good governance values. Although this group of 
African leaders is still in the minority, their actions and visions constituted part of the 
immediate impulse for the NEPAD initiative. 
       The birth of a non-racial South Africa and the end of military dictatorship in 
Nigeria also converged to give the quest for continental renewal added impetus. The 
emergence of a non-racial South Africa, under the direction of the ANC with its 
African focused foreign policy, was a key development that became the gem for the 
“African Renaissance” philosophy that provided the context for the formulation of the 
MAP and eventually the NEPAD. 
     The thesis has shown that the emergence of civil society was part of the 
momentum that eventually gave rise to the new African initiative. Although available 
evidence indicate that civil society was not sufficiently consulted during the processes 
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leading up to the establishment of the NEPAD, the initiative emerged within the 
context of increased pressures for a transformation of the relationship between the 
African states and their societies. This is borne out by the internal dimensions of the 
NEPAD partnership framework that seek to establish a new way for African states to 
relate with its people and business. 
      Changes in the thinking within the main continental organisations – the OAU and 
the ECA – were equally instrumental in facilitating the shifts in the policy choices 
contained in the NEPAD. At the close of the twentieth century, a consensus developed 
that the OAU had grown inefficient and that there was a need to transform the 
character of the organisation to respond to the challenges of the moment, particularly 
post-Cold War development challenges. Finding a socio-economic strategy to 
facilitate the refocusing of the continental organisation’s thrusts took centre stage 
within OAU circles. Out of the desire to blend the OAU’s largely political thrusts with 
a viable socio-economic orientation relevant to a globalising world, the NEPAD 
emerged.  
      The change of leadership at the UNECA also contributed to the policy shifts 
contained in the NEPAD. During much of the time that the institution was headed by 
Nigerian born Adebayo Adedeji, most of its formulations were inspired by the 
inward-looking, self-reliant paradigm of the dependency genre. The current executive 
secretary, Ghanaian born K. Y. Amoako, has been seen to be more sympathetic of 
liberal economic ideas and has therefore, been more supportive of market principles 
and greater engagement with the global economy. This has been reflected in the ECA-
inspired “Global Compact for Africa’s Recovery,” which defines new relationships 
between Africa and the industrialised world. 
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        After showing that the NEPAD differs in significant ways from earlier 
continental economic initiatives, the thesis reconstructed the diplomatic processes 
through which this change occurred. The final NEPAD framework was preceded by a 
number of parallel initiatives all designed to bring about the economic turnabout of 
the continent. However, the NEPAD was the product of two main conceptual 
documents: the MAP and the Omega Plan, with technical inputs from the technical 
and analytical inputs from the “Global Compact for Africa’s Recovery,” developed by 
the ECA. The successful merger of these parallel initiatives into a single continental 
economic cooperation framework and the ability to secure pledges of support from 
Africa’s external partners for the framework was an impressive feat in Africa’s 
regional economic cooperation history.  
        The thesis has investigated how African leaders of the NEPAD precursor 
initiatives – the MAP and Omega – bargained and negotiated with each other, and 
with existing African institutions (the OUA, ECA and ADB) to craft the NEPAD. It 
has also examined the involvement of Africa’s external partners – multilateral 
institutions and individual industrialised countries – to frame the external partnership 
defined by the NEPAD. The thesis sought to identify the interests and objectives of 
the principal actors involved in the diplomatic process and how these interests played 
out to produce the policy shifts contained in the NEPAD. 
         Since the most immediate impulse for the NEPAD came from the continent’s 
debt crisis, the bulk of the diplomacy leading up to the initiative and directed at its 
promotion, has weighed in favour of satisfying a minimum of the Northern partners 
preferences and meeting their prescriptions on what has to be done to help Africa exit 
from its development crisis.   The prominence of external partners in the NEPAD 
diplomatic process created the perception that the preferences and interests of the 
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North in terms of appropriate economic policies and political institutions and 
processes for the continent were impressed on the final NEPAD document. The 
emergence of a new African initiative that appears to lean towards the liberal 
economic ethos and governance standards favoured by Northern states and 
multilateral institutions has raised questions about the initiatives’ claims to an African 
ownership and leadership.  
     However, the thesis also presented evidence that the preferences and interests of 
key African actors in the NEPAD process – particularly South Africa and the ECA – 
were to promote liberal economic principles in the continent. For South Africa, this 
interest derived from the nature of its national economy – with a relatively solid 
industrial base, a well-established private sector and the necessary infrastructure to 
compete economically both within the continent and globally. The ECA, although 
designed as an African economic policy institution, has remained a largely United 
Nations institution that is therefore, vulnerable to the dictates of major global 
economic players. With the leadership of the institution passing over to a supposedly 
more liberal executive director, the ECA’s preferences during the NEPAD 
negotiations tilted in the direction of liberal economic principles. 
         The good governance agenda had been gaining some popularity within the 
circles of African institutions like the defunct OAU, the ECA and the ADB. It was 
also been entertained by several African states – including the lead states of the 
NEPAD process, South Africa and Senegal, (and to a lesser extent, Nigeria, Algeria 
and Egypt).  Their interests during the NEPAD process were to promote the 
entrenchment of the good governance agenda across the continent, particularly as a 
strategy to curtail the negative spillovers of poor governance. 
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       Therefore, it would be presumptuous to conclude that the market orientation and 
the good governance agenda contained in the NEPAD were imposed by external 
actors through the NEPAD diplomacy.   Rather, it would be more appropriate seeing 
them as a product of the convergence of ideas and interests of both internal and 
external actors, though the North’s involvement in the process probably gave them 
added impetus.    
       NEPAD is distinctive in African economic cooperation history in linking good 
governance to the development prospects of the continent.  It is even more distinctive 
in its establishment of a collective self-monitoring mechanism – the APRM to oversee 
implementation. However, I have shown that for the NEPAD to be sustainably 
implemented, African states would be required to make deep political sacrifices. 
Although the potential economic gains to be derived from the NEPAD (particularly 
through its good governance agenda) are substantial, the nature of political sacrifices 
expected of African states raise questions about African states’ willingness and ability 
to uphold its prescriptions.  
      Given the engagements that the NEPAD initiative seeks to establish with external 
actors, the implementation of the initiative is partly dependent on the behaviour of 
these actors. Although the North’s support for the NEPAD is hinged on the ability of 
African states to demonstrate improvements in governance, the success of the 
initiative will also be contingent on changing the incentive structures that underpin aid 
and ODA delivery, foreign direct investment and debt relief policies. 
        The thesis has attempted to evaluate the potential capability of the APRM to 
align the behaviour of African states to agreed norms and standards of governance 
that are seen as a precondition for the success of the initiative. The APRM is intended 
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to be voluntary and self-selective in character – and also its processes are intended to 
be non-adversarial and non-sanctioning.  
     The voluntary and selective character of the APRM sets it apart from all earlier and 
existing African regional cooperation monitoring mechanisms. Although the principle 
creates room for free-riding by African states that choose not to sign up for the 
initiative, those states that do sign up, are more likely to be motivated by genuine 
political commitment and would, therefore, be more likely to uphold its prescriptions 
(unlike earlier initiatives where membership was mandatory on grounds of being an 
African state).  
         Regarding the non-adversarial and non-sanctioning principle of the APRM, it 
might appear to make the entire peer review process a costless ritual for African 
states. However, a more critical examination of the principle revealed that it could 
help align African states’ policies and practices to the agreed governance norms and 
standards. This could be facilitated by the exercise of regular peer pressure and 
dialogue, by the transparency of the review processes, and more importantly, by the 
public scrutiny that peer review pressures are expected to generate. 
        With the reputation of African leaders to “cover up” for each other, and in the 
face of scepticism about the willingness to hold each other accountable, the thesis also 
examined the option of tying the workings of the APRM to an external restraint – that 
is, Africa’s external partners.  Within this context, the study examined the potentials 
of the implied “good governance-resource flows’ based reward-penalty” assumption 
that seems to underpin the external partnership component of the NEPAD. However, 
anchoring the operations of the NEPAD’s APRM on external resource flows may 
have the undesirable effect of rendering the initiative very unpopular – appearing to 
externalise a supposedly African owned and African led initiative and strengthening 
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perceptions that the ideas and principles behind the initiative have come from outside 
the continent. 
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